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Abstract
Mexico and Spain have had a long and complex relationship since the former 
achieved independence from the latter at the beginning o f the nineteenth century. 
The two countries established diplomatic relations in 1836, yet it took almost a 
century before relations became meaningful and mutually beneficial. The 
establishment of the Second Spanish Republic in 1931 signified a new era in 
Spanish politics, and Spain’s foreign policy towards the Americas adopted a more 
pragmatic and progressive approach. In particular, this led to a new era in 
transatlantic relations towards Mexico. During the next five years, Spain and 
Mexico developed amicable and cooperative social, economic and political ties.
The military uprising in Spain in the summer of 1936 put the Spanish Republic’s 
international relations to the test, revealing her true friends and allies. Mexico 
proved to be, beyond any doubt, Spain’s firmest supporter, although the 
relationship was unable to counterbalance the influence o f European Non- 
Intervention, and American neutrality. Mexican efforts to gather sympathy and 
support for the Republican cause in the League of Nations had little effect. 
Mexico, along with the Soviet Union, and the contribution of the International 
Brigades, represented the legitimate Spanish Government’s only hope of 
international support.
Other Latin American countries did not follow the example set by Mexican 
foreign policy towards Spain during the civil war. Nevertheless, Mexico’s stance 
demonstrated its commitment to democracy, whilst at the same time, showing its 
independence from the United States. There was an intense interest in the fate of 
the Spanish Republic, and after its defeat in 1939, Mexico opened the doors to 
nearly 30, 000 Spanish Republican exiles. They made an important contribution to 
Mexican cultural life, and became a constant reminder that the Second Republic 
was truly a significant, though thwarted, step towards the establishment of a 
democratic regime in Spain.
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Introduction.
On August 17, 1945, the City Hall of Mexico's capital was declared Spanish territory. 
This extraordinary declaration, along with the corresponding lull diplomatic 
immunities granted by the Mexican government, allowed an official public session of 
the Cortes Espanolas to reconstitute the Spanish Government of the Second 
Republic.1
The reasons behind this exceptional situation lay in the close relationship developed 
between the two countries during the previous decade. In order fully to understand 
the broad picture of the historical links, and the significance of Mexican-Spanish 
relations at a time of fundamental changes in world politics, a word must be said 
about the historical antecedents.
In the period that elapsed between achieving independence from Spain and the 
military uprising against the Spanish Republican regime, Mexico had barely more 
than a century of history. Throughout this period, Spain played a prominent and, at 
times, very active role, as for example during the struggle for independence. It would 
be a mistake, however, to assume that Spain’s only active involvement was in 
^attempting to prevent Mexican independence. On the contrary, Spaniards played a 
relevant part in the actual achievement of Mexico’s independence from Spain.
As a sovereign state, Mexico owes its very existence to a collective effort in which 
Spaniards had a major role to play. Spaniards bom in the colonial territory were 
known as criollos, whereas those who had been bom in Spain were referred to as 
peninsulares. The former group played the leading role in organising and directing 
the War of Independence from the Spanish Crown, aided and abetted by the latter. 
Despite this, it is not surprising that some criollos did not want the American 
territories to be independent, while in addition, not all the peninsulares were against
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the independence of the colonies. Some key figures emerged from this group, who 
identified themselves with the independence movement and made important 
contributions to it. One of them, Francisco Javier Mina, a young military man of the 
Spanish army, is considered a Mexican hero for his contribution to the war effort in 
resisting the colonial armies during the War of Independence.2 Due to his standing as 
a foreign fighter for Mexican independence, his name would later be linked to those 
of Mexican volunteers during the Spanish Civil War. Broadly speaking, thereafter the 
general pattern o f relations between two sovereign nations would be every bit 
contradictory as they had been when the relationship was between a Metropolis and a 
colonial possession.
The history of Mexico as an independent state, in concise terms, passed through three 
defining stages: Independence (1810-1821), Reform (1848-1857), and Revolution 
(1910-1917). The struggle for independence, which lasted eleven years, culminated in 
political independence in 1821. Ironically, independence was achieved after an 
agreement was reached to establish a short-lived Mexican empire. This was an era 
entirely dominated by the criollos elite, with the sole exception of Jose Maria 
Morelos, the first mestizo figure in Mexican politics.3
The Reform era, a crucial period, gave birth to the new Republic after three traumatic 
events. Firstly, there was a chaotic period of internal struggle between the
1 Jose Antonio M atesanz (com p), M exico y  la Republica E spanola, A ntologia de  documentos, 1931- 
1977, Centro Republicano Espanol de M exico, M exico, 1978, p. 13. Julio A lvarez del V ayo, G ive m e  
com bat, The mem oires o f  Julio A lvarez del Vayo, Little, Brown and Co., U S A , 1973, p p .191-192.
2 Another prominent Spanish figure justly honoured as a M exican hero is General Juan Prim. Spain 
had agreed with France and the United Kingdom to send a joint force to M exico  in 1861; once there, 
and realizing the true nature o f  the enterprise, Prim’s decision not to fulfil his orders as commander o f  
the Spanish army w on the recognition o f  the M exican people and government. The UK had endorsed 
the Spanish attitude. That left only France. The episode would be another traumatic experience for the 
M exican nation. See Archivo Historico Diplom atico M exicano, no.25, D on Juan Prim y  su labor  
diplom atica en M exico, SRE, M exico, 1928.
3 Formerly known as N ew  Spain, M exico’s government and econom y was dominated by a handful o f  
whites, out o f  w hich the European-born were a tiny proportion. A mestizo  w as the offspring o f  a 
M exican native and either a peninsular  or a criollo. To complicate matters further, M orelos was a 
mulatto, the offspring o f  a black parent and a m estizo  parent. Timothy Anna, The Independence o f  
M exico and C entral A m erica, in Leslie Bethell, The C am bridge H istory o f  Latin  A m erica, vol. Ill, 
From Independence to c.1870, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985, p.77.
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representatives of the two main political projects. The Liberals favoured a federal 
division for Mexico as opposed to the Conservatives’ proposal of a centralised 
programme for the country. This period of civil unrest was followed by the 
imperialist war waged against Mexico by the expansionist North American power, 
which took over half of the Mexican territory (1847-1848), and the struggle against 
the French military intervention who were attempting to impose the puppet Austrian 
Emperor, Maximilian von Habsburg (1862-1867).4
This episode of Mexican history can be compared, in its final stages, to that which 
Spain would experience sixty-nine years later, for the Republican regimes of both 
countries were fighting to preserve the independence of their nations, against the 
threat of pro-Monarchic military groups allied with foreign forces. In this politically 
significant period, the principal figure would be a pure Mexican Indian, Benito 
Juarez, the epitome of a Liberal, whose legacy would permeate throughout the next 
hundred years of Mexican politics and society, much to the disapproval of the 
Catholic Church. It was under the Juarez regime that separation between the State 
and the Church was established, initiating a profound secularisation process.5
The third and final stage was the Mexican Revolution, which began in 1910, mainly 
as a fight for social justice and political democracy, and achieved its ultimate goal 
with the expropriation of the oil industry in 1938, through which Mexico ultimately 
achieved economic independence. This era is also commonly accepted as the 
beginning of the ‘modem era’ in Mexican politics, and was dominated by both criollo 
and mestizo figures alike. Particularly relevant is the fact that most of the land 
seizures and expropriations during this period affected the interests of Spaniards, who 
were still the principal landowners or hacendados.6
4 An interesting discussion and an account o f  the ideological debate o f  this period can be found in Will 
Fowler, M exico in the A ge o f  Proposals, 1821-1853 , Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 1998.
5 Jan Bazant, M exico from  Independence to 1861, in Leslie Bethell, The C am bridge, vol. Ill, pp.262- 
269.
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During all these critical periods of modem Mexican history, a Spanish presence has 
been clear and more or less influential, either in support of, or opposed to, the 
dominant political tendency. More accurately, the Spanish influence in the defining 
stages described above, took the form, with very few exceptions, of resistance to any 
change of the status quo.
The decolonisation process of the Americas began in Mexico in 1810, but it would 
take over a decade for Mexico to become an independent country, years after the first 
Latin American republic was established in Colombia in 1811. The reluctance of the 
Spanish Crown to let go of a precious jewel was to have a long lasting effect on their 
relations. Once Mexico was an independent country, it would take a further fifteen 
years for Spain to recognise it as a sovereign nation. This conflictive start was to be 
the constant feature in dealing with the interests of subjects and citizens of either 
country.
This would explain why it is not an easy task to avoid cliches when attempting to 
define Mexican-Spanish relations, for there are few clearer historical examples of ‘a 
love-hate relationship’. Spaniards in Mexican history have embodied villains and 
heroes, fathers and rapists, brothers and rivals, accomplices and traitors. As a 
consequence, contradictory points of view often emerge to explain the presence of the 
Spanish in Mexico and the role this has played in shaping up the country’s perception 
of Spain.
At the time when Mexico struggled to consolidate itself as an independent country, 
Spain was immersed in a series of revolutionary movements that made its internal 
political life rather convulsive. For most of its history in the Nineteenth Century, 
Spain’s political life was intensely conflictive, yet some progressive reforms were
6 Leslie Bethell, (ed.) H istoria de Am erica Latina, vol. 9, M exico, A m erica C e n tra ly  El Caribe, 
c.1870-1930, Critica, Barcelona, 1992, pp.78-142.
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achieved.7 Political turmoil and civil strife were not uncommon, and the Spanish 
army was the main tool for political change. After the revolutionary period of 1808- 
1840, and the relatively stable and liberal era of Isabel II, whose reign came to an end 
in 1868, as the culmination of increasing pressure for democratic and progressive 
reforms, came a phase with a strong element o f republican inspiration and the newly 
arrived socialist idea.8 The attempted democratic revolution was performed by a 
myriad of political organisations inspired by Pi I Margall and led by General Prim.9 
The revolutionary movements between 1868-1870 began a brief period of even 
greater instability and radicalism. The murder of Prim in December 1870 was a 
terrible blow that shattered the democratic government that had initiated an intense, 
although somewhat chaotic, phase of progress with a strong sense o f secularisation. 
Amadeo I, a bashful monarch at best, tom by the way political changes were 
conducted by the revolutionaries, abdicated early in 1873. His departure gave way to 
the establishment of a short-lived Republican regime in Spain. The First Republic, 
unable fully to eliminate Monarchist resistance, also suffered from instability derived 
from the tension between civil and military political elites on the one hand, and by 
the conflicting Conservative and Liberal programmes pursued by either groups, on 
the other.10
The restoration of the Monarchy under Alfonso XII -son of Isabel II- finally brought 
an era of political stability, accompanied by economic development. The last quarter 
of the 1800s witnessed a bi-party system designed by Antonio Canovas del Castillo 
and hilly complemented by Sagasta. The leaders of the Conservative and Liberal
7 For a general analysis and a critical v iew  o f  the traditional perceptions o f  Spanish history in the 19th 
and 20th centuries, see Juan Pablo Fusi y Jordi Palafox, E spana: 1808-1996, E l desafio de la  
m odernidad, Espasa, Madrid, 1997.
8 The dispute about the political regim e was not as relevant as the fact that the Republicans pursued a 
Federal State, against which, wrongly, criticism arose for its supposed attempt against the unity o f  the 
nation. See Juan Pablo Fusi, E spana.La evolucion de la iden tidad nacional, Temas de hoy, Madrid, 
2000, pp. 178-180.
9 Some o f  the prominent figures in this particular period o f  Spanish politics were Francisco Pi i 
Margall, Emilio Castelar, Praxedes M ateo Sagasta, and Juan Prim. See Fusi and Palafox, Espana: 
1808, pp.53-152.
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parties -  Canovas and Sagasta, respectively- inaugurated the era of government 
alternation (turnismo) that did not, however, represent a real change in power 
politics. This was a system that can be defined as formal democracy, similar to those 
established in some countries in the present century. It provided the necessary context 
to foster economic growth in a period of sporadic industrialisation. This period also 
witnessed the emergence of the first labour organisations, as a consequence of 
industrial progress. The establishment of the PSOE {Partido Socialista Obrero 
Espanol) in 1879, and the Socialist-inspired UGT {Union General de Trabajadores) 
in 1888, was only natural.11 Although initially small, the very existence of the first 
workers organisations meant the transformation of political life in Spain.12
Alfonso XII died in 1885 and his wife, Maria Cristina, took over as Regent. The end 
of the Nineteenth Century, however, also witnessed the final deterioration of the 
former Spanish Empire and the entrance of the United States as a major player on the 
world stage. The one event that summed up this turning point was the Spanish- 
American War over Spain’s last colonial possessions in the Americas and in South 
East Asia. A diminished power, Spain was defeated by the growing American 
imperialist power, and the loss of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines was 
severely resented on the mainland. Spain was facing internal political turmoil once 
more.13 Throughout the Spanish-American war, Mexico sided with Spain.
Partly as a result of this loss, from 1902, the sixteen year-old Alfonso XIII ruled over 
a divided country characterised by the impoverishment of large masses of people both 
in the rural areas and in the cities. These circumstances led to a deterioration in the 
strength of the Monarchy, contributing to an ongoing withdrawal of support and 
increasing discredit not only of the government, but most of all, of the Monarchy 
itself.
10 Additional pressure was put on Spanish politics by the events in the colonial possessions. In Cuba, 
for instance, a revolt initiated in 1868 obliged the Spanish Crown to com m it numerous resources and 
troops to remain in control o f  the island. Fusi and Palafox, Espana: 1808, pp.76-85.
11 Idem, p. 162.
12 Idem, pp. 166-168.
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Meanwhile, at the beginning of the Twentieth Century, Mexico was going through 
considerable political, economic and social turmoil under the long dictatorship of 
Porfirio Diaz. Mexican Spanish relations seemed slightly to improve at this stage, but 
no significant long-term engagements were made to that effect. All that would change 
as a result of the arrival of the Spanish Republic in 1931. After almost a century of 
diplomatic relations, Mexico and Spain finally agreed to up-grade their official 
representations at the time when both countries were heading towards new challenges 
in their political regimes. In the case of Mexico, the post-revolutionary stability had 
evolved into a special period of a “strong-man” regime known as Maximato. In the 
case of Spain, the equally significant change of political regime after remarkable 
municipal elections saw the end of the monarchy and the establishment of a republic 
in a bloodless and festive episode. During these years o f significant internal political 
development, Mexico and Spain intensified their bilateral relations to an 
unprecedented level. The identification between the two countries went beyond 
superficial sympathy and produced effective settlement of claims and mutually 
beneficial economic agreements.
The aim of this work is to analyse the bilateral relations between Mexico and Spain 
during the 1930s; specifically during the 1931-1935 period, to examine the political 
role played by the Mexico during the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939, and to evaluate 
the impact of the Spanish Republican exile in Mexico from 1939 onwards.
In this respect there is a gap in the literature surrounding this topic. Although some 
references are made about Mexico’s help to the Spanish Republic in several 
published works in English, significantly such as Patricia W. Fagen, Exiles and 
citizens, Spanish Republicans in Mexico, University of Texas Press, USA, 1973, only 
one book has been devoted to the actual involvement of Mexico with the Republican 
cause during the Spanish civil war (Thomas G. Powell, Mexico and the Spanish Civil
13 Fusi, Espana. La evolucion, pp.238-242.
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War, University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque, 1981). Powell’s book is of little 
value because firstly, it puts no emphasis in the role of the labour movement in order 
to explain the political ambience of 1930s Mexico; secondly, it dismisses as 
insignificant both the governmental attitude towards the Spanish republican cause 
and popular support of the latter, and thirdly, it does not bring satisfactory evidence 
to support the conclusion that after the Civil War in Spain, a myth was created about 
Mexican foreign policy towards Spain.
Finally, it is worth noting that even in the literature on this topic in Spanish, there is 
also a gap regarding both the specifics of Mexican aid and wider popular attitudes 
during the Spanish Civil War, although innumerable books exist on one of the most 
relevant consequences of the Civil War for Mexico, that is to say, the exiles and their 
assimilation into Mexican society. The majority were written by Spanish Republican 
exiles. The most valuable works from the Mexican perspective are the excellent 
compilation made by Jose Antonio Matesanz {Mexico y  la Republica Espanola. 
Antologia de documentos, 1931-1977, Centro Republicano Espanol de Mexico, 
Mexico, 1978), although, in fact, did not take into account the period of the Second 
Republic, and his more recent Los origenes del exilio espanol, Mexico y  la Guerra 
civil espanola, 1936-1939 (Mexico, Colmex-UNAM, 1999), with a similar span, and 
Ricardo Perez Montfort, Hispanismo y  Falange, Los suenos imperiales de la derecha 
espanola (FCE, Mexico, 1992), which deals with the Right-wing perspective. More 
recently, Mario Ojeda’s Mexico y  la Guerra Civil Espanola, (Taurus, Madrid, 2005), 
although an updated work from the Mexican perspective, again fails adequately to 
assess the role of Labour in the Mexican stance. Furthermore, Ojeda overlooks the 
issue of Mexican volunteers and ignores their status as a group apart from the official 
position.
The first chapter of the thesis deals with the historical background, including a brief 
description of the early relations, between 1900 -1930, that is to say, during the 
revolutionary period in Mexico and the chaotic pre-dictatorship period up to the eve 
of the establishment of the Second Republic in Spain.
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Chapter II examines how official diplomatic relations, after the establishment of the 
Second Republic were strengthened and raised to unprecedented level. The analysis 
covers the period when President Pascual Ortiz Rubio’s government attempted the 
reinforcement of the ideals of the Mexican Revolution: agrarian reform, ‘socialist’ 
education, and the taming of the Church and other conservative forces. From 1934, 
Mexican politics was dominated by the determination o f the new President, Lazaro 
Cardenas to put a halt to the maximato era. Coinciding with the Cardenas 
administration, as is shown here, the unification of the labour movement took place 
under the leadership of Vicente Lombardo Toledano. The alliance between Cardenas 
and Lombardo Toledano would be the bedrock on which support for the Spanish 
Republic would develop both in Mexican domestic politics and Mexican foreign 
policy. Chapter III analyses the development of Mexican Spanish relations during the 
period 1931-1935, emphasising the widespread reciprocal interest. Particularly 
relevant is the contribution of the labour movement in Mexico and the influence the 
latter had in the strengthening of the broad bilateral relationship.
The official Mexican response to the Spanish Civil War, and the efforts to provide all 
the necessary aid to the Republican Government in Spain, are analysed in Chapter IV. 
It might have suited Mexico better “to seek refuge in isolation from European 
problems, an attitude that its geographical position [would have made] [...] easy to 
adopt and defend.” 14 However, President Cardenas took a firm stance regarding the 
legitimate government in Spain. The best known actions are the sale of arms and the 
purchase of war material on behalf of the Spanish Government, followed by support 
on the diplomatic front. In this latter regard, diplomatic efforts in the League of 
Nations in favour of the Spanish Republican Government were made by the Mexican 
representatives, Narciso Bassols and Isidro Fabela.
14 ‘The M exican Government in the presence o f  social and econom ic problem s’, Ministry o f  Foreign 
Relations, M exico an d  Spain, and the League o f  Nations, M exico, 1936, p.20.
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In Chapter V, the different forms through which non-official Mexican aid was 
provided to the Spanish loyalists are discussed. Traditionally assumed exclusively to 
have been a governmental action, the Mexican aid provided to the Spanish Republic 
had many other sources. Led by Lombardo, head of the Workers Confederation 
formed in 1936 (Confederacion de Trabajadores de Mexico -CTM), Mexican Labour 
was instrumental, alongside the solidarity organisations that sprang up, in 
encouraging Mexican society to support the Republicans in Spain. The last part of 
this chapter deals with the issue of Mexican volunteers that went to fight in Spain on 
the Republican side, a very much neglected issue in the literature.
Chapter VI shows how there was a faction of Mexican society that unequivocally 
supported the rebel side. The Mexican conservatives allied to the Spanish colony, 
carried out as many actions as possible in favour o f the so-called Nationalists, whom 
they perceived to be the defenders of traditional Spanish values. In this regard, 
attention is given to the activities of the Falange Espanola en el Exterior (in 
Mexico), and the intense anti-Republican campaign in Right-wing Mexican 
newspapers and public opinion. It is demonstrated that the Spanish Civil War had a 
major impact in Mexican politics. The formation of the Right-wing National Action 
Party (1939), was a response to both the progressive and revolutionary policies 
pursued by Cardenas, and the growing strength of the labour movement.
The end of the war in Spain, with the triumph of Francisco Franco, was not the end of 
Mexican aid to the Spanish Republic. Chapter VII demonstrates that the end of the 
war meant the beginning of a massive influx of Spaniards into Mexico. Around half a 
million Spaniards fled into France towards the end of the war. Around thirty thousand 
went to Mexico between 1939-1950. This body of immigrants, many of whom 
constituted an educated and highly qualified working force, came to symbolise the 
survival of Spanish Republican ideals. The chapter analyses the Mexican internal 
debate around the Spanish exiles, the arrival of the first large groups, their temporary 
refuge, and their settlement in their final destination. Chapter VIII reconstructs and 
explains the process of integration and the cultural contribution to Mexican life of
16
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Spanish Republican exiles. After a long, patient and painful waiting for the fall of 
Franco, many of the Spanish exiles felt either treated or assumed as ‘Spaniards in 
Mexico and Mexicans in Spain’. At the same time as Mexico, in terms both of its 
government and its people, treated the Spanish Republic in exile as the legitimate 
representation of Spain, as this final chapter shows, the seeds of rapprochement with 
Franco’s Spain were developing. Accordingly, the chapter attempts to give a sense of 
the contradictory, if not schizophrenic, policy towards Spain that emerged as 
Mexico’s governments became ever more conservative after the Second World War. 
Mexico and Spain did not re-establish diplomatic relations until 1977, after the re­
establishment of democracy in Spain.
17
Chapter I
Mexican Spanish relations before the establishment of the Second 
Spanish Republic.
Diplomatic relations under strain (1900-1930).
The beginning of the Twentieth Century witnessed a brief improvement of bilateral 
relations between the governments o f Alfonso XIII and General Porfirio Diaz, as a 
consequence of both personal relations established by Diaz’s Ambassador to Spain, 
Vicente Riva Palacio, and Diaz’s determination to strengthen European links to 
counterbalance the menacing American expansionism. Diaz’s liberal programme 
encouraged foreign investment as the main source of capital for development of local 
industry, regardless of any dependency this might incur. Needless to say that 
Mexican socio-political development at the turn of the century was influenced by the 
long duration of his regime -known as the porfiriato)
The economic growth of the porfiriato era was particularly elitist and exclusively 
benefited the supporters of Diaz. It not only excluded the indigenous groups, but also 
most of the regional interests represented by small businessmen. However, it was the 
complete lack o f social justice, the terrible working conditions under which labourers 
had to work, particularly in foreign controlled industries, including mining, rail, and 
textiles, where English investments were considerable, that sowed the seed for 
popular rebellion. The living and working conditions of the peasantry were no better 
than before but rather even more appalling; the hacienda system had reduced them to 
starvation under semi-feudal practices.
1 D iaz had been democratically elected in 1883, after a failed coup against the legal heirs o f  Juarez. A  
military hero against French intervention and heir to the liberal tradition, D iaz w as able to concentrate his 
efforts on econom ic developm ent and the modernisation o f  the country. The American perspective on 
D iaz’s regime is in Pauline Safford R elyea, D iplom atic R elations between the U nited States and M exico  
under Porfirio D iaz, 1876-1910, Northampton, Massachusetts, 1920. A M exican interpretation is in 
Daniel Cosio V illegas, The U nited States versus Porfirio D iaz, University o f  Nebraska Press, Lincon, 
1963.
Chapter I Mexican Spanish relations before the establishment of the Second Spanish Republic.
Given their respective internal political concerns, however, neither Mexico nor Spain 
were particularly interested in pursuing greater rapprochement. The Spanish had not 
completely forgotten the enormous list of claims they had made after the 
independence of the former colony. In return, Mexico had not entirely buried the 
suspicion derived from hostile relations prior to the Spanish finally recognising the 
Mexican Government. Subsequently, Spain demanded the settlement o f an enormous, 
and certainly fraudulent, list of claims for compensation; an inventory, which, 
needless to say, Mexico was not prepared to recognize.2 Hence, it was only natural 
for the ill feeling between the two countries to be reciprocal. So it had remained for 
almost a century. However, some relevant events showed the sympathetic side of the 
coin, such as the Mexican stand backing Spain in its war against the US over Cuba, 
although the decision to side with Spain in this case, had more to do with opposing 
American intervention in Latin America rather than accepting Spanish colonial 
actions.3
During the celebrations of the Centenary of the Mexican Independence in 1910,
Spain had sent a representative, to make a symbolic gesture on behalf of the young 
Alfonso XIII. Camilo Garcia de Polavieja y del Castillo, Marques de Polavieja, a 
prominent figure of the times of the Regency, brought back to Mexico the military 
uniform that belonged to Morelos and was kept in the Artillery Museum in Madrid, 
He also decorated Porfirio Diaz with the Collar de Carlos III.4 However, these polite 
gestures had almost no impact in the broad bilateral relation, not the least in the every 
day life o f Spaniards living in Mexico.
Most of the rich people in Mexico at this time were Spaniards, but by no means all 
Spaniards were rich. In fact, the experience of “doing the Americas”, often frustrating 
and even humiliating, produced a working class component within the Spanish
2 A H D M , M exico y  Espana durante la Republica Restaurada, no. 24, SRE, M exico, 1985, passim .
3 Leslie Bethell, (ed.) H istoria de A m erica Latina, vol. 9, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1991, pp.204-207.
4 AGA, FM AE, 277, Leg. 2, Exp.7.
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community. When young and ambitious or even desperate Spaniards accepted 
exploitation at the hands of well-established and rich Spanish residents, the sons of 
relatives and acquaintances were granted accommodation, food and miserable wages. 
They were, nevertheless, less miserable than the indigenous Mexican population, but 
they had to fight for their position against the growing mestizo population. This 
situation also reproduced the existing animosity against the “gachupines” .5 In a 
reverse of the fortunes, some Spanish workers, having had some contact with 
workers organisations in Europe, related their experience and contributed to the 
awareness of Mexican workers.6
The Mexican Revolution, which began shortly after the Centennial festivities, 
initiated major changes in both the socio-economic and the political situation in 
Mexico. The former had been characterised by the existence of a system of haciendas 
which had impoverished the overwhelming majority of the population, particularly in 
rural areas, while a handful of rich landowners, many of whom were foreigners, 
mostly Spaniards, became richer.7
The Mexican Revolution challenged the ancien regime and its fundamental 
ideological, political and social beliefs.8 The goals of political democracy, social 
justice, and economic development that favoured an egalitarian redistribution of 
wealth, were embodied in the new Constitution, promulgated in 1917. The essence of 
the new regime was to be defined through the constitutional text, which would 
recover the main content of the 1854 Constitution and the so-called Reform Laws. It 
was also to include the demand for restoration of land ownership to the original
5 Gachupin  is a pejorative term for a Spaniard, and is the M exican equivalent o f  the Peruvian 
Chapeton, m eaning “tenderfoot”; see Rafael Sanchez Mantero, et al, La imagen de Espana en 
America, 1898-1937, CSIC, Sevilla, 1994, pp. 197-237.
6 Vicente Lombardo Toledano, La libertad  sindical en M exico, (1926), Universidad Obrera de 
M exico, M exico, 1974. p.57.
7 AM AE, Leg H 1659, dispatch o f  25 October 1921.
8 Even though there is the opinion that th eporfiria io  and the regime established after the revolution 
are part o f  the same historical process, hence they have more similarities than differences, as particular 
political projects they could not be further apart. For an excellent discussion and a detailed analysis o f  
the origins o f  the ideology o f  the M exican revolution see Am aldo Cordova, La ideologia  de la 
Revolucion M exicana, La form acion  d e l nuevo regimen, Era, M exico, 1973.
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inhabitants, and would establish a new economic programme as the basis for the 
country's future development. Thus, secular, free, and compulsory elementary 
education would be a prime concern. The recognition of the rights of the individual 
would include the reinforcement of religious freedom. The new Constitution 
eliminated private property rights for individuals and attributed the ownership of all 
land to the Mexican Nation. This would provide the Mexican Revolution with its 
radical character. Likewise, the new agrarian reform was to provide the revolutionary 
governments with a solid defence against external territorial or similar ambitions, and 
this was reinforced by the proclamation of the sovereignty of the Mexican Nation 
over the natural resources within its territory and its terrain. This document was 
intended to be the main tool through which the goals of the revolution, i.e. 
democracy, national independence, a higher standard of living conditions and 
economic development, would be achieved.9 These objectives constituted a challenge 
to traditional and conservative private interests. Reluctant to surrender their 
privileges, the Catholic Church and the big landowners offered strong resistance 
against the economic and political reforms instigated by the revolutionary 
governments.10
Most Spaniards living in Mexico were part of that privileged group now suffering 
from the revolutionary impetus through the confiscation of haciendas, as well as 
facing extensive damage to their properties. In 1921, according to the report of the 
Spanish Minister in Mexico, Luis Martinez de Irujo y Caro, 95% of the rural 
properties owned by foreigners were Spanish. On occasions, even the assassination of 
a rich Spanish subject would be assumed to be a matter of social justice and tolerated 
by the local authorities, who would turn a blind eye to the vigilantes. This attitude of 
the Mexican authorities was rightly assumed to be an outrage by Spanish
9For a detailed account on the Mexican Constitution o f  1917 and its legal reforms to the present, see 
M exico a traves d e  sus constituciones, H. Congreso de la Union, M exico, 1994. There have been, 
however, major changes introduced ever since, particularly during the Salinas administration (1988- 
1994), for exam ple, in the articles 27 and 130 regarding the property in rural areas and the legal status 
o f  the Church, respectively.
10 AHDM , M exico y  Espana durante la Revolucion M exicana, SRE, M exico, 1985.
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representatives." However, it was only another example of their reciprocal 
contempt.12
The darkest side of the relationship during the revolutionary turmoil was provided by 
the attitude of the Spanish Minister during the early and frail -and brief, in part 
thanks to the Spanish envoy- years of democratic rule after the overthrow of Diaz in 
1911.13 The presidency of Francisco I. Madero was under threat both internally and 
externally. Both the American and the Spanish diplomatic representatives represented 
some of the external threats.14 In short, the diplomats openly intervened in Mexican 
internal affairs, actively and effectively conspiring against the government. In 1913, 
Minister Bernardo Cologan y Cologan had gone as far as asking President Madero to 
resign given the fact that, according to the Spanish Minister, Madero was unable to 
control the situation and bring order to the country, and of course this was affecting 
the interests of Spain.15 That Cologan was not acting on his own accord was proved 
by the fact that the Spanish Government immediately recognised Adolfo de la 
Huerta’s spurious government. This further upset the bilateral relations.16
Once the various revolutionary factions forced out Huerta, and Venustiano Carranza 
seized power, the entire Mexican diplomatic corps was dismissed. The removal of the 
Spanish Minister -  as well as the American Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson- 
together with the end of the violent stage of the revolution and the normalisation of
" AM AE, Leg. H 1659, various dispatches between 1920-1921.
12 AGA, FMAE, 297, Leg. 5.
13 For the analysis o f  the bilateral relation during this period, see Flores, Oscar, E l G obierno de su 
M ajestad Alfonso XIII ante la Revolucion M exicana, Universidad de Monterrey-Senado de la 
Republica, M exico, 2001.
14 Isidro Fabela, H istoria D iplom atica de  la Revolucion M exicana , Tomo I, [1912-1917], FCE, 
M exico, 1958, pp.257-267. For a detailed analysis o f  Mexican foreign relations during the 
revolutionary period from the international perspective, see Friedrich Katz, The Secret war in M exico , 
Europe, the U nited States and the M exican R evolution, University o f  Chicago Press, 1981.
15 Isidro Fabela, (ed.) D ocum entos H istoricos de la Revolucion M exicana, Tomo IX, Revolucion y  
Regimen M aderista, Vol. 5, JUS, M exico, 1965, pp.225-237.
16 AGA, FMAE, 292 , Leg. 1, Exp.26.
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rule of an organised and stable government, brought some ease to an otherwise 
turbulent relationship.17
As part of the revolutionary wave worldwide, a more radical movement in Russia 
took further the demands for social change, and had bigger impact in many countries 
to different degrees. The triumph of a Marxist-led movement was something so far 
unknown in international politics and presented the world with an alternative solution 
for extreme social problems. In Spain, for one, the Soviet example encouraged the 
labour organisations and Left-wing parties to push their political aims further. This, 
however, was not the first time that such influence had appeared. Late in the 
Nineteenth Century, a year after the foundation of the Spanish Socialist Party (.PSOE) 
in 1879, the followers of Marx led by Pablo Iglesias were pivotal in providing the 
Spanish labour movement with a distinctive profile. Thus, the orthodox Marxist line 
prevailed in the Socialist UGT and in its various strongholds in Madrid, Bilbao, and 
Asturias. The followers of Bakunin, on the other hand, were instrumental in the 
establishment of the first labour organisations in Catalonia, where a strong influence 
of anarchist ideas would survive, as would be demonstrated by the remarkable case 
of the CNT (Confederacion Nacional del Trabajo) founded in 1910.18 As a 
consequence, the Spanish labour movement had been historically divided.
The rise of new political organisations, particularly with republican and socialist 
orientation, further complicated the conflict between traditional liberal and 
conservative parties. The complexity of the Spanish political spectrum was a sign of 
modernisation in Spanish politics, whilst effectively producing yet another blurred 
situation. The system of turnismo, in which the two main dynastic parties had agreed 
to take over power by turns, thus avoiding the dangers of military coups, was in 
crisis. The electoral procedure, very much in the hands of local caciques, seemed to
17 H ouse D ocum ents, 1913, P apers R elating to the Foreign R elations o f  the U nited S tates ,
W ashington, 1920, pp.977-1010.
18 Although the C N T  was not established until 1910, there was, however, a strong anarchist influence 
in the labour m ovem ent in the late 1800s; see Juan Pablo Fusi and Jordi Palafox, Espana: 1808-1996: 
el desafio de la m odem idad , Espasa Calpe, Madrid, 1997, p. 167. A detailed account o f  the period and 
the process o f  formation o f  the anarchist labour union is in Xavier Cuadrat, Los origenes de la CNT, 
S ocia lism oy  anarquism o en Cataluha (1899-1911), Revista del Trabajo, Barcelona, 1976.
23
Chapter I Mexican Spanish relations before the establishment of the Second Spanish Republic.
be at the base of the growing criticism of the government, and for the first time a 
campaign against the King, still a popular figure, was initiated.19
The trienio bolchevique, as the three-year period between 1918 and 1921 was known, 
had led to a two-fold radicalisation of the character of the labour movement, i.e. the 
anarchist and the socialist tendencies. Inspired by the triumph of the revolutionary 
faction led by Lenin in Russia, the Spanish revolutionaries saw the opportunity to 
further their goals by confronting the weakened Monarchy and its regressive 
government. For a short period, the strength of the Spanish labour movement was 
enough to propel some of the necessary economic changes, although it was not really 
achieving its primary objectives. The violent confrontation between the different 
workers organisations and between these and the successive conservative 
governments was the main feature of this period.20 As a whole, Spanish society in the 
early twenties faced increasing political instability. Particularly significant in creating 
this awareness was the enormous setback in the military colonial strategy in 
Morocco, after the defeat at Annual in 1921.21 Regarding the latter event, Mexican 
Gen. Francisco L. Urquizo, former Minister of War in Carranza’s cabinet, referred to 
one of the most bizarre episodes in the bilateral exchange. According to Urquizo, 
living exiled in Madrid after Carranza’s death, a group of Mexicans exiled in Tucson, 
some of whom were Yaqui Indians, were recruited by the Spanish Consulate in 
Arizona in order to join the Spanish forces that would try to reverse the disaster of 
Annual.22
19 M iguel de Unamuno and Ramon Valle-Inclan were two o f  the writers who ridiculed the King 
fiercely as a criticism o f  the monarchical regime rather than the person.
20 Raymond Carr, Spain, 1808-1975, Oxford University Press, 2 nd Ed. 1982, pp.497-516; and, 
Francisco Romero, Twentieth Century Spain. P o litics and Society in Spain, 1898-1998, Macmillan, 
London, 1999, pp.34-46.
21 In July 1921, one o f  the leaders o f  the nationalist movement o f  resistance against Spanish and 
French occupation in M orocco, Abd el-Krim, produced a devastating strike to the Spanish colonial 
army in the Rif. With som e 9000 casualties and the retreat from around 3000 sq. m iles in the M elilla 
region, this military disaster had the impact o f  a coda to the 1898 war; Carr, Spain, pp.517-523, Fusi y 
Palafox, Espafia: 1808, p. 190; and, Francisco Romero, Twentieth Century Spain. P olitics and Society  
in Spain, 1898-1998, Macmillan, London, 1999, p.46.
22 Francisco L. Urquizo, O bras E scogidas, FCE, M exico, 1987, pp.1038-1042.
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Meanwhile, in Mexico, Alvaro Obregon’s administration (1920-1924) was the first 
post-revolutionary regime that was able to start implementation of the urgent socio­
economic changes in the country following the Constitution of 1917 and so 
successfully complete its term in office. Obregon also succeeded in instigating both 
economic and political reform, and became the most important and popular leader of 
the revolution, even after his term as president had expired. An era of political 
stability began, although a certain degree of political uncertainty would remain for 
another decade. His administration also pursued a proactive foreign policy, where 
Spain had a special place. After the recognition by the US of his Government, 
Mexican foreign relations became more stable for a while, including those with 
Spain, in spite of the growing clerical tension.
The Mexican Government tolerated Catholic activity even beyond the limits set 
within the Constitution, so long as the clergy did not actually defy civil authority. 
However, encouraged by the backing of the Holy See, Mexican Catholics attempted 
to regain their lost privileges. An agreement was drawn up with the Roman Catholic 
Church in 1924, which allowed a new apostolic delegate to reside in Mexico in 
exchange for Rome's pledge to appoint as bishops only those Mexican priests who 
abstained from political activity.23 The lower clergy felt they had been betrayed. The 
reconciliation of the two governments did not take into account complaints from the 
poor priests and the latter’s concern about the obstacles the revolutionary regime put 
before them. Although this would frustrate their spiritual work, this was of little 
concern to the ecclesiastical hierarchy. The agreement made with the government had 
ensured a de facto  recognition for the Church, a stalemate in political terms, with no 
greater compromise than the sacrifice of some of the poorest members of the clergy.
To deal with the “unfriendly” attitudes in Spain, the Mexican Government had a 
useful device. Since the early 1920s, the economic support of the magazine Nemesis, 
published in Barcelona by Jose Maria Vargas Vila, had played no small part in the
23 George W olfskill, and D ouglas W. Richmond, (eds.) Essays on the M exican Revolution: revisionist 
view s o f  the leaders , University o f  Texas Press, Austin, c.1979, pp.88-89.
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successful image campaign of the Mexican Government. This opportunistic journalist 
saw the chance to set himself up as the Mexican president’s voice in Spain to 
promote the good image of the new regime. The magazine published by Vargas Vila 
was a sign of the revolutionary regime, to be identified with cultural activities no less 
than to influence the public opinion, in a country that hosted prominent political 
exiles eager to criticize the Mexican Government.24
Although few, the Mexican revolutionary regime also had Spanish supporters. 
Celebrated as one of the distinguished members of the 98 Generation, Spanish writer 
Ramon Maria del Valle-Inclan y Montenegro, was one of them. Valle Inclan had 
visited Mexico in 1892, leaving many friends there. He then returned in 1921, as a 
guest of honour of President Obregon for the commemoration of the Centenary of 
Mexican Independence.25 This time, the eccentric, witty and loquacious character dug 
even deeper into his passion for the land of revolutionary thrust, and got acquainted 
with new public figures, such as the rising labour leader Lombardo Toledano.
As elected president, Calles had visited Berlin and Paris in 1924, but avoided 
Madrid.26 Alfonso XIII questioned the Mexican Minister, Alfonso Reyes, as to why 
the future Mexican president did not go to Spain. Reyes replied cautiously arguing 
that perhaps Calles felt that his political orientation was not acceptable for the 
Spanish Military Directory. The King expressed his conviction that, had Calles 
visited him, they would have had only an informal meeting, smoked some cigars, and 
Calles’ image amongst the Spanish residents in Mexico would have improved.27
After his term ended, Obregon retired to private business, leaving Plutarco Elias 
Calles as his successor. Calles continued with the application of the revolutionary 
programme; his administration (1924-1928) laid the foundations for long-lasting
24 Pablo Y ankelevich, Nemesis, m ecenazgo revolucionario y  propaganda apologetica , in Boletin del 
FAPECyFT, no. 28, M ay-August 1998, pp.3-20. AHDM ., Vargas Vila, Exp. 17-7-14 s/f.
25 Santos Martinez Saura, Espina, Lorca, Unamuno y  Valle-Inclan en la po litica  de  su tiempo,
Prodhufi, Madrid, 1995, p.297; Perea, La rueda, p.252.
26 AHDM , EM ESP, Leg. 1 5 2 ,1905-1935, and Leg. 2 4 9 ,1920-1929.
27 Mauricio Ortiz, Un mexicano en Paris, in Boletin del FAPECyFT, N o. 25, A ugust 1997, pp. 12-15; 
Hector Perea, La rueda del tiem po, M exicanos en Espana, Cal y arena, M exico, 1996, pp.415-416.
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institutions such as the Bank of Mexico and the Partido Nacional Revolucionario, 
grandfather of the long-lasting ruling PRI (Revolutionary Institutional Party). (See 
infra).28
Mexican politics had entered a phase of stability. The different revolutionary factions 
had compromised their views to form a common ideal. They did not, however, 
achieve an agreement without bloodshed. Far from being involved in a smooth 
transition, the local leaders and caudillos of the country found themselves embroiled 
in endless confrontations, machinations, and rebellions. Each of the various groups 
professed a specific conception about the ways in which the ultimate aims of the 
revolution could be achieved. The common tool, broadly speaking, was the so-called 
ideology of the Mexican Revolution.
According to Vicente Lombardo Toledano, an intellectual and leader in the making 
of the labour movement, the “(Mexican) Revolution has had a unique characteristic 
that will save it from its errors: it has been a movement of reconquest o f all that is 
genuinely Mexican.” Praising the exaltation of nationalism as a relevant feature of 
the revolutionary movement, Lombardo placed this issue as the backbone of, and the 
unifying element of the new era in Mexican history, well beyond the contributions of 
the revolutionary leaders and caudillos.29 This particular notion was a permanent 
feature in Lombardo’s analysis and in his ideological and political guidance of the 
labour movement. (See Chapter III).
28 Calles only founded the National Revolutionary Party in 1929 after the assassination o f  Obregon, as 
recognition o f  the end o f  the era o f  caudillos  and the beginning o f  the era o f  institutions. During the 
years o f  Cardenas administration, and after the crisis produced by the clash between Calles and 
Cardenas him self, the PNR  transformed into the Party o f  the M exican R evolution in 1938. (See  
Chapter IV). Finally, in 1946 the PR M  gave w ay to the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI). The 
latter was established under M iguel A lem an’s rule as Interior Minister, soon to be the first civilian  
president, and represented the arrival o f  a new political elite, with predominance o f  conservative 
figures. It is relevant to note that the main labour organisation began a long journey into unconditional 
support o f  whatever governmental policy it was presented with. With such foundations, the PRI 
established itse lf as the ruling party that remained in power for five and a h a lf decades. It was not 
fortuitous that the Aleman administration was characterised by a rampaging political corruption.
29 Lombardo Toledano, La libertad sindical, pp.259-260.
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In Spain, after a prolonged period of escalating social agitation, Miguel Primo de 
Rivera y Orbaneja seized power on September 13,1923. As a result o f the political 
unrest prevailing, the dictatorship was, to some extent, accepted. Primo de Rivera 
was to have two years in which to enjoy this favourable social climate. In trying to 
develop a policy of collaboration between the different political sectors, including the 
Socialists, Primo de Rivera's dictatorship transitorily succeeded in achieving 
economic development, but after the initial successful performance, also contributed 
to the country's deteriorating situation. For the time being, however, overcoming the 
military defeats in Africa, in a joint military action with the French army, thus partly 
restoring the prestige lost in Cuba, together with the initial economic recovery, the 
short-term accomplishment of the dictatorship also brought some sort of social ease. 
Perhaps the lure of the latter was reason enough for Spanish society to accept the 
lesser evil. Or perhaps it was the “Iron Surgeon’s” anti caciquismo, a policy that 
attempted to regain control over rampaging political corruption, although more 
rhetorical than effective, that provided the dictator with popular support.30 Another 
element of Primo de Rivera’s early success was economic growth. His regime’s 
economic policy was largely based on strong intervention o f the State in the 
economy, with protectionist measures, regulatory controls and State controlled 
companies.31
Critical of the Spanish dictator, some famous Spanish personalities visited Mexico 
during those troubled years, making evident the strong link between the two countries 
regardless of their political regimes. The gesture included the philosopher Jose 
Ortega y Gasset and the novelist Vicente Blasco Ibanez, who enjoyed an extended 
trip and wrote a number of articles and books about the Mexican military and the 
revolutionary movement.32 Given the choice, however, Blasco Ibanez decided to live
30 Joaquin Costa, “the sym bol o f  the radical regenerationism o f  the intellectuals”, explains Raymond 
Carr, contemplated a leader “who should combine the virtues o f  Gregory VII, Porfirio Diaz, the 
dictator o f  M exico, and Hammurabi”, that w ould be the ‘iron surgeon’ that w ould rule Spain 
temporarily, in order to free it from corruption. Carr, Spain, p.526.
31 Fusi y  Palafox, Espana: 1808, pp .227-231; Carr, Spain, pp.577-581.
32 AHDM , EMESP, Leg. 200, 1924-1927, Llegada de  in telectuales espanoles a M exico p a ra  estrechar 
relaciones, 1925.
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his life in voluntary exile during the years of Primo de Rivera dictatorship in the US 
rather than in Mexico, despite befriending Obregon and other leaders of the country.33
Although critical of the perceived militaristic nature of the Mexican regime, Blasco 
Ibanez praised the Mexican disposition to improve its foreign relations. Even though 
he referred to the Mexican American relationship, his words could have also been 
applied to Spain. “Mexico’s relations with the US during the 1920’s were, of course, 
stormy. But”, he concludes, “beneath the storm ran an undercurrent of dialogue and 
mutual comprehension.”34 Furthermore, he refers to the fact that Thomas Lamont, 
banker of the House of Morgan, declared himself “against the attempt to class (the 
Mexican) government in with the Soviets”, as the State Department had suggested, 
since Mexico’s government “on the whole (when its difficult political situation is 
recalled) has done pretty well and made progress.”35 It was, in other words, a 
government with which one could do business.
On the other side of the Atlantic, the sudden collapse of the Spanish dictatorship in 
the midst of the international depression saw a strengthening of the Spanish labour 
movement.36 Albeit divided by its opposing ideological tendencies, it was now a 
major predominant feature in Spanish politics. After losing the confidence of his 
former supporters, such as, significantly, the King and the military, Primo de Rivera 
resigned at the end of January 1930.
Although similarly troubled by civil unrest, the nature of the problems faced by Spain 
and Mexico distinctly differed. In the latter country, as a consequence of the 
fulfilment of the revolutionary programme, relations between the government and the 
Catholic Church deteriorated. As mentioned above, the revolutionary movement 
affected important economic and political interests and, therefore, it was only natural
33 John W.F. D ulles, Yesterday in M exico, A Chronicle o f  the Revolution, 1919-1936, University o f  
Texas Press, Austin, 1961, pp.22-26.
34 V icente B lasco Ibanez, M exico in Revolution, N ew  York, 1922, p.9.
35 Idem .
36 Carr, Spain, pp.581-590; Fusi and Palafox, Espaha: 1808, 243-248; and, Romero, Twentieth, pp.59- 
60.
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to expect the representatives of the sectors involved to react against the revolutionary 
government and its policies. In this sphere, the Mexican Catholic Church, encouraged 
by the Vatican or otherwise, became highly active in organising disaffected and 
resentful people to confront the government by whatever means possible, including 
violence. In this way tensions between the progressive forces and those of the 
reactionary sectors escalated to such an extent that they led to three years of grave 
armed conflict between 1926 and 1929.37 Conservative Spaniards condemned the 
revolutionary process in Mexico because it affected clerical and landed interests and 
labelled it "the crucifixion of Mexico".38 The Cristero revolt in Mexico was praised 
by the conservative sectors in Spain as a response to the 'anti-religiousness' o f the 
revolutionary movement.39 At the same time, this issue allowed these sectors to 
summon their supporters to defend "traditional Spanish values" they believed were 
being threatened by the republican challenge.40
The revolutionary and proudly secular enforcement of the 1917 Constitution 
continued to produce tension. The Law was applied vigorously. This bedevilled 
relations with Spain. Before the outburst of the Cristiada, when the tension was 
reaching its limits, a State Governor asked Calles whether he had authorised the 
Spanish priest Jose Casaponza to say Mass. Calles response was short: “1 cannot 
authorise actions above the Law”.41 Accordingly, irrespective of their mission, no 
priest, if a foreigner, was allowed to enter the country.
37 In his article C alles o la decision, Jean M eyer points out the relevant features o f  Calles 
administration and show s how US-M exican relations and the Catholic rebellion were o f  incomparable 
relevance to the rest o f  the crucial events, and how his determination and revolutionary conviction  
were his permanent guide. Boletin FAPECyFT, no. 26, Septem ber-Decem ber 1997, p p .4 -11.
38 Ricardo Perez Montfort, Hispanism o y  Falange, los suenos im periales de la derecha espahola, 
FCE, M exico, 1992, p.31.
39 There is another version o f  the attitude o f  both the M exican Church and the Vatican, according to 
which the C ristero  rebellion was a spontaneous popular movement, often referred to and bitterly 
criticised by the clergy. See Jean Meyer, La christiade, I'eglise, I'etat e lep eu p le  dans la Revolution  
M exicaine, Payot, Paris, 1975. For a detailed account o f  the C ristero  war, see David C. Bailey, jV iva  
Cristo Rey! The C ristero  Rebellion and the Church-State conflict in M exico, University o f  Texas 
Press, Austin and London, 1974. Regarding the support and manifestations o f  solidarity o f  the Spanish 
conservative Catholics with the Mexican Cristeros, see Perez Montfort, Hispanism o.
40 Perez Montfort, H ispanism o, p.4 1 .
41 AGN, Fondo Obregon-Calles, Grupo 182, S erie429 , Vol. 178-181.
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Shortly after his re-election in 1928 as President for a second term, for which the 
Constitution had to be amended, as non-re-election was a key feature of the 
revolutionary movement against Diaz, Obregon was assassinated by a radical 
Catholic. Although not directly affecting bilateral relations, the murder showed how 
events in one country could have an impact on the other. Spanish Conservative and 
Catholic partisans used the news of the murder as propaganda for their own ends, 
pointing out the consequences for Spain, if a similar type of government took over.
At the same time, perceived as anti clerical and, worst of all, anti Catholic, the 
Mexican Government was portrayed as a dreadful regime with which there should be 
no further contact.42
It was not difficult to understand the level of animosity and distrust that existed 
between the two governments. Nonetheless, the relations between Mexico and Spain, 
particularly complex as they were, still had room to be relaxed in other areas, namely 
in cultural and commercial spheres. In Mexican politics, the murder of Obregon 
underlined the need to break the pattern of governments led by all-powerful 
caudillos.
For the moment, however, Calles, although not president, remained as the power 
behind the presidency. Emilio Portes Gil was designated interim president by the 
Congress in order to call elections. He remained in office for fourteen months and 
further developed the previous regime's agrarian policy throughout Mexico. Although 
there was little evidence that Calles was intentionally acting as the power behind the 
throne, his political status and revolutionary prestige made him the most influential 
politician at the time, transforming him into a shadow for President Portes Gil. 
Referred to as the Jefe Maximo de la Revolution, like Obregon and Carranza before 
him, Calles unwittingly inaugurated a special period in Mexican politics. Having no 
opponent of stature to challenge his political prestige to unify the various 
revolutionary factions, It is clear that, wittingly or not, Portes Gil was the first of the
42 Ricardo Perez Montfort, E l asesinato de A lvaro Obregon en la pren sa  espahola (Aproxim aciones a 
la opinion publica  espahola y  su vision de  M exico durante los ahos veinte), in Revista Papeles de la 
Casa Chata, ano 2, num. 3, M exico, 1987 , passim .
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three presidents to ‘rule’ under the influence of General Calles. Calles became the 
“needle of balance” for political disputes nation-wide. The so-called maximato era 
was beginning.43
The calling for an extraordinary presidential election, opened the possibility for Jose 
Vasconcelos, former Minister of Education, and a well-known Hispanista, who was 
eagerly supported by the Spanish Minister, Manuel de Figuerola Ferrati, Marques de 
Rialp, Mexican conservative sectors, and disaffected revolutionaries. The solution for 
the dispersed revolutionary family was to create a national party, uniting all 
revolutionary factions and embracing the revolutionary aims contained in the 
Mexican Constitution. Thus the National Revolutionary Party was bom. It was 
integrated by many small regional parties formed in the wave of the revolutionary 
movement, and most of local caudillos, but not all of them. As reported by the 
Spanish Minister, generals Escobar, Manzo and Torres, rebelled against the 
imposition.44
Vasconcelos was defeated in the presidential election, a ballot suspected of dirty 
management, and Pascual Ortiz Rubio was elected president for the remaining four- 
year period.45 Vasconcelos, Martin Luis Guzman, and other oppositionists went into 
exile fearing Calles’ persecution.46 They both joined other Mexican exiles in Spain, 
although their respective politics would eventually oppose. Vasconcelos would 
develop his bitter anti-Calles criticism from Spain, gaining support from Spanish 
conservative circles.47 Similarly, although gradually engaging more into local 
business and politics, Guzman frequented liberal circles linked with republican 
ideas.48
43 A m aldo Cordova, La R evolu tion  en crisis, La aventura d e l m axim ato , Cal y  Arena, M exico, 1995, 
pp.89-98.
44 AM AE, Min. Edo., Leg. H -2565,
45 W hen the Constitution was modified in 1928, to allow  Obregon to be re-elected, the presidential 
term was also changed from four to six years.
46 Jose V asconcelos, M em orias, II, e lD esastre , E lP roconsu lado , ( la . Ed. 1938) FCE, M exico, 1982.
47 AM AE, Min. Edo., Leg. H -2565.
48 Manuel Azana, D iarios Completos, C ritica, Barcelona, 2000, p. 145.
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Another important feature of the period that eventually becomes relevant was the 
initial relation between the Mexican and the Spanish labour, in their international 
connection. The Mexican labour movement represented by the CROM participated in 
international conferences organised by the International Organisation of Labour. 
Likewise, the UGT, led by the Socialist Party, represented the Spanish workers there. 
In this way, the first contacts between Lombardo Toledano and Francisco Largo 
Caballero, head of the Spanish UGT, took place.
The young barrister Lombardo had been linked to the labour movement since 1918, 
having attended the foundation of the Confederation Regional Obrera Mexicana 
(Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers), and as a rising figure in the Mexican 
political life. As a representative of the Mexican CROM delegation, Lombardo 
attended several international conferences linked to the International Labour 
Organisation, where he established contact with worldwide leaders of the Labour 
movement. In 1919, significantly, he was present at the Labour International 
Conference held in Washington to set up the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO), where he made the acquaintance of Leon Jouhaux, from the French 
Confederation General de Travail (CGT) and Francisco Largo Caballero, Luis 
Araquistain and Fernando de los Rios from the Spanish Union General de 
Trabajadores*9 As a member of the Pan-American Workers Confederation (COPA) 
the CROM was under the influence of the American Federation of Labour led by 
Samuel Gompers, the conservative that strongly opposed the International Worker’s 
Association. As a member of the latter, the UGT unsuccessfully sought the possibility 
of establishing the Ibero-American Workers Federation.50
Known as one of the “seven wise men”,51 Lombardo built an early public career. He 
was designated interim Oficial Mayor (Chief Clerk) of Mexico City in 1921, during
49 Amaro del Rosal, Vicente Lom bardo T oledanoy sus Relaciones con e l M ovim iento O brero Espanol, 
F acetas d e  una vida, CEFPSVLT, M exico, 1980, pp.8-9.
50 Amaro del Rosal, L os C ongresos O breros ln ternacionales en el Siglo XX, de 1900 a 1950, Grijalbo, 
M exico, 1963, pp.383-384.
51 The other six were Manuel G om ez Morin, Antonio Castro Leal, A lfonso Caso, Teofilo Olea y 
Leyva, Jesus M oreno Baca, and Alberto Vazquez del Mercado. They all constituted the Sociedad de
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the Obregon administration, and interim Governor of his home state, Puebla, in 
1923.52 In both positions, he developed a distinctly progressive governmental policy, 
particularly in the enforcement of land distribution.53 But his link with labour would 
prove definitive, although he never abandoned his academic inclination. Lombardo 
and Largo Caballero would meet again only at an ILO conference held in Geneva 
inl92554,but it was Antonio Fabra Rivas, Spain’s UGT representative at the ILO and 
PSOE member, who recommended Lombardo for the preparation of a report for the 
ILO on the situation of Labour in Mexico in 1926.55
The common set of ideas and principles that formed the ideology of the Mexican 
Revolution, as has been previously described, had its roots in an elementary sense of 
social justice. The pursuit of its aims, from political democracy to land reform and 
from economic development to the improvement of both labour and living conditions 
in general, could not fail to disturb traditional conservative interests. At the same 
time, or probably because of the latter, the various revolutionary governments were 
pursuing revolutionary measures, but only up to a point. They did not want to be 
associated with Soviet Communism, even though some of the novelties of Soviet 
Russia sincerely attracted their attention. When questioned about his opinion on 
Bolshevism, Calles replied that “all progressive men are labelled as Bolsheviks”56, 
and when receiving the credentials of the first Soviet diplomatic representative, 
Alexandra Kollontai, in 1926, he praised the fact that Mexico willingly accepted the 
freshness of the Soviet project.57
Conferencias y  C onciertos, informally referred to as Los Siete Sabios, which Narciso B assols and 
Daniel C osio V illegas would join later; Raul Gutierrez Lombardo, Apuntes p a ra  una B iografia  
Politica  de  Vicente Lom bardo Toledano, CEFPSVLT, M exico, 1998, p.8.
52 During his short-term governorship Lombardo decreed the banning o f  bullfights, considering them  
nothing but a “lucrative business based on the ignorance o f  the people”; [Vicente Lombardo Toledano] 
O bras C om pletas, vol. I, Gobierno del Estado de Puebla, M exico, 1992. p 330.
53 M illon, M exican M arxist, p. 17; Francie R. Chassen de Lopez, Lom bardo Toledano y  el M ovim iento  
O brero M exicano (1917/1940), Extemporaneos, M exico, 1977, p.54; Nathaniel W eyl and Sylvia  
W eyl, The R econquest o f  M exico, The Years o fL azaro  Cardenas, London, 1939, p .79.
54 Rosa Ma. Otero y Gama, Efemerides, in Vicente Lom bardo Toledano, O bra H istdrico-C ronoldgica, 
Tomo I, vol. 4, 1927-1928, CEFPSVLT, M exico, 1994, p.398.
55 V icente Lombardo Toledano, La L ibertad Sindical en M exico, Lucha, M exico, 1926, p.7.
56 [Plutarco Elias Calles] Pensamiento po litico  y  social, A ntologla (1913-1936), FCE, M exico, 1988, 
p. 103. His response to Bolshevism  was given in an interview to E l D em ocrata, on 18 April 1924.
57 Idem, pp .204-205.
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Even though attempts were made to upgrade Spanish Mexican bilateral diplomatic 
relations after 1913 those were not times, as has been shown, for engaging in 
diplomatic endeavours other than to remain on the most amicable terms possible, if 
only cautious and superficial.58 Besides, there was a need for a stronger motivation 
for such a move. Nevertheless, the Mexican diplomatic representative in Madrid, 
Enrique Gonzalez Martinez, who arrived in Spain in 1924, had been working to 
persuade both governments to establish the new diplomatic status, but the truth is that 
neither circumstances nor the will of the governing elites were focused to that end. 
The bilateral relations would change, but only when, and if, there existed an evident 
reciprocal benefit in sight. That was to be provided by the arrival o f the Republican 
regime in Spain.
In the meantime, the pro-Republican movement was spreading throughout the 
Spanish peninsula; soon it would gain momentum with the beginning of the new 
decade, the departure of the dictator, and the decreasing prestige of the monarchy. At 
this point, even the commemoration of the short-lived first Spanish Republic was 
perceived as a threat by the government.59 The decision to relocate the remains of 
Pablo Iglesias to Teruel, for example, an apparently humble event in April 1930, was 
reported by the Provincial Governor to the Ministry of Interior.60 A less innocuous, 
and hence more alarming, occasion was given by the return of Unamuno from 
Hendaye and the crowd that gathered awaiting his arrival at Inin, headed by Indalecio 
Prieto and the leaders of the local Republican Socialist Party. Unamuno had been in 
exile, after having conducted a long campaign savagely ridiculing the King during 
the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. The official report played down the meeting, 
regarding some 5 000 demonstrators as a confused mixture of republican adherents 
and passers-by coming out of a football match. In his violent speech against both the 
dictatorship and the Monarchy on 12 February 1930, Unamuno reportedly decided to
58 AHDM , EM ESP, Leg. 1 5 1 ,1913-1936.
59 The Ministry o f  Interior (M inisterio de la Gobem acion) had particular interest in follow ing up the 
activities o f  both political parties, particularly socialist and republican ones, and prominent 
personalities o f  these sectors. A H N , Min. Gob., Leg. 45 A, Exp.7-9.
60 AHN, M in. Gob., Leg. 45 A Exp.7.
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modify the Carlist motto of “Dios, Patria y Rey” (God, Motherland and King) and 
from then on and forever, he would say “Dios, Patria y Ley” (God, Motherland, and 
Law).61
After Primo de Rivera, the King entrusted another General to form government, with 
the hope of regaining control of the situation. The last remnants of the monarchist 
government, however, now headed by Damaso Berenguer, would endure only little 
more than a year before the arrival of the Spanish Republic. Effectively the 
continuation of Primo de Rivera's regime, although not as repressive, this so-called 
"dictablanda", was unable to contain the republican impetus that had permeated the 
whole of Spain.62
In an attempt to overthrow the Crown and establish a Republican regime, a 
revolutionary Committee was established in August 1930, and planned an 
insurrection to take place the following December. Among the signatories of the 
Pacto de San Sebastian were former Monarchist Niceto Alcala Zamora, the Radical 
Alejandro Lerroux, the Left Republican Manuel Azana, and the moderate Socialist 
Indalecio Prieto.63 The republican movement would count as its first martyrs, Fermin 
Galan and Angel Garcia Hernandez after the repression of the revolt in Jaca and the
61 A H N , Min. Gob., Leg. 45 A  Exp.8.
62 For a full account o f  the period, see Shlom o Ben-A m i, The origins o f  the Second R epublic in Spain, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford and N ew  York, 1978.
63 In the official despatch to the Ministry o f  Interior, the meeting is reported to have taken place on 17 
August 1930 in San Sebastian at the premises o f  the local Union Republicana, and was presided over 
by Fernando Sasiain. There, the representatives o f  the myriad o f  republican organisations were present. 
According to the official report those w ho attended the reunion were Alejandro Lerroux and Manuel 
Azana on behalf o f  the Alianza Republicana (Republican Alliance); Marcelino D om ingo, Alvaro de 
Albornoz, and A ngel Galarza on behalf o f  the Partido Radical Socialista (Socialist Radical Party); 
N iceto A lcala Zamora and M iguel Maura on behalf o f  the republican liberal right (derecha liberal 
republicana); Manuel Carrasco Formiguera on behalf o f  the A ccion Catalana (Catalan Action); Julio 
Aigualar on behalf o f  the Estat Catala (Catalan State); and Santiago Casares Quiroga on behalf o f  the 
Federation Republicana Gallega (Galician Republican Federation). A ll the above m entioned, together 
with the Partido Federal Espanol (Spanish Federal Party) -  which was unable to send a representative 
while waiting for the decision o f  its forthcoming congress, constituted the full spectrum o f  republican 
elements o f  the w hole country. Recorded as participating on their own account are Felipe Sanchez 
Roman, Eduardo Ortega y Gasset and Indalecio Prieto. Unable to attend the meeting was Gregorio 
Maranon, then in France, who sent an enthusiastic letter expressing solidarity with the purposes o f  the 
reunion. A H N , Min. Gob. Leg. 45A Exp.8.
36
Chapter I Mexican Spanish relations before the establishment o f the Second Spanish Republic.
general strike in Madrid.64 Oddly, the repression of the republican leaders, obliquely 
demonstrated Mexican Spanish ties. In a remarkable case of the informal connections 
linking Mexicans and Spaniards, the close relation established between Manuel 
Azana and Martin Luis Guzman was particularly revealing. They met in 1915, during 
Guzman’s first brief Spanish exile. Together with Cipriano Rivas Cherif, Azana’s 
brother in law, Guzman was one of the regular friends Azana had since the early 
years of the Ateneo de Madrid. The Mexican writer ran away from the group that had 
strengthened its grip on power after Obregon's murder. Most of Guzman’s novels 
were based on actual characters and events of the Mexican Revolution; he built a 
reputation as a novelist and as biographer of Pancho Villa. The irreconcilable terms 
in which Martin Luis Guzman had left Mexico were clearly directed against the 
ruling group -  led by Calles. His early acquaintance with Azana became noteworthy 
in the late 1920s and early 1930s, when he was a privileged witness of the Spanish 
drama before the establishment of the Republican regime and an actor in the short­
lived democratic experiment. Once he was settled in Madrid, Guzman seemed well 
integrated into Spanish culture, and more interested in Spanish politics than some 
local politicians. After the failed revolutionary events of December 1930 and the 
consequent repression, Azana’s eventful escape was less exciting and mysterious 
than popular believe attributed to it. In truth, it was almost dull: he was hiding at 
Guzman’s house, only yards away from his own house.
Meanwhile, in Mexico, the definition of the new revolutionary programme and the 
establishment of new institutions largely dominated Mexican domestic politics in the 
1930s. The tension between the Church and the State also remained an essential part 
of their modus vivendi in Mexico during this period.65 Both the laity and the clergy 
were aware that in order to deal with it, something more than divine patience and 
God’s will was necessary. Simplistically, some diplomatic and journalistic observers 
tended to assume that it was Calles’ powerful and dominating opinion that prevailed 
in this matter, but this was not so. The revolutionary family was deeply and firmly
64 Fusi, Espafia. La evolu tion , p.252, and Preston, The com ing o f  the Spanish C ivil War, pp.33-34.
65 Cordova, La R evolu tion  en crisis, p.265.
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convinced of the terrible influence and the disastrous impact that the Catholic Church 
had had in the history of the Mexican people. Part of the revolutionary discourse was 
that the Church had subjected the Mexicans to ignorance, prejudice and exploitation 
as the best way to entitle them to a better life in the after-world. In the light of this 
belief, it took little effort to convince the more conscious and determined elements 
that the best way to contribute to the mental liberation of the poor was by attacking 
the power o f the Church. This would be a step towards their social, economic, and 
political liberty, following the path of the Reformist movement headed by Juarez in 
the mid Nineteenth Century.
To clear the air between Church and State was to take more than good wishes. The 
assassination o f President-elect Obregon by a fanatical Catholic was to provide 
another justification, if needed, for the aggressive policies of the revolutionary 
governments in dealing with the Catholic Church. Accordingly, irrespective of their 
mission, no priest, if a foreigner, was allowed to enter the country. In February 1931, 
Luciano Serrano, sent by the Spanish Ministry of Education to visit Mexico, was 
refused permission to enter the country. This baffled the Spanish Minister of Foreign 
Affairs given that Serrano had a diplomatic passport.66 The Spanish Minister in 
Mexico reported that only after a high level official negotiation, limited authorisation 
to visit Mexico was granted. The Minister explained to Alba that this was a truly one- 
off exception, given that it was the law and Mexican officials were determined to 
apply it.67
But Spanish politics were entering a phase that required the undivided attention of the 
government. Continuing with the crisis, after the resignation of Berenguer in 
February 1931, a new Council of Ministers was formed, headed by Admiral Juan 
Bautista Aznar.68 The new government called for municipal elections to be held on
66 Telegram Alba to Gracia Real, 11 February 1931, AM AE, M in. Edo. Leg. R-34 Exp.20.
67 Telegram Gracia Real to Alba, 12 February 1931, AM AE, Min. Edo. Leg. R-34 Exp.20.
68 Telegram M inister o f  Interior to C ivil Governors, 17 February 1931, A H N , Min. Gob., Leg. 14 A, 
Exp.3 Censura, 1931. The postponement o f  elections meant the reestablishment o f  censorship upon 
the national press, according to Spanish authorities, because o f  the ill intentioned and rebel attitude o f  
republican parties and the working classes.
38
Chapter I Mexican Spanish relations before the establishment of the Second Spanish Republic.
April 12. A number of concejales (members of local councils) were to be nominated, 
without election, according to Article 29, by which unopposed candidates did not 
face the voters. This clearly favoured monarchist candidates in rural areas where the 
caciques were poweful.69 However, in urban areas, the Ministry of Interior received 
the confirmation of an outstanding republican performance. The reports of the polls 
in Madrid did not leave room for doubt: twenty concejales for the monarchist 
coalition, and thirty for the republican-socialist one.70
While the majority vote was not for the republican parties, the result was rightly 
considered an overwhelming triumph, for they did not expect such a turn out 
favouring them. For the Monarchy, it was a disaster, for it represented the 
confirmation of a widespread rejection of the monarchist regime. Although the 
republican parties did not actually win the majority of votes, everybody knew the 
implications of the forecasts, including the King. On April 14, 1931, the Second 
Spanish Republic was proclaimed, almost 70 years after the short-lived First 
Republic. Elections for the Cortes Constituyentes would take place in June. A new 
era in Spanish history had begun.
According to the Francoist historian, Joaquin Arraras, it was Gabriel Maura who 
wrote the message that Alfonso XIII signed on 13 April 1931 acknowledging that 
"today I have not got the love of my people".71 He, nevertheless, resisted 
relinquishing any of his rights as King, deciding instead to suspend the exercise of 
Royal power, and "walk away from Spain, leaving her as the only master of her 
destiny."72
69 According to the official records o f  the Ministry o f  Interior, those three groups were integrated in 
the manner o f  the follow ing classification: Monarchists included centristas, ciervistas, conservadores, 
liberales, dem ocratas, albistas, reformistas, otros constitucionalistas, tradicionalistas, independientes 
and indeterm inados. Republicans included derecha republicana, radicales and regionalistas. Anti­
monarchists included socialists, communists, independents and indeterm in ates. AHN, Min. Gob., Leg. 
30A  Exp.3.
70 Telegram 585, 12 April 1931, Madrid, G obernador C ivil aM in istro  de  G obernacion, A H N , Min. 
Gob., Leg. 30A  Exp.7.
71 Joaquin Arraras, H istoria de la Segunda Republica Espanola, Ed. Nacional, Madrid, 1956, p. 14.
72 Idem.
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Y  Madrid vestido ya de prim avera  
V io  flotar airosa en la Castellana  
Y  sobre el Palacio, en Espana entera  
La nueva bandera, la republicana  
A nd  M ad rid  d ressed  up  in  S p r in g  
Saw  at th e  C aste llan a , p rou d ly  flo a tin g , 
A n d  at th e  P a lace , everyw h ere  in  S p a in  
T h e n ew  b an n er, th e  rep ub lican  on e.
G uty Cardenas.
The establishment o f the Second Republic meant a radical change in Spain’s traditional 
way o f succeeding regimes. Acclaimed by popular support after an historical outcome 
in municipal elections, the bloodless and sudden change had little, if  any, resemblance 
to hundreds o f years o f Spanish history. However, the Republic of 14 April 1931, in the 
words o f Manuel Azana, “it was not but a national impulse, a fervour, a promise, a will, 
if  you please; that is, it was everything and at the same time nothing at all.”1
The first important test for the young democracy was to strengthen its new institutions 
as a means to consolidate the Republican regime. The oldest o f the Spanish institutions 
and the most conservative and reactionary of all, the military and the Church, were 
determined not to allow the new regime to achieve its democratic and progressive aims. 
The powerful pair had also the support o f the big landowners, the class under threat in 
Spain’s semi-feudal economic structure. Before the arrival o f the Spanish Republic, 
anti-Monarchist opposition had also been anti-clerical, given the identification between 
the Church and the King. The Republican regime had identified itself with the forces of 
progress against the conservative tendencies. Thus, land reform, regional autonomy,
1 M anuel A zana, En e lp o d e r y  en la oposicion  (1932-1934), Espasa-Calpe, Madrid, 1934, p.412.
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religious freedom and secularisation o f public life were an essential part o f the 
Republican project, very much opposed by the Right-wing Republican organisations, 
which accepted the Republic only as long as their interests were not touched or 
removed.
The Right would soon launch new political organisations to defend its interests and to 
oppose the changes envisaged by the wave of progress and liberalism brought by the 
republican movement. Within a few weeks, at the beginning o f May 1931, a self­
defined electoral organisation was established in Madrid, Action National, with the 
aim o f unifying all those who accepted the conservative concepts o f Religion, 
Motherland, Order, Family, Work, and Property. Action National would also have an 
impact on Mexican political life with the creation of Mexican branches by the end of 
the decade.
As soon as the new government o f the Spanish Republic was established, both 
countries willingly changed the status of their respective representations. Thus, the 
former legations now had the rank o f embassies. This was the first official sympathetic 
and reciprocated gesture made at the start o f the new relationship between Mexico and 
Spain. Thus, just three weeks after the proclamation o f the Spanish Republic, 
negotiations between Mexico and Spain on diplomatic representations were defining 
the new status, in accordance with the new Spanish era. In fact, it had taken a long time 
to achieve the upgrading o f the diplomatic representations. The arrival o f a progressive 
regime, in the form o f a Republic in Spain heralded the final accomplishment o f a long 
awaited aim for Mexican diplomats. From the Spanish side, there was a desire to find 
an ambassadorship for Julio Alvarez del Vayo, a man whose credentials had not been 
acceptable in the increasingly endangered Weimar Republic in Germany. All that 
paved the way for the happy agreement.4 The ABC  reported on 5 May 1931, “the
2 A B C , 2 M ay 1931 p.21. Their m anifesto was published in A B C  on 8 M ay 1931, pp.23 and 24.
3 In the case o f  M exico , the decision  was stated in the D ecree o f  M ay 12, 1931, signed b y  both President 
Pascual Ortiz Rubio, and M inister o f  State and Foreign Affairs Charge Genaro Estrada; D iario  O ficia l de  
la  F ederacion , 14 M ay 1931.
4 B ow ers referred the non-acceptance o f  A lvarez del V ayo as Spanish Am bassador to Berlin to the fact 
that “the governm ent o f  H itler declared him  person a  non gra ta”, but at the tim e o f  the appointment, 
Hitler was not yet in power. The non acceptance by the German G overnm ent o f  the prestigious 
journalist, nevertheless, m ust have had a political basis, g iven  the deteriorating situation o f  the 
democratic governm ent in Germany. B ow ers, M y m ission, p.286. In the end A m erico Castro was sent to  
the Spanish E m bassy in Berlin. Paul Preston, C om rades! P ortraits fro m  the Spanish C iv il War, p. 147.
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Minister o f State has issued a statement ihat negotiations have started to rise to 
Embassy status what hitherto has been the Spanish Legation in Mexico”.5 Meanwhile, 
Jose Gallostra y Coello de Portugal remained as Charge de Affaires ad interim.6
The first Spanish Republican Ambassador appointed to Mexico was Alvarez del Vayo, 
a Left-wing journalist. Acknowledging the ongoing negotiations regarding the official 
representations, del Vayo’s designation was announced by the Minister o f State to the 
press. Included in the press release were other diplomatic appointments, such as that of 
Luis de Zulueta, who was sent to the Vatican.
The arrival o f the Spanish Republican Ambassador was a success in itself. Hundreds o f 
Mexicans and Spaniards gathered to offer a popular reception anticipating the new
o r
approach to deal with bilateral issues. Alvarez del Vayo developed his new post 
enthusiastically, and indeed, his disposition helped considerably in forging a strong link 
in Spanish Mexican international relations. He established a particularly fruitful 
relationship with the former Mexican president Plutarco Elias Calles, who, as we have 
seen, was especially influential in Mexican politics. Alvarez del Vayo himself 
acknowledges that his relations with Calles "were o f incomparable value in my effort 
to settle the difficulties between Mexico and Spain."9
In the case o f the Mexican representation, Mexican diplomatic representative Enrique 
Gonzalez Martinez, and his Spanish friends in Madrid had been hoping for his 
promotion. After all, he had been pursuing the upgrading o f diplomatic relations for a 
long time. His friends had even sent a friendly telegram to President Ortiz Rubio asking 
this to be his decision. In fact, Ortiz Rubio expressed the hope that the petition could be 
fulfilled in his cordial reply.10 Previously, the name of Luis Leon was mentioned as the 
more likely Mexican appointment for the ambassadorship in Madrid, given his close 
relation with Luis N. Morones, the still powerful labour leader.11 However, the 
appointment o f Mexican ambassadors to Spain was to be defined more by domestic
5 A B C , 5 M ay 1931, p.25.
6 A G A , FM A E , ID D  61, Leg. 569 , P olitica , 1931.
I A BC , 5 M ay 1931, p.25.
8 A G A , FM A E , ID D  61, Leg. 606.
9 Julio A lvarez del V ayo, The la s t optim ist, Putnam, London, 1950, p .228.
10 A B C , 10 M ay 1931, p.42.
II A B C , 6 M ay 1931, p.38.
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political considerations than by simple diplomatic or bureaucratic procedures. The 
Mexican ambassador would have close allegiance with Calles, and thus be an enemy of 
those eminent Mexican writers exiled in Spain, such as Martin Luis Guzman, Jose 
Vasconcelos, and Gonzalez Martinez himself. Alcala Zamora, President-to-be o f the 
Spanish Republic, was later to acknowledge that Gonzalez Martinez had “achieved
1 9victory without the prize”.
The Mexican Government appointed Alberto J. Pani, former Foreign and Finance 
Minister, and Mexican diplomatic representative in France, Ambassador to the Spanish 
Republic. After a long career as a high-ranking official and Minister in the cabinets of 
Obregon and Calles, Pani thought of this appointment as a temporary post. His 
appointment was a reward for his loyalty, but he did not enjoy being away from active 
political life for long. In the ceremony of presentation o f the lettre de credence, he 
expressed his pride at having been designated by the Mexican Government as the first 
plenipotentiary ambassador to the Spanish Republic. Furthermore, he proclaimed that 
words worn down by constant repetition within diplomatic protocol had now recovered 
their original strength, for the upgrading o f the diplomatic representations had a 
meaning well beyond the limits of courtesy or convenience. He even went on to explain 
how the establishment o f the Spanish Republic was the culmination o f the evolution 
process initiated by the Spanish empire’s former colonies becoming republics at the
IT » •beginning o f the Nineteenth Century. More concerned by his business interests, Pani 
never developed diplomatic relations to any significant degree in Spain. Nevertheless, 
he managed to acquire an important art collection. In this way, the first Mexican 
ambassadorial appointment in Spain became a formality rather than a reality.
Not only did Pani not engage in a serious diplomatic endeavour in Spain, but he also 
did not show particular interest in strengthening the bilateral relations beyond 
formalities, or too keen in the needs o f Mexicans living in Spain. As in the case o f the 
detention and expulsion from Spain o f a Mexican citizen on suspicion of being in 
contact with radical extremists Spaniards in Madrid that was reported in September
12 Enrique G onzalez M artinez, O bras C om pletas, p p .783-784 , cit in H ector Perea, La Rueda d e l Tiempo, 
p .429 .
13 Embajada de M exico  en Espaiia, R elacion es in ternacionales iberoam ericanas, Espasa Calpe, Madrid, 
1931, pp. 11-13. M exico y  la R epu blica  Espanola, A n to log la  d e  docum entos, 1931-1977, Centro 
R epublicano Espanol de M exico , M exico , 1978, pp. 19-20.
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1931. He was detained together with a Cuban citizen and they both were considered to 
be communists. It was said that both of them had been expelled from their own 
countries for the same reason.14 The main consideration for expelling Mexicans and 
other Latin Americans was that they could cause disturbances, usually linked to 
political activism, normally related with communist and other radical movements. Pani 
could even justify such an action.
Meanwhile, in Mexico, although the armed conflict between the Catholic Church and 
the Mexican Government had finished, the Mexican government was still wrestling 
with a hostile clergy, and, as usual, the perceived anti-Catholicism of the Mexican 
authorities was used to bolster support for the Monarchist cause in Spain. As the 
Madrid-based ABC  reported on 2 May 1931, a group o f five Spanish Catholic priests 
were expelled from Mexico for contravening Mexican laws, which banned foreigners 
from acting as priests.15 The so-called religious question would remain a recurrent 
problem in Mexico during these years, upsetting the response o f conservative 
Spaniards in both countries. Surely this, and other delicate issues would require a 
tactful approach from the Spanish ambassador.
Julio Alvarez del Vayo soon realised the state o f Mexican politics, and established 
relation with all major players, starting with Mexico’s strong man. It was a wise move 
for del Vayo to cultivate Calles’ friendship. It was even more judicious that he did not 
neglect the formal chiefs, fulfilling his official duties by treating the Mexican 
presidents with due consideration. Alvarez del Vayo was both attentive and meticulous 
in developing his duty and made it his custom to invite high-ranking Mexican officials, 
such as Genaro Estrada, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to dinner at his house.16 Although 
Calles was not always inclined to attend, he was always well informed about the guests 
attending and the relevant topics under discussion at these informal gatherings. 
Sensitive as was the region for foreign economic interest, a tactful approach helped the
14 A H N , M in. Gob. Leg. 34 A , E xp.6 and 13. Expulsiones d e  ex tran jeros, 1931-1933.
15 The agreement w ith  the Rom an Catholic Church in  1924 included the acceptance by Rom e o f  the 
M exican legal d isposition that permitted only M exican nationals to act as priests w ithin the M exican  
territory. T hose involved in the affair w ere Rafael A lvarez, B onifacio Castro, Pablo G onzalez, Ram on  
Carvajal, and Ismael R odriguez, w ho were expelled  on board o f  the liner U vhledam ; A BC, 2 M ay 1931 
p .37.
16 Letter A lvarez del V ayo to Calles 12 October 1931, FAPECyFT, APEC, E xp.218 Inv. 218 Julio  
A lvarez del V ayo Gav.3.
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negotiations. Alvarez del Vayo, ajoumalist with a developed sense of observation, 
soon decided the best way to come closer to Mexican officials and win the favour of 
Mexican public opinion. He could hardly have chosen a more emblematic issue and 
touch so responsive a chord than when he took on writing the name of his host country 
in the local style. In the Spanish Ambassador’s official documents, Mexico was written 
with an x  as opposed to a j ,  commonly used in Spain. A simple gesture, very much 
appreciated by the local population and their authorities, which helped to smooth the
• 17path o f  many claims.
The ambassador did not shy away from using any social event as an opportunity for his
1 Rown advantage. On such occasions he would make the most o f his conversations with 
his guests or companions, particularly with Calles, whom he would cause to recall his 
years as a teacher being approached by his keenest student. Furthermore, he cherished 
his opinions and would keep him well informed o f the political situation in Spain. 
Apart from cultivating useful social relations, Julio Alvarez del Vayo also engaged in 
permanent journeys nationwide, showing genuine interest in Mexican life and in the 
problems o f Spaniards all over Mexican territory. This granted him the appreciation of 
his country fellow citizens and the respect o f Mexican people. 19
In contrast to his Spanish counterpart, Ambassador Pani did not engaged in promoting 
widespread Mexican Spanish exchanges, and only developed his ambassadorial work 
in a rather formal manner. Although an admirer o f Azana, Pani preferred the company 
o f Spanish aristocrats and lived in a luxurious residence. Hence, when the Spanish 
Republican Government decorated Pani with the Gran Cruz de Isabel la Catolica, it 
was not particularly in praise o f his work as ambassador, but more as a result o f the 
level o f closeness and friendship achieved between the two countries. Scarcely six 
months after Pani arrived in Madrid, he was eager to return to active political life in
17 A G A , FM A E , 9808 , Leg. 561, C orrespondencia  con la E m bajada d e  E spafia en M ejico , (1931).
18 Early in  M arch 1932, for exam ple, del V ayo sent stalls tickets for the opening o f  the p lay “La C orona” 
(The Crown) b y  M anuel A zana at the Virginia Fabregas Theatre. This tim e, how ever, C alles 
acknow ledged the gesture and regret he could not attend. FAPECyFT, A PEC , E xp.218 Inv. 218 Julio 
A lvarez del V ayo Gav.3 N ote A lvarez del V ayo to C alles 1 March 1932.
19 A G A , FM A E , ID D  61, Leg. 8o., E xpediente p erso n a l de  Julio A lvarez d e l Vayo, (III-s-IV).
20 M anuel A zana, D iarios C om pletos, Critica, Barcelona, 2000, p .444.
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Mexico. He became Minister o f Finance again, in the cabinet o f the newly appointed
7 ipresident Rodriguez and later became a member o f the Cardenas cabinet.
Even some Mexican exiles in Spain showed more interest than the Mexican 
ambassador in Spanish issues. Manuel Azana put and entry in his Diary on 15 
November 1931, mentioning a short trip to Aranjuez in the company o f Luis Bello, 
Cipriano Rivas Cherif, and Martin Luis Guzman, and the long chat, back in Madrid, 
about Spanish politics. Azana clearly pointed out Guzman’s excitement evidently
77contrasting with his own disdain of the subject. As a writer, Guzman was also very 
interested in local newspapers, where his articles regularly appeared, and engaging in 
the newspapers, eventually becoming director manager of El Sol and La Voz.
Guzman’s involvement in local politics, and his links with Azana and the Left- 
Republicans also made him a target for aggressions by lerrouxist hit men.23
If  Pani’s performance as Mexican ambassador in Madrid was merely a pale reflection 
o f the good will o f Mexico’s leaders, the appointment, in January 1932, of Genaro 
Estrada would counterbalance the neglect. For his credentials as former Foreign 
Minister, and his prestige in international politics as the author o f the Doctrina Estrada, 
together with his decision to commit himself to the best of his abilities in his new 
diplomatic post would correspond to the level of commitment showed by the Spanish 
Republican ambassador. However, Estrada did not happily assume the appointment, 
although he acknowledged the consideration and distinction set upon him through it. At 
the first opportunity, he wrote to Calles requesting that he not forget that he assumed 
the position as temporary “for professional diplomacy is not o f attraction to my 
spirit.”24
21 W ith a long experience as a civil servant since 1917, Pani had a typically dem agogic perform ance in 
politics. In his biographical essays, S ilva Herzog sym ptom atically entitled the relevant chapter as “ Un 
revo lucionario  y  o tro  dudoso: S a lva d o r A lvarado  y  A lberto  J. P an i” (A  revolutionary and a doubtful 
one); see Jesus S ilva H erzog, E lpen sam ien to  econdm ico, s o c ia ly  p o litico  d e  M exico, 1810-1964, 
Instituto M exicano de Investigaciones Econom icas, M exico, 1967, p p .496-512.
22 A zana wrote: ‘A  Guzm an le interesa la politica espanola m as que a m i.’ (G uzm an is more interested  
in Spanish p o litics than m e) M anuel A zana, D iarios C om pletos, M onarquia, R epublica, G uerra C iv il, 
Critica, Barcelona, 2000 , p .364.
23 Azana, D ia rio s  C om pletos, entry o f  24  D ecem ber 1932, p .661.
24 Letter Estrada to Calles, 4 March 1932, FAPECyFT, APEC, Exp. 108, L eg.2 /2  Inv. 1939, Genaro 
Estrada, Gav. 30.
46
Chapter II The Golden Era o f Mexican Spanish Diplomatic Relations.
Fortunately, for both the Mexican representation in Madrid and the bilateral relations, 
Estrada soon found himself comfortable in his role as the envoy o f a progressive 
regime very much in accordance with the changes being pursued in Spain. His official 
reports and his diligent and meticulous performance gave the Mexican embassy an 
adequate and dignified image. Not every single aspect o f the bilateral relations, 
however, was a token o f the closeness and friendship o f the two governments, but the 
disposition towards each other and the willingness to sort out things smoothly justified 
the optimism. Early on in his new responsibility, Estrada reported the activities o f 
Mexican citizens against the Mexican Government, presumably in connection with 
Martin Luis Guzman or Jose Vasconcelos. Therefore, It was only natural therefore that 
shortly after arriving in Madrid in 1932, Genaro Estrada would confirm “Vargas Vila 
will continue to receive the subsidy through the Mexican Consulate in Barcelona”.25 
The funding o f a magazine disguised as cultural promotion with clear political aims, in 
all lasted over a decade and, significantly, only ended after the Calles-Cardenas rift in 
1935.26
Diligent in his ambassadorial post, although not always satisfied with the way things 
developed, Estrada’s engagement in his work went well beyond his customary duties. 
His was a familiar presence in the Spanish Cortes, but so had been Pani’s. What was 
new and very relevant was Estrada’s consciousness in apprehending the political 
situation o f the country o f his assignment. The official reports regularly sent to Mexico 
City were thoroughly detailed. They accurately reflected the development o f the 
several political crises he witnessed during his ambassadorship in Madrid. He unveils 
for the far-away spectator the nature of the different characters and how their
97interaction had an impact on the political situation in Spain. In his political analysis, 
Estrada pointed out the intentions o f Alejandro Lerroux who attempted to “overthrow” 
the Republican Government, and, in his view, the firm response o f the Socialist Party
9Rand the UGT. Estrada was cheerful when he reported the extremely friendly and 
courteous attitudes o f Spanish officials and public in general towards his country.
25 T elegram  Estrada to C alles, 4  March 1932, E xp.108 Leg. 2 /2  Inv. 1939, Genaro Estrada, Gav. 30.
26 Pablo Y ankelevich , N em esis, m ecenazgo revolucionario  y  propagan da  apo logetica , in B oletin  del 
FA PEC yFT, no. 28 , M ayo-A gosto, M exico , 1998, pp.3-20.
27 E m bajada  d e  M exico en E spana (1932-1934), A H D M , num. 29 , Cuarta epoca, La D ip lom acia  en 
A ccion , G enaro E strada , SRJS, M exico, 1987, despatch E lp e r j i lp o li t ic o  d e  A zana, Madrid, 9 June 1932. 
AREM : 34-4 -12 , pp. 131-136.
28 Letter Estrada to C alles, 21 July 1932, FAPECyFT, A PEC , Exp.8 Leg. 2/2 Inv. 1939, Genaro Estrada,
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After the initial and successful performance o f the Spanish ambassador in Mexico, the 
del Vayo-Calles relationship proved to be ready for action. During the summer o f 1932, 
after obtaining the essential approval o f the Spanish Government after an extensive 
consultation, del Vayo wrote to Calles with the offer o f the Republican Government 
“with the explicit plea that you recommend it to the (Mexican) Ministry o f War.”29 
Thus began one of the most important commercial exchanges between Mexico and 
Spain. Until this point, the traditional character o f the bilateral trade between the two 
countries had been agricultural, with some exchange o f raw materials. So far, the trade 
balance between the two countries was negative for Spain, hence the eagerness to 
modify the tendency. As for Mexico, the growing dependency o f its trade with the US 
remained a regular concern o f the fateful geographical location.30 The economic aspect 
of the bilateral relations changed during these years, but the ambitious objective of 
modifying the exchange balance, so as to make Spain Mexico’s most important 
commercial partner, was far from reached, given the ever watchful American presence 
in the region, and the natural limitations o f the bilateral Mexican Spanish economic 
relationship. The acute sense o f diplomatic operations was one o f del Vayo’s main 
tools in carrying out his duties. While on his way for his summer holiday in Spain, for 
instance, del Vayo sent a telegram to Calles from the ship he had embarked on at 
Veracruz: “In the sea, under the continuous attraction/influx o f Mexico, my final 
fervent greeting (is) for the great friend of Republican Spain.”31
Del Vayo was on his way to Spain at the time when the Spanish Republic faced an 
early threat to the new regime, but particularly to the political orientation the 
Republican Government under Azana and other Left-Republicans and Socialists, had 
shown. It came with the attempt o f a military coup of 10 August 1932, led by Gen. Jose 
Sanjuijo. It was an utter failure, but it unveiled the reactionary nature o f the enemies o f 
the regime and their disposition to use violence to regain control o f the country.
Gav. 30.
29 Letter A lvarez del V ayo to C alles 31 July 1932, FAPECyFT, APEC, E xp.218 Inv. Julio A lvarez del 
V ayo Gav.3.
30 Concha Pando Navarro, La colon ia  espanola  en M exico: 1930-1940 , unpublished PhD thesis, 
U niversity o f  M urcia, 1987, pp.62-94.
31 Telegram  A lvarez del V ayo to Calles 12 A ugust 1932, FAPECyFT, APEC, E xp.218 Inv.218 Julio 
Alvarez del V ayo Gav. 3.
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On the day after the failed coup de etat Alvarez del Vayo was informing Calles about 
the issue and Calles took the opportunity to send a message to President Azana through 
the Spanish Ambassador, advising that Sanjuijo be shot in order to "avoid widespread 
bloodshed and make the Republic live".32 Manuel Azana, an intellectual turned 
politician, had nonetheless a different perception of how to deal with the issue. 
Considering that bloodshed was not only useless but also counterproductive, he 
believed that keeping Sanjuijo alive and imprisoned would serve the cause of the 
legality and legitimacy of the Republic better; killing him would only make a martyr of 
him and bring supporters to his cause. Countless telegrams and letters were sent to the 
government by republican organisations stating their reasons or beliefs as to why
' X ' XSanjuijo should be pardoned or not.
During the meeting the Spanish Council of Ministers held to discuss the issue, only 
Casares Quiroga voted in favour of the death sentence being enacted against Sanjuijo. 
(Sanjuijo had also participated in the military uprising that was instrumental in the 
instigation of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera.34) The other council members 
including Prieto, Domingo and Azana, voted for commuting the sentence.35 Alvarez del 
Vayo would later state his belief that, had they followed Calles’ radical advice, no 
other General would have ever dared to launch another rebellion.36
Shortly after the attempt against the Republican regime in Spain, political tension in 
Mexico between the different factions within the PNR gained momentum. Those with 
power either constituted or were linked to revolutionary factions. Consequently, they 
had much influence in making important decisions in relation to matters such as cabinet 
appointments, state governorships and candidacies to either house of Congress.37
32 Preston, Las tres Espahas, p .261; Alvarez del Vayo, The last optimist, p .228.
33 A H N , Min. Gob. Leg. 2A , Exp.22 and Leg. 18 A  Exp.8-12. M ost o f  the com m unications were made to 
intercede on beh alf o f  “political and social prisoners”.
34 Shlom o B en-A m i, Fascism from  above, The dictatorship o f  Primo de Rivera in Spain, 1923-1930 , 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983, pp.49-78.
35 M anuel Azana, Diarios, 1932-1933 , Los cuadernos robados, Critica, Madrid, 1998, p.44.
36 In the account o f  Alvarez del V ayo, Prieto is mentioned as the only one who opposed the commuting 
o f  Sanjurjo’s death sentence. A lvarez del Vayo, The last optimist, p.228.
37 For a com prehensive analysis o f  the formation o f  the M exican political system, see Rolando Cordera y 
Carlos T ello , M exico. La disputa por la Nacion, Perspectivas y  opciones de desarrollo, S ig lo  XXI, 
M exico, 1984.
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Although there were rifts within the political elite, major conflicts or rebellions were 
not as menacing as before, however, the need for real unity was evident, and the 
unifying factor was Calles. Ortiz Rubio had no other choice but to resign, and he did so 
on 2 September 1932, when Calles withdrew his support.38
W ithin a matter o f days, the Congress, officially, elected Abelardo L. Rodriguez as
-JQ
Ortiz Rubio’s replacement. Acknowledging Calles supremacy, Rodriguez himself 
openly stated that he considered himself an administrator and not a politician. So, as 
long as his post o f administrator was respected, Rodriguez left Calles free to act as he 
pleased politically.40 Abelardo L. Rodriguez completed the task, finishing the first six- 
year period for which Obregon had been elected. It was a period o f building up 
institutions, and economic growth, similar to the time of prosperity o f the early years of 
Primo de Rivera in Spain. The years o f the maximato still had a strong social tendency, 
although seemingly slowing down the pace enforcing the legal precepts favouring 
peasants and keeping a submissive labour leadership. The need to take further the 
revolutionary programme grew, but the so-called revolutionary family was not 
homogeneous nor had it identical perceptions o f how better to serve the cause o f 
revolution, and given the fact that organised opposition was non-existent, the main 
political confrontations occurred within the governing elite.41
In the meantime, while in Madrid del Vayo did not loosen his grip on Mexican 
business. At all times he kept Calles informed about the goings-on in the “Spanish 
inter-ministerial mission” that had been sent to Mexico by the Spanish Government in 
order to discover new ways for increasing bilateral economic cooperation.
38 A ccording to the M exican Constitution, in case o f  vacancy o f  the post o f  elected president w ithin the 
first tw o years o f  an official term, an interim  president should be appointed by the Congress in order to 
call elections. I f  the vacancy occurs w ithin the final two years, a substitute president should be appointed  
to conclude the term in office.
39 A ccording to his ow n account, Pani was on top o f  the list that Calles had decided to use to so lve  the 
substitution. C alles w as to propose a list o f  three candidates to Gen. M anuel Perez Trevino, president o f  
the PNR; those were, first, A lberto J. Pani, Finance M inister; Gen. Joaquin A m aro, War M inister; and 
A belardo L. Rodriguez, Industry, Trade and Labour M inistry. However, Pani did not w ish  to succeed  
Ortiz R ubio as a result o f  the so le  decision  o f  one man, i.e. C alles, so he begged  Calles not to be  
designed, and proposed Abelardo R odriguez instead. See A lberto J. Pani, A puntes au tobiograficos, t. II, 
pp. 169-170, and Silva H erzog, E l pen sam ien to  econom ico, pp.505-506.
40 Cordova, La R evolucon en crisis, p .3 10.
41 T his is probably one o f  the few  issues where historians o f  the M exican revolution coincide. A m aldo  
Cordova supports his argument with the aid o f  Lorenzo M eyer, Rafael Segovia  and Alejandra Lajous; 
Cordova, La R evolucion  en crisis, pp .23-25.
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Furthermore, del Vayo wrote senores Suanzes and Marchesi letters o f recommendation 
to facilitate their assignment, while keeping Calles informed, as was his custom.42
On September 8,1932, Manuel Azana wrote in his diary: "Alvarez del Vayo, who 
came back from Mexico as a devotee o f General Calles, tells me about his triumphs 
over those lands. He is very enthusiastic about the project o f building ships for Mexico 
in Spain, and he assures me that Calles wants to commission them here."43 Azana’s 
observation was probably accurate, but the project o f building ships for Mexico was 
not a small business. Apart form providing jobs for the Spanish shipyards, Azana 
foresaw that, in the worst-case scenario, that is if  Mexico failed to pay, as a creditor, 
Spain would acquire a new position, more prestigious in the Americas.44 Besides, 
Alvarez del Vayo’s interest in strengthening relations with Mexico extended much 
further to than just normalizing the relations between Spain and its former biggest 
colony. He was convinced o f the importance o f establishing a new Latin American 
Spanish foreign policy with Mexico as the essential vehicle o f  its implementation as 
Spain’s stronghold in the Americas. In support o f this, he regarded as highly important 
the economic interest o f the shipbuilding project for Mexico, but went further by 
acknowledging the importance o f setting the basis for a permanent “modem and 
pragmatic close economic link between the two revolutionary republics.”45 Thus, his 
remarks that the previous fictitious hispcinoamericanismo did not go far enough in his 
opinion and in which both Mexico and Venezuela would have the same influence were 
not entirely unwarranted.46
Whilst negotiations were under way in Mexico, in Madrid it was necessary to pass a 
bill, for the proposal o f the agreement included the concession to the Mexican 
Government o f a loan from Spain. Before the Cortes could agree to authorise it, an 
acrimonious debate took place with the fervent opposition o f the Right-wing parties.
42 Letter A lvarez del V ayo to C alles 30  Septem ber 1932, FAPECyFT, A PEC , E xp.218 Inv.218 Julio 
A lvarez del V ayo Gav.3.
43 Azana, D iario s, pp .59-60. It is interesting to note from  this how  deferentially C alles is referred to, as i f  
it w as he and not Ortiz R ubio w ho w as the actual president o f  M exico. Certainly this w as the period o f  
the m axim ato , and it is clear that he w as an influential person in M exican politics, a fact acknow ledged  
both in M exico  and elsew here.
44 Azana, D iarios, 1 9 32 -I 933 , p. 111.
45 Letter A lvarez del V ayo to Calles 30  Septem ber 1932, FAPECyFT A P E C , E xp.218 Inv.218 Julio 
A lvarez del V ayo Gav.3.
46 Idem.
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Strongly arguing against the proposal, and even offensively attacking Mexico, Gil 
Robles attempted to thwart the agreement, but finally the majority o f the Centre-Left 
coalition approved it. President Alcala Zamora signed the Decree on 28 December 
1932.47
In spite o f the best o f intentions, matters were not running as smoothly as it had been 
hoped they would. The Spanish commercial mission had a difficult and at times 
frustrating task to perform in convincing the Mexican naval authorities of the value o f 
Spanish expertise in the field and the economic benefits of the proposed deal. 
Ironically, major obstacle to be overcome before achieving their aim was the 
opposition to the project o f the former Mexican ambassador to Spain, Alberto J. Pani, 
and now Finance Minister. Whether because of other arrangements that were more 
convenient for Pani or simply from jealousy at this achievement, which he could have 
managed for himself, the fact remains that he did not fully back the initiative. He acted 
in this way in spite o f his previous diplomatic appointment and his fervent expressions 
for a new and more productive bilateral cooperation. Once all the obstacles were 
overcome on both sides, the final agreement to build five war vessels o f over thousand 
tons and ten boats o f 140 tons was signed on 13 March 1933. They benefited mainly 
Basque shipbuilding companies. This sole event demonstrated fully the extent to 
which Mexican Spanish bilateral relations had reached.49 Many other would be 
thwarted, either by local interests, or political changes in Spain.
47 A M AE, M inisterio de Estado, Leg. R -963 E xp.94, C onstrucciones navales d e g u e rra  p a ra  M exico, 14 
Feb 1933.
48 A M AE, M inisterio de Estado, Leg. R -963 E xp.94, C onstrucciones n ava les de  gu erra  p a ra  M exico, 14 
Feb 1933.
The agreed calendar for paym ents w as thus:
1 Jan 1934 10*000,000 ptas. 2*500,000 p esos 1 Jan 1937 15’3 1 5 ,0 0 0  pts 3 ’828,750
pesos
1 Jan 1935 l l ’3 1 5 ,0 0 0 p ts  2 ’8 2 8 ,750  pesos 1 Jan 1938 17*315,000 pts 4*328,750
pesos
1 Jan 1936 13*315,000 pts 3 *328,750 pesos
Total 67*260,000 pts 16*815,000 pesos 
Plus 5 per cent interest for credit and balance due. M exican Spanish bilateral econom ic exchange for the 
remaining o f  the decade w ould be defined around this debt.
49 The relevance o f  the naval contract is show n by the amount o f  correspondence betw een the Comision  
M exicana d e  C onstruccion  N ava l and the M inistry o f  War regarding the hiring o f  workers, payrolls, 
buying o f  equipm ent for the ships and the reports o f  M exican personnel in Spain betw een 1933 and 
1936. A H D M , EM ESP, Leg. 630 to Leg. 677.
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In fact, prior Spanish residents bear no small responsibility in the failure to reach a 
formal agreement between the two governments, in spite of negotiations being carried 
out. The trade balance favoured Mexico, and although the Spanish Government pushed 
the negotiations, the fact that the Spanish residents, mostly traders, found themselves in 
opposition to the interests o f the Spanish exporters complicated and doomed any 
agreement. No treaty o f Friendship was signed, although the failure o f negotiations 
revealed the limits o f compromise.50
One o f the many uncompleted projects was the erection o f a monument dedicated to 
Friendship (the one between Mexico and Spain, that is) to be built in Cuernavaca. This 
was the same city where the murals by Rivera in Cortes Palace’s had offended Spanish 
pride by their portrayal o f the conquest as no less than an outrageous massacre and rape 
o f the indigenous Mexican -Aztec and other local ethnic groups. Likewise, the official 
textbooks were criticized by the Spanish Ambassador backed by the Spanish colony, 
for the “distorted and offensive description o f the first Spaniards in Mexico”.51 There 
was also much criticism of the anti-Spanish campaign orchestrated by different groups 
all over the country. The attitude, which the Mexican authorities adopted in response, 
gave some reassurance to the Spanish colony and would also be praised as a diplomatic 
victory. This was to gain the liberal Spanish ambassador the support o f the 
overwhelmingly conservative Spanish colony and its organizations, such as the Casino 
Espanol. During his two year period as Spanish ambassador, del Vayo’s commitment 
towards the interest o f Spain and the Spaniards living in Mexico would rightly deserve 
the praise o f both Mexicans and Spanish alike. The monument was never built, the 
murals remained in their place at the palace, and the textbooks continued to portray the 
same savage but truthful image o f the conquistadors. Nevertheless, the friendship 
between Spain and Mexico was stronger than ever, and domestic and foreign visitors, 
including numerous Spaniards, continued to visit gladly Cuernavaca and its murals.52
50 A M A E , M in. Edo. Leg. R -445, Exp.5, N egociaciones p a ra  con cretar un Tratado d e  A m istad , and 
Exp.9, N egociaciones com ercia les.
51 Letter A lvarez del V ayo to C alles 23 M ay 1933, FAPECyFT, A PEC , E xp.218 Inv. 218 Julio A lvarez  
del V ayo Gav.3.
52 Another frustrated venture pursued b y  del V ayo w as the projected visit o f  President A lcala Zamora to 
M exico. After the initial agreement, because o f  political circum stances in Spain, the Spanish  
representation in M exico dropped the idea; A lvarez del V ayo, The la s t op tim ist, p .238.
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During the period that could have been conveyed as politically stable and even
promising for strengthening the democratic-reformist tendencies in Spain, Alvarez del
Vayo wrote a rather optimistic letter to Calles, explaining how things were finally
heading in the right direction. Moreover, he reassured Calles that Azana’s position was
secure and that the knowledge gained from experience o f Germany, with the arrival in
power o f Nazism, had been useful for reaching unity between the democratic and
•  • • •progressive forces in Spain. An enthusiastic -overoptimistic, as he would 
permanently be considered by many o f his colleagues- Alvarez del Vayo finishes by 
saying: La revolution siguey  hacia la izquierda (The revolution goes on and towards 
the Left).54
In his reply, Calles said that he was pleased to know that things were going smoothly in 
Spain and that Azana had strengthened his position. The old Mexican revolutionary, 
however, did not waste the opportunity to offer his advice and expressed his opinion 
that now was the chance for the Spanish Government to clearly show the radical 
tendencies -h e  assumed- o f the Spanish movement. He urged them to do something 
that “moves and imposes itse lf’ so that the masses would know with whom their future 
laid and what future there was for the great Spanish Republic.55
An unequivocal demonstration of their ideological affinities, although not very 
considerate towards the ecclesiastical institution, was Calles’ telegram to Alvarez del 
Vayo on 5 June 1933, greeting personally through him “all the members o f the Spanish 
Government who were excommunicated by the Pope”.56 By demonstrating this attitude 
he was acting in a manner that was not only consistent with his own policies towards 
the Mexican clergy but also in a way that acknowledged the influence the Vatican had 
on both countries’ ecclesiastical position against progressive reforms. There is no 
evidence, however, that an actual excommunication was issued against the Republican 
Government on that day, or any other, for that matter. Nevertheless, that cannot 
obscure the fact that the Vatican authorities were ostensibly opposed to reformist
53 Letter A lvarez delV ayo to C alles, 23 M ay 1933, FA PE C yFY , APEC, E xp.218 Inv. 218  Julio Alvarez 
del V ayo, Gav. 3.
54 Idem .
55 Letter C alles to A lvarez del V ayo , 30 M ay 1933, FAPECyFT, APEC, E xp.218 Inv. 218  Julio A lvarez 
del V ayo, Gav. 3.
56 Telegram  C alles to del V ayo 5 June 1933, FAPECyFT, APEC, E xp.218 Inv.218 Julio A lvarez del 
V ayo, Gav. 3.
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republicanism in Spain and regarded State-Church relations in the same way they had 
some years earlier in Mexico.
I f  Alvarez del Vayo was the living embodiment o f the new Spanish way o f dealing 
with Mexico and the Americas, it was not just by his own personal inclination. The 
establishment of the Spanish Republic had effectively brought a new perspective 
towards the most important issues in Spanish political and social life, and the 
symbolism o f republicanism had become the trademark for reform and modernization.
Another factor relevant for Mexican-Spanish relations, if  indirectly, was the fact that 
American foreign policy towards Mexico was based on the imperialistic Monroe 
doctrine. Such an approach was evidently in conflict with the new Spanish Ibero- 
American perspective o f the Republican regime. Tom between its two most important 
foreign relationships, Mexico successfully manoeuvred to remain close to its Spanish 
heart, but not to far away from American money.57
The arrival o f Josephus Daniels as American Ambassador in Mexico in April 1933, 
changed the mood o f Mexican-American relations. The work of his predecessor, 
Reuben Clark, in the ambassadorship, was good, an interregnum for improving the soil, 
certainly less successful than the “ham and eggs” diplomacy of Dwight Morrow in the 
1920s, but good enough to keep the trend. Daniels’ determination to so convincingly 
pursue President Roosevelt’s New Deal policy, however, was to prove o f exceptional 
and extraordinary importance for the future of this relationship. It was not, 
nevertheless, solely the Good Neighbor policy that would enable the Mexican 
Government to develop its revolutionary programme, the latter necessarily affecting 
American interests. It was a happy coincidence indeed, just as Lazaro Cardenas
CO
acknowledged, and a relevant consideration before important decisions were made. 
Nevertheless, it would be very simplistic to assume that concurrence as the sole reason 
that explains Mexican foreign policy or economic policy under Lazaro Cardenas.
57 Friedrich E. Schuler, M exico betw een  H itler an d  Roosevelt, M exican F oreign R elations in the A g e  o f  
L azaro C ardenas, 1934-1940 , U niversity o f  N ew  M exico Press, Albuquerque, 1998, pp.33-91.
58 Frank Tannenbaum, M exican stru gg le  f o r  p e a c e  and  bread, Knopf, N ew  York, 1960, p. 197; Krauze, 
B iografia , p .470.
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As the celebrations o f the second anniversary o f the Spanish Republic were still festive 
and optimistic, some hard-core Catholic and Monarchist groups were awaiting the 
opportunity to show their true colours.59 The democratic institutions in Republican 
Spain seemed to be working, but their major task, to contain the excesses o f radical 
groups, was still to be tested. The fierce political confrontations between opposite 
parties, however, did not resemble only a pro-Monarchist v Republican struggle. As the 
Republican Government went further in implementing its reformist and progressive 
policies, the political tussle became more clearly defined in traditional terms, a Left- 
wing, socialist and reformist camp v a Right-wing, conservative and reactionary camp. 
The general elections to the Cortes show the growing tension. The economic situation 
was stable but feeble. Likewise, the political confrontation between the most radical 
groups started showing some violent features that escaped the control o f both the 
government and political organisations.60
Political tension notwithstanding, the moderate Republican- Socialist coalition 
governing Spain during the first two years o f the new regime manage to pass some 
relevant legislation favouring the changes long awaited by the Spanish people. The 
most important issues included the Agrarian Reform, State-Church relations and the 
Catalan statute. Timid in principle, the legislation approved pointed out the direction 
towards structural change. However, because o f their limited scope they also meant 
that the Right-wing parties would use them to further antagonise the dissatisfied 
groups.61
In contrast to the Mexican experience, and as a response to the Republican challenge, a 
relevant feature in Spanish politics was the proliferation o f Right-wing organisations. 
The conservative and authoritarian Monarchist, Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera y Saenz 
de Heredia, adopted an ultra-nationalist position. He had become involved in politics as 
a result o f his decision to clear his father's name62 and became the leader o f the fascist 
organisation that wanted a totalitarian state in Spain, Falange Espanola. Ideologically 
identified with Fascism, the FE  was a clear response to the progressive republican
59 A H N , M in. Gob., L eg. 45 A , Exp.9, Segundo A niversario  d e  la R epublica , 1933.
60 A H N , M in. Gob. Leg. 31 A , Exp.3, E lecciones gen era les de  d ipu tados a las C ortes, 1933.
61 Paul, Preston, La D estruccion  de  la D em ocracia  en E spana, Reform a, reaccion  y  revolucion en la  
Segunda R epublica , Grijalbo, Barcelona, 2001 , pp.83 and 178.
62 Preston, Las tres E span as , p. 103.
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movement. It would soon be merged with another Fascist party, the Juntas de Ofensiva 
Nacional Sindicalista, led by Onesimo Redondo and Ramiro Ledesma.
Besides the FE de las JONS, the other important Right-wing organisation in Spain was 
the Confederacion Espanola de Derechas Autonomas (CEDA), led by Jose Ma. Gil 
Robles. The CEDA was in fact bigger than FE de las JONS, and also the combination 
o f different organisations with common aims. After the fall of the monarchy, several 
groups, both Catholic and Monarchist such as Accion Catolica, Confederacion 
Nacional Catolico Agraria, and others, pursued unification. Having witnessed the 
progressive reforms proposed by the centre-Left Republican coalition, the Right-wing 
organisations were determined to fight to preserve their privileges. On their unification 
congress, which took place early in 1933, their declared aim was to defend Christian 
values, and the revision o f the Constitution, particularly regarding education, religion 
and property.64 They had the encouragement of the recent election o f Hitler as 
Chancellor in Germany, and they intended to follow in his steps: to use legal means to 
seize power and destroy the regime from within. These Right-wing organisations 
maintained close contact with their Italian and German counterparts.65 Gil Robles 
defiantly declared that a Right-wing victory would herald the end o f the Republic.66 
The FE de las JONS and the CEDA posed a major threat to the Republic.
Meanwhile, the Mexican revolutionary regime, although progressive and at times 
radical, was not perceived as such by those Mexican radicals under the influence o f the 
Communist International. During the years o f the maximato era, the image o f a 
repressive, anti-workers and counter-revolutionary government in Mexico was 
portrayed in the IC newsletter. Under the title o f “Savage terror in Mexico”, the 
International Press Correspondence described the Mexican Government as anti-
fndemocratic and totalitarian. Considered by the International Communist as a 
repressive regime, in any case, the Mexican Government had no interest in promoting 
any Communist influence, but had no intention o f suppress it either. In fact, having no
63 Stanley Payne, F alange, A H istory o f  Spanish Fasism , Standford University Press, California, 1961, 
p p .38-48 .
64 Preston, The C om ing o f  the Spanish C iv il War, p.65.
65 Claude B ow ers, M y M ision to Spain , pp.74-75; D uchess o f  A tholl, Search ligh t on Spain, Penguin, 
London, 1938, pp .345-346 .
66 B ow ers, M y M ission , p. 181.
67 Inprecorr, January-December 1933, num. 6 p. 159.
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relations with any local Socialist oriented organisations, the envoys o f the IC had 
created the Mexican Communist Party in 1919, but their work produced no significant 
result for a while. Perhaps the most relevant event regarding the Mexican CP was the 
incorporation in the mid 1920s o f some activists like Diego Rivera and Alfaro 
Siqueiros, both with strong current and future Spanish connections. Both Mexican 
muralists had previously organised the Revolutionary Painters, Sculptors and 
Engravers Union, and produced the weekly El Machete, which eventually became the
/ 'O
Party’s newspaper. By the early 1930s, however, the M CP’s influence was very 
limited.
On the other side of the political spectrum in opposition, the Mexican Right intended to 
divert the path of the governmental reform, although it lacked any strong political 
impulse, and no organised party. In fact, it would not be until the end o f the decade, 
strongly influenced by the Spanish experience, and considering the threat that a 
government like Cardenas’ represented to their interests, that they decided and were 
able to organise a political party. (See Chapter VI)
A significant event that contributed further to the strengthening o f Mexican Spanish 
relations, was the unfortunate accident in Mexico involving a famous team of aviators 
taking part in an historical flight. Having set themselves the challenge -a  transatlantic 
flight between Madrid and Mexico City, via Havana- the Spanish pilots Barberan and 
Collart successfully completed the first and most dangerous part o f the flight. In fact, 
the successful arrival o f the Spanish pilots to Havana was an extraordinary 
accomplishment in itself, leaving the remaining journey as part o f a triumphal entrance 
in Mexico, in which “Mexicans and Spaniards should lose themselves in a mutual 
embrace.”69 Just when both Mexican and Spanish public eyes were expecting an 
imminent and glorious arrival in Mexico City airport, the lack o f news foretold a tragic 
outcome. The loss o f both visual and radio contact with the Spanish crew only minutes 
away from landing made the anxious onlookers fear the worst. With the passage o f 
time, the sense of hopelessness only increased, and even though there was no 
confirmation o f the crash straightaway, it was clear to everybody that this was what had
68 D avid Alfaro Siqueiros, M e llam aban e l C oronelazo , p .23; A ngelica  Arenal de Siqueiros, in V id a y  
O bra de  D a v id  A lfaro Siqueiros, Ju icios C riticos, FCE, M exico , 1975, p.8; D iego  Rivera, M y A rt, my  
life, An A utobiography, (w ith Gladys M arch) N ew  York, 1991, p .26.
69 Julio A lvarez del V ayo , The la s t optim ist, Putnam, London, 1950, p .238.
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happened. On 27 June 1933, there was actual confirmation o f the disaster when the 
bodies o f the Spanish pilots were found and the accident became a national tragedy in
7AMexico. Soon del Vayo would leave Mexico for his new diplomatic assignment and 
the new Spanish representative would have to wait a few months to be nominated. The 
Spanish political situation was giving birth to the antithesis o f what had been so far the
» ♦ • 71spirit o f republicanism.
The Spanish general elections in the fall o f 1933 gave the triumph to the Right-wing 
coalition, and what had so far been intimated became a bitter truth; the liquidation o f 
the economic and social reforms accomplished by the previous government was on the 
way at the hands o f the new government o f the Republic. Ambassador Estrada could 
not help but show his disappointment after the arrival o f the Right-wing Government in 
Madrid. He knew, and so he informed the Mexican Foreign Ministry, that the Lerroux 
Government was to be not only less friendly but even hostile towards Mexico and its 
government.72
Social and economic reform was implemented during the first period o f Republican 
Government. The second period, with the Right having won the majority o f the seats in 
the Cortes, was a counter-reformist era. Thus, effectively, the "liquidation o f the 
reforms was an essential part o f the liquidation of democracy in Spain."73 Not long 
afterwards, again it was Azana, while addressing the crowd o f members o f the Left
70 Various telegrams betw een C alles and A lvarez del V ayo, 12-27 June 1933, FAPECyFT, APEC, 
Exp.218 Inv. 218 Julio A lvarez del V ayo, Gav. 3.
71 A lvarez del V ayo was appointed as the first Spanish R epublican A m bassador to the Soviet U nion in 
the sum mer o f  1933, shortly after Spain granted recognition to the S oviet Governm ent. The change o f  
governm ent in Spain, and the arrival o f  a R ight-w ing governm ent frustrated the appointment. The first 
ambassador to the U SSR , M arcelino Pascua, was not appointed until after the C iv il War had begun; Julio 
A lvarez del V ayo, F reed o m ’s  B attle, Heinem ann, London, 1940, p .25. The episode o f  the Soviet 
recognition by Spain m otivated Genaro Estrada’s com m ents to qualify the act as “inadequate, lega lly  
wrong, and even  imprudent”. The D octrin a  E strada, proposed by the M exican diplomat, repudiated such 
pretence and proclaim ed that a governm ent should refrain from recognising others, safeguarding its right 
to keep or withdraw its diplom atic representatives as a de fa c to  recognition. That has been  the M exican  
foreign practice ever since, and was in the base o f  its Spanish foreign policy; E m bajada  de  M exico en 
E spana (1932-1934), A H D M , num. 29 Cuarta epoca, La D ip lom acia  en A ccidn, G enaro E strada , SRE, 
M exico, 1987, pp .177-183, E l an tigobiern ism o sistem atico  d e l p u eb lo  E sp a n o ly  e l  establecim ien to  de  
relaciones con la Union Sovie tica , San Sebastian, 3 A ugust 1933.
72 E m bajada de  M exico en E spana (1932-1934), A H D M , dispatch La com posicion  d e l g o b ie m o  d e  
Lerroux, Madrid, 18 Septem ber 1933. AREM : 34-2 -17 , pp .184-187.
73 Bowers, M y m ission, p .l  17.
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Republican Youth gathered at the Coliseum Pardinas in Madrid on 16 April 1934, who 
summed up the situation: “We have to start all over again!”74
Meanwhile, in Mexico, shortly before leaving, Alvarez del Vayo received a note from 
the American ambassador referring and editorial o f the Cronos newspaper in Puebla, in 
which the work o f both ambassadors was praised. “I hope your standing will not be 
injured by your being classed with me”.75 In fact, Josephus Daniels became the most 
popular American ambassador to Mexico and yet, was unable to establish a closer 
relationship than the one Alvarez del Vayo had developed with both Mexican 
authorities and citizens, and his fellow countrymen. Having said that, it would only be 
fair to acknowledge the fact that Daniels was playing second best in general terms 
during the del Vayo years, but once del Vayo was gone, he was the most popular and 
well-received foreign diplomat in Mexico. In spite o f his nationality or perhaps because 
of it, at times he was also regarded as the champion o f Mexican conservatives.
Nevertheless, Daniels showed a more liberal view towards Latin America than 
expected, given his involvement in previous aggressive actions, such as the invasion 
and bombing of Veracruz in 1914. During the revolutionary period in Cuba in 1933, for 
instance, the possibility o f an American military invasion was again contemplated, 
namely because of a so-called Communist threat. Josephus Daniels had both the 
common sense and the ability to contribute to clearing the air. “In our country”, he 
wrote to the Secretary o f State, “and elsewhere people attribute to Communism all the 
agencies that work evil.” Furthermore, he recounted the following anecdote about a 
Cameron of Scotland: “ .. .in his (Lord Lochiel’s) inability to give a definition (of a 
Bolshevist) satisfactorily to himself, (he) said, ‘Oh well, a Bolshevist is anybody you 
don’t like”. “May not the rich and powerful o f Cuba, and their allies in the US, and 
imperialistic officers”, prudently inquired Daniels, “be behind the attempt to hide 
behind exaggerating the lawlessness of Communists? I do not know, but I submit the
77question for your consideration.” This time, at least, there was no American 
intervention, and Daniels’ contribution to that effect was of no little significance. The
74 Azana, En e lp o d e r ,  p .4 1 1.
75 A G A , FM A E , IDD 61, Leg. 16o. Excmo. Sr. D. Julio  A lvarez d e l Vayo. E m bajador de  Espana. 
E xpediente person a l. (III-s-II), press cutting o f  C ronos, 8 July 1933.
76 M emorandum o f  telephone conversation betw een the Secretary o f  State and Ambassador in M exico  
(D aniels), 9  Septem ber 1933, FR U S, 1933, V ol. V , The A m ericas, pp .412-413 .
77 Letter D aniels to Secretary o f  State, Cordell Hull 9 Septem ber 1933, FR U S, 1933, V ol. V , pp .414-415.
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closeness between Ambassador Daniels and both President Roosevelt and Secretary o f 
State Cordel Hull was an essential part of his performance as American representative 
in Mexico. The combination of both teams, the American new dealer and the Mexican 
cardenista, produced the proper recipe to allow the Mexican Spanish foreign policy to 
flourish.
When del Vayo left Mexico, he did not know his diplomatic mission in Mexico was 
over. As was customary, the secretaries acting as charge de affairs ad interim would 
fill in for the ambassadors in their absence. Alvaro Seminario thus covered the six- 
month period between the departure o f del Vayo and the arrival of his successor. In 
spite of this somehow irregular state o f affairs, considering the strong nature o f such a 
link, diplomatic relations between Spain and Mexico were not severed, although further 
strengthening was prevented by it. Seminario acted as an intermediary between Alvarez 
del Vayo and Calles when Ramon Franco visited Mexico.78 Replying to the official 
request to meet him, Calles informed the secretary of the Spanish embassy that he “will 
gladly receive (...) Commander Franco, in Cuernavaca.”79
The new Spanish ambassador, Domingo Barnes Salinas, presumably following the 
advice o f del Vayo, also intended to develop as close a relationship with the still Jefe 
Maximo, as his predecessor had so successfully and efficiently done. As soon as he 
arrived in Mexico early in 1934, Barnes wrote to Calles expressing his delight and 
privilege in cultivating his friendship, sending also some o f the books he had written 
along with the letter.80 As a cold reminder o f the maximato style, Barnes received a 
reply written by Calles’ private assistant, Soledad Gonzalez, who politely 
acknowledged the words of the ambassador towards Calles, while making it clear that 
no books had accompanied the letter.81 Barnes was presented with a much more 
favourable opportunity to befriend Calles when he had to inform him o f the decision o f
78 Letter Seminario to C alles 23 D ecem ber 1933, FAPECyFT, APEC, Exp.2 Inv. 4639 , Luis Quer B oule, 
Gav. 63.
79 Telegram  C alles to Seminario 6 January 1934, FAPECyFT, APEC, Exp.2 Inv. 4639 , Luis Quer B oule, 
Gav. 63.
80 Letter Barnes to C alles 2 February 1934, FAPECyFT, APEC, Exp.2 4693 , Luis Quer B oule, Gav. 63.
81 Letter G onzalez to Barnes 28  February 1934, FAPECyFT, APEC, Exp.2 4693 , Luis Quer B ou le, Gav. 
63.
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the president o f the Spanish Republic to decorate Calles with the Banda de la Orden de 
la Republica,82
At this stage, the lead in promoting and taking further the bilateral relationship was 
solely in the hands o f the Mexican Ambassador. Continuing his methodical 
performance, Estrada sent several despatches referring to the case o f Valle-Inclan who 
lived in poverty. The Spanish poet, whose pride and perhaps strident style and 
eccentric way o f life rejected the financial support offered to him by the Spanish 
Cortes. Valle-Inclan had visited Mexico during the Obregon years in the early 
twenties, and befriended both Obregon and Calles. Now an old and impoverished man, 
his situation was o f some concern to Mexican officials given the outspoken admiration 
and declared sympathy o f the poet towards Mexico and the Mexican leaders. 
Eventually, after the increasing deterioration of Valle-Inclan’s emotional state and 
living conditions, vividly expressed in a letter to Calles in March 1934, Estrada got the 
“all clear” to provide the means for Valle-Inclan to travel to Mexico.85 Calles, the 
strongman o f Mexico, resolved for the Mexican Government to pay for Inclan’s 
travelling expenses. Furthermore, he also decided to fund, through the Ministry of 
Education, a series o f lectures during a period o f four months and a monthly salary o f 
$400.86 In the end, Valle-Inclan did not go back to Mexico, but his name was already 
deeply rooted in Mexican cultural life.
During the process whereby the new Centre-Right governments in Spain began 
dismantling all the progressive reforms carried out by the Left-wing Republican 
Government, Estrada pointed out accurately that even the excellent bilateral relations 
with Mexico would be affected. Similarly, as happened with the various projects 
initiated by del Vayo in Mexico, the different plans that Estrada envisaged to further
82 Letter Barnes to C alles 2 M ay 1934, FA PEC yFT, APEC, Exp.2 4693 , Luis Quer B oule, Gav. 63.
83 Letter Estrada to C alles 28  July 1932, FAPECyFT, APEC, Exp. 108, L eg 2 /2 , Inv. 1939, Genaro 
Estrada, Gav. 30.
84 Telegram  Estrada to C alles, 1 October 1932, FAPECyFT, A PEC , Exp.8 Leg. 2 /2  Inv. 1939, Genaro 
Estrada, Gav. 30.
85 Letter Estrada to C alles, 12 March 1934, FAPECyFT, A PEC , E xp.25, Inv. 1345, Genaro Estrada, Gav. 
47 (13010302).
86 Letter JB (on b eh a lf o f  C alles) to Estrada, 6 M ay 1934, A PEC yFT, A PEC , E xp.25, Inv. 1345, Genaro 
Estrada, Gav. 47  (13010302).
87 E m bajada de M exico en E spana (1932-1934), A H D M , num. 29 , Cuarta epoca, La D ip lom acia  en 
A ccion, G enaro E strada , SRE, M exico, 1987, dispatch La represion  a los g ru pos d e  Izq u ie rd a y  e l 
deterioro  de  las re lac ion es entre M exico y  E spana, Madrid, 26  M arch 1934, p p .213-217.
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strengthen the bilateral relations collapsed with the fall o f the Republican-socialist 
Government. One of the most important o f such ideas was the possibility o f Spain 
buying oil from Mexico. Even Spain’s main oil supplier, the USSR, was concerned 
about such a possibility, and sent a commission to Madrid, officially to explore the
QO
construction o f war vessels in Spam.
As a result o f the inclusion of the CEDA in the government by the end o f 1934, the 
centre Left parties decided it was time for action. The big labour organisations,
Socialist and Anarchist, were pushing for a rebellion to overthrow the CEDA 
government, and a popular uprising was being planned. The leaders o f the main parties 
were doubtful o f the success o f the action and tried to discourage the masses, but the 
rank and file were already in the move. The action was planned to take place in 
October 1934, but the Barcelona and Madrid organisations fail to mobilise the workers. 
The Asturias workers, led by Gonzalez Pena and other UGT and local PSOE  leaders, 
were on their own. Although not entirely convinced o f the prospects o f success, they 
were persuaded by the eagerness of the rank and file. They were severely repressed. 
Barnes Salinas resigned his ambassadorial post in protest at the repression unleashed. 
Ramon Maria de Pujadas Gaston, First Secretary o f the Spanish Embassy, filled a long 
period of vacancy in the ambassadorial post as Charge de Affaires a.i. The delay in 
appointing an ambassador had everything to do with the political situation in Spain and 
the different perspective with which the new Spanish Government approached Latin 
America. The lack o f Spanish ambassador in Mexico was not only a set back in formal 
terms. Pujadas being in charge, the previous prejudiced vision o f the typically 
conservative Hispanism , regained control of the Spanish embassy in Mexico and filled 
the reports sent to Madrid.89
Cardenas took office in December 1934, and, given the state o f the affairs in Spain, and 
the lack o f Spanish Ambassador appointed to Mexico, a Spanish representation was 
sent to attend the official ceremony for the handing over to the president elect. The
88 E m bajada de  M exico  en E spana (1932-1934), A H D M , dispatch P etrd leo , Madrid, 24 January 1933, 
AREM: III-1320-5, p p .249-250.
89 A G A , FM AE, ID D  61, Leg. 17o. E xpedien te p erso n a l de  Ram on M aria de  Pujadas, P rim er Secretario  
de la E m bajada , III s XII.
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Spanish diplomatic representative in Costa Rica, Luis Quer Boule, arrived in Mexico as 
Ambassador Extraordinary to witness Cardenas taking office as Mexican president.90
At the time, writing from Madrid, Alvarez del Vayo acknowledged Calles’ accurate 
predictions about Spain, and regreted that it seemed unavoidable that Spain had 
followed the Mexican pattern during the revolutionary turmoil. He was now convinced 
that “August 10th could and should have saved the Republic. (Because) ever since then 
it had started to die.”91
The revolutionary movement of October in which the miners o f Asturias played a 
central role was still fresh and del Vayo praises its heroic standing in the face o f the 
political shift towards the Right, as is clear from the inclusion o f the CEDA in the 
government. Furthermore, del Vayo considered that, out o f all the mistakes the 
Republicans made, the election o f Alcala Zamora to the Presidency o f the Republic 
was “the biggest mistake o f all.”92
Appreciating how these political changes in the Peninsula affected the bilateral 
relation, and, what is more, how in the end there was a political struggle beyond 
borders, Alvarez del Vayo summed up the situation like this:
“The hatred to the Spanish Left was shown (in times o f the Monarchy, and that 
was only natural) also as unfriendly attitudes toward Mexico. Ultimately, you 
and us are the same enemy for them (...) everybody on the side o f the Left and
QTthe revolution in Spain sees Mexico today more affectionately than ever.”
Shortly afterwards, the new Mexican Ambassador to Spain, Manuel Perez Trevino, was 
evidently a political exile, after having been Cardenas’ challenger for the candidacy to 
the presidency. His performance was not very relevant, limiting himself merely to 
follow protocol in Pani’s style. In any case, Perez Trevino’s views were far closer to
90 Telegram  Calles to Quer 5 D ecem ber 1934, FAPECyFT, APEC, Exp.2 4693 , Luis Quer B ou le, Gav. 
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91 Letter del V ayo to Calles, 14 D ecem ber 1934, FAPECyFT, APEC, E xp.218 Inv. 218 Julio A lvarez del 
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92 Letter del V ayo to Calles, 14 D ecem ber 1934, FAPECyFT, APEC, E xp.218, Inv. 218 , Julio A lvarez 
del V ayo, Gav. 3.
93 Idem.
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the lerrouxistas than to those o f the azanistas. He was the Mexican ambassador at the 
time o f the military rebellion in the summer o f 1936. (See Chapter IV).
Finally, the designation o f the Spanish Ambassador to Mexico in September 1935 was 
a further symptom of the political deterioration undergone in Spain. A close ally of 
Lerroux, and his protege, Emiliano Iglesias was a discredited and corrupt politician 
with no prestige left, about whom the Spanish Cortes had expressed its deep repulsion, 
and declared their incompatibility with such a person.94 President Alcala Zamora 
seemed to have no option but to accept the designation, as Lerroux, in alliance with Gil 
Robles, presented Iglesias’s appointment almost as a demand from Mexico.95 As a 
member o f the parliament, he even faced open opposition by fellow party members, 
which bitterly criticised him and officially disapproved his opinion like Martinez 
Barrio.96 Iglesias profited from the previous Spanish ambassadors in Mexico, 
particularly Alvarez del Vayo, but soon he was to be known for what his was. Needless 
to say no major contribution to the bilateral relationship was made during his time in 
Mexico. It was said that Mexico must have had a great deal o f affection towards 
Republican Spain to accept such a character as Spanish representative.97 He left after 
three months in his post, and though he was not as reactionary as Pujadas, his personal
ORactions kept the Spanish representation in the lowest point during the whole decade.
Meanwhile, another crisis was unfolding in Mexico, where the most conservative 
sectors o f the PNR in alliance with Calles were concerned about the direction o f 
Mexican politics, particularly as a result o f the strengthening o f Labour. Perceived as a 
real threat for the stability of the country during the early days o f Cardenas 
administration, the rise o f an independent labour movement, with the inevitable 
increase in the number o f strikes was at the centre o f the dispute. Calles blamed the 
leaders o f the workers, particularly Lombardo, but his attack was intended to reach 
Cardenas. Only six months after reporting the formation o f Cardenas cabinet in 
December 1934, Pujadas reported on the changes made by the Mexican president in
94 N iceto  A lcala Zamora, M em orias, Planeta, Barcelona, 1998, p .582-583 .
95 A lcala Zamora, M em orias , p .377.
96 M anuel A zana, D iarios com pletos, entry o f  29  October 1931, p .349 .
97 Juan S im eon Vidarte, Todos fu im os cu lpables, Testim onio d e  un soc ia lis ta  espafiol, FCE, M exico , 
1973, p.796.
98 A M A E , M in. E do., Leg. R -964, E xp.7, A ctuacion  d e l em ba ja d o r E m iliano Iglesias.
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response to the threat posed by Calles." Unfortunately for Calles, that was not the end 
o f it, and slowly but surely more o f his friends were removed from relevant posts in the 
Mexican Government.100 By mid June the crises deepened. On 11 June Ezequiel 
Padilla- Calles’s pet journalist- published an interview with Calles criticising the 
political situation o f the country, blaming the labour unions for the unprecedented 
number of strikes, and making a veiled threat to Cardenas by comparing the prevailing 
situation to that o f the eve of Ortiz Rubio’s resignation. The following day Lombardo 
called the formation of the Proletarian Defence Committee to face Calles’s criticism, 
and an 80 000-strong demonstration gathered backing Cardenas. (See Chapter III). On 
14 June, a Cabinet’s reshuffle took place. Calles decided to go on a long trip to the 
United States, and left on 18 June. For the next six months Cardenas continued his 
strategy o f strengthening his position and successfully manage to get the backing o f the 
Congress to remove callistas from governorships and both legislative chambers.101
On 22 December 1935, Lazaro Cardenas wrote in his Diary that drifting apart from 
General Calles depressed him, but Calles’s inconsistent attitude towards Cardenas 
responsibilities obliged him to fulfil his duties as the highest representative o f  the 
nation.102 Firm in his determination not to repeat the sad exhibition o f weakness o f his 
two predecessors, Cardenas defied Calles’s influence and decided he should leave the 
country in order to avoid sterile and likely violent confrontation between his followers 
and the government. The president’s progressive and liberal policies had secured him 
the backing o f the labour movement, which was led by Lombardo and was growing in 
numbers and strength. (See Chapter III).
Meanwhile in Spain, as most conservative Republicans, Alcala Zamora’s 
republicanism tended to challenge the political regime in terms o f the way o f 
conducting the government rather than its economic and social structure. It was only in
99 A M AE, M in. E do., dispatch no. 140, 17 June 1935, Leg. R -962, E xp.8.
100 Bulletin de R enseignem ents de E. Lombard, 1'Attache M ilitaire (W ashington), 5 February 1936, N° 
57/V . S.H .A .T. 7N  3373 (Etat-Major de l'Armee - Section d'lnformation des A ttaches M ilitaires - 
M exique), D ossier 2 (l'Armee - l'Aviation, la Marine - les materiels de guerre).
A s a result o f  the political crisis, General Joaquin Amaro, a c lose ally o f  Calles, w as rem oved as director 
o f  the M ilitary A cadem y in D ecem ber 1935. H e was replaced by Lieutenant C olonel A lam illo  Flores, a 
protege o f  Cardenas. I w ould like to thank Darren O lley for this information.
101 A licia Hernandez Chavez, H istoria  d e  la  R evolucion M exicana, p e r io d o  de  1934-1940, La m ecanica  
carden ista , C olegio  de M exico, M exico, 1979, pp.54-60.
102 Lazaro Cardenas, O bras, I-Apuntes 1913-1940 , Tom o I, U N A M , M exico , 1972, p .333.
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appearance a matter o f his degree o f commitment to change Spain’s political situation, 
but he failed to understand the need for a complete transformation o f the social, 
economic, and political spheres. Not a revolution in the traditional violent way, but a 
profound reform programme modernising Spanish political life and culture. In order to 
transform the social and political structure, at least some attempt must be made at 
changing the economic structure. The need for an electoral alliance was evident if  the 
Republican efforts to restore the changes of the early days o f the regime were to be 
rescued. Left-Republicans and Socialists were determined to regain the influence and 
control of the Cortes in order to achieve the social and economic reforms they 
wanted.103 The confrontation o f two opposed inflexible projects, together with foreign 
intervention, would eventually mean the destruction o f Spanish democracy. The Left- 
Republican and moderate Socialists realised that it was necessary to look for a broader 
coalition if  they were to regain control over the government and the Cortes to ensure 
the social reforms. They began to envisage a new strategy. It was at this stage that 
became clear that political struggle implied more than superficial or cosmetic changes. 
The general elections took place on 16 February 1936, and an historic triumph o f the 
Centre-Left coalition gathered in the Popular Front, seemed to have given the 
possibility o f rescuing the Spanish Republic.
On 20 February 1936, Calles sent a telegram congratulating Manuel Azana “for the 
triumph revolutionary ideals and (Spanish) Republic represents your presence in 
power.” Azana’s rather formal and laconic response, perhaps still under the influence 
of Guzman, “for the friendship and prosperity o f both republics”, came on 5 March 
1936.104
Within few months, both political figures were to face unsuspected and momentous 
events. Exile and war were to determine their fate, in an insinuation o f the times to 
come for thousands o f people on the two sides o f the Atlantic. But so far, both Mexico 
and Spain were going through a renovated impetus of social reform, regaining control 
of their most progressive institutions and gathering the strength to take the changes to 
unprecedented stages. Both the Mexican and the Spanish people were expecting that
103 H elen  Graham, Socialism  an d  war, The Spanish Socia lis t p a r ty  in p o w e r  an d  crisis, 1936-1939, 
Cambridge U niversity Press, Cambridge, 1991, p.24.
104 FAPECyFT, A rchivo Plutarco Elias Calles, E xp.216, Inv. 442 , M anuel Azana, Gav. 7.
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the good things promised to them would come. In Mexico the revolutionary 
programme that had lost vigour had to be reactivated. In Spain, the dismantling o f the 
reforms o f the first Republican Government was to oblige the new centre Left 
coalition, and the Popular Front Government, as Azana put it, to start all over again.
The outcome o f the Calles-Cardenas rift came with Calles being sent into exile to the 
United States on 10 April 1936, in the company o f his close aides Luis Leon, Melchor 
Ortega, and Luis N. Morones.105 On their arrival at Brownsville, they issued a public 
statement pointing out that Cardenas Government intended to establish a collective 
system similar to the Russian.106 He did not return to Mexico until after Cardenas’s 
administration ended, and the latter committed all his efforts to fulfilling the electoral 
programme for which he had been elected. The end o f the maximato period represented 
not only the strengthening o f Cardenas in power, but also the speeding up of the 
fulfilment o f the revolutionary programme. Some problems remained though, like the 
long-lasting religious tension, but Cardenas had a clear picture o f what kind of 
government he wanted in Mexico. He wanted to improve the living conditions for the 
poor and the working class, and to do so avoiding any bloodshed and thus finish his 
term in office with clean hands in every respect. That was to be known as the 
cardenismo.
As a result, the fervent demonstrations o f revolutionary zeal shown by some State 
governments that had further contributed to the mounting tension, particularly in the 
relations between the State and Church, diminished. The disposition o f not allowing 
unmarried priests entrance to one State, the closure o f many churches for no apparent 
reason, and the general attitude o f restraint towards the clergy was significantly
107reduced. However, in accordance with the Constitution, the Federal Government 
considered public interests would not oppose the reopening o f churches, where they 
had been closed by local authorities and not by virtue o f a Presidential Decree. Murray, 
from the British Legation in Mexico, reflected on the more tolerant attitude of the new 
administration towards "religious” questions in a letter to Mr. Eden:
105 Cardenas, O bras, I-Apuntes, p .339.
106 D aniels, Sh irt-S leeve D ip lom at, pp .64-65.
107 The m ost radical measures w ere applied in the cases o f  the states o f  Veracruz, under Adalberto 
Tejeda, Tabasco, with Tom as Garrido Canabal, and to a lesser degree M ichoacan, during Cardenas 
govem orship.T he prohibition o f  single priests to enter the State o f  Tabasco did not last long, though.
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“It is indeed difficult to see why President Cardenas should have taken over 
from his predecessor an antireligious policy which, from whatever point o f 
view it is regarded, has been carried too far, cannot possibly contribute to his 
popularity, and must inevitably have an adverse effect on relations with the 
United States o f America.”108
Nonetheless, a number o f incidents took place during the thirties, particularly involving 
rural teachers engaged in literacy campaigns.109 A dangerous episode occurred in the 
course o f the spring of 1936, when one of the cultural brigades organised by the 
government was attacked in the State of Guanajuato. The religious service finished and 
the parishioners o f San Felipe Torresmochas -now renamed Ciudad Gonzalez-, 
encouraged and armed by the priest, violently attacked the group o f teachers. The angry 
mob engaged in a fight that left a dozen dead and a number o f injured.110 So delicate 
was the situation that President Cardenas himself went to Ciudad Gonzalez to remedy 
the situation and to show his determination not to allow repetition o f such actions. He 
forced the priest to leave town because o f his promotion o f violence.111
Although Cardenas was never really under the yoke while Calles was in Mexico, once 
he decided that the latter should leave the country, nobody would presume there could 
be a higher authority in Mexico than its president. The rift in the revolutionary family 
had a limited impact on Mexico’s foreign relations, but it is possible to argue that the 
change greatly improved the prestige of the local government in international politics. 
For one, the American Ambassador to Mexico, Josephus Daniels, praised the Mexican 
president’s gallantry and thoroughly dismissed Calles accusations o f attempts to 
establish a dictatorship o f the Russian type.112
108 M urray to Eden, March 18, 1936, “Attitude o f  M exican Governm ent towards religious questions.” 
F 0 3 7 1/19792 A 2859; Krauze, B iografia , p .442.
109 Sim ilarly to the Spanish Republic, M ex ico ’s education p o licy  was given  vital importance. Perea, La 
rueda , pp. 37 and 44.
110 M urray to Eden, April 1, 1936, “R elig ious question in M exico”, F 0 3 7 1/19794 A 3346.
111 Palabras y  docum entos publicos de Lazaro Cardenas, 1928-1970, M ensajes, discursos, declaraciones, 
en trevistas y  o tro s docum entos, S iglo X X I, M exico, 1978, pp .206-208.
112 Josephus D aniels, Sh irt-s leeve  D ip lom at, U niversity o f  North Carolina Press, Chapel H ill, 1947, 
pp.59-65.
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Mexican-Spanish relations reached an unprecedented level during the years starting 
with the establishment o f the Second Spanish Republic in 1931. It can rightly be said 
that the del Vayo years in Mexico witnessed a closer and more brotherly relationship in 
the Hispanic-Mexican link, and that his personal relation with Calles was particularly 
useful and effective in achieving his set aims as ambassador, given the political pre­
eminence of the latter.113 Few diplomats accredited before the Mexican Government 
were more accepted and were greeted so enthusiastically, by both Mexican authorities 
and public opinion, thjin the first Spanish Republican ambassador. His pre-eminence 
and closeness next to high-ranking officials was almost proverbial. Not even during the 
years of the most popular American ambassador in Mexico, there would be such 
distinction.114 Mexican-Spanish relations would prove to be firmly based upon 
ideological identities and universal democratic principles in international politics.
There was justified reason for optimism, as long as the threats were kept in sight and 
measures taken to safeguard democracy and pave the way to progress.115
113 Pando, La co lon ia  espah ola , pp .376-378.
114 On 31 A ugust 1934, D aniels wrote to h is friend C laude Bowers, A m erican ambassador in Spain:
“This country (M exico) in a sense is a laboratory for n ew  econom ic and legislative ideas, m ost o f  w hich  
I regard as very good .” D aniels Papers (The Papers o f  Josephus D aniels, Library o f  C ongress), cit in 
Cronon, Josephus D an ie ls , p .30.
115 Describing the international situation o f  the 1930s, where the world w as presented w ith the 
alternative, C om m unism  or Fascism , Eric H obsbaw m  suggested turning our faces towards Latin  
America. “M exico , he wrote, (w as) “reviving its great revolution in the 1930s under President Lazaro 
Cardenas ( . . . )  and passionately taking sides for the Spanish Republic in the C ivil War.” A g e  o f  Extrem es, 
The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991, A bacus, London, 1994, p. 171.
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Mexican and Spanish politics during the Second Republic.
"The most familiar objects...are usually those of 
which it is most difficult to get an accurate description, 
for familiarity almost inevitably breeds indifference."
Marc B loch.
During the five years that elapsed between the establishment o f the Second Spanish 
Republic in 1931 and the military uprising in the summer o f 1936, the relationship 
between Mexico and Spain improved greatly, beyond the diplomatic sphere. The 
exchange o f amicable messages transcend formal relations and official 
representations. That Spanish Mexican relations entered a more civilized era was due 
to the different perspective and attitude o f the Spanish regime towards the region in 
general, and the work o f Spanish diplomats accredited in Mexico in particular. 
Spanish interests in Mexico were now effectively protected and local authorities 
began to firmly act against anti-Spanish manifestations. However, the interest in 
everyday life in both countries was more the result o f the identification that Mexican 
people felt towards Republican Spain. After all, it was Spain that had changed, 
getting closer to the Mexican ideals and aspirations. This interest increasingly 
developed with a wide variety o f  cultural, commercial and political exchanges, and 
became reciprocal.
Relevant to develop such an interest was, apart from the devoted work o f Spanish 
Ambassador del Vayo, the setting up of pro-Republican and Socialist groups in 
Mexico, and their relationship with Mexican political and labour organisations.
Chapter III Mexican and Spanish politics during the Second Republic.
By the time o f the establishment of the Spanish Republic in 1931, Lombardo 
Toledano, perhaps the most influential Left-wing intellectual in twentieth century 
Mexico, was the maverick o f Mexican Labour. Although from an upper middle-class 
family, with a Christian philosophical background, Lombardo’s humanism soon 
linked him with the working class and he was influential in developing a new 
intellectual and progressive orientation in Mexican politics.1 Lombardo’s years in the 
CROM  also coincided with the defining years o f his intellectual and philosophical 
formation.2 During his time with the CROM , as a member of the Executive 
Committee in charge o f political education, he was concerned about educating the 
workers as the best way to acquire a class conscience, and significantly he engaged 
himself in studying Marxism. He was never part o f the Grupo Action , the clique 
headed by Luis N. Morones and which he used to serve his personal political 
ambitions. As Minister o f Labour under Calles, Morones aspired to the presidency in 
1928 only to be halted by the over powerful Obregon. Nevertheless, Morones retained 
his grip on a docile labour movement. Although he was never charged with being 
involved in Obregon’s murder, the shade o f suspicion never abandoned him. By 
1929, at the beginning o f the maximato period, Lombardo started considering that the 
CROM  was being ruined by political corruption, and thus, the labour movement 
betrayed by its leaders. However, Lombardo did not yet see an alternative way to 
pursue both the fulfilment o f the revolutionary programme and that o f the working 
class in particular.3
As explained earlier, Calles, perhaps unwittingly, after achieving the relative unity of 
the main revolutionary factions, became the arbiter of their confrontations, thus 
assuming the role o f a supreme judge. Although other presidents were being elected, 
Calles effectively became the power behind the throne. Calles presided over profound 
changes in the social sphere, particularly in education, where the governmental stand 
provoked the violent reaction o f the Catholic Church, as we saw in the previous 
chapter. The maximato period served the purposes of the revolutionary family, which 
developed its quarrels within the framework o f the National Revolutionary Party
1 Robert Paul M illon , M exican M arxist-V icen te L om bardo T oledano , The U niversity o f  North Carolina 
Press, U SA , 1966, pp.3-29.
2 M illon, M exican M arx ist, p .2 1.
3 Idem , pp .26-28.
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(PNR) since 1929. Nevertheless, Calles’s commitment to political democracy was 
limited. Calles then hampered the revolutionary impetus, and rural communities that 
suffered a harsh submission to local caciques, mainly paid the burden o f the sacrifice. 
The system o f  hacienda, which was still significant in organising land tenure, had by 
no means entirely gone, but the revolutionary elite slowed the pace o f land 
distribution. By 1930, Calles declared the agrarian reform over. So far, the revolution 
had changed the political and social image of Mexico, but the economic structure had 
seen little alteration. Particularly alarming was Mexico’s backward position in terms 
o f foreign economic dependence, which in the midst o f the Depression meant foreign 
trade fell by around two thirds.4 Calles’s economic conservatism was compensated by 
his radical view regarding the Church, which he perceived as a reactionary institution 
to be firmly controlled and deprived o f its fanatical influence. The anti-clerical stand 
was not intended as anti-religious, but as a “new spiritual conquest” to win the 
younger generation for the Revolution.5 This was the ideological bond shared by 
Lombardo with the revolutionary elite in his engagement for the emancipation o f the 
workers. In this early stage o f Lombardo’s career as independent labour leader, he 
also developed his relations with Spanish workers resident in Mexico.
The news o f the establishment o f the Second Spanish Republic in April 1931, reached 
Mexico in the midst o f the maximato period, when a tense calm was the norm in 
Mexican politics. Together with the official celebration o f the proclamation o f a 
Republican regime in Spain, there was also popular support from both Mexicans and 
Spaniards, celebrating the news.6 Mexican and Spanish labour organisations 
strengthened their already established relations, and some Spanish residents in 
Mexico, normally cut-off from the events in Spain, showed greater interest in what 
was occurring there. This was an excellent opportunity for many Spaniards to get to 
know about the ongoing changes and the new realities in their homeland. On the 
wave o f the Socialist and Republican rise in Spain some resident Spaniards organised 
the Spanish Socialist Group in Mexico to celebrate the first anniversary o f the
4 A lan Knight, M exico, c. 1930-46 , p .8, in The C am bridge H istory  o f  Latin A m erica , vo l. VII, Latin  
A m erica  s in ce  1930, M exico, C en tral A m erica  an d  the C aribbean , edited by L eslie B eth ell, Cambridge 
U niversity Press, N ew  York, 1990, pp.3-82.
5 Idem , p. 10.
6 The m ost popular M exican com poser o f  the tim e, Guty Cardenas, wrote a "corrido" (popular M exican  
song telling the story o f  a real event) praising the arrival o f  the Republican regim e in Spain; Guty 
Cardenas, vo l 5, Sus u ltim as canciones, La R epublica  en E spana, Musart, 1978.
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establishment o f the Spanish Republic. The group invited Lombardo to give a lecture 
regarding the role o f the Spanish residents in Mexico and their responsibilities 
concerning both Mexico and Spain. As if  to mark the differences in their political 
preferences, the Casino Espanol refused permission to hold the meeting in its 
premises, but the Orfeo Catala gladly granted it. It was the first time that Lombardo 
had addressed a Spanish audience. Although his words referred mainly to Spain, he 
took the opportunity to criticise the callismo and the failure o f the Mexican 
Revolution. Considering that both Mexican and Spanish workers were facing similar 
problems, Lombardo declared that what mattered was not the “colour o f the banners, 
but to elevate the living standard o f the working class and to improve the distribution 
o f wealth.” He also considered the establishment o f the Spanish Republic as the 
beginning o f a real possibility for a revolutionary change in Spain, and expressed his 
hope for a bloodless change, similar to the one that had produced the Republican 
regime in Spain.8
Regretting not having been able to attend the lecture, Ambassador del Vayo praised 
Lombardo’s qualities, and described him as “the ablest o f the young leaders around 
whom were grouped the best elements o f the trade unions and many intellectuals who 
were conscious of the importance o f backing the Mexican revolution with a powerful 
labour movement.”9 Another special occasion was the first live radio broadcast 
between Madrid and Mexico City on 21 May 1932. The Spanish President, Niceto 
Alcala Zamora, addressed the Mexican audience with a brief but emotive message 
that put Mexico and Spain in closer contact.10 Interest in Spanish every-day life 
became a common feature during the early years of the new era in Mexican Spanish 
relations. The old antagonism and animosity gave way to an amicable relationship. 
This change did not occur overnight, but the general ambiance towards Spanish issues 
was altogether friendlier.
7 A G A , FM A E „ 9870, Leg. 584 , P olitico  -II- a -  G eneral - 1932, Letter Julio A lvarez del V ayo to 
M inister o f  State, 8 April 1932.
8 [V icente Lombardo Toledano], O bra H istorico -C ron o log ica , T om o II, Suplem ento, 1931, 1932, 
1933, CEFPSVLT, M exico , 2001 , pp.29-46.
9 A lvarez del V ayo, The la s t op tim ist, pp .228-229 .
10 Letter Julio A lvarez del V ayo to M inister o f  State, 1 June 1932, and press cutting from E l U niversal, 
2 0  M ay 1932. A G A , FM AE, 9870 , Leg. 585, P o litico  -II- b - c - G e n e r a l- 1932.
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As part o f the improved relationship between Mexico and the Spanish Republic, the
latter granted scholarships to Mexican students and teachers.11 The pre-existing
exchange agreement for Mexican and Spanish students and teachers was renewed 
10from 1931 onwards. The academic exchanges would continue almost 
uninterruptedly, even during the difficult years o f the relationship.13 (See infra).
By now a convinced Marxist, Lombardo supported proletarian internationalism, and 
regularly referred to the condition o f Latin American and Spanish workers, 
comparing and contrasting it with the local situation in Mexico. On 23 July Lombardo 
delivered a powerful speech sentencing “the road is towards the Left”, in which he 
insisted on taking the workers demands further. He also criticised the government for 
having, according to Lombardo, betrayed the Mexican Revolution.14 Morones reacted 
by defending the government and accusing Lombardo o f attempting to instil “exotic” 
ideas, i.e. Marxism, alien to Mexican tradition, thus precipitating the conflict and the 
breakdown o f the CROM. Lombardo quit both his managerial post and his 
membership to the CROM, and developed a period of intense activism, 
enthusiastically promoting the setting up of new labour unions with the ultimate goal 
o f uniting them in a powerful confederation. During this period, such an attitude 
might have seemed unwise, as the influence o f Morones and other callistas was still 
considerable. Besides, no real alternative existed to the discredited trade unions, but 
Lombardo’s determination was resolute. The many fronts on which Lombardo 
developed his work were expanding.
In August, after the farcical attempted coup de etat against the Spanish Republic 
known as Sanjurjada, Lombardo wrote a press article on property rights and public 
interests in Spain, pointing out his believe that strengthening the latter and setting 
limits to the former could be the first step towards the “emancipation o f Spain.” He 
also urged the transformation o f the Spanish regime into a more progressive and
" D ispatch no. 5, 1 January 1932, A G A , FM RE, E m bajada d e  E spana en M ejico , Leg. 585 , P olitica - 
ll-b -c-G en era l, 1932.
12 Letter Garcia T ellez  to Gallostra, 20  A pril, 1931, A G A , FM RE, E m bajada  d e  E spana en M ejico , 
L eg. 570, P o litica -b -c— G eneral-1931.
13 A H D M -III-118-21, M exicanos en E spana, 1934.
14 Javier Romero, C ardenas y  su  C ircunstancia, p .69, in the introduction to P a la b ra s y  D ocum entos 
P u blicos de L azaro  C ardenas, 1928-1970 , vol. 1, M ensajes, D iscursos, D eclaracion es, E n tre v is ta sy  
o tro s docum entos, 1928-1940 , S iglo X X I, M exico, 1978, pp. 13-84.
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revolutionary one .15 Whether supporting the Republican regime in Spain or not, the 
Spanish community in Mexico had a clear tendency towards conservatism. Spanish 
consulates were working trying to improve the image o f Spaniards.16 From time to 
time, the Spanish consuls had to deal with anti-Spanish campaigns and often faced 
bitter reactions from radical individuals, particularly in those regions under the 
influence o f ultra nationalist groups.17 The majority o f Spanish residents in Mexico, 
however, felt the real danger were popular and progressive Left-wing leaning 
governments in either country, and feared the menace o f Communism as a threat to
1 o
their economic interests. On the other hand, the relationship between both the 
Mexican and the Spanish labour movements were developed at length during the 
early years of, and throughout the Second Spanish Republic given the prominence o f 
the Socialist Party (PSOE) in Spanish politics, and the strong Socialist influence in 
the working class leadership in both countries.
In the rise o f Mexican labour movement, the old and corrupt CROM , which witty 
workers referred to as Como Roba Oro Morones (How Morones steals gold), and the 
back-to-front version o f Mas Oro Roba Calles (Calles steals more gold), gave rise to 
the CROM-depurada (purified), when Lombardo abandoned it, only to be followed 
by the biggest federations. The programme proposed by Lombardo and approved by 
the extraordinary convention o f the CROM (depurada) o f March 1933, was 
ambitious. It stressed the need for internal democratic procedures, and complete 
independence from the state. Political education of all its members was essential, thus 
the creation o f the Escuela Superior Obrera (Workers College) and the “Pablo 
Iglesias Central Socialist Library.” 19 Its main political objectives were the 
intensification of land reform, the nationalisation o f the oil industry, and the creation
15 E l U niversal, 24  A ugust 1932, p.5.
16 A G A , FM A E , 9844 , Leg. 709, C orrespondencia  con E m bajada  en M ejico, 1933, V ice-C onsul in  
Torreon, A ugust 1933; A G A , FM AE, Leg. 627.
17 A G A , FM A E , 10237, Leg. 4 , C orrespondencia  G eneral, 1935-1937 . In spite o f  their title, the 
docum ents referring to the anti-Spanish cam paign in Durango led by one Roberto D . Fernandez 
betw een  July and A ugust 1933, are in this file. Similar cam paigns w ere developed during other years; 
A G A , FM A E , ID D  61 , Leg. 616.
18 Concha Pando Navarro, La C olonia E spanola en M exico, 1930-1940 , unpublished doctoral thesis, 
U n iversity  o f  M urcia, 1987.
19 [V icente Lombardo T oledano], O bra H istorico-C ronolog ica , T om o II, vol. 4 , 1933, CEFPSVLT, 
M exico , 1995, p .75.
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o f the Ibero American Workers Confederation. This programme showed a remarkable
• * * 20 coincidence, if  not actually a Spanish-inspired influence.
The struggle between the labour leaders was the forerunner o f the forthcoming 
presidential election. O f the three strongest pre-candidates, Carlos Riva Palacio, 
Manuel Perez Trevino, and Lazaro Cardenas, only the latter began an extensive 
campaign visiting remote places in rural Mexico. He even visited small villages and 
towns that had never been visited by a governorship candidate, let alone a presidential 
candidate before. Witnessing the May Day 1933 parade at the Zocalo Square, 
Cardenas drew attention to the division of labour organisations, which was not in the 
best interests o f the workers. He was convinced o f the necessity o f a strong labour 
movement and was determined to encourage it.21 Once the only remaining challenger, 
Manuel Perez Trevino, withdrew his candidacy in June 1933, and Lazaro Cardenas 
had the full support o f the PNR , the cynical politician wondered why did he engage so
99much effort in an electoral campaign with no real opponent threatening victory. 
Cardenas’s commitment to the electoral campaign platform approved by the PNR was 
whole-hearted and eventually confronted him with the Church, local caciques and 
Calles.
Similar to the main political aims o f the reformist biennium in Republican Spain, 
revolutionary Mexico was engaged in major issues embracing land reform {Reforma 
Agraria), which included land distribution and promotion of the ejido system 
(collective tenure o f land); education, in Cardenas words, desfanatizacion, which 
necessarily implied Church-State relations23; and the defence o f workers’ justified 
demands whilst promoting the industrialization o f the country.24 These issues, 
however, found contradictory positions and even provoked clashes between the 
various revolutionary factions. It was not a simple struggle for power, but the
20 Javier Rom ero, C ardenas y  su  C ircunstancia, p .68.
21 Lazaro Cardenas, O bras: 1 -A p u n te s  1913-1940, U N A M , M exico, 1972, p.222.
22 Adalberto Tejeda, w ho in 1938 w ould be appointed A m bassador to Spain, for the P a rtid o  S ocia lis ta  
d e  las Izqu ierdas, A ntonio I. V illareal, for the P artido  A nti-reeleccion ista , and H em an Laborde, for the 
B loqu e O brero  y  C am pesino, w hich included the Com m unist Party, were the other three presidential 
candidates at the presidential election  o f  4 July 1934.
23 Luis Suarez, C ardenas: R etra to  Inedito, Testim onios de  A m alia  Solorzano de  C ardenas y  nuevos  
docum entos, Grijalbo, M exico , 1987, pp .388-390; Gilberto B osques, The N ational R evolu tionary P a rty  
o f  M exico  a n d  the S ix-Y ear P lan , P N R ,M exico, 1937, pp. 12-26.
24 T zvi M edin Ideo log ia  y  P raxis, p. 159 and p. 178.
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confrontation o f groups with different degrees o f commitment towards the fulfilment 
o f the political project o f the Mexican Revolution.25 At the same time, attempting to 
modernise the country, the PNR set out to define a short term programme addressing 
its major social and economic needs, thus, it set up a governmental programme in 
early December 1933 to promote Cardenas presidential candidacy. At the time of 
the Second National Convention of the PNR which elaborated and defined the Six- 
Year Plan, perhaps many o f the participants assumed it merely as a letter o f good 
intentions, Calles included. Not so for the presidential candidate who was supposed to 
fulfil such a programme.
Assuming the Soviet example as the right way to pursue a revolutionary programme, 
even the International Communist bitterly criticised the Mexican Six-Year Plan (Plan
97Sexenat) as a pitiful forgery o f the Soviet Five year plan. The truth is that the 
Mexican plan had little resemblance to the Soviet one, particularly in terms o f their 
objectives, where the Mexican stressed the political rather than the economic aims. It 
also lacked a regulating board supervising the application o f the plan, thus making the 
Mexican version rather an electoral platform that eventually would become a 
governmental programme.28
Lazaro Cardenas was deeply convinced about the social responsibility o f the 
revolutionary governments to deliver what the impoverished masses expected from a 
self-proclaimed popular and revolutionary government. It was not in vain that he had
90visited the country in a long, exhausting journey during his electoral campaign.
Apart from having the backing o f the government, Cardenas had no strong competitor 
and would obtain a clear victory in the polls the following summer, and was 
determined to fulfil the Six-Year-Plan.30
25 A m aldo Cordova, La R evo lu tion  en crisis, La aventura d e l m axim ato, Cal y  Arena, M exico , 1997, 
pp.James W ilk ie and Edna M onzon de W ilkie, M exico Visto en e l S ig lo  X X , interview w ith Lombardo  
Toledano, p .283.
26 Gilberto B osques, The N ational R evolu tionary P a rty  o f  M exico an d  the S ix-Year P lan , Bureau o f  
Foreign Information o f  the N ational R evolutionary Party, M exico, 1937, pp. 129-223.
27 Inprecorr, January-Decem ber 1933, num. 50 p .l 113.
28 Gilberto B osques, The N ational R evolu tionary P arty  an d  the S ix-Year P lan , PNR , M exico , 1937, 
pp.44-45.
29 Lazaro Cardenas, O bras, I- A puntes, p p .231-305; James W . W ilkie, and Edna M onzon de W ilkie, 
M exico Visto en e l S ig lo  X X , pp .282-284. Once Cardenas was elected, he kept touring the country 
during the five months betw een the elections and his taking office on 30 N ovem ber 1934.
30 A M A E , M in. E do., Leg. R -962, Exp. 13, Transm isidn de  p o d ere s  p res iden cia les en M exico.
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Away from the official labour organisations and their political agendas, the labour 
movement led by Lombardo gained in strength under the new CROM  which soon 
united with other small syndicates to become the General Confederation o f Workers 
and Peasants o f Mexico (CGOCM) in October 1933.31
Devoted to the process o f unifying the Mexican labour movement, Lombardo 
Toledano founded a magazine dedicated to promote this aim. Futuro was initially 
published every fortnight, starting in December 1933. Its aim was to become a 
working-class journal through which labour ideas would be expressed and, as the 
editorial o f the first number wrote, it would “offer guidance to the Mexican labour 
movement”, and above all, “Mexico’s problems will remain the main concern o f our 
work”.32 Significantly, it was to become also the main source o f information 
regarding Spanish Socialists and Republicans for the Mexican working class.
Meetings, conferences, congresses and so on were almost a pass time in Mexico 
during those agitated days. Every week there was an event to attend, and almost every 
Sunday, a demonstration. Lombardo’s speeches were part of every day life, and this 
was only the beginning o f an intense period o f activism on the part o f the working 
class and revolutionary organizations.33 One such ephemeral congress was called the 
Congress o f Female Workers and Peasants (Congreso de Obrerasy Campesinas) that 
interestingly enough managed to bring together Catholics and Communists. 
Apparently, the debates on the situation o f women in Mexico showed pretty much the 
state o f things in society: scarce participation o f women, radical and opposing points 
o f view, and no practical agenda to be pursued. Blanca Lydia Trejo gave a bitter 
account o f the assembly in the pages o f Futuro. A controversial character, Trejo was 
to be a future Spanish Republican campaigner who, nevertheless, would turn into a 
hostile and bitter critic o f the Republic. (See Chapter V). Catholics did not accept her 
as she was a free thinker, and Communists rejected her as she was a Trotskyite, thus
31 A  month earlier, betw een  7 -14  September, Lombardo participated in a philosophical debate w ith  
A ntonio Caso at the N ational U niversity. The debate was continued in the national press, and its 
consequences greatly shaped the biggest M exican U niversity and Lom bardo’s perm anence in it. See  
Chapter VII.
32 Futuro , no. 1, 1 D ecem ber 1933, p.3.
33 Enrique Krauze, B iografia  d e l P oder, C audillos d e  la R evolucion mexicana (1910-1940), Tusquets, 
M exico, 1997, pp .442-443 .
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she willingly accepted the label reformist. The failure of the congress was due, she 
concluded, to the “sui generis ‘communism’ prevailing”34
Given the state o f affairs regarding the religious issue in Mexico, Lombardo 
published an open letter addressed to Jesus Christ. “Anti-Christian people benefit 
under your shade”, he claims, “as priests from all religions have benefited from 
serving their gods.” It was undoubtedly an attempt to capture the attention o f those 
abundant sectors o f Mexicans who identified with religion but not with the Church.
A working-class instrument for debate and political discussion, Futuro opened its 
pages to all those interested in current affairs. Thus, written contributions o f varied 
political inclinations were published there, but the Communists stayed away. 
Traditionally critical o f Lombardo’s policies, the Mexican Communist Party refused
o r
to collaborate with him, although they would try to influence the masses he led.
Revolutionary Mexico and Republican Spain were being targeted by opposing sides, 
but it would be Pope Pius XI who finally labelled the alliance o f those evil countries 
forming The Red Triangle, -Soviet Russia, Mexico, and, by 1933, Spain.37 Not for 
nothing the reformist government in Spain was facing growing social upheaval due to 
the resistance o f conservative groups opposed to the Socialist- Republican reform 
programme. The Church opposed the reform of education and the regulation of 
religious congregations, which meant the reduction of its power and influence.38 Big 
landowners rejected the agrarian reform and particularly the law o f municipal
-IQ
boundaries. The Army, naturally allied with these sectors, was particularly 
concerned about the modernising reform o f their sector, which they did not 
understand.40All these groups opposed the Catalan statute and its provision o f limited
34 F uturo, no. 2 , 15 D ecem ber 1933, pp.6 and 35.
35 F uturo, no. 3 , 1 January 1934, p.7.
36 T ypically  orthodox, the M exican Com m unist Party defined its strategy: “Con Lom brado, nada; con  
la s m asas que siguen a Lom brado, todol A ll that changed after the IC VII Congress in 1935.
37 John C ornwell, H itle r ’s  P o p e , The Secret History o f  Pius XII, V iking, London, 1999, p .l  12.
38 Paul Preston, The C om ing o f  the Spanish C ivil War, Reform, R eaction and  R evolution in the Secon d  
R epublicc, R outledge, London, 1994, pp.38 and 53.
39 Edward M alefakis, A grarian  reform  an d  the p ea sa n t revolution: origins o f  the C iv il War, London, 
Y ale U niversity Press, 1970, pp .186-257.
40 M ichael A lpert, E l E jercito  republicano en la guerra civil, Iberica de E diciones y  Publicaciones, 
Barcelona, 1977, pp.9-14.
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autonomy, and developed a permanent propaganda campaign that eventually 
mobilized numerous groups against the reformist Republican Government.41
Late in 1933 a divided Left with combined majority seats in the Cortes gave way to a 
Right-wing Government in Spain. The electoral triumph o f the Right-wing coalition 
produced a government that engaged in dismantling the progressive reforms o f the 
various Centre-Left governments o f the first Republican biennium. Furthermore, the 
most radical members o f the Right-wing coalition o f the second biennium prepared 
not just for a continuation o f such policies but also for a full take over o f the Spanish 
Republic, in order to establish a government similar to those in Italy and Germany.42
The experience o f the division between the Socialist and Communist parties in 
Germany in 1932, which helped eventually catapult Nazi electoral success in 1933, 
was very much taken into consideration. The problem of an electoral alliance in Spain 
was similar in terms o f the possible coalition o f the main parties, in this case, Left- 
Republicans and Socialists. The close links between the Spanish CEDA and the Nazi 
party were well known; therefore, it came as no surprise when Gil Robles openly 
declared that the triumph o f his party would mean the final destruction o f the Spanish 
Republic 43 This was alarming for it meant not just the destruction of the political 
project represented by the government, but also o f the regime as a whole.
The so-called “Bienio Negro” in Spain clearly showed the new trend in Spanish 
politics. Although this Spanish conservative biennium was not reflected at first in its 
relationship with Mexico, it certainly had an impact. In the official quarter this was a 
low profile period that left various projects unfinished.44 Echoing the events in Spain, 
in February 1934 Futuro editorialised its alarm about the threat o f a group o f 
Spaniards intending to organise the Spanish Fascist Group of Mexico (Grupo 
Fascista Espanol de Mexico) in the Northern region of La Laguna, following the 
steps of Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera who had formed the Falange Espanola in
41 Frances Lannon, P rivilege, P ersecution  and Prophecy: The C atholic Church in Spain, 1875-1975, 
Clarendon, 1987, pp. 13-22.
42 Preston, The C om ing o f  the Spanish C ivil War, p. 186 and p. 199.
43 Katherine A tholl, Search ligh t on Spain, Penguin, London, 1938, pp .273-274; Claude B ow ers, M y  
M ission  to  Spain, W atching the R ehearsa l f o r  W orld War II, V ictor G ollancz, London, 1954, p.74; 
Preston, The C om ing o f  the Spanish C ivil War, pp .120-121.
44 Concha Pando Navarro, La colon ia  espanola en M exico, 1930-1940, p .44.
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Spain.45 It was.only natural that both conservative Mexicans and Spaniards resident in 
Mexico supported Right wing oriented organisations, as it was for Mexican workers 
to be ready to confront them. Considering the empowerment o f a conservative 
government in Spain, a Spanish worker, who signed only as Santiago, sent a letter to 
Futuro and expressed criticism on the way politics were conducted in Spain. “I refuse 
to join a political party, either Republican or a class party”, he laments, but still hoped 
that the “fraudulent triumph o f the Right will finally bring the Frente Unico 
Obrero.”46 Yet, the issue o f the unity o f workers did not seem to provoke interest in 
broader coalitions to gain power. For a while, there was still time to write optimistic 
views o f the Socialist future o f Spain, such as Jesus de Amber Arruza’s homage to the 
founder o f the PSOE , “e/ Abuelo”, Pablo Iglesias, which considered the arrival o f 
Socialism anything but a natural law.47
In spite o f the new political situation in Spain, or perhaps because o f it, it was 
common that Mexican Left wing local organisations, for instance, petitioned Spanish 
consulates regarding their counterparts in Spain in order to establish direct contact 
and regular exchanges o f information. One such request was from the Confederation 
de Ligas Socialistas in Oaxaca, wishing to establish relations with Spanish Socialist 
Leagues, the Socialist Party, and the UGT.48 Over all, the improvement o f the 
bilateral relationship in this period, other than official, was also determined by 
political and ideological affinities.
The conservative Government in Spain pursued a different foreign policy towards the 
Americas. It came as no surprise then, that in the report o f May 1934, reference was 
made to Calvo Sotelo’s demand in the Cortes for the cancellation o f the credit granted 
to Mexico for the building of ships in Spain.49 The polarised positions in Spanish 
politics also had its parallel in Mexico, but in a reversed form. The harshness o f the 
aggressive Right-wing radicals was directed against the Spanish people, whereas in 
Mexico the strength o f the progressive and reformist groups was the dominant trend. 
Resisting the growing Right-wing charge against Spanish democratic institutions, it
45 F uturo , no. 5, 1 February 1934, p.6.
46 F uturo, no. 7, 1 M arch 1934, p .25.
47 F uturo, no. 9, 15 April 1934, pp .28,29 and 34.
48 A G A , FM AE, 9845 , Leg. 713 , Letter replying to C on federa tion  d e  L igas S ocia lis tas o f  O axaca, 3 
A pril 1934.
49 A G A , F M A E ,, Leg. 616.
82
Chapter III Mexican and Spanish politics during the Second Republic.
was the rank and file o f Socialist and Republican parties who halted the enthronement 
o f  a totalitarian regime in Spain in 1934.50 The popular insurrection in Asturias in 
October 1934 was confronted with a terrible repression, which made clear the 
determination o f the Government to prevent any radicalisation.
Meanwhile in Mexico, the end of 1934 was a promising time. Lazaro Cardenas’s 
inauguration as Mexican president took place on 30 November, and he was ready to 
deliver on his pre election promises from day one. Although the latter possibility 
caused great alarm in the Spanish representative, who reported the radicalisation of 
the Mexican regime.51
The main working class concerns were concentrated in unifying its main 
organisations. What was probably the most important single event in the unification 
process in terms o f creating a new organisational structure, were the works o f the 
First Congress o f the CGOCM  (General Confederation o f Workers and Peasants of 
Mexico), held between 24 and 29 December 1934 at the Fine Arts Palace.52 I f  the 
January 1935 issue o f Futuro was committed to “contribute to the study o f the 
Mexican Revolution” - probably the single topic most referred to by Lombardo 
throughout his entire life - in February, the magazine dealt at length with the 1934 
October Revolution in Spain; its causes, development, failure and future. They also 
reproduced Henri Barbusse’s article, which appeared in Le Monde, where the French 
thinker compared the problems facing the Spanish proletariat as “perfectly 
analogous” to the ones Russia’s workers had had to face in 1917.53 In Mexico there 
was a divided opinion on the issue. The radical Left, represented by Lombardo and 
his followers coincided with the idea that Asturias represented the Spanish way to 
revolutionary changes. But this stand considered the revolutionary Mexican style 
rather than the Russian, if  not for anything else, for the peculiar social and political 
characteristics of both Mexico and Spain.54
50 Paul Preston, L a D estru c tio n  d e  la  dem ocracia  en E spana, Reform a, rea c tio n  y  revo lu tio n  en la 
Segunda R epublica , Grijalbo M ondadori, Barcelona, 2001 , pp .225-247 .
51 A M A E , M in. Edo. Leg. R -962, Exp.9.
52 F uturo, tom o II, nos. 5 and 6, D ecem ber 1934.
53 Futuro, no. 8, February 1935, p .99.
54 Idem , p .23.
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With the principal Socialist and Republican leaders imprisoned, 1935 became the 
year o f undermining the very bases o f the Republican regime in Spain.55 Ten years 
after their last encounter, Lombardo Toledano visited Largo Caballero in the Madrid 
Modelo prison in September 1935. The Executive Committee o f the UGT met 
regularly during their imprisonment, and Lombardo attended one o f the meetings.56 
They discussed the political situation o f the working classes and the revolutionary 
movement worldwide. Both Lombardo and Largo were deeply convinced o f the 
inevitability o f the collapse o f Capitalism and the arrival o f Socialism. Largo said he 
was confident and at ease, as for the future o f Spain. He went as far as to contrast the 
situation o f Spain with that o f his ill wife whose death was imminent. Both issues 
have an inevitable outcome, Largo said, sadly my wife will die, but Spain will be 
saved.57 However, the perfect example o f the actual misfortunes o f the Spanish 
democracy was the designation o f a new Spanish Ambassador to Mexico. Emiliano 
Iglesias represented the worst o f Spanish political life. The corrupt ally o f Alejandro 
Lerroux was sent abroad to be protected from yet another scandal. (See Chapter II). 
Juan Simeon Vidarte poignantly said that Mexico must have had a great deal o f 
affection for Spain to tolerate such envoy, from whom even the Spanish Cortes had
C O
openly dissociated itself.
On the home front, as explained before, the opposing factions struggling for control 
over the labour movement were represented by Morones and Lombardo. During the 
May Day celebration in 1935, and as part o f the Calles-Cardenas confrontation, 
Morones did not miss the opportunity to criticise Lombardo by saying that “he has the 
obsession o f making the social revolution in Mexico.”59 And indeed Lombardo was 
fully committed to social changes favouring the working classes, but the main reason 
for Morones to have a go at Lombardo was the increasing tension between the two 
rival revolutionary factions competing for the control o f Mexican political life. Only a 
few weeks later, Lombardo would call the labour movement to back President 
Cardenas against the threat posed by Calles, and the National Committee of
55 Paul Preston, L a D estru c tio n  d e  la  D em ocracia  en E spana, p p .252-279.
56 Am aro del R osal, Vicente L om bardo  Toledano y  sus R elaciones con e l M ovim iento O brero  E spanol, 
C EFPSVLT, M exico , 1980, pp.8 and 9.
57 [V icente Lom bardo T oledano] O bra H istorico-C ronolog ica , tom o III, vol 3, 1935, CEFPSVLT, 
M exico, p p .439-443 .
58 Juan S im eon  Vidarte, Todos F uim os C ulpables, FCE, M exico , 1973, p .796.
59 FAPECyFT, A PEC , Exp. 118 L eg. 4 /4  Inv. 1583 D iscu rsos vario s  Gav. 24.
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Proletarian Defence was set on 12 June 1935.60 Lombardo exemplified the new 
regime’s unique determination to develop a revolutionary policy, essentially similar to 
all previous revolutionary regimes, but more effective in satisfying the demands of 
labour.
Given the deteriorating political situation and the unfulfilled demands o f the workers, 
the period o f the so-called maximato corresponded entirely with the struggle of labour 
organisations to become independent and grouping as many workers in their fields as 
possible to push forward the revolutionary programme. This was by no means a one- 
man job. In this attempt, the cooperation of leaders o f different factions and 
ideologies was needed. The participation of some members of the Communist Party 
like Heman Laborde and Miguel A. Velasco alongside opportunistic leaders such as 
Fidel Velasquez, Fernando Amilpa, Jesus Yuren and others seemed bizarre. However, 
Lombardo’s determination for unity as the best way to get strength was firm. His 
work as a bridge between those opposing factions in the formation of the Frente 
JJnico (United Front) proved decisive.61
During the first six months of the Cardenas administration, the extent of labour 
complaints, strikes and workers mobilisations grew significantly. The numerous 
strikes and labour conflicts nationwide were at their highest point ever: there were 13 
strikes in 1932, 202 in 1934, and 642 in 1935.62 Calles, who was in the habit of 
informally influencing some governmental decisions, felt that the agitation o f the 
previous months provoked by the numerous strikes, was leading to chaos, and openly 
declared his criticism o f the working class leaders who were provoking the situation. 
It was clear that, even though there was no direct criticism of president Lazaro 
Cardenas, he was the ultimate target o f the condemnation. Given the fact that the 
working class movement was going through an intense period of activity pursuing its 
unification as the best way to gather strength to defend its demands, Calles’s criticism 
became a catalytic factor that accelerated the process.
60 C hassen, L om bardo  Toledano, pp. 175-177.
61 A lic ia  Hernandez, H istoria  d e  la R evolucion  M exicana, pp .142-147 .
62 A lan Knight, M exico, c. 1930-46, p. 13.
63 James W . W ilk ie, and Edna M onzon de W ilkie, M exico Visto en e l S iglo XX, E ntrevista  d e  H istoria  
O ral, Instituto M exicano de Investigaciones Econom icas, M exico , 1969, Interview w ith V icente  
Lombardo T oledano, p .324 .
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On his return from a long trip to the US, Calles was interviewed by Ezequiel Padilla, 
his pet journalist, and accused Lombardo and Alfonso Navarrete, the leader o f the 
railroad workers, o f causing the chaos and turmoil. Calles was not criticising 
Cardenas directly but declared that the political situation was similar to the crisis that 
led to the resignation of President Ortiz Rubio in 1932. Unsurprisingly, Pujadas 
shared the criticism o f Calles.64
Reporting these events to the Foreign Office, the British representative provided a 
similar view pictured earlier by his Spanish counterpart. Furthermore, in the brief 
description of Lombardo included in the ‘Leading personalities’ despatch sent from 
the British Legation in Mexico, Rodney Murray wrote in December of 1935:
An able and unscrupulous lawyer who professes communism and who has 
lately come into prominence as a professional strike-leader. A dangerous 
personality who may easily obtain political power owing to his growing 
popularity with the various labour unions.65
According to his own perception, Lombardo was a by-product of the Mexican 
Revolution. “I started thinking about Mexico”, he said, “at the time the Mexican 
Revolution started its building up process.”66 He was loyal, but to the principles o f the 
revolutionary movement, and through these principles he elaborated the idea o f 
establishing a socialist regime in Mexico by developing them fully. His conviction, 
typically Marxist, o f labour being the basis of any revolutionary action, was 
particularly consolidated during these years.
The inauguration o f the New Year in 1936 in Mexico saw the beginning o f the end of 
the maximato era, and the commencement of a new stage in pursuit o f the 
revolutionary programme and the strengthening o f the institutions immersed in a 
process o f modernisation. However, it was not a straightforward process. Early in 
February 1936, the industrialists issued a manifesto declaring illegal the strike in the 
glass factory in Monterrey, which began on 1 February, and demanded its end, not
64 A M A E , M in. Edo., Leg. R -962, Exp.9.
65 M urray to Eden, D ecem ber 31, 1935, “Leading personalities in M exico .” F 0 3 7 1/19794  A 1333.
66 M illon , M exican M arxist, p .25.
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without directing their most acrimonious criticism at Lombardo. Tension increased 
after the owners o f the industrial plants in Monterrey threatened to go on strike 
(.Paro), to show their disapproval of the way the government was bemg conducted, 
and in anger called for a strike of their own. There was a perfect match in criticism by 
Calles and the industrialists, but Lazaro Cardenas was not ready to concede defeat 
that easily, nor was Lombardo prepared to miss the chance to show how far the 
unification process o f labour had gone, and how strong it had become.
Addressing a meeting in Mexico City on 6 February, Lombardo, as general secretary 
o f the CGOCM, vigorously responded to those criticisms and symbolically defied the 
industrialists by reading the verse written by the Spanish poet Valle-Inclan fifteen 
years earlier (see Chapter I). Valle-Inclan had died only on 5 January, and Lombardo 
took the opportunity to honour him while at the same time threatening the oligarchs, 
calling them the new encomenderos, with the rage o f the working class. Lombardo 
handed over the little banner with Valle-Inclan’s hand written verse to the National 
Committee o f Proletarian Defence, which had been recently created to support
/ 'O
president Cardenas in his rift with Calles. On 8 February, Cardenas went to 
Monterrey, where he defended the legality o f the strike in a meeting with the 
industrialists and rejected the notion that there was political turmoil in the country. He 
confronted the men o f money, defended his policies, and further demanded the 
support o f the Mexican rich for the welfare of the nation. On 9 February, he spoke at 
a demonstration o f 18 000 workers. On the 11th, he was ready to meet again with the 
industrialists and demand from them their support.69
The following weeks were tense, but the determination of the president to pursue his 
social programme favouring the working classes was evident. Coinciding with this 
presidential determination, the on going process o f unification envisaged by 
Lombardo was gaining momentum. During the last week o f February, the congress of 
workers unification took place, as a result o f which the CGOCM  decided to dissolve 
itself. The CGOCM  was collecting the fruits of the three previous years in 
confronting the corrupt labour leadership o f the CROM  and Morones, the close ally of
67 H istoria  D ocu m en ta l d e  la  CTM, 1936-1937, ICAP, M exico , 1981, p .52.
68 H istoria  D ocu m en ta l d e  la CTM, pp .48-49.
69 Idem , pp .53-58.
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70Calles. Another political triumph for Lombardo was the inclusion o f the 
Communist-led CSUM  (Confederation Sindical Unitaria de Mexico) along with 
smaller labour federations. Finally, the CGOCM  was transformed into the powerful 
Mexican Confederation o f Workers (CTM), on 26 February 1936. Led by Lombardo, 
the aim o f unifying the labour movement was finally reached as a result o f the active 
participation o f the workers and the compromise achieved by the leaders regardless of 
their ideological affinities. The CTM  became highly successful in defending the 
workers interests; an era during which, as a result of its strength, the influential labour 
movement was living its golden years.71
After such display o f power, and popular support Cardenas was confident about his 
future. Nonetheless, believing that General Calles understood the need for him to stop 
his criticism o f the government, Cardenas disliked the personal distance that had
77grown between the two. However, his high revolutionary conviction allowed him to 
follow a different course from Calles, thus defining their distinct places in history. 
Cardenas resisted to the last the inevitability of the expulsion o f Calles, but he knew 
that it was the only option left, given the mounting tension and the real threat to his 
government. The acts o f sabotage, such as the bomb placed at the railroad of the 
Veracruz train that resulted in many casualties, seemed to have made Cardenas finally 
take a decision. On 8 April, he instructed the military commander in Cuernavaca to 
inform Calles o f his decision. A couple o f days earlier, Cardenas had sent general 
Mujica, a very respected and mutual friend, to offer Calles this alternative: either 
three generals and a civilian would leave the country or Calles himself accompanied 
by three civilians would have to leave the country. Calles wanted to know the names 
o f  the generals, but Mujica did not know them. Cardenas had presented him with a 
cryptic message, which Calles seemed to have understood. He decided to leave along 
with the three civilians, his closest allies, Luis N. Morones, Luis Leon, and Melchor 
Ortega.73
70 Francie Chassen, L om bardo Toledano, pp. 191-196; H istoria  docum ental d e  la CTM , pp.61-64.
71 Hobart A . Spalding, Jr., O rgan ized  L abor in Latin A m erica, H istorica l ca se  studies o f  w orkers in 
depen den t soc ie ties, Harper & R ow, N ew  York, 1977, pp. 118-129.
72 Lazaro Cardenas, O bras I, A puntes 1913-1940 , U N A M , M exico , 1972, p .333.
73 Cardenas did not unveil the nam es o f  the three generals, but he considered that they w ould not 
represent a threat to the governm ent, providing C alles was out o f  the country. What is  interesting is the 
fact that Cardenas did not consider it a problem  for C alles to have remained in M exico had those three 
unnam ed generals and a civilian  been  sent instead. In any case, it is clear that the w hole episode  
marked the path not on ly  for Cardenas presidency, but for future governm ents, a feature that w ould
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Lazaro Cardenas believed in the content o f the Six-Year plan and was determined to 
apply it to the best of his abilities. When Cardenas decided to put an end to Calles’ 
criticism in 1936, however, he did not forget the revolutionary contribution Calles 
had made.74 After successfully resolving the matter o f Calles’ obstruction and indirect 
threats to his position as president, Cardenas strengthened his ranks and prepared to 
pursue a similarly independent path in his foreign policy. In fact, by doing so, he was 
simply being faithful to the principles derived from the revolutionary programme and 
adopted as state policy. For the following two years the unchallenged progressive 
Mexican Government devoted itself to the implementation o f social demands, 
creating the basis for future economic development. Cardenas also developed a 
merciful and bloodless outcome by dealing with his political enemies in the form of 
exile, as opposed to the physical elimination pursued by Calles. Hence, Calles was 
sent to exile. The parallel process o f unification o f the labour movement on the one 
hand, and the strengthening o f the progressive revolutionary elite in the government 
on the other, meant the final removal o f the hindrance o f callismo.
The confrontation o f Cardenas with the closest ally o f the former Spanish Republican 
Ambassador del Vayo, Calles, in no way affected the bilateral relationship, which by 
this time was still going through difficult phases resulting more from the internal 
changes o f government in Spain. (See Chapter II). In fact, it is possible to argue that 
the political changes in Mexico improved the bilateral relationship, as the ideological 
coincidences grew deeper. (See Chapter V).
The Labour movement under Cardenas administration developed more freely. Yet, 
Cardenas firm opposition to Lombardo’s intention o f integrating rural labourers into 
the CTM  structure, showed the limits to his pro-labour policy. A unified workers 
and peasants organisation would have meant an extraordinary power for the CTM.
provide som e o f  the long lasting stability o f  the M exican regim e; Cardenas, O bras I, pp .337-340.
74 B etw een  late D ecem ber 1935 and early April 1936, Cardenas often wrote in his Diary, reflecting  
about C alles past and current attitudes; Lazaro Cardenas, O bras,, I- A pun tes , pp .332-341. A  selection  
o f  C alles political speeches is in: [Plutarco Elias C alles], P ensam iento P o litico  y  Social, A n tologia  
(1913-1936), Instituto de Estudios de la R evolucion  M exicana, FAPECyFT, FCE, M exico, 1988.
75 T zvi M edin, Ideo log ia  y  P raxis P o litico  de L azaro C ardenas, S ig lo  X X I, M exico, 1980, pp. 114-145.
76 T zvi M edin, Ideo log ia  y  P raxis, pp.84-86; A licia  Hernandez, H istoria  d e  la R evolucion M exicana, 
p. 164.
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Instead, the formation o f the Confederation o f Mexican Peasants (CCM) under a 
discreet cardenista direction, served to counterbalance the growing strength and
77influence o f Lombardo and the CTM.
The peasants, not being organized as the industrial workers, were still a separate and 
less influential sector. However, it is important to bear in mind the other relevant 
characteristic o f this period, for the progressive reform of land tenure, in which 
Cardenas pursued an impressive redistribution o f lands unprecedented at any time 
during the revolutionary period, also needed the support of organised rural labourers. 
(See Chapter V).
In any case, Lombardo’s aspiration seemed too ambitious for a labour organisation 
whose principal leaders were not as committed as he was to keeping unity and 
working towards a common objective. The ongoing struggle between the members of 
the CP, whose limited influence they wanted to overcome, and the traditional labour 
leaders that had followed Lombardo since the days o f the CROM-depuraday such as 
Fidel Velazquez, and Fernando Amilpa would eventually take its toll.78 Nevertheless, 
the CTM  was the strongest labour organisation in Mexico, and would remain the 
largest in Latin America for the time being.
Similarly engaged in a crucial period o f its political life, Spanish democracy was 
facing enormous challenges when the two antagonistic projects prepared to fight a 
general election. After having a particularly intense electoral campaign, the prospects 
of electing a government based on the coalition o f centre-Left parties in Spain also 
passed through a momentous situation early in 1936.
The decision o f the electoral coalition to pursue a Popular Front approach to the 
election as the best way to ensure triumph over the strong and menacing Right, was 
probably the only option those parties had to “restore the reforming impetus of the
77 Javier Rom ero, C ardenas y  su  C ircunstancia, Introduction to P alabras y  D ocum entos P ublicos de  
L azaro  C ardenas, 1928-1970 , vol. 1, M ensajes, D iscursos, D eclaraciones, E ntrevistas y  o tros 
docum entos, 1928 /1940 , S ig lo  X X I, M exico , 1978, p.83.
78 A licia  Hernandez C havez, H istoria  d e  la R evolucion  M exicana, P eriodo  1934-1940, La M ecanica  
C arden ista , El C oleg io  de M exico , 1979, pp. 148-165.
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liberal biennium.”79 On the other side o f the political spectrum, the Left-wing 
Republican and Socialist parties had the aim to regain power so as to fulfil their social 
programme so blatantly crushed by the reactionaries who governed between the end 
of 1933 and early 1936.80 They wanted a second chance to develop their social 
reforms and to take the appropriate measures effectively to defend them. The general 
election in February 1936 was to be a cornerstone for both of the projects.
Perhaps the single event that was in the minds of the political leaders during the 
electoral campaign was the popular insurrection o f October 1934. On the one hand, 
for the Centre-Left parties, Asturias meant a popular insurrection aiming to prevent 
the coming to power o f the extreme Right whilst demanding social justice. On the 
other, for the Right wing parties, Asturias was evidence o f the revolutionary threat 
posed by the radicalised masses.81 The decision finally to create a Popular Front 
electoral coalition was made in December 1935, while some o f the leaders o f the 
PSOE  and UGT were still in prison after the Asturias revolt.
On 16 February 1936, the outcome o f the general election did not provide a landslide 
triumph for the Popular Front coalition in terms o f votes, yet the impact o f the victory 
was enormous, given the electoral system favouring coalitions. It was a defining 
moment for supporters o f the Popular Front and opponents alike. Faced with the 
triumph o f a Left-wing leaning government, attempts were made by the leader of 
CEDA, Gil Robles, and the Chief of General Staff at the Ministry of War, General 
Francisco Franco, to convince the Prime Minister to impose martial law and even to 
prevent a Popular Front Government. The military temptations to take over arose 
once more. After initial doubts, Prime Minister Portela Valladares refused to engage 
in such attempts and left things in the hands of the President Alcala Zamora.82
The scepticism and contradictory nature o f President Alcala Zamora exacerbated the 
situation. He had been the guarantor o f institutional stability, although he was not 
convinced of governmental policies pursued by the Left wing republicans. A
79 H elen  Graham, Socialism  a n d  war, The Spanish S ocia lis t p a r ty  in p o w e r  an d  crisis, 1936-1939, 
Cam bridge U niversity Press, Cambridge, 1991, p .24.
80 Idem , pp. 180-210.
81 Paul Preston, The C om ing o f  the Spanish C ivil War, pp. 161-179.
82 Paul Preston, F ranco, A B iography, Harper C ollins, London, 1995, pp. 115-119.
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conservative Catholic, Alcala Zamora was a former monarchist turned Republican 
after being convinced o f the futility o f the Monarchy. Thoroughly convinced of the 
need for regime change, he was, nevertheless, opposed to radical measures. In his 
view, some o f the progressive reforms o f the Republican-Socialist coalition o f the 
first biennium went beyond his conception o f a moderate government, particularly 
regarding the Church.83
The triumph o f the Popular Front regime, however, was not a simple thing to deal 
with, given the various interests, aims, and strategies that its member organisations 
had, and particularly the internal confrontation between Socialists.84 Although at this 
stage the Spanish Communist party was very small and a lot less influential than its 
German counterpart, Communist influence made an impact via the new Popular Front 
policy defined by the Comintern. It was also the moment when the conservative 
forces, decided to overthrow republican legality were waiting for the right time to 
strike the decisive blow. The traditional reactionary forces started plotting literally on 
the day of the election, once the results were known. Military men, the clergy, and the 
former beneficiaries o f the backward system of land tenure had a common goal: not 
to allow their privileges to be affected by governmental reforms. The marginal 
victory justified the electoral tactics, but the electoral success did not secure a viable 
government. The threat o f instability was permanent.
Meanwhile, Spanish representatives in Mexico, being less aware about the gravity o f 
the problems faced by the Republican Government, lamented the retrograde attitude 
o f Spanish residents. Jose Maria Argiielles Leal, First Secretary o f the Spanish 
Embassy in Mexico, sent a letter to Jesus Navarro de Palencia y Romero, former 
Agricultural Attache (Agregado Agronomico):
So, there, my dear Navarro, you already know that in Mexico, those o f us
[Spaniards] who profess Left-wing republicanism, are subjected to a
83 N iceto  A lcala Zamora, M em orias, Planeta, Barcelona, 1998, p p .231-234.
84 H elen  Graham, Socialism  an d  War, pp .39-50.
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reactionary (cavernario) regime, as our colony, honourable exceptions saved, 
is closer to the Company o f Jesus than to that o f Azana.85
In the meantime, the turmoil provoked by Right-wing organisations in Spain, seeking 
an excuse for rebellion, was handled with some difficulty. Besides, the various strikes 
and the taking over o f landed estates made by their own partisans contribute to the 
disorder. But the fact that the government was divided even for practical matters 
meant that this was the first weakness to be corrected. The impeachment o f the 
President o f the Republic, Niceto Alcala-Zamora by the Cortes, although he bitterly 
criticised it as illegal, was the only option to strengthen the regime against the Right- 
wing pressure, which was keen in thwarting the Popular Front Government.86 It was, 
ultimately, also the recognition that Alcala-Zamora had been an obstacle for the 
social-reformist coalition project.
Thus, Manuel Azana became the second President o f the Spanish Republic on 10 
M ay 1936, but the prospects o f finally reaching an agreement to form a government 
were slim. The internal divisions o f the Socialist party, the biggest and most 
influential o f the parties constituting the Popular Front electoral coalition, 
complicated the selection of the best person to succeed Azana as Prime Minister. 
Followers o f Largo Caballero did not accept the nomination o f Indalecio Prieto, a 
decision that was to have long lasting and even disastrous consequences.87
The following months were intense and proved to be crucial for the fate o f the 
Republic. The CEDA, Falange, and other Right-wing extremist groups orchestrated 
political instability. They expected that by provoking agitation against the 
government, thus increasing political tension, this would pave the way for a military 
rebellion. There was close contact between Sanjuijo, then in exile in Estoril, with 
some generals like Emilio Mola, and through the latter with members o f the anti- 
Republican UME (Spanish Military Union), such as Colonel Valentin Galarza, and 
also with some Right wing political leaders like Gil Robles.88
85 A G A , FM A E , ID D  61, L eg .l8 o . D ip lom aticos y  C onsules de  C arrera  en serv ic io  ac tivo  en la 
R epu blica  M exicana. E xpedientes person a tes  (III-s-XIII), 12 March 1936.
86 Alcala-Zam ora, M em orias , pp .408-425.
87 Paul Preston, A C oncise H istory  o f  the Spanish C iv il War, pp.61- 63.
88 Paul Preston, Franco, A B iograph y , Harper C ollins, London, 1995, p .122.
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With the triumph o f the Popular Front and the return o f the progressive republicans to 
government, it was only a matter o f time before the arrival o f an appropriate 
representative to resume the active role towards Mexico and Latin America. After a 
swift agreement form the Mexican Government, on 9 April 1936 Felix Gordon Ordas 
was designated as the new Ambassador to Mexico.89 Gordon Ordas had been a 
prominent member o f the Radical Socialist Party. Then, along with Diego Martinez 
Barrio, formed the Republican Union Party in September 1934.90 Gordon had also 
won a seat to the Cortes in the February election, as part o f the Popular Front 
coalition.
On May 28, Gordon reported to Madrid having taken over the Spanish Embassy in 
Mexico City.91 Little did he know the restless times he was to face and the relevance 
o f his post in the near future. Although political tension had been increasing in 
Madrid, his own assignment was a direct consequence o f the optimism and 
confidence o f the republicans to be able to fully develop their political programme. In 
Gordon’s speech at the presentation o f his credentials, he reassured the Mexican 
president o f the common ideals and aims o f Republican Spain and revolutionary 
Mexico.92 This was in fact a perfect mirror image of both the ideological similarities 
and the nature o f the political programmes that the governments of Spain and Mexico 
were pursuing in the mid thirties. After a long and complicated start, the two 
republics were, finally, on the verge o f bringing about their most cherished 
democratic and humanistic ideals. There were still some difficult cases, which not 
even the most persuasive diplomacy could solve. A decade after the Cristero 
rebellion, for example, there were still efforts being made to find out what had 
happened to the son of a rich Spaniard, Alfonso Diez Gonzalez, who was captured
QTduring the rebellion in the State o f Durango. Even though it was unlikely that Senor
89 A G A  Fondo M inisterio de R elaciones Exteriores, Seccion  M exico , ID D  61, Embajada de Espana en 
M ejico , L eg, lOo. -E xpedien te P erso n a l - Excmo. S en or D. F elix G ordon O rdas - 1 9 3 6 -1 9 3 9 .
90 Paul Preston, L a destruccion  d e  la  D em ocracia  en E spana , p .271.
91 G ordon to M inister o f  State, 28  M ay 1938, dispatch 93, FUE, FGO, GO 2.1.
92 G ordon to M inister o f  State, 10 June 1938, dispatch 101, FUE, FGO, G 0 2 .1 .
93 Letter A nacleto Garcia (Spanish V ice-con su l in Durango, M exico) to M ariano V idal (Spanish  
C onsul General in M exico) 23 M ay 1936, A G A , FM AE, 10237, L eg. 4.
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Diez was alive after being missing for 10 years, official representations were made 
not only in his case but also for a myriad o f complaints made by Spanish citizens.94
By the beginning o f the summer, the rumours of an uprising were widely circulating 
in Madrid, but were generally dismissed as “just rumours” by governmental officials. 
Nevertheless, the tension accumulated and gained momentum; all that was needed 
was a spark to light the fire. That came on 13 July with the murder of a member of the 
Republican Assault Guards, Lieutenant Jose del Castillo, followed by the immediate 
reprisal assassination of Calvo Sotelo.95 Neither event was reason enough to set in 
motion a coup d'etat, but they certainly provided an excuse for the followers of both 
sides to challenge the government so as to halt each other’s radicalism. The 
Republican Government seemed trapped between the radicalised positions o f both 
Left and Right. Calvo Sotelo, the vociferous anti-Republican reactionary whose goal 
was to destroy the Republican regime, was the leader o f the CEDA in the Cortes.96 
His murder was the final blow that moved half-hearted plotters like Franco to join the 
uprising.97
In mainland Spain, the news o f a military uprising came from Melilla on 17 July 
1936. So far an isolated manifestation of the plot from an out o f the way place.98 
Then, on 18 July most military garrisons in mainland Spain attempted a coup against 
the government. The military rebels expected to overthrow the government and take 
over completely in a matter of days. They utterly failed. This initial failure o f  the 
pronunciamiento was partly due to the popular reaction backing Azana’s 
Government.99 Popular resistance, in addition to the refusal o f some military 
commanders to join the rebellion, made it impossible for the rebels to achieve their 
plan.
94 D espatch no. 366 , M ariano Vidal (Spanish D eputy Consul) to A nacleto Garcia, 30  M arch 1936.
95 Paul Preston, The C om ing o f  the Spanish C iv il War, p .274.
96 Julio Alvarez del V ayo, F reed o m ’s  B attle , Heinemann, London, 1940, p. 17.
97 Paul Preston, La G uerra C ivil E span ola , M ondadori, Barcelona, 2004 , pp .72-73 and p .75.
98 Carlota O ’N eill w as the w ife  o f  Captain V irgilio  Leret, Republican pilot in charge o f  the B ase de  
H ydros  in M elilla  on the day o f  the uprising. Captain Leret w as shot with his c lose  aides; h is w ife was 
im prisoned for five years. Her horrifying experience is told in her Una M exicana en la G uerra de 
E spana, La Prensa, M exico , 1964.
99 M anuel Aznar, H istoria  d e  la  G uerra d e  E spana (1936-1939), Idea, Madrid, 1940, p .l  1.
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The rebel movement within the Spanish Republic radically polarised Spanish society 
into two large opposing camps. On the one hand, the Republican side, constituted by 
Left-wing organisations including socialists, communists, democrats and liberals, 
supported the government with their popular mass organisations. On the other, the 
Church, generals and other top-level members of the Army, as well as several 
monarchist and Right-wing groups, represented the so-called Nationalist side. The 
latter supported the uprising in order to defend the interests of the elite and, 
eventually, restore the monarchy. Broadly speaking, therefore, it was a conflict 
between the progressive forces, allied within the Popular Front Republican 
Government, against the conservative groups representing the interests o f the big 
landowners, clergy, and military men.100
Meanwhile in Mexico City, due to the longest power cut caused by a strike, only one 
newspaper was able to report the military uprising in Spain. The workers o f the 
Power Company went on strike between 16 and 24 July 1936.101 However, in spite 
o f the limited newspapers and radio units run on batteries, the Mexican public came 
to know about the events in Republican Spain within a week of the military rebellion.
109Two days after the strike was successfully over , on 26 July, the CTM  organised the 
first demonstration supporting the Spanish Republican Government. The meeting was 
attended by Republican Spaniards, such as Ambassador Gordon Ordas and, member 
o f the Spanish Socialist Party Anselmo Carretero, who both addressed it.103
By this point, the plotters’ new plan considered a take-over to be only a matter of 
weeks. However, the mobilization o f masses o f supporters o f the Popular Front 
Government was much larger than the rebels expected, and extreme measures had to 
be taken if  they were to succeed. The rebels sought aid from their Italian and German 
friends. Although they failed at first to convince them to help them out, with a 
persevering negotiator and a stroke o f luck, they finally achieved a favourable
100 Paul Preston, The Spanish C iv il War, 1936-39 , W eidenfeld & N ico lson , London. 1986, pp .51-70.
101 Jose A ntonio M atesanz, L as R aices d e l E xilio, M exico an te la g u erra  c iv il espanola, 1936-1939, El 
C oleg io  de M exico-U N A M , M exico, 1997, pp.35 and 36.
102 O n 2 4  July, the CTM  organised a press conference destined to exp lain  to foreign residents the 
reasons for the long strike. A im ing to gain their support, Lombardo w ent into detailing working  
conditions o f  M exican workers under the A m erican-owned Light and Pow er Company; see H istoria  
D ocu m en ta l d e  la CTM, 1936-1937 , ICAP, M exico , 1981, p p .1 5 6 -1 6 4 .
103 H istoria  D ocum en ta l d e  la CTM, 1936-1937 , ICAP, M exico, 1977, p .167-172 .
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solution. Thus the civil strife in Spain was transformed into an international war. The 
need for solidarity and effective aid for the Spanish Republic became increasingly 
urgent.
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Chapter IV
The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War and the Mexican response in an 
international context.
A bsurdo suponer que el paraiso  
Es so lo  la  igualdad, las buenas leyes, 
E l sueno se hace a m ano y  sin perm iso  
A rando el porvenir con  v iejos bueyes. 
It is r id icu lou s to  assu m e th a t p arad ise  
Is  o n ly  eq u a lity , a good  law , 
T he d ream  is m ad e b y  han d  and w ith ou t p erm ission  
P lou gh in g  th e  fu tu re  w ith  old oxen  
Silv io  Rodriguez
1. Mexico’s Official Diplomatic Response to the Spanish Civil War
Mexico’s foreign policy has traditionally been based on two principles it has 
developed throughout its history as an independent nation: non-intervention and self- 
determination. They have been part o f the Mexican constitutions ever since 1857, and 
it was on those principles that Juarez fought the French in the 1860s. After the 
revolutionary period o f  1910-1917, when some countries had not yet recognised the 
Mexican Government, particularly the US Government, the then Mexican Foreign 
Minister, Alberto J. Pani, (later the first Mexican Ambassador to Republican Spain, in 
1931) developed a defensive and legalistic foreign policy between 1921 and 1923. 
Calvin Coolidge’s Government only recognised Obregon’s Government in 1923. 
During the inter-war period, Mexico’s foreign policy started to take the form of a 
defined doctrine pushing forward its traditional principles. The development of such a 
doctrine was underway before Mexico was accepted as a member o f the League of 
Nations. Early in 1930, Genaro Estrada, recently appointed Foreign Minister by
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President Ortiz Rubio, repudiated, in no uncertain terms, the idea o f a government 
granting recognition to the government o f another sovereign country. This, as Estrada 
pointed out, clearly contradicts the very notion o f the principle o f self-determination. 
Therefore, he concluded, the Mexican Government will abstain, from now on, from 
granting recognition to another government, limiting its action to preserving or 
removing its diplomatic representatives from any country, without thus implying any 
judgement in favour o f or against such a government.1 It was Estrada who began to 
organise a set o f principles to be followed by the Mexican governments.2 By acting in 
this way, Mexico was defending its own right to govern in the way it wanted, 
regardless o f foreign wishes, thus giving voice to small nations so far subjected to 
foreign pressures as to their form of government. To become a member o f the League 
o f  Nations, Spain, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan presented Mexico’s 
candidacy in a joint proposal in 1931.3 As a full member of the League since 1932, 
M exico’s pledge to endorse the principles of the Covenant was wholehearted. It was 
firmly committed to the promotion o f peaceful means to resolve international 
disputes, and severely criticised the use o f force, particularly when two member 
countries o f the League were in conflict.4 This was the Mexican attitude in 
international politics and its stand in either bilateral or multilateral conflicts during 
the 1930s.
a) The International Context.
The inter-war period was characterised by the different attempts to re-organise both 
the national economies and international relations. Specific attempts were made to 
modernise local economies attending to the most needy sectors. The idea o f social 
justice was at the base o f these projects, aiming at economic and political progress as 
the medium to achieve it. Thus, after the “Great War”, Italy in the early 1920s, the 
Weimar Republic in Germany throughout its entire existence, and the Second Spanish
1 A H D M , no. 39, Un S iglo  d e  R elaciones In tern a tion a les d e  M exico  (a troves de  los m ensajes 
p res iden cia les)  SRE, M exico , 1935. See Foreword by Genaro Estrada, p p .iv -v ii.
2 A m ald o Cordova, La R evo lu tion  en Crisis, La A ventura d e l M axim ato, Cal y  Arena, M exico , 1995,
p. 181.
3 A H D M , R elaciones C o n su la resy  D ip lom dticas M exico-E spana, S ig lo  X X , EM ESP, Leg. 618, 
G enaro Estrada’s reply to the League o f  N ations, and President Ortiz R ubio’s com m ents on  the issue.
4 Isidro Fabela, La P o litico  In tern a tion a l d e l P residen te  C arden as , A nteceden tes H istorico-Jurid icos  
d e  la E xpropiacion  P etro lera , JUS, M exico, 1975, pp. 10 and 11.
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Republic, all went through similar processes o f economic and political modernisation. 
Faced with an international economic crisis, these political projects also had similar 
outcomes.5 Coinciding with this feature in Western Europe, the Russian Revolution 
had also altered European politics.
Particularly relevant is the case o f Germany, which had to face those aims within the 
constraints o f the Versailles Treaty, combined with a severe international economic 
crisis. The German experience o f having democratically elected a Nazi leader, when 
the combined forces of Socialist and Communists were more powerful, was a very 
persuasive expression o f the consequences of divisionism for Left-wing parties. 
George Dimitrov, leader o f the Bulgarian Communist Party and prominent member of 
the Comintern living in Berlin, had suffered as the first well-known victim o f the 
Nazi Government in 1933, having been accused o f the burning o f the Reichstag. 
Dimitrov’s eloquent defence o f himself contained such powerful and logical 
arguments that it had a devastating effect on the Nazi tribunals. The external pressure 
on the German Government did the rest and saved his life, but the Nazi repression of 
the Socialists and Communists and the labour unions they commanded was 
merciless.6 Under Nazi rule, Germany had undergone the establishment o f a new 
European order, to be eventually extended the world over.
By the mid 1930s, however, Hitler’s Government was still perceived by the Western 
democracies as a government with which they could do business; it had been 
democratically elected, was crushing the radicals, and was re-invigorating the 
German economy; that surely could only mean good news. Implicitly recognising the 
tight limits the Versailles Treaty had imposed on Germany, the Western Democracies 
considered it necessary to be flexible and allow some vital space to the defeated 
nation in its re-constitution. The evident militarism and aggressive nature o f the Nazi 
regime caused certain limited concern but not alarm in the British and French 
political elites. Furthermore, it could be an ally o f great value in dealing with the 
Communist menace represented by the Soviet Union.7 On its own account,
5 Paul Preston, La G uerra C iv il espafiola, P laza y  Janes, Barcelona, 2000, p .48.
6 [G eorgi D im itrov] G eorg i D im itrov  accu ses..: his f in a l L eipzig  sp eech , London, W orkers’ Bookshop, 
1934 ,p p .3 -5 .
7 Santiago Alvarez, L os C om isarios P o litico s en e l E jercito  P opu lar de  la R epublica, A portaciones a  
la  h istoria  de  la  G uerra C ivil espafiola (1936-1939), E dicios do Castro, A  Coruna, 1989, pp.21-23.
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Mussolini’s Fascist Italy had long embraced a similar totalitarian rule, which 
forcefully suppressed Left-wing organisations.
Finally, in the US, Secretary o f State for the Good Neighbour policy, Cordell Hull 
looked to Bolshevik influence to explain threatening attitudes to American interests 
everywhere, particularly so in Latin America and Republican Spain, in the vein o f
o
what Josephus Daniels had criticised as an excuse, three years earlier. (See Chapter 
II). The League of Nations, the international organisation that was set up to resolve 
disputes, faced increasing challenges. By the time o f the Italian invasion o f Abyssinia 
(Ethiopia) in October 1935, only a few countries brought up the issue for discussion 
and demanded an end to the occupation. Mexico was amongst those countries.9
In light o f the above, it is clear why, at the time o f the military rebellion in Spain, it 
was not difficult for the Western foreign policy makers to define the course o f action 
towards the Spanish conflict. The first few days o f the Spanish conflict were very 
intense and defining. After the initial failure of the military rebellion, the dramatic 
change in the circumstances surrounding the events determined the fate of both the 
Republican regime in Spain, and the maintenance o f peace in Europe. Both Hitler and 
Mussolini’s decision to support the military rebellion in Spain changed the odds 
against the democratically elected Government o f the Spanish Republic.10 With their 
focus on the wider picture, both British and American diplomats and policy makers 
developed intense activity to elaborate their response in a manner to strengthen peace. 
They decided upon Non-intervention and Neutrality, respectively, and as a common 
policy to deal with the issue.
The American traditional policy o f Neutrality, aiming at keeping the US out o f 
European issues, was originally a “moral embargo” that became law almost six 
months after the outbreak o f the war in Spain.1 ’More than just factual reports on the 
Spanish situation, the information supplied by those diplomats clearly stated foreign 
intervention. Charge de Affairs Henderson and then Ambassador Davis in Moscow,
8 F R U S, D ip lom atic  P a p ers , 1933, V ol. V , The A m erican R epublics, W ashington, 1952, pp .412-415.
9 Murray to Eden, 31 D ecem ber 1936, dispatch A  1205, Annual R eport on M exico, F 0 3 7 1/20639.
10 D ocum ents on G erm an F oreign  P o lic y ,1918-1945, Series D  (1937-1945) V ol. I ll Germany and the 
Spanish C ivil W ar, 1936-1939 , pp. 1-42.
11 FRUS, D ip lom a tic  P apers, 1936, V ol. II, Europe, W ashington, 1954, pp.471; [Cordell Hull] The 
m em oirs o f  C ordell H ull, vol. 2, H odder and Stoughton, London, 1948, p.47.
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Ambassador Clark in London, and Ambassador Strauss in Paris permanently reported 
to  Secretary of State Cordell Hull in almost identical terms as Ambassador Bowers 
did from Madrid.12 These men, American diplomats who cannot be accused o f 
Bolshevism, advised on the increasing danger that the Nazi-Fascist powers 
represented for the smaller European countries. However, the State Department, 
particularly Cordell Hull as Secretary and William Phillips as Acting Secretary, 
disregarded the official reports from several American diplomats, and pursued a 
policy favouring the abandonment of the Republican Government in Spain, a 
democratically elected government with which they had maintained normal 
diplomatic relations. Furthermore, the regular information regarding the Spanish 
conflict and its international ramifications was provided by several diplomatic 
sources. The Western democracies believed that a less radical government in Spain 
would best serve their economic interests in the Iberian Peninsula. Franco was 
"perceived as more likely than the Republicans to safeguard foreign investment".13 
Therefore, although some normal relations with the Spanish Republican Government 
were to be maintained, and the policy of Non-intervention would theoretically be 
formal neutrality, in reality there continued to be British partisan work in favour o f 
the military rebel’s cause.14
However accurate these reports were, American diplomats and politicians at the State 
Department ignored them on the grounds o f their being infected with Communist 
propaganda, but in fact, what they were hiding were their own pro-Fascist views.15 
President Roosevelt himself, a sensible politician and a liberal opposed to the 
isolationism, and who designed the Good Neighbour policy towards the Americas, 
failed to assess the urgency o f the Spanish conflict.16 This flaw o f abandoning Spain
12 FRUS, D ip lom atic  p a p ers , V ol. II, Europe, W ashington, 1954, Spain, The Spanish C iv il War, I. 
In tern ational P o litica l A spects , p p .436 -497 .
13 Mark F a lco ff & Fredrick Pike, The Spanish C ivil War, 1936-39, A m erican H em ispheric  
P erspectives , U niversity o f  Nebraska Press, U SA , 1982, p.21.
14 Enrique M oradiellos, N eu tra lidad  benevola: e l G obierno b r i ta n ic o y la  insurreccion m ilita r  
espafio la  d e  1936, O viedo, 1990, p p .l 17-188; Little, M alevolen t N eutrality, pp .221-265; van der Esch, 
P re lu d e  to w ar, pp .72-85.
15 Idem .
16 It has been suggested  recently that President R oosevelt was more com m itted to the cause o f  the 
Spanish R epublic than so  far recognised. The main argument o f  this idea is the attempt to send  
A m erican arms to R epublican Spain with the approval o f  R oosevelt. See D om inic T iem y, Franklin D. 
R oosevelt an d  C overt A id  to the L oyalists in the Spanish C ivil War, 1936-1939 , in Jou rnal o f  
C ontem porary H istory , vol. 39 (3 ), 2004. The frustrated event, how ever, although linked with Eleanor 
R oosevelt and som e o f  Franklin R oosevelt’s in-law s, does not prove any com m itm ent o f  the President.
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to the hands o f its executioners, whilst depriving the Republican Government from 
obtaining any aid from abroad, had terrible consequences.17
This policy o f Roosevelt’s first administration was the perfect match for European 
Non-Intervention. In spite o f the regular and detailed diplomatic reports sent by 
Claude Bowers to the State Department, American foreign policy towards Spain 
followed the British criteria. In the case o f the United Kingdom, its decision to pursue 
neutrality was based on two beliefs. In the first place, Non-intervention was a means 
to avoid a European conflict, and in the second, the hope for a new Spanish 
Government which would be more convenient for Britain's traditional economic 
interests in the peninsula. France, under a Front Populaire government, similarly 
constituted to its Spanish counterpart, was initially willing to aid the Spanish 
Government, particularly having signed agreements to purchase arms in 1935. Due to 
British pressure on Leon Blum’s Government, and the internal criticism in the 
powerful Right-wing media, France’s Popular Front failed to fulfil both its moral and 
political duties towards Republican Spain.18
Both policies, Non-intervention and Neutrality, were based on a strategy that 
considered the possibility o f a Communist take-over in Spain, given the strength of 
the Left-wing groups, the progressive character o f the Spanish Republic, and the 
Soviet support of the latter. Nevertheless, according to the official Anglo-French 
proposal, the Spanish Civil War should have remained an internal conflict and all of 
the European countries ought to have kept out of it in order to avoid international 
involvement and the ensuing risk of war between the European powers.19 The Soviet 
Union participated officially in the Non-Intervention Committee, but decided to
M oreover, had he w ished to tip the balance in  favour o f  the Spanish R epublic, there were m any other 
w ays and m eans to do so  effectively . In fact, the evidence produced by Spanish Am bassador Gordon  
Ordas and som e M exican diplom ats points to exactly the opposite.
17 [Claude B ow ers] M y Life, The M em oirs o f  C laude B ow ers , S im on and Schuster, N ew  York, 1962, 
p .283.
18 Jean Lacoutur, Leon Blum , H om es and M eier, N ew  York, 1982, pp .306-307.
19 Patricia van der Esch, P relu de to War, The In ternational R epercussions o f  the Spanish C iv il W ar 
(1936-1939), Martinus N ijhoff, The Hague, 1951 pp.156-164; see also Enrique M oradiellos, L a  
perfid ia  d e  A lbion, E l G o b iem o  b r i ta n ic o y la  gu erra  c iv il espafiola, S ig lo  X X I, Madrid, 1996, pp.40- 
113, and Jill Edwards, The B ritish G overnm ent an d  the Spanish C ivil War, M acm illan, London, 1979.
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actively support the cause o f the Spanish Government. Soviet aid, however, did not 
reach Spanish territory until after the Soviets had decided they would not be more 
bound to the agreements o f the Committee than any other o f the participant powers.
Those who had pointed out the Communist menace saw their worst fears confirmed 
when the International Brigades were being organised under Communist leadership.22 
However, if  the organising o f the International Brigades was a Comintern initiative, 
the response rapidly exceeded the expectations and spread well beyond Communist 
party membership and control.23 Moreover, although perhaps unknown to most 
people was the fact that the Comintern itself, engaged in a new approach towards 
revolutionary tactics worldwide, the so called Popular Front strategy, in which a 
myriad o f political parties would fit, from centre to Left, was worried about “the 
cause o f the Republic”24 Even after the perceived vacillation o f the Spanish 
Government, the Comintern suggested raising the question o f forming a new 
government to effectively defend the Republic, which would include all the parties of
o r
the Popular Front, Communist and Socialist. The International Brigades became the 
trench where those non-committed politically the world over found a place to fight 
for a just cause, and so they did, selflessly engaging in a war far away form their 
home towns but conscious that their fighting in Spain could prevent a future fight in 
their own homeland. Not for nothing, the largest contingents in the International 
Brigade were made up o f French, Italian, and German anti-Fascists; but there were 
also large American and British battalions. Latin American volunteers also arrived, as 
did others from over fifty countries worldwide. There were also a few hundred 
Mexicans. (See Chapter V).
20 Ivan M aisky, Soviet A m bassador in London, and Soviet representative at the N on-Intervention  
C om m ittee, g ives a fascinating and detailed account o f  the works o f  the C om m ittee in h is Spanish  
notebooks, Hutchinson, London, 1966.
21 Little, M alevo len t N eu tra lity , p .248.
22 E. H . Carr, the C om intern an d  The Spanish C ivil War, M acM illan, London, 1984, pp .22-23.
23 D evoted  to the Popular Front policy , Communist leaders defended the idea o f  a progressive  
bourgeois regime; see Palm iro Togliatti, Jose D iaz, and Santiago Carrillo, L os C om unistas y  la  
R evolucion  espafiola , Una an to log ia  d e  textos fu ndam en ta les p a ra  e l conocim ien to  y  com prension  de  
nuestra h istoria, Bruguera, Barcelona, 1979.
24 Telegram  M ayor (Comintern, M oscow ) to D iaz and Luis (M adrid), 20  July 1936, H W 17/27, N o. 
6484/Spain , 22 July 1936, M ost Secret, PRO.
25 Idem .
26 For a general v iew  o f  the International Brigades see V incent B rom e, The In ternational B rigades: 
Spain  1939-1939 , London, Heinem ann, 1965; for the A m erican and British Battalions, respectively, 
Peter N . Carroll, The O dyssey  o f  the A braham  Lincoln B rigade, California, Stanford Press, 1994 and
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By early August 1936, Western diplomats had given the Spanish rebels the treatment 
o f belligerents de facto , following the German and Italian intervention, and in spite of 
the strong opposition o f the American Ambassador to Spain, Claude Bowers, and 
other American diplomats. The impression o f a radical if  not Communist influence 
gaining control over local authorities in Republican Spain gave substance to the
77Western perception o f a Communist threat. There was a long, complex and 
tumultuous effort made to defend the Republican regime in Spain, in which Mexico’s 
contribution would be unique. (See next section) Nevertheless, by March 1938, 
Bowers had to report that the Spanish Government “cannot possibly compete against 
the odds piled up by the unchallenged and open flooding o f the Franco Army with 
material from the Fascist Powers.” Other American diplomats such as Kirk, then in 
Moscow, wrote to the Secretary of State in July 1938, referring the Soviet concerns
* • ,  9 0about a general war in Europe, and his positive impression o f Stalin.
However, the policy o f Appeasement pursued by Chamberlain gained the day. 
Germany’s rearmament and the occupation o f the Rhineland in 1936; the sacrifice o f 
Austria, in March 1938, and then the division o f Czechoslovakia in September 1938, 
were all Hitler’s policies supported and approved by the West. Nevertheless, not 
everybody was convinced that sacrificing yet another country to the Nazi-Fascist 
alliance was the best way to avoid a broader conflict. Furthermore, in the opinion of 
US Ambassador to the Soviet Union Joseph Davis, the only way to deal with 
European business was to bring aid, and support the Soviet Union to strengthen the 
position o f the Western Democracies (France and Britain) to face Hitler. Otherwise, 
as he wrote to Harry Hopkins in January 1939, it was possible and likely that Stalin, 
feeling abandoned by those countries would establish an alliance with Hitler himself. 
Davis concluded that France and Britain, as with the cases o f Italy, Poland and 
Hungary, had “been pushing the Soviet Union towards Germany for ten years.”30 
Davis’ apparent fervent support of Soviet Russia was based on his personal
Richard B axell, B ritish  Volunteers in the Spanish C ivil War: the B ritish  B atta lion  in the In ternational 
B rigades, 1936-1939 , London: R outledge, 2004 .
27 Telegram  Strauss to H ull, 4  A ugust 1936, FRUS, D ip lom atic  P apers, V ol. II, Europe, p .459.
28 FRUS, D ip lom a tic  P apers, 1938, Europe, V ol. I, p. 168.
29 FRUS, D ip lom a tic  P apers, The S ovie t Union, 1933-1939 , W ashington, 1952, pp .570-571.
30 Joseph E. D avis, E m bajador de  E stados U nidos en la URSS, Editorial del Sureste, M erida, M exico, 
1944, p .18.
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experience o f dealing with Soviet authorities and a good deal o f common sense. To 
believe in the honesty and sincerity o f the Soviet leaders was only a matter o f 
pragmatism, with no false expectations. The fact remains that the so-called Soviet 
conspiracy was nothing more than part o f the propaganda campaign. ‘Soviet 
influence’ in Spain, concluded Alvarez del Vayo, the Spanish Foreign Minister 
during the Civil War, “was the result largely o f the fact that when all the world 
persisted in denying us our right to purchase arms for our defence, Russia restored us
T1that right.” It was under those circumstances that Mexico pursued its Spanish 
policy against predominant international opinion and in favour o f the Republican 
cause.
b) Mexico’s Assistance to the Second Spanish Republic, the International Front.
Mexico’s official response to the military rebellion in Spain was clearly defined by its 
traditional foreign policy. Mexico’s Spanish foreign policy during the second half o f 
the 1930s was particularly intense. Never before had a Mexican Government 
developed so much diplomatic activity both in the highest tribune o f the League of 
Nations, while at the same time, as we will see, undertaking secret negotiations on 
behalf o f the Republican Government o f Spain. In doing so, the Mexican Government 
pursued effective non-intervention and self-determination, the core of its international 
canon, as defined by the Estrada Doctrine.
One week before the military rebellion in Spain, a new Mexican diplomatic 
representative to France was appointed. Adalberto Tejeda presented his credential 
letters in Paris on 10 July 1936. Little did he know about the intense and delicate
T9mission before him. On 20 July, Mexican Ambassador to Spam, Manuel Perez 
Trevino, then in France, reported in a brief message to Eduardo Hay, Mexican 
Foreign Minister: “Madrid, cut off. Situation critical. I believe Government will re-
TTgain control, though”. The next communication came from the Mexican Vice- 
Consul in Barcelona, Tomas Morales, giving a detailed account o f the failed
31 Julio Alvarez del V ayo, F reed o m ’s  B attle , Heinemann, London, 1940, p .78.
32 M A E, A M  18-40, M exique, 34. The rest o f  the c iv il servants at the M exican L egation in  Paris, as 
reported by the H avas A gen cy  on 3 June 1936, included Manuel Escudero, First Secretary, A ugustino 
Fernandez M ejia, Second Secretary, and E pigm enio Guzman, Chancellor.
33 Telegram  Perez Trevino to Hay, 20  July 1936, A H D M -III-764-1 (1“ Parte) 1936.
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insurrection and the popular response to defend legality.34 A few days later, First 
Secretary Francisco Navarro reported from the embassy in Madrid that Rodolfo 
Reyes and Pedro de Alba, both Mexican citizens, had asked for and were given 
shelter in the premises.35
Spanish Republican Ambassador to France, Fernando de los Rios, made the first 
official request from the Spanish Republican Government to Mexico on 28 July. 
Given the success o f the British pressure on the French Government to avoid any 
involvement in the Spanish conflict, the Spanish Republicans were forced to turn 
towards any other government willing to help them. The day after de los Rios 
approached Tejeda requesting Mexico’s mediation to purchase arms on behalf of the 
Spanish Government, the Mexican diplomatic representative was authorised to 
precede, “providing no international complications with French Government will 
arise.” During the first two weeks o f the Spanish conflict, when the Republican 
Government was eagerly looking for arms suppliers with little success, and the real 
options were starting to fade away, the Mexican stand grew even greater in 
importance and risk. New diplomatic representatives o f the Cardenas administration 
were placed in strategic posts with delicate missions to fulfil. Mexican diplomats 
were actively engaged in generating some sort o f solidarity for the cause o f Spain, 
which was, according to President Cardenas himself, the cause o f Mexico and of all 
the democratic countries. For him, Mexico's "behaviour which, according to our 
judgement, is the one every country should have observed", was the only morally
■>o
acceptable course in following international law. Furthermore, he criticised the 
western democracies, because:
Under the terms of'non-intervention1, certain European nations shield 
themselves in not providing aid to the legitimately constituted Spanish 
Government. Mexico cannot make its own such criteria, for the lack of
34 D ispatch M orales to H ay, 23 July 1936, A H D M  -III-764-1 .
35 Telegram  Navarro to H ay, 28  July 1936, A H D M  -III-764-1 .
36 T elegram  H ay to Tejeda, 29  July 1936, A H D M -III-764-1 (II) 1936-1937.
37 A H D M , EM ESP, L eg. 259, N om bram ien tos d e l p e rso n a l d ip lom atico  m exicano acred itado  en e l 
ex ter io r  (1905-1936). A ppointed as First and Second secretaries to the M exican em bassy in Madrid, 
w ere Gregorio N iv o n  L opez (Leg. 261) and Francisco Navarro (L eg. 263), respectively, in  1935. They  
played  an important part during the delicate situation produced by the asylum  o f  Spaniards at the 
M exican  E m bassy in  M adrid. See next section.
38 E pisto lario  d e  L azaro  C ardenas, V ol. 1, S ig lo  X XI, M exico , 1974, p.293.
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collaboration with a friendly country’s constitutional authorities is, in practice, 
an indirect help -but not for that reason less effective- to the rebels who are 
threatening the regime that such authorities represent. Hence, that is in itself 
one o f the most cautious ways o f intervention.
Once the Mexican president had established beyond any doubt the official stand 
towards the Spanish war, Mexican diplomats developed their tasks in their respective 
areas o f responsibility. After having authorised the active involvement o f Mexican 
diplomats to support the Spanish Republican effort, Cardenas himself took another 
significant decision. On 10 August 1936, Spanish Republican Ambassador, Felix 
Gordon Ordas, requested from the Mexican president the sale o f arms and war 
materials. The response was immediate. The Mexican Government would do 
anything within its power to contribute to the Republican war effort.40
A  few days after Cardenas confirmed with the Spanish Ambassador Gordon Ordas 
the sale o f Mexican arms to the Spanish Republic, Alvaro de Albomoz wrote to Julio 
Lopez Olivan in London and asked him to look after Jacques Marcovici, who was 
working alongside Mexican diplomats for the same purpose.41 Then, on 18 August 
1936, Jose Rendon, Secretary o f the Mexican Legation in London, requested a licence 
from the Board o f Trade to export arms from the UK to Mexico. The Board o f Trade 
asked whether the Secretary o f State for Foreign Affairs saw any objection to the 
issuing o f a licence to Mexico for export o f arms. The petition included 20 000 rifles 
and a total o f 50 million rounds, for £305,000.42 In the Foreign Office there was 
speculation about the final destiny o f the arms, and a scrupulously rigorous procedure 
prevented the Mexican authorities from purchasing arms in this country. Although 
British officials were not aware of it, the amounts of rifles and ammunition requested 
for export to Mexico were similar to those of Mexican arms previously sold to the 
Spanish Republic. However, the Mexican Government had refrained from allowing 
the export o f any war material to Spain other than that manufactured in Mexico. It
39 Idem .
40 Lazaro Cardenas, O bras, I-A puntes,1913-J940, Tom o I, U N A M , M exico, 1972, p.354; [Lazaro 
Cardenas] E pisto lario  d e  L azaro  C ardenas, p .290; M exico y  la R epublica E spafiola, p .24.
41 T elegram  A lb om oz to L opez Olivan, 14 A ugust 1936, H W 12/206 -  065927-S  British Intercepts.
T he F oreign O ffice im m ediately  noted that M arcovici, a Rumanian, had approached several British  
armaments firms regarding the purchase o f  m unitions for the M exican Governm ent.
42 Shackle (Board o f  Trade) to Holm an (Foreign O ffice), August 21 , 1936, F O 371/20573  W 9883.
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would only authorise the export from Mexico of war material manufactured in other 
countries when the governments o f such countries were informed o f the final 
destination and accepted it.43
Analysing Mexico's petition, British officials reflected on the fact that Mexico was 
"shipping large supplies of arms from Vera Cruz (sic) for the Spanish Government, 
and as you will observe that Vera Cruz (sic) is specified as the destination o f the 
consignment in the present instance."44 In truth there was nothing mistrustful about it, 
given the fact that the port o f Veracruz was the only real option for sailing to and 
from any European destination. There was also no indication that the Mexican 
authorities were effectively planning to act any differently from their public assertion. 
In the official reply to Rendon's request, British determination to prohibit the export, 
direct or indirect, o f munitions o f war to Spain was firmly stated and, if  it was a fact 
that the Mexican Government was authorizing the supply o f such munitions to Spain 
there would be nothing to prevent fresh supplies purchased in the UK from being sent 
on to Spain after landing in Mexico, or alternatively used to replace other supplies 
forwarded to Spain.45 The Mexican request to British authorities was not authorised. 
Moreover, in a secret despatch, the Foreign Office notified the Chanceries in Paris 
and Brussels of Mexican intentions to purchase arms either in France or Belgium, and 
asked them to let both governments know what was happening and "hint to them the 
suspicions which we attach to these orders".46
As part o f this meticulous fulfilment o f their duty, British officials asked Sir R. 
Lindsay, in Washington, for a verbal communication to the State Department, 
regarding the suspected supply o f arms by Mexico to Spain.47 The verbal 
communication proposed to keep the United Kingdom and the United States of 
America reciprocally informed about the sales o f arms from both countries to 
Mexico. Perhaps the answer from the State Department was rather disappointing 
since it stated that for July and August o f 1936, the exports o f arms to Mexico were
43 Telegram  B oal (Charge in M exico City) to M oore (A cting Secretary o f  State), 31 D ecem ber 1936, 
FRUS, D ip lom atic  P apers, V ol. II, Europe, W ashington, 1954, p .626.
44 Shackle (Board o f  Trade) to Holm an (Foreign O ffice), A ugust 21, 1936, F O 371/20573 W 9883.
45 Idem .
46 Idem.
47 M inute o f  A ugust 26 , 1936, F 0 3 7 1/20573, W 9886.
109
Chapter IV The Outbreak of the Spanish Civil War and the Mexican Response in International Context.
j o
“well below the average of the preceding months". It was a rather frustrating 
experience for Mexican officials who were engaged in numerous attempts to mediate 
in arms-buying for the Republican cause in Spain. Probably the most extreme case 
was the permanent aim of closing deals and successfully concluding shipping 
operations in France. The Western democracies were determined not to allow what 
they perceived as a Communist-sympathetic regime in Spain. Italy’s Fascism was 
radical, but well within the spirit o f anti-Communism. Nazi Germany was even 
keener to eradicate Communist ideas and influence. Anything would be more 
acceptable than a Communist oriented regime. Consequently, the foreign offices o f 
the two main promoters of the Non-Intervention policy acted accordingly, preventing 
any possible aid to the Spanish Republican Government. In spite o f the optimism in 
the triumph o f the Republican cause, no diplomatic effort could, it seemed, overcome 
the anti-Republican alliance.49
On 3 September 1936, the British embassy in Paris sent a dispatch to the French 
Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, briefing them on the Mexican petition to buy arms. They 
refer to their official response in which they denied the legitimacy o f the Mexican 
request. Simply put, the Mexican request was rejected on the grounds o f suspicion o f 
helping Spain. In diplomatic terms, the Mexican Legation was informed that “His 
Majesty's Government had learnt from reports published in the press” that the 
Mexican Government was shipping military supplies to Spain in considerable 
quantities. In view of their undertakings in the matter, His Majesty's Government was 
o f  the opinion that they could not authorise the issue of a licence for exportation of 
munitions o f war unless they were fully satisfied that they would not then be exported 
to Spain, either directly or indirectly.50
The many attempts to buy arms were constantly thwarted by British diplomacy. The 
Foreign Office not only prevented Mexico from purchasing arms in the UK, but also 
effectively persuaded its allies against conducting that kind of business with the 
Mexican authorities. Colonel Leveque of the Mexican Legation in London had also 
been making enquiries for similar material in Belgium and France, and the British
48 T elegram  M allet to Eden, A ugust 28 , 1936, F 0 3 7 1/20573, W 9973.
49 Lazaro Cardenas, O bras, p .366.
50 Letter from  the British E m bassy in  Paris to the French M inistry o f  Foreign Affairs, 3 Septem ber 
1936. M AE A M I 8-40, M exique, 41.
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Embassy in Paris was anxious to inform the French Ministry o f Foreign Affairs 
confidentially o f the information in case the Quai d'Orsay may have received a 
similar application.51 The French Foreign Office did not need much persuasion, since 
they clearly opposed the Front Populaire Government and added pressure from 
within, in the same way that the overwhelming majority o f the Spanish diplomatic 
corps sided with the rebels. France was not even able to fulfil a small order o f war 
material requested by the Spanish Government, despite the fact that the Franco- 
Spanish agreement signed in 1935, under whose provisions the request was made,
C 1}
was still in force. According to the French intelligence service, the two main 
providers o f arms for Republican Spain, at least by the end o f September 1936, were 
Poland and Czechoslovakia. The efforts made by Mexican diplomats to fulfil 
Spanish requests from the eager French sellers were at first met with mixed 
responses. Finally, the Mexican Diplomatic representative in Paris, later Ambassador 
to Spain, Adalberto Tejeda, was officially informed o f the impossibility o f granting 
authorisation for exporting arms to Mexico. He knew that this was primarily due to 
political reasons.54
Very few o f these efforts succeeded, and many o f them would be thwarted at the very 
start or worse, when some agreement had been reached and some down payment had 
been made, resulting not only in the frustration o f the acquisition of essential 
materials but also in the defrauding o f the Spanish Republic which was thus deprived 
o f  millions o f dollars worth of war materials that never arrived in Republican Spain. 
Anglo-French promoters o f the Non-intervention policy wanted to tighten the grip by 
entirely controlling the flow of arms to Spain. That is, to Republican Spain. The 
Mexican Government intended to contribute in pacifying Spain by means o f allowing 
the legal government to regain control of the situation. For the conservative French 
diplomats the fact that Mexico was openly supporting the Republican Government
51 Idem .
52 Jean Lacouture, Leon Blum , H olm es & M eier, N ew  York, 1982, p .307.
53 SHAT, 596 , 195, Etat-Major de l'Armee - D euxiem e Bureau - Section  de Centralisation des 
R enseignem ents, P/a N ° 25 .290 , Secret, 2 October 1936.
54 Letter Y von D elb os to D aladier (Secretariat General - C ession  a l'etranger), 13 A ugust 1936, N ° 
26 0 8 , M AE, A M  18-40, M exique, 40.
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was clear proof that non-intervention was “lettre morte” concerning the government 
in Valencia.55
The Mexican Government issued a communique, through its Ministry o f National 
Defence, declaring it unacceptable that the Non-Intervention Committee had 
attempted to thwart Mexico’s efforts in pacifying Spain and pretending to impose its 
accords on non-European countries, which were not even members o f the London 
Com m ittee.56
The fact was that Mexico was interested in the strengthening o f the international 
forum to resolve disputes between countries; therefore, the other relevant front in the 
international arena was the League o f Nations. In spite of its evident weakening as a 
result o f its ineffectual actions towards these delicate issues, it was still the main 
international legal body to whose rules most countries had pledged to abide. 
Instructed by their government, Mexican delegates to the League regularly 
participated in the debates and meetings. They had firmly criticised the invasion o f 
Abyssinia by Italian troops in 1935, and they would devote themselves to pursuing 
the case o f Republican Spain. In the words o f John Murray, British Diplomatic 
representative in Mexico, two major questions o f world interest “afforded Mexico 
[...] the opportunity o f clarifying and demonstrating her gratitude towards the League 
o f Nations: [...] the failure o f the policy o f sanctions to prevent the Italian conquest 
o f Abyssinia, and the civil war in Spain.”57
Facing American Neutrality and Anglo-French Non-intervention, President Cardenas 
praised the aid given by the Mexican Government to the legitimate one o f the Spanish 
Republic as " the logical result o f a correct interpretation o f the ’non-intervention’ 
doctrine, and o f a scrupulous observance o f the principles o f international morality 
which are the very basis of the League."58 Mexican delegates to the League o f 
Nations put to the Assembly the legality of its stance in the case o f Spain and 
demanded the fulfilment o f the spirit o f the Covenant o f the League contained in
55 SHAT, 7N  3373 (Etat-Major de l'Armee - A ttaches M ilitaires - M exique), D ossier 3 (N otices sur le 
M exique, politique interieure, exterieure, econom ique et financiere, 1916-1939), 2  April 1937.
56 Idem .
57 D ispatch  Murray to Eden, 31 D ecem ber 1936, A nnual R eport on M exico, 80 - Spain , A  1205,
F 0 3 7 1/20639.
58 E pisto la rio  d e  Lazaro C ardenas, V ol. 1, S ig lo  X X I, M exico , 1974, p.292.
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Articles 10 and 11. The Mexican delegation expressed the Mexican interpretation of 
the concept o f non-intervention, how it had to be understood and thus applied by the 
League. Furthermore, the delegation denounced how the Non-Intervention policy had 
not only completely failed in keeping other nations away from Spain, but overall, 
how it had prevented the legal government from acquiring the elements for its 
defence, to which it was entitled as a full member o f the League with full rights.59
Discussing the report presented by the Secretary-General o f the League o f Nations to 
the XVII General Assembly on October 2,1936, the Mexican delegate, Narciso 
Bassols, pointed out the necessity o f strengthening the means o f the League 
efficiently to apply the existing judicial rules. International regulations, he stated, 
must be scrupulously observed by the states under the active and effective 
surveillance o f the League. He criticised as "regression" the legalistic approach in the 
case o f the Spanish conflict, and argued in favour of the Mexican position regarding 
the latter, not only as a sovereign decision, but also as a moral and lawful act. The 
Spanish political phenomenon, he urged, had acutely raised the urgency for the 
League to establish the way to an effective enforcement of rules.60 Unfortunately, no 
actions were taken in accordance with the Mexican perception. Nevertheless, there 
was to be a new opportunity for the Mexican delegates at the League to take their 
proposal further. Hence, on 29 March 1937, the Mexican Foreign Ministry issued an 
official proposal insisting on discussing the issue o f the war in Spain in the Assembly 
o f the League, particularly under Article 10 o f the Covenant, as a means to strengthen 
the international organisations and oblige all its members to effectively observe its 
rule.61 The Mexican position was also in accordance with the Havana Convention of 
1928, and scrupulously observed its canon. But nothing could have been done to 
convince the big powers to change their attitude. New conferences and assemblies o f 
the League would bring together Spanish Republican and Mexican diplomats in 
September 1937 and in May 1938, where their common determination was shown
59 Isidro Fabela, N eutralidad, E studio H istorico, Juridico y  P olitico . La S o c ied a d  de  las N a c io n e sy  e l 
C ontinente A m ericano ante a la guerra  de 1939-1940, B iblioteca de Estudios Intem acionales, M exico, 
1940, pp .262-263.
60 N arciso B assols, O bras, p .394; see also M em oria de  R elaciones E xteriores, 1936-1937 , p .28 and 
M exico y  la R epublica  E spafio la , p.26.
61 Isidro Fabela, N eutra lidad , pp.262; M em oria de  la Secretaria  d e  R elaciones E xteriores, 1936-1937, 
M exico , D A PP, 1939, pp .29-30.
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once more. In the event, the League o f Nations proved itself ill-equipped to preserve 
international harmony, and unable to offer an effective mechanism to resolve 
differences between States. The Spanish war was the ultimate test for the League of 
Nations, and it failed miserably.
Latin America, with an obviously strong interest in Spanish issues, fell under the 
influence of an officially neutral US. The Mexican position was perceived as 
radicalism, and was not to be pursued. Particularly when Catholic faith was on the 
cards. The religious issue played as part o f the enormous propaganda campaign 
developed by the so-called Nationalists and their local allies. The same issue was to 
be systematically referred to in the US, where Catholic votes counted, particularly 
after Pope Pius XI declared that “a satanic preparation has re-lighted in Spain.63 The 
closest position to the attitude assumed by Mexico was that o f Colombia, although 
not held as strongly as in Mexico. Within two weeks o f the outbreak o f war in Spain, 
both Houses o f the Colombian Congress had unanimously adopted resolutions of 
solidarity with the Republican Government. Those resolutions sealed the attitude of 
Colombia through the war, although the issue still caused deep divisions in 
Colombian society.64 Cuba intended to remain neutral but the division was evident: 
the government held a divided position; Fulgencio Batista and the military supported 
the rebels, and the civil government o f Miguel Gomez and vast sectors o f the 
population, the Republic. The main incident was the impounding o f the Republican 
ship Manuel Arnus in November 1936 when on its way to Veracruz to load arms. The 
Arnus odyssey, as Gordon called it, was the main issue during the Spanish Civil War 
as far as Cuba was concerned. After a tiresome process in which Mexican charge 
d'affaires in Havana, Oscar Reyes Spindola, successfully intervened, it was freed to 
go to Mexico in March 1938.65 By then, General Oscar Benavides’s Peru broke off
62 M em oria  de  la Secretaria  de  R elaciones E x teriores, pp .158-160; [Julio A lvarez del V ayo] Speech o f  
Sen orA lvarez d e l Vayo a t the C ouncil o f  the L eague o f  Nations, M ay 1938, U nion  o f  Dem ocratic  
Control, London, 1938.
63 D ispatch Osborn (H oly  See) to Eden, 15 Septem ber 1936, F O 371/20539, W 1 1665/62/41. 
A ddressing Spanish clergy and laity ex iles, Puis XI significantly m entioned R ussia, China, and M exico  
as p ro o f o f  the extended evil m enace.
64 D avid  B ushel, C olom bia, in Mark F a lco ff and Frederick B . Pike (eds) The Spanish C iv il War, 
A m erican  H em ispheric P erspectives , U niversity o f  Nebraska Press, L incoln and London, 1982, 
pp. 159-202.
6 FUE, G .O . 21, D ispatch no. 92 dated 7 March 1938, D ispatch 102, 21 March 1938 and Dispatch  
1 2 7 ,1 8  A pril 1938.
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diplomatic relations with Republican Spain.66 Before the Spanish war was over, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Peru had recognised Franco's Government. 
Mexico firmly and permanently rejected the Latin American proposal (Uruguayan in 
origin) for mediation in the Spanish conflict. It would have meant a de facto
fnrecognition o f the rebels as belligerents.
Alongside the secret representations on behalf o f the Spanish Government, and 
multilateral negotiations regarding the war in Spain, Mexican diplomats engaged in 
bilateral negotiations with Spain to find the best possible way to resolve some of the 
urgent issues
c) Mexico’s assistance to the Second Spanish Republic, the bilateral front
In the tangled atmosphere created around the arms embargo against Spain, not even 
the public decision by Mexico to support the Republicans was free from speculation. 
The Mexican Government made explicit its position vis a vis the Spanish Republic. 
Nonetheless, in the case o f the Mexican sale o f arms to Spain, three different figures 
were assumed to be accurate. On 28 August 1936, the Daily Telegraph carried a 
paragraph headed “Mexican Arms for Government: Cargo o f 50,000 Rifles”. The 
day before, a ciphered message had been received from Mr. Gallop, in Mexico City, 
in which he claims to be reliably informed that the consignment “consisted o f 40,000 
rifles and 20,000,000 rounds.”69 The real number o f Mexican rifles sent to Spain was 
actually a lot smaller, but whatever the number o f rifles in that shipment, the relevant 
issue was the fulfilment o f an engagement assumed with loyalty towards the 
governmental legality represented by Republican Spain. The actual significance of 
Mexican arms would be addressed in Homage to Catalonia, by George Orwell, who 
fought under his real name of Eric Blair, and claimed that the “Mexican cartridges 
were better and were therefore reserved for the machine guns... I always kept a clip 
o f German or Mexican ammunition in my pocket for use in an emergency.”
66 A fter a period o f  am bivalence, Peru effectively  broke o f f  diplom atic relations w ith the Spanish  
R epublic on 22 M arch 1938.
67 T elegram  Lay to H ull, 28 A ugust 1937, FRUS, D ip lo m a tic  P apers, 1937, V o l. I, Europe, 
W ashington, 1954, p .380.
68 Shackle (Board o f  Trade) to Holm an (Foreign O ffice), A ugust 21, 1936, F 0 3 7 1/20573 W 9883.
69 Gallop to Eden, 26  A ugust 1936, Supply o f  rifles to Spain , F 0 3 7 1/20573 W 9804.
70 Orwell, George, H om age to C atalonia, Seeker and Warburg, London, 1938, pp .42-43.
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In his State o f the Union speech on 1 September 1936, President Cardenas referred to 
the sales o f arms to Spain:
The Spanish Government sought from my Government through His 
Excellency the Ambassador Senor Gordon Ordas the sale o f war material, a 
request which was immediately complied with, 20,000 7mm rifles and 
20,000,000 rounds o f national manufacture being placed at his disposal in the 
port o f Veracruz.71
Then he added:
The sale has also been authorized to the Colombian Government o f 5,000
79rifles o f 7mm similarly manufactured m this country.
Western policy makers o f the 1930s, often driven by anti-Communist sentiments, did 
not always present an accurate picture o f the aid the Mexican Government gave to 
Spain, and some historians have reproduced such a vision.73 Furthermore, Mexico 
being the only other country that openly supported the Republican cause, its stance 
was used to criticise the Soviet Union. The latter was the main supplier o f war 
material that allowed Republican Spain to put up a fight against Nazi-Fascist assisted 
rebels. Whether comparing or contrasting both sources o f Republican support, part of 
the criticism regarding the supply o f arms was that the rifles were old and practically 
useless. Another criticism assumed that the delivery o f arms was, contrary to the 
Soviet case, by courtesy of the Mexican Government, or at least a selfless and non­
profit action.74 The reality was quite different. On 7 September 1936, Gordon Ordas 
requested from the Ministry o f State (as the Spanish Foreign Office was then named) 
permission to sign a contract proposed by the Mexican Minister o f Finance, according 
to which the purchase of war material, food and other essentials, could be charged 
against the existing Mexican debt to the Spanish Government. The terms of the new
71 G allop to Eden, Septem ber 8, 1936, “R eopening o f  the M exican C ongress”, F 0 3 7 1 /1 9 7 9 2  A 7651.
72 Idem .
73 Thom as G. P ow ell, M exico and  the Spanish C ivil War, 1978, pp .58-74.
74 Gerald H ow son, A rm s f o r  Spain, The U ntold  S tory  o f  the Spanish C iv il War, Murray, London, 1998, 
p .103.
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contract put to the Spanish Ambassador by the Ministry o f Finance were certainly 
more flexible than those experienced by Spanish officials with the Soviet 
Government.
Nevertheless, this was by no means a gift, but a regular business arrangement 
between two honourable parties, looking for the best and most convenient deal 
considering the circumstances. According to the terms of the contract to build ships 
for Mexico in Spain, signed on 14 February 1933, the Mexican Government owed for 
the credit plus the interest, and had to pay in pesetas, but given the instability o f the 
Spanish currency once the Civil War began, it was impossible to determine the 
exchange rate. Additionally, the Mexican currency, silver peso, was replaced by a 
copper-zinc alloy, given the rise in the price of silver, which put the value o f the peso 
above its nominal value. Hence, the Mexican proposal modified the terms o f the 3rd
th • * •and 4 clauses o f the original agreement and established a new currency for
nc
repayment, golden pesos o f 75 eg. There was no legal reason for the Mexican side 
to modify the contract. Although an element o f convenience could be found in the 
fact that reaching the new agreement would smooth the process o f repayment, whilst 
at the same time provide certainty to the commercial exchange, it would also prove 
further commitment to the Republican cause. The selling o f arms was essentially a 
political operation, but it was made strictly under the principles o f normal 
international relations between two countries with special links.
The signing of the new contract was authorised on 28 September 1936, and was put 
into practice on the following day. Suddenly, the Spanish Republic had acquired an 
important source o f credit in times o f emergency. Although they did not lack funds, 
the option provided by the contract gave certain flexibility to one of the most active 
Spanish diplomats devoted to the task o f buying arms for the Republic. Gordon’s 
mission required accessible cash to seize opportunities that opened up only briefly, 
given the enforcement o f Non-intervention. The Mexican authorities, for their part, 
were pleased to have reached a reciprocally beneficial agreement, and were prompt to 
grant loans in cash or materials to see their debt reduced. This is not to say that the 
Mexican authorities were unduly benefiting from the agreement. The new contract
75 C ontrato C elebrado  p o r  la Venta que e l G o b iem o  d e  M exico hizo a l  d e  Espafia, d e  A rm am ento , 9 
October 1936, A M A E , M in. Edo. Leg. R -996  Exp.87.
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provided a solid base for any commercial and financial exchange with Spain, both in 
terms o f economic certainty -now  that the Mexican debt could be re-paid but not 
necessarily by money transfer- and in extending the aid that the Mexican regime was 
eager to give to its friend and political ally. However, although some o f the rifles that 
arrived to Republican Spain were in fact old, it cannot be assumed that the Mexican 
Government sold them. Some o f those old rifles, truly museum pieces, were actually 
bought by the Spanish Ambassador in Mexico, Gordon Ordas, certainly not as his 
first choice but probably as the only option he was faced with under the
7 f \circumstances. Mexico and Spain had not signed a treaty o f friendship or assistance, 
but that was irrelevant when the Spanish request was put to the Mexican Government. 
The generosity o f the Mexican position consisted of the very fact that no other 
government was ready openly to sell arms to Spain, in the flexible terms on which the 
sale was conducted, and in the decision to allow Mexican diplomats to act as 
intermediaries for the Republican Government.
The first, most important, and most publicly advertised cargo o f arms sent from 
Mexico to Republican Spain was on board the Spanish ship Magallanes, which, after 
an epic journey, arrived safely in Cartagena, just in time for the preparation o f the
77defence o f Madrid. The rifles were o f Mexican manufacture but not old, as has been 
commonly believed. Some historians have erroneously assumed that these were the 
so-called Mexicansky, but this was not so.78 The Mexican-made rifles were 7mm, 
whilst both the Russian Mosin and its American-made version Mosin-Nagant, were 
7.62mm. It is possible, however, that some American made Mosin-Nagant had 
travelled from the US to Mexico during the belligerent period of the Mexican 
Revolution (1910-1917), and eventually found their way to Spain. The name 
Mexicansky, like some o f the volunteers fighting in Spain, and particularly the Soviet 
advisors, referred to as los mexicanos, was a simple cover up used during the first 
days o f the Soviet involvement in Spain. There were other cases where the name of
76 D ispatch M urray to Eden, A nnual R eport on M exico , 89- S pain , 31 D ecem ber 1936, F 0 3 7 1/20639  
A 1205
77 M . Henri Goiran to D elb os, 3 Septem ber 1936, D epeche 74 , M .A .E . A m i8-40, M exique, 16; 
F O 371/20639 Murray to Eden, Annual Report, 31 D ecem ber, 1936.
78 Ironically, the m odel o f  the M exican-m ade 7m m  rifles w as “A lem an”, as specified in the first clause  
o f  the sale contract o f  9  October 1936, A M A E , M in. Edo. Leg. R -996  Exp.87.
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Mexico was otherwise used, as in the case of Francisco Perez Lopez, also known as 
E l Mexicano, for no particular reason.79
By the end o f August, the list o f war material unloaded in Cartagena, as reported by 
French intelligence, included a Mexican cargo with rifles and machine guns; six 
Russian cargos containing between 150-200 vehicles and their operators, including 
light tanks and planes with their own pilots and personnel. Finally, the list included an 
English cargo containing 6 planes o f Dutch manufacture, and a Swiss or Norwegian
OA
steamer with an undefined arms cargo.
Mexican efforts to provide effective long-lasting aid to the Spanish Republic were 
systematically thwarted by Western diplomats keen on preserving formal Non­
intervention whilst enforcing the undeclared aim o f crushing the Republican 
Government. In Washington there was a close follow up on every suspected arms 
cargo regarding Mexico, not only in American ports but in Mexican ports as well. 
This was the case o f the Motomar, which was preparing its voyage to Spain, loaded 
with war material for Republican Spain, including American planes purchased by
o  1
Ambassador Gordon. The pressure o f the American Government on the Mexican
Q'y
Government prevented this particular cargo from leaving. Apart from the 
difficulties and obstacles Mexican aid had to overcome regarding American neutrality 
and Non-Intervention, there was another problem for the aid delivery, and that was 
the insufficient caution with which such help was being organised. The excitement 
and openness with which the sending o f arms to Spain was referred to in the 
newspapers, namely in El National, worked against Republican interests, not only on 
the propaganda front, but also effectively in preventing new shipments from arriving 
in Spain.83
79 Francisco Perez L opez, D ark  an d  B loody G round, A G uerrilla  D ia ry  o f  the Spanish C iv il War,
Little, B row n & Co. B oston  (Toronto), 1970. In the introduction to this book, V ictor Guerrier wrote: 
“The barbaric genius is what has created the legend o f  El M exicano (as Francisco w as know n b y  his 
enem ies)”, p. 14.
80 SHAT, 596 , 194 Etat-M ajor de l'Armee - D eu xiem e Bureau S.E .A . (A lger), E/C. 27 October 1936,
N ° 1720/J, Secret.
81 A M A E , M inisterio de Estado, Embajada Espafiola en M ejico , R -996, Exp.31 M otom ar.
82 Telegram  H ull to D aniels, 16 April 1937, FRUS, D iplom atic P apers, V ol. I, Europe, W ashington, 
1954, pp .587-588; Telegram  B oal to Hull, 12 July 1937, FRUS, pp .592-594.
83 G iven the clear opposing stands, regular press reports appeared in  E xcelsior  and E l N acional, 
including sensitive inform ation that could be used  for purposes other than mere propaganda, 
particularly in  the case o f  the R epublican cause.
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The French Army High-Command information service reported the capture o f the 
Mexican cargo destined for the Republican Government by rebel forces late in 
November 1936. Captured in the Strait o f Gibraltar, the Mexican vessel was escorted 
to Algeciras where the war material was unloaded. It included 22 French Schneider 
cannons, 356 boxes o f ammunition, machine guns and Lebel rifles. No reference was 
made to the people on the ship. No more extreme example was the case o f the Mar 
Cantabrico in March 1937. Loaded with food, arms, clothes, and some Mexican 
volunteers, this second cargo was to be lost for the Republicans. The ship was 
expected and so, intercepted by rebel vessels. They took over the precious cargo -  
which later moved Franco to refer to “Divine Providence” being on his side- and 
executed the volunteers. The Mexican volunteers were shot in Algeciras; the only 
woman was spared, and made her way back to Mexico. (See Chapter V).
The provision o f supplies for the Republican Government had to go through the most 
incredible manoeuvres to avoid the strict surveillance set up by the Western powers. 
During the first few weeks o f the implementation of a total arms embargo to 
Republican Spain, a complicated net of providers, dealers and transport achieved 
some effective deliveries. In almost every attempt, the Mexicans played audaciously. 
Usually, Mexican diplomats were the official buyers, requesting arms, and signing for 
the cargos. There were also Mexican ships charged with making the final delivery. 
One o f these ships was the Jalisco, formerly Ibai, and under the command of 
Mexican captain Manuel Zermeho -whom  the French authorities believed was 
Spanish because his place o f birth was Guadalajara.85 According to Gerald Howson, 
Captain Zermeno was in fact a crewmember o f the Durango, one o f the Mexican 
ships built in Spain, who was entrusted to buy and rename the vessel. Although 
many o f the attempts o f shipping arms for Republican Spain were frustrated or 
crushed, some o f the ships loaded with food, clothes and Mexican-made war material 
managed to smuggle small American pieces of no relevance for the war effort. Thus,
84 SHAT, 596 , 194 N ote de l ’Etat-Major de l'Armee - D euxiem e Bureau - Section de R enseignem ents, 
26  N ovem ber 1936, P/a N ° 25 .693 , Secret, SHAT, 7N  2762 Fonds de l'Attache M ilitaire.
85 Salengro to Daladier, 22 October 1936, N° D.F. 81 .787, S.H .A.T. 519, 189a.
86 Gerald H ow son, A rm s f o r  Spain, p. 103.
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Republican ships such as the Ibai and the Sil, were used to send significant amounts 
o f  sugar, chickpeas, and some war material.87
Meanwhile, Tejeda remained very active in Paris, and reported the successful 
acquisition o f  war material for Republican Spain, although pointed out the need for 
tanks and planes and the enormous difficulty in acquiring them. So far, he had 
managed to purchase different military equipment for the Republican cause to the 
value of 150 million Francs.88
If  finding ways to provide military supplies to Republican Spain proved terribly 
complicated for Mexican diplomats, their efforts supporting the Spanish Government 
seemed contradictory in the light o f the granting o f asylum to supporters of the rebels 
at the Mexican Embassy in Madrid. Although a humanitarian gesture in principle, the 
abuse o f the right o f sanctuary put to the test the patience and tolerance o f the 
Republican authorities. Perhaps unwittingly, Mexican diplomats became the
oq 9
instrument o f anti-Republican militants organised in the Fifth Column. This was not 
only the case o f the Mexican embassy, but given the close relationship between the 
two governments, the issue became particularly sensitive. Not having been in Madrid 
at the time o f the military rebellion, Ambassador Perez Trevino faced a fait accompli 
regarding refugees at the embassy. However, not only did he assume full 
responsibility, but even encouraged the protection of Right-wing radicals. Soon the 
Mexican embassy was providing shelter to over 800 refugees, some o f whom were
87 There were at least seven  different contracts through w hich M exico  sold  to R epublican Spain over 
25 thousand tons o f  chickpeas, 600 tons o f  sugar, over 30 m illion  7m m  cartridges, over 20 thousand  
n ew  7m m  rifles, over three thousand 7m m  rifles made in 1934, over ten thousand hand grenades, and a 
num ber o f  M exican-m ade war material parts. Am erican made military equipment acquired by M exico  
before the outbreak o f  the war in Spain, thus not included in the A m erican Neutrality A ct o f  8 January 
1937, was also included and sold, in sm aller amounts. The latter case prompted the im aginative 
suggestion  that b y  doing so, and then buying new  material, M exico  m anaged to entirely renovate its 
m ilitary hardware. That w as not a viable option and it could not have happened; sim ply because it was 
not w ithin Cardenas’s priorities. G iven the fact that the paym ent for those sales was made against the 
ex isting  M exican debt w ith Spain, for the ships built there, Cardenas’s critics referred m aliciously  to 
those ships as paid w ith chickpeas. A M A E , M in. Edo., Leg. R -996, Exp.87.
88 T elegram  Tejeda to Hay, 10 October 1936, A H D M -III-764-1 (2a. parte) 1936-1937.
89 M ary B ingham , w ife  o f  the Third Secretary in the M exican Em bassy in  Madrid, Juan F. Urquidi, 
w as perhaps responsible for initiating the granting o f  asylum  to Spanish nationals, although, as w e saw  
earlier, Francisco Navarro accepted tw o w ell-know n conservative M exican nationals at the M exican  
Em bassy.
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active Fifth Columnists.90 His embassy was tainted by what was perceived as an 
unfriendly attitude towards the Spanish Republic, to say the least.
Perez Trevino proposed that the local authorities resolve the issue by taking the 
refugees out o f Madrid, but there was no agreement. The presence o f refugees in 
diplomatic representations in Madrid became a serious issue during the first months 
o f  the war, and an extra diplomatic pressure on Republican Spain, in this case 
particularly from the representatives of Chile and Argentina.91 When the need of an
Q2urgent solution became evident, it meant the removal o f the Mexican Ambassador.
As if  intended to compensate for the damage made, the new Mexican Ambassador, 
appointed early in January 1937, was Ramon Perez de Negri, a radical revolutionary 
who seemed prone to going too far in the opposite direction. At a time when the 
Republican Government was making desperate efforts trying to convince the Western 
powers o f its democratic credentials, far from any radicalism, Perez de Negri’s 
appointment did not seem to contribute to such an endeavour. Nevertheless, his 
reports on the political situation in Spain and the evolution o f the war effort between 
January and August 1937 were perhaps the most complete and thorough analysis 
made by any Mexican diplomat in Spain.94 Furthermore, Perez de Negri reached an 
agreement to evacuate the embassy and disengage from the hundreds o f buildings 
under the Mexican flag.95 Possessed by his revolutionary radicalism, Perez de Negri 
suggested to President Cardenas that he take the opportunity to re-establish 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, given the fact that the two Republics were
90 T elegram  Tejeda to Hay, 8 January 1937, A H D M -III-764-1 (2a. parte). Tejeda was only sending the 
telegram  on  b eh a lf o f  de N egri, w ho w as in Paris w aiting for his diplom atic credentials to go to Spain.
91 Telegram  Navarro to Hay, 13 A ugust 1936, A H D M -III-764-1 (2a. parte).
92 D ispatch Perez Trevino to Hay, Inform e C onfidencial, 10 October 1936, A H D M -III-764-1.
A lthough originally a revolutionary, M anuel Perez Trevino w as an anti-Com m unist w ho becam e a 
clo se  friend and ally  o f  Em iliano Iglesias. T hey were, coincidentally, diplom atic representatives o f  
their respective countries w ith each other’s in 1935.
93 A t the cerem ony presenting his credentials to President Azana, Perez de N egri was reportedly  
wearing M exican revolutionary-like costum e, with cartridges belt, and a leather jacket. Azana was in a 
morning suit, as w as customary.
94 D ispatch Perez de N egri to Hay, Inform e C onfidencial, 17 March 1937, A H D M , Exp.III-765-1 (4a. 
parte). Strictly from  a military perspective, w hich deals w ith strategic and tactical military manoeuvers, 
the reports sent by C olonel Reynaldo Hijar, M ilitary Attache in V alencia, match those political reports 
o f  Perez de N egri.
95 T elegram  Perez de N egri to H ay, 4 February 1937, A H D M -III-764-1 (2a. parte).
122
Chapter IV The Outbreak of the Spanish Civil War and the Mexican Response in International Context.
the only allies o f Spain. Cardenas wrote a long reply to de Negri explaining his 
reasons for not proceeding according to de Negri’s wishes.96
It is clear that the Mexican president did not need a maverick as Ambassador in such 
a delicate position. Perez de Negri was removed only seven months after his 
appointment, leaving the Mexican Embassy in the hands o f General Leobardo C. 
Ruiz, Military Attache in Paris. During his temporary appointment, Ruiz worked to 
regain the smoothness of the bilateral relationship. This period served to make stable 
the otherwise intense relations, then engaged in delicate endeavours. In spite o f the 
difficulties faced by the Republican Government, there was still hope for victory. The 
decision was made by the Mexican Government to decorate President Azana, who 
had previously received the Aztec Eagle Band in 1933. This time Azana was 
decorated with the Aztec Eagle Collar, as a symbol of the struggle o f the Spanish 
people.97 After some consideration, Cardenas decided to appoint Adalberto Tejeda as
QO
Mexican Ambassador to Republican Spain late in 1937. Narciso Bassols replaced 
him in Paris. Tejeda was more identified with both Cardenas and Azana’s ideology 
and politics. He remained in Spain until the end o f the war, regularly reporting on the 
military and political situation in Spain.99
Apart from the more urgent needs o f the ongoing war effort, and with foresight o f the 
need to find a place o f refuge for a defeated Republican army had already been 
glimpsed. Juan Simeon Vidarte was entrusted by Negrin to explore the possibilities of 
a Mexican refuge.100 This was in no way a defeatist attitude, but a prudent concern. 
Late in 1937, Vidarte met with Cardenas and put before the Mexican President the 
issue o f a possible Republican emigration to Mexico.101 He received ample
96 [Lazaro Cardenas] E pisto lario  d e  L azaro  C ardenas, pp .294-295; Centro R epublicano Espafiol de 
M exico , M exico y  la  R epu blica  E spafiola, A ntologla  d e  docum entos, 1931-1977 , CREM , M exico, 
1978, pp .30-31. Cardenas letter to de N egri was dated 10 M ay 1937.
97 A M A E , M inisterio de Estado, Leg. R -2656 , Exp.3, C ondecoraciones extran jeras, 22 October 1937. 
General Jose M iaja w as also granted a distinction. H e w as awarded the M ilitary Merit, First Class, 
Green Collar decoration; Idem , 23 October 1937.
98 A M A E , Leg. R -756, E xp.57, P ro toco lo , F acilidades p a ra  e lp a so  d e l G enera l L eobardo  C. Ruiz, 
January 1938.
99 T ejeda’s reports betw een January 1938 and February 1939, are contained in A H D M -III-764-1 (7a. 
parte)
100 Juan-Sim eon Vidarte, Todos fu im os culpables, Testim onio de un Socia lista  espafiol, FCE, M exico, 
pp .788-789 .
101 Juan-Sim eon Vidarte, Lazaro C ardenas, un discurso  y  ires testim onios, V alle de M exico , M exico, 
1971, pp .42-43.
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reassurances o f  a warm reception should the Spanish Republicans go into exile. There 
was still, needless to say, a well-based hope o f victory over the rebels, but as a truly 
realistic politician, Negrin took the precaution o f seeking a safe retreat for loyal 
Spaniards. In his interview with Cardenas, the President repeatedly gave Vidarte his 
opinion on the Spanish Republicans’ mistakes. In Cardenas’s view, the first mistake 
o f the Spanish Republican regime was the failure to create a truly Republican army, 
by means o f the removal o f suspicious elements. Evidently, the Spanish Republican 
Government was aware o f that, and had begun a process pursuing that aim, although 
not to the extent and depth required to modernise it sufficiently to make it a proper 
Republican army. The other relevant mistake, according to the Mexican President, 
was not to have developed a profound agrarian reform from day one of the 
Republican regime. “Your greatest misfortune”, Vidarte was told by Cardenas, “was 
not to have enough time to achieve those two essential reforms.” 102
d) The Home Front
The outbreak o f the Spanish Civil War propelled an immediate reaction on the part o f 
both public and private sectors in Mexico. A divided society assumed partisan 
positions. The Cardenas administration promptly fulfilled the Spanish petition for sale 
o f arms, whilst the labour movement enthusiastically organised the raising of funds 
for the Republicans and developed campaigns of solidarity for the Spanish people. 
The conservative press linked with the Spanish community, for their part, developed 
an opposing campaign, criticising the government position.103 Opposition to 
Cardenas’s Spanish foreign policy, although reduced and limited to an easily 
identified sector, was present throughout the whole conflict and was by no means 
trivial. According to a press release which appeared in Paris, in a secret meeting, the 
Mexican Senate rejected a proposal by Senator Felix Rodriguez to grant extraordinary 
powers to president Cardenas to continue, within the limits o f public funds, the 
sending o f arms to the Spanish Government, and to urge the Mexican Congress to 
make public its spiritual solidarity,104
102 FPI/M -Fot 410 , Juan-Sim eon Vidarte, L azaro C ardenas, un discurso y  tres testim on ios , pp .42-43.
103 Thomas G. P ow ell, M exico an d  the Spanish C ivil War, U niversity o f  N ew  M exico  Press, 
Albuquerque, 1981, pp .58-144.
104 M AE, A M  18-40, M exique, 41 , A pro p o s  des envois d'arm es en E spagne, Paris, A gence H avas, 8 
Septem ber 1936.
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The Spanish conflict was to be permanently present in Mexican society in both 
Mexican and Spanish circles. The division was no longer by nationality but by 
ideological or class division. Even in far away places within the Mexican Republic, 
some Spanish residents showed their loyalty to the Republican regime in Spain. In 
Tapachula, for instance, in the Southern state o f Chiapas, Spaniards had a Vice- 
Consulate to consult when needing to resolve their concerns. Eduardo Sanchez, the 
Vice-Consul, had regular contact with Mexico City and was perfectly aware o f the 
military rebellion in Spain. On 24 July 1936, he received the communication o f 
Ambassador Gordon regarding the official communique issued in Madrid.105 A week 
later, the local labour organisation, the South Eastern Chamber o f Labour, affiliated to 
the CTM, sent a telegram as part o f the solidarity campaign initiated by the latter.106
In Northern Mexico, the Vice-Consulate in Durango had a close relationship with the 
Spanish Ministry o f State, as evidence o f the extent to which bilateral relations were 
encouraged at all levels. Regularly, official communications to consulates were made 
through the normal channel, i.e. the Consulate General and the Embassy in Mexico. 
This also showed the importance o f this city, and the region for Spanish interests in 
Northern Mexico. The latter, however, did not have an impact in political or 
economic terms during the war. There was a significant level o f trust between the 
embassy and those consular offices that firmly showed their stand with the 
Republican Government.107
Cardenas’s second State of the Union speech to the Mexican Congress showed how 
much things had changed in a few months, both internally and abroad. Fortunately, 
the directions o f the changes produced in Mexican politics were both favourable to 
the president and to the most needy sectors. In the section dedicated to Mexican 
international relations, the first reference was to the case o f the Italian-Abyssinian 
conflict and how the Mexican representatives dealt with the issue at the League o f 
Nations. As expected, Cardenas criticised the Italian invasion of Abyssinia and 
explained why the Mexican stand was the only stand compatible with the fulfilment
105 Telegram  Barcia to Gordon, 24 July 1936, A G A , FM AE, 10240, Leg. 4 , C orrespondencia  1935- 
1937.
106 A G A , FM A E , 10240, Leg. 4 , C orrespondencia  1935-1937, 1 A ugust 1936.
107 A G A , FM A E , 10235, L eg.55, S ervicio  E spanol d e  Inform acion, 16 April 1938.
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o f the Constitution o f the League o f Nations.108 Significantly, before mentioning the 
Spanish request for arms, something that had been very much in the public debate and 
had created great expectation, the president facing Congress mentioned the agreement 
reached with the Spanish Government over agricultural products. Earlier, during the 
Spanish “Bienio Negro” period, the Spanish Government had passed a Decree 
banning the importation o f Mexican chickpeas. Once the Popular Front Government 
was in office, the negotiations pursued by the Mexican Government resulted in the 
end o f the ban, and the elimination o f a 10% import tax established for chickpeas, and 
a 20% import tax for coffee; both important agricultural products exported by 
Mexican farmers.109
The announcement o f this must have smoothed the scepticism o f the critical members 
o f the Congress. Indeed, it was possible to refer to the Spanish petition and the 
presidential decision of selling arms, a delicate issue very much in the centre of 
public concerns, and receive a standing ovation. The presidential action had been 
endorsed by Congress, and was certainly supported by popular organizations. 
However, far from making everybody happy in Mexico, it further antagonised 
conservative circles, but C&rdenas went further and even did so audaciously. At the 
official ceremony on 15 September 1936, celebrating independence from Spain, after 
praising the national heroes that “gave us our Motherland and Freedom”, President 
Cardenas also called out “long live the Spanish Republic”.110 That action was not 
only a significant gesture full o f spontaneous sentiment, but also the expression of a 
profound conviction o f the legitimate cause o f democracy. A real conviction, about a 
real democracy; yet the fate o f Spain was sealed, as the gesture was made by a 
supporter whose rhetoric was more powerful than his resources.
Shortly after the successful defence o f Madrid, a group of militiamen and women 
were visiting Mexico, touring in their military uniforms, they paid a visit to the 
chamber o f Deputies.111 Amongst them was Caridad Mercader, mother o f the future 
assassin of Trotsky. The group enjoyed the hospitality of the deputies, members of
108 Isidro Fabela, La P o litico  In ternacional d e l P residen te  C ardenas, p. 19.
109 Idem , p .20.
1,0 Enrique Krauze, L azaro C ardenas, G enera l m isionero, Biografia del poder/8, Fondo de Cultura 
E conom ica, M exico, 1987, p. 159.
111 Murray to Eden, 19 N ovem ber 1936, M exico and  the Spanish C ivil War, F 0 3 7 1/20551 W 17129
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.the National Revolutionary Bloc, and of course, o f the CTM. They understood that the 
great majority o f the Spanish colony in Mexico sympathised with the rebels, and thus 
appreciated the attitude o f Mexican labour, which had threatened to harass them with
11 *7strikes and boycotts.
On his 1937 New Year’s Day message to the Mexican nation, significantly, C&rdenas 
included the aid provided to the Spanish Republican Government, reporting the form 
o f arms sales.113 Mexican public opinion was kept well informed o f the evolution of 
the war effort, and the extent to which Mexico’s government was supporting the 
Republican cause. Therefore, when significant actions were taken in favour o f the 
Spanish Republic, they would have broad social support. The most significant events 
included accommodating 500 orphaned Spanish children in 1937, to be protected by 
the Mexican State, and the invitation extended to a small number of Spanish 
intellectuals in the same year and later in 1938. The children went to live in Morelia, 
the capital city of the State o f Michoacan. The intellectuals were soon organised and 
continued their work in the Casa de Espana.u 4 (See Chapter V).
Once again, when informing Congress about Mexican foreign affairs in 1937, the 
Mexican president thoroughly explained the reasons for sending a note to the League 
o f Nations on 31 March. Issued on the specific case o f Spain, it argued that it was 
more convenient to ascertain international neutrality, in cases like that o f Spain, as in 
accordance with the principles o f the Pact of the League o f Nations. Hence, it 
established a clear distinction between the legitimate governments suffering from 
aggression, which should be given the aid they were entitled to, and the aggressor 
groups, to whom it would be inappropriate to provide aid, for them to continue 
fighting an even bloodier struggle.115 In this, his third State o f the Union Speech, as 
usual, Cardenas acknowledged the sale o f arms to the Spanish Government for the
1.2 Idem.
1.3 D ispatch Murray to Eden, 7 January 1937, Situation in M exico, F 0 3 7 1/20639 A 527 . T he value o f  
the arms sales was reported in pesos ($5 ,291 ,166 .26 ) and presum ably included the fam ous 20  thousand 
7m m  rifles and 20  m illion  rounds.
114 Centro R epublicano Espanol de M exico, M exico y  la R epublica  E spahola , pp.32-33; Fagen, Exiles 
an d  citizens, pp .22-31; P ow ell, M exico an d  the Spanish C ivil War, pp .58-102.
115 A H D M , Segunda serie, no. 9 L as re lacion es in tem acion a les d e  M exico traves d e  los m ensajes  
presiden cia les, 1935-1956 , SRE, M exico , 1957, p.21.
84 Idem , p .2 1.
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amount o f $8*200, 078.21, over half a million pounds sterling, and thus reported by 
the British Diplomatic representative to the Foreign Office.116
The Spanish Embassy praised the indefatigable campaigning in favour o f  the 
Republican Government pursued by El National, the semi-official newspaper, under 
the influence o f its chief editor, Hector Perez Martinez.117 Likewise, Manuel Landin, 
from the Propaganda Undersecretary in Barcelona, recommended providing all
110
possible graphic material to El Popular through the Spanish Embassy m Mexico. It 
was evident that both newspapers had contributed to change the way Spanish issues 
were perceived, making Spain and its war an everyday matter for many Mexicans.
2. Preliminary Conclusions
When the troubled Spanish Republican Government faced the military rebellion in 
the summer o f 1936, the choice between providing support to a reforming 
government suspected o f Communist influence or accepting a Conservative one aided 
by the Fascist powers, presented the British Government with no alternative. Given 
its policy o f appeasement, His Majesty’s Government soon decided not to intervene 
to support the legitimate government of Spain. A rebel victory would avoid a 
Communist take-over, which threatened, in their view, to lead to a Republican 
Government resembling a "Kerensky regime".119 On this basis, if  Fascism was an 
obstacle to Communism then the existence of a Fascist regime in Spain would be a 
price worth paying, and Franco was the man for the job. The Right-wing military 
uprising that stunned the Second Spanish Republic was supported almost immediately 
by Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy. The Republican Government had been 
democratically elected and maintained normal diplomatic relations with the Western 
European democracies. However, a decision was taken by Britain and France to 
pursue a policy o f non-intervention in spite of the Spanish Government's request for
116 D ispatch Gallop to Eden, 2 Septem ber 1937, P o litica l situation  in M exico, Sum m ary o f  the 
P resid en tia l A ddress to the C on gress , F 0 3 7 1/20639 A 6649.
117 Loredo A paricio to M inister o f  State (Barcelona), 24  January 1938, dispatch 49FU E , GO 2.1.
118 A M A E , M inisterio de Estado, Leg. R -979, E x p .l, E m bajada espahola  en M ejico , 20  August 1938.
119 During the R ussian revolution o f  February 1917, power w as seized  b y  moderate revolutionaries, 
am ongst w h om  A lexander K erensky eventually becam e Prime M inister. H is governm ent, nevertheless, 
gave w ay to the radical B olshevik  takeover o f  October giving the S oviets total control over the 
governm ent.
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help. American policy towards Spain was based on the Neutrality Act, modified in 
December 1936 in recognition o f the new situation. Perhaps behind this attitude was, 
on the one hand, the fact that Republican Spain’s economic and trade relations with 
Britain, and thus with the United States, had been deteriorating for some time and, on 
the other, the perception o f the Republican Government as too liberal. Only the 
Mexican Government was prepared to help the Spanish Republic, acting in 
accordance to its traditional foreign policy and the principles of the Covenant o f the 
League o f Nations. The Western democracies considered a less radical government in 
Spain would best serve their economic interests in the Iberian Peninsula. Franco was
1 <yr\
“perceived as more likely than the Republicans to safeguard foreign investment”. 
Therefore, although some normal relations with the Spanish Republican Government 
were maintained, and the policy of non-intervention would theoretically be formal 
neutrality, in reality there continued to be British partisan work in favour o f the so
171called Nationalist cause. They also received generous aid in the form of the Non­
intervention o f the Western democracies, which was undoubtedly highly effective. In 
addition to this, London, for instance, played a highly visible role in the propaganda 
war, being the home o f continuous anti-Republican, and pro-"Nationalist" 
publications.122
The two opposing trends o f perceiving the conflict and pursuing a Spanish policy 
during the civil war developed in a complicated manner. Whilst some were seeking 
formal Non-intervention and neutrality, but were actually influencing the conflict, 
either directly (Germany, Italy, and the USSR) or indirectly (Britain, France and 
others), Mexico was openly supporting the Republic. For a while, even Soviet- 
American meetings would avoid the issue, or only marginally refer to it.123 In the
120 Mark F a lco ff & Fredrick Pike, The Spanish C ivil War, 1936-39, A m erican H em ispheric  
P ersp ec tiv e s , U niversity o f  Nebraska Press, U S A , 1982, p .2 1.
121 Enrique M oradiellos, N eu tra lidad  benevola: e l G ob iem o  b r itd n ic o y  la insurreccion m ilitar  
espah ola  d e  1936 , O viedo, 1990, pp. 117-188; Little, M alevolen t N eu tra lity , p p .2 2 1-265; van der Esch, 
P relu d e  to  w a r , pp .72-85.
122 For exam ple, b y  October 1936, several editions had been published o f  a pamphlet w ith the title “A  
Prelim inary O fficial Report on  Com m unist A trocities in Southern Spain -C om m itted  in July and 
A ugust 1936, by  the C om m unist Forces o f  the Madrid Governm ent”. Later, a second and a third report 
w ith  the sam e titles w ere published. A  rather cynical publication w as m ade in 1937, after the first 
aerial bom bing warfare practised by  the German Luftw affe w ith the title “Guernica”, being the 
“O fficia l Report o f  a C om m ission  A ppointed by  the Spanish N ational Governm ent to Investigate the 
Causes o f  the D estruction o f  Guernica on April 26-28 , 1937”.
123 Telegram  D avies to  Secretary o f  State, 10 July 1937, FR U S, D ip lo m a tic  P apers , The Soviet Union, 
1933-1939, W ashington, 1952, pp .386-388.
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case o f Soviet involvement, Stalin's decision to support the Republican Government, 
once the Non-Intervention Committee proved itself to be a farce, led the Western 
democracies to fear a possible Communist take-over in Spain. Nothing could have 
been further from the truth, as the Soviets declared their intention o f contributing to 
the restoration o f a bourgeois Republic, an outcome favoured particularly by the 
Americans and the British.124
After the failure o f the original plot against the Spanish Government, and when the 
rebels began their revival through Nazi- Fascist coalition support, the loyalists 
gathered around the Republican cause became dependant on foreign aid from a 
variety o f limited sources. However, the disparity between the amount and the quality 
o f  arms supplied was appalling. The Communists complained, for example, that the 
aid received through France was insufficient and was arriving too slowly.125
In the case o f the so-called Communist threat Spain, there has been a great deal of 
exaggeration about such influence, particularly at the beginning o f the conflict, where 
there was no real Communist influence in the government. Therefore, it is more 
appropriate to conclude that, as the evidence shows, the strategy followed by the 
Communists bore in mind both the struggle against Fascism and the defence o f 
democracy, whilst, against the commonly held misconception, the Western Powers, 
the so called Western democracies, were acting against it. For the Comintern, given 
the alarming situation in connection with the Fascist conspiracy in Spain, it was decided 
that the first and most important aim was to preserve intact, at any cost, the ranks of the 
Popular Front. The call for unity seemed the most sensible thing to do, as any split in the 
front there would be utilised by the Fascists in their fight against the people. The 
Communists were also hardening their position towards other Left-wing tendencies, 
traditionally more influential in working class circles and with the peasantry. The 
Anarchist movement in Spain would suffer from this particular stand, but not only as 
a direct consequence of the growing Communist influence, but because the war effort
124 Fernando Claudin, quoted in Paul Preston (ed) Revolution an d  w a r in Spain, 1931-1939 , Methuen, 
London, 1984, p .251.
125 Telegram  Secretariat (Comintern, M oscow ) to Thorez and Marc (Paris), 14 A ugust 1936, 
H W 17/14, N o. 6886/France, 15 Septem ber 1936, M ost Secret.
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demanded more committed behaviour from all the parties defending the democratic 
regime embodied by the Republic.
Apart from the official representation at the League o f Nations, and given both the 
urgency of the Spanish need and the refusal of the Western countries to abide by the 
terms o f the Covenant, Mexican diplomats were instructed to pursue a number of 
legal actions on behalf o f the Spanish Government, such as the purchasing o f arms 
and war material. Preventing the Mexican Government from successfully helping the 
Spanish Republic was an essential part o f the enforcement o f the Non-Intervention 
agreement. To that effect the foreign offices of the Western democracies were 
working closely together. They succeeded in thwarting any aid the Spanish 
Government might have received from abroad. This time not even the expectations of 
their own nationals and their economic interests were good enough reasons to sell 
arms to Mexico. In the case o f Mexico, the propaganda campaign was based on 
clandestine activities developed by both the Italian, and “more particularly, the 
German Legation”127 (See Chapter VI).
The sales o f arms to Spain by Mexico were a regular transaction, albeit under 
extraordinary circumstances. It was business as usual. The relevance o f the Mexican 
position was ironically catapulted by the attitude assumed by the so-called Western 
democracies, which hypocritically abandoned the Spanish Government on the 
grounds o f Non-intervention. By honouring its engagements and its compromises 
within the League o f Nations, Mexico stood up for its own principles in an 
extraordinary manner. Its almost lone position in international politics during a 
defining decade o f the twentieth century gave Mexico some prestige.
The fact that the US Democrat Government was pursuing a softer approach towards 
its neighbours was also relevant for the success o f Mexican economic policy. This 
achievement, however, owes more to Mexican internal politics than to the 
Rooseveltian New Deal policy o f the Good Neighbour, as suggested by the fact that 
no other Latin American country pursued such a policy. For once, US-Mexican
126 T elegram  M ayor (Comintern, M oscow ) to M edida (Madrid), 17 July 1936, H W 1727, N o. 
6485 /S p .22  July 1936.
127 D ispatch G allop to Eden, A ugust 5, 1937, R ep o rted  beginning o f  a  fa sc is t m ovem ent in M exico, 
F 0 3 7 1/20639 A 5928 .
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relations would not be stretched to their limits, and the claims would be settled at the 
negotiation table. The Mexican Government was eager to help the Spanish Republic, 
but not so eager as to compromise its position in the international arena, nor its 
relations with important partners, namely the US. The limits o f the Mexican stand, 
however, were set by Mexico’s strategic use o f political pragmatism and ethical 
considerations. The Mexican position was largely and legally based upon the 
principles contained in the Charter o f the League o f Nations, hence the only limits to 
its actions were set by concepts such as self-determination and non-intervention. 
Ironically, there were different ways to interpret and to apply those principles.
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Mexico Supports the Second Spanish Republic.
L os hom bres sin  historia son la Historia. 
Grano a grano se juntan largas playas 
Y  luego v iene el viento y  las revuelve  
Borrando las pisadas y  lo s  nombres 
M en  w ith o u t h istory  are  H istory . 
L arge  b each es are m ade gra in  b y  grain  
T hen  th e  w in d  com es and sh u ffles  them  
E rasin g  th e  footp rin ts and the n am es 
S ilv io  Rodriguez
1. The Leading Forces of Solidarity and Aid for the Spanish Republic.
The internal political situation in Mexico, where progressive forces were pursuing 
a programme to bring about social justice, was not very different from that o f 
Spain. However, unlike in Spain, tensions between the opposing political factions 
were softened because o f the overwhelming strength of one o f them: the 
revolutionary government o f Cardenas and the labour movement. Hence, 
although the political situation was similar in both countries, it can be said that 
the consequences differed.
The impact o f the Spanish Civil War on Mexican society was evident, and so was 
the division the debate generated. The rapid formation o f sides, as we have seen, 
followed the same pattern as in the Spanish belligerent camps. The official 
Mexican stand regarding the war was firm and clearly in favour o f the Spanish 
Republic, but it was not only a governmental policy. Even though Mexican 
society was profoundly divided over the issue, it was obvious that the majority of
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the Mexican people were in favour o f the legitimate regime and decidedly behind 
any effort to support the Republican cause.
Most references to Mexican support o f the Spanish Republicans emphasise the 
governmental stand and the gestures o f Mexican intellectuals in favour o f their 
Spanish counterparts, whereas in fact, the strongest and most unequivocal 
decision to support the Spanish cause was shown through the role played by the 
Mexican labour movement. Under the leadership o f Secretary General, Lombardo 
Toledano, the recently founded Mexican Workers Confederation (CTM- 
Confederation de Trabajadores de Mexico), and the Workers’ University (UO- 
Universidad Obrera) linked to it, encouraged Mexican society to support the 
Republicans in Spain. There were also numerous activities organised by other 
organisations, such as the ruling Partido National Revolucionario (PNR- 
National Revolutionary Party), the Mexican Communist Party, and the 
organisations formed ad hoct including actions taken by Spanish honorary 
consulates nation-wide in Mexico. Likewise, whether organisations or 
individuals, a number o f actions involving Mexican nationals took place in Spain 
during the war years.
In spite o f the clear stance o f the Mexican government towards Republican Spain, 
however, the sending o f volunteers was not encouraged, yet a few hundred made 
their way to fight for the Spanish Republic. Some fought within the International 
Brigades, some in the ranks o f the Spanish Popular Army. They were scattered 
throughout Spain and so was the relevant information regarding them or it was 
lost. An attempt is made here to put together their story and their names.
a) The Role of the Labour Movement.
Barely a week had passed since the outbreak o f the military rebellion in Spain 
when the most important Mexican labour union organised a demonstration 
supporting the Republican government. On 26 July 1936, the CTM  gathered to 
show its firm stance in favour o f the democratic regime in Spain. Lombardo 
recalled his prophetic words five years earlier there, when the Second Spanish 
Republic was proclaimed. In his usual style, he recalled that when the Spanish
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Monarchy had collapsed, rich Mexicans and intellectuals alike rejoiced when the 
bloodless revolution occurred, as no essential change had been produced. He 
remembered, how shortly after, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Group (affiliated 
to the PSOE), had asked him to give a speech on this issue, but they were denied 
the use o f the premises o f the Casino Espanol in Mexico City, and in 
consequence they congregated at the Orfeo Catala. Lombardo affirmed that 
whenever the Spanish Republic stopped being only a formal structure and became 
a new regime challenging the economic order established in Spain, then the 
Spanish Republic would stop being a sympathetic cause for the rich and would 
become a curse for them. Now, he declared, this is exactly what had happened.1
After Lombardo’s, the speech by the Spanish Republican Ambassador Gordon 
Ordas in the Teatro Principal was short but powerful, the kind o f oratorical piece 
required by an already enthusiastic audience wanting to hear about the strength o f 
the Republican workers in Spain, fighting to keep alive the ideal o f social justice 
and a democratic regime. He started by accepting that he was one o f those who 
naively believed in the readiness to compromise o f those who, having witnessed 
the magnificence o f 14 April, would be prepared to surrender some o f their 
privileges.2 After making a brief summary o f the history o f the Spanish Republic 
and the meaning o f the Popular Front victory, he vehemently labelled the 
rebellion as Fascist, and went so far as to say that rather than militarism in Spain, 
the Republicans preferred Communism. Perhaps that remark was a little 
imprudent, given the criticism o f the Republican Government made by the rebels 
and their Mexican allies. But at this early stage, when the attempt on the Spanish 
regime had failed, Gordon’s confidence in the triumph of the Republican 
Government was solid, so much so that he ended his speech inflamed, solemnly 
declaring that this time there would be no mercy for the traitors. From that day 
onwards, the work carried out by the Spanish Republican ambassador in Mexico 
found an extraordinary ally in the Mexican abour movement and its leader.
1 H istoria  D ocum en ta l de  la  CTM, 1936-1937, ICAP, M exico, 1981, pp.212-213.
2 F uturo, no. 6, A ugust 1936, pp. 10-11; H istoria  D ocum ental, p.218.
3 Futuro, no. 6, p. 12; H istoria  D ocum ental, p.221.
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As a political writer, Lombardo's attitude toward Fascism was clearly shown in 
his numerous press articles and public speeches. He considered Fascism to be but 
a form of capitalism, even if  he recognised "democratic Capitalism" as far 
preferable to its diseased manifestation, pure Fascism.4 Lombardo was very 
critical of the policies o f Western capitalist nations towards the rise o f Fascism; 
therefore, he condemned the vacillation and hesitation o f English and French 
appeasement. These were very Communist approaches to international politics 
and yet Lombardo was bitterly criticised by the Mexican Communist Party. This 
is one o f the ironies surrounding the personality o f a self-styled Mexican Marxist, 
leader o f the greatest trade union the Mexican labour movement has ever known, 
opposed by both the Communists and the right-wingers, and the most influential 
man in Mexican politics as far as a progressive government would allow. Only a 
year after its formation the CTM  was facing its first schism, which meant the 
withdrawal o f the main industrial labour unions such as the Electricity Power 
Union (SME), the miners and railway unions, and the teachers union. The 
Mexican CP bore the responsibility for this.5 It took the presence o f the 
Comintern envoy, Earl Browder, Secretary General o f the USCP, to make his 
fellow Communists work with Lombardo and the CTM.6 Throughout the long 
process of labour unification the Communists’ dictum was “nothing with 
Lombardo, but everything with the masses that follow Lombardo”. During the 
Calles-Cardenas rift, assumed to be a bourgeois clash, the Communist stance at 
first was “Neither with Calles nor with Cardenas”; after the National Proletarian 
Defence Committee was set up, it changed to “ Not with Cardenas; with the 
cardenista masses, yes”. This traditional sectarian attitude o f the Mexican CP 
began to change as a result o f Dimitrov’s popular front strategy for the 
Comintern. Furthermore, the Spanish conflict also worked as an extra element of 
unification, cementing a rather loose relationship.
4 M illon , M exican M arxist, pp. 108-109.
5 A lic ia  Hernandez, H istoria  d e  la R evolucion M exicana, p. 152.
6 Jam es W . W ilkie and Edna M onzon de W ilkie, M exico Visto en e l S ig lo  X X , Interview with  
V icen te Lombardo Toledano, pp.326 and 327; A licia  Hernandez, H istoria  d e  la R evolucion  
M exican a , pp. 162-165.
7 Lom bardo only m et H em an Laborde, General Secretary o f  the M exican CP in M oscow , in 1935. 
D im itrov introduced them. Laborde was attending the fam ous VII C ongress o f  the Comintern. 
Lom bardo w as visiting Soviet trade unions. James W . W ilkie, M exico Visto en e l S ig lo  X X , 
Interview  w ith V icente Lombardo Toledano, 164.
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As we know, the first couple o f weeks after the military rebellion in Spain were 
decisive for the development o f the war effort. The internationalisation o f the 
Spanish conflict became evident shortly after the unsuccessful coup. More than 
ever, in view o f the growing international encirclement around the Spanish 
Republic, the leftist press was keen to show the events taking place in Spain. This 
job was undertaken wholeheartedly by one big newspaper only, El National, and 
the fortnightly magazine Futuro, now closely associated with the CTM  and the 
Universidad Obrera (Workers’ College), founded only days before the CTM  (see 
Chapter III), devoted its pages to the alarming situation in Spain, particularly 
reproducing the speeches given at demonstrations and meetings. Anselmo 
Carretero, a member o f the PSOE  who happened to be in Mexico at the time of 
the military rebellion, immediately became active in the war effort. Firstly, 
promoting solidarity for the Spanish Republic, and then later becoming 
instrumental in setting up the military intelligence service {SIM) back in Spain. 
Participating in one such meeting, Carretero gave a lengthy, albeit emotive, 
speech. His analytical mind as a trained engineer allowed him to dissect the 
Spanish conflict as the international struggle towards which it had evolved. After 
spending the first few months o f the war in Mexico, actively collaborating with 
the Spanish Ambassador Gordon, and in close contact with the Mexican labour 
movement, he went back to Spain, where he developed a delicate mission as a 
politically engaged engineer. He worked within military intelligence at a time 
when both the rearguard and the divisions in the Republican ranks were a 
priority.9
Although most o f the commercial press was in favour o f the rebels, including the 
bigger newspapers Excelsior and El Universal, with bigger print runs, and usually 
better means o f distribution through the traditional channels, it is no less true that 
word o f mouth remained an effective way o f circulating news. Besides, El 
National was permanently to report truthful accounts, clearly siding with the 
Republican government, and the bigger labour union would also have its voice
8 Futuro, no. 7, Septem ber 1936, pp. 15-19.
9 Interview o f  the author with A nselm o Carretero, M exico  City, 7 October 1999.
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heard, notwithstanding the odds.10 By now, it was known that the Mexican rifles 
had arrived in Madrid, and that the launching o f an offensive on the Spanish 
capital was imminent. The Republican government had left for Valencia, and the 
Alcazar o f Toledo was about to be taken by the rebel army. The mystification of 
the events there would develop into a myth for the rebels.11
Meanwhile, as part o f the attempt to raise the consciousness o f Mexican workers 
and their families, the CTAfs  magazine was making it a regular issue for its 
readers to learn about the Spanish war. Stressing the fact that the events occurring 
in Spain could also easily happen in Mexico if  not enough effort was made to 
avoid it, Futuro published its first full-issue homage to Spain in October 1936.12 
Some o f the Mexicans who had already been in Spain began to write first-hand 
accounts o f the actions there. Some o f them would return later as volunteers. 
Andres Iduarte, a Left-wing journalist who was living in Spain at the time of the 
military uprising, compared the Mexican Revolution to the Spanish revolutionary 
movement o f October 1934, which, according to Iduarte, was in the origin of the 
present conflict. He established the parallels between the two political projects, 
starting with their main objective, that o f social justice. For Iduarte, the two 
revolutionary movements were facing the same enemy, although the situation in 
Spain was far worse than in Mexico because there the Fascist Powers were
1 7supporting the local reactionaries. Therefore, he urged Mexican workers to 
support the Republican anti-Fascist struggle by fighting their local allies in 
Mexico. The latter was the common ground for Mexican progressive forces. The 
Spanish war influenced many o f the actions o f Mexican workers, and even 
became the catalytic factor for their grouping. A special branch o f revolutionary 
workers, artists and painters developed an essential part o f the solidarity campaign 
in favour o f the Spanish Republic. Previously developed on an individual basis, 
the creation and exhibition of posters developed by young revolutionary artists 
committed to making an impact on public opinion, became a team effort. Raul
10 A  detailed reconstruction o f  the conflict in the M exican press is in Jose A ntonio M atesanz, L as 
ra ices d e l exilio  E span ol en M exico, M exico an te la gu erra  c iv il espafiola, 1936-1939 , C olM ex- 
U N A M , M exico , 1999.
11 Juan Sim eon Vidarte, Todos Fuim os C ulpables, Testim onio d e  un Socia lis ta  E spanol, FCE, 
M exico, 1973, pp.450-454.
12 F uturo, Tercera Epoca, no. 8, October 1936, H om enaje a E spana.
13 F uturo, Tercera Epoca, no. 11, La R evolucion M e x c ia n a y  la R evolucion  Espafiola, pp. 14-17.
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Anguiano was a founder member o f the Popular Graphics Workshop, (Taller de 
Graflca Popular) along with Juan O’Higgins, Luis Arenal, and others, which was 
organised by militant artists to support the solidarity campaign o f the Spanish 
Republican cause early in 1937. They are responsible for many of the posters 
portraying the war effort, based on the premise o f the Spanish war as the fight of 
the working classes against Fascism.14
Touring Mexico as part o f an international campaign to counter balance the 
rebels’ anti-Republican propaganda, Marcelino Domingo, former Minister of 
Education in the first Popular Front governments, participated in a gigantic 
demonstration in Mexico City in February 1937.15 There, he not only realised the 
varied and powerful popular support for the Republican cause which existed in 
Mexico, but the impact o f the Spanish war in a far away land.16 His words 
motivated some Mexican youth to contribute to the war effort. In spite o f right- 
wing criticism of the Republic, and probably more determined because o f it, both 
Spanish Republicans in Mexico and their supporters continued to denounce the 
nature o f the war in Spain. “Nobody can deny anymore”, Domingo said, “what a 
few people denounced in July 1936, that the war going on in Spanish territory is 
an international war.”17 Efforts were being made to convince the Western 
governments o f the evident significance o f the war, as ample social sectors in 
their own countries became actively involved defending Spanish legality; but 
even governments considered as progressive failed to act accordingly. Mexico 
being the exception, its name became a sort o f synonym for the Republican cause, 
even within Spain. And this put Mexico in a delicate position.
On 31 July 1937, Lombardo gave a speech to a Congress o f the CTM  and
1 o
denounced the beginning of a Fascist movement springing up in Mexico. Then 
he placed at the disposal o f the Attorney General the material on which his
14 Interview  o f  the author w ith Raul A nguiano, M exico City, 19 October 1999.
15 F utu ro , Tercera Epoca, no. 13, M arch 1937.
16 This w as the first such m eeting, a lleged ly  attended by 10 000  people. It was organised by  the 
so-called  M exican Popular Front, w hich  included the N ational R evolutionary Party, the 
C om m unist Party, the peasants’ organisation ( CCM ) and the CTM. It w as held at the Toreo de  
C uatro C am inos (m ain bull-ring) in M exico  City.
17 M arcelino D om ingo, E spana an te e l m undo, M exico N uevo, M exico , 1937, p. 158.
18 D ispatch G allop to Eden, 5 A ugust 1937; F ascist ac tiv ities in M exico, F O 371/20639 A 5928.
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allegations were based. As a result, there were police raids on two organisations, 
the Middle Class Union, and the Union of Revolutionary Veterans. According to 
Rodney Gallop, from the British Legation in Mexico, the former organisation was 
in receipt o f German subsidies.19 Although dismissing Lombardo as a 
Communist, hence "likely to scent out 'fascism' anywhere", the Foreign Office 
took notice o f Fascist propaganda activities in Mexico. Although documents were 
seized and several individuals arrested, proceedings were abandoned apparently 
on the direct orders o f President Cardenas, and the two organisations were 
allowed to resume their activities.20 (The British Foreign Office assumed that 
there was a Cardenas-Lombardo conflict "strikingly reminiscent o f the Roosevelt- 
Lewis relationship in the United States).21
In general, campaigning for the Republican cause was an indirect way to confront 
local adversaries, as we have seen, but in doing so, labour organisations intended 
to elevate the level o f consciousness o f their affiliates as a means o f strengthening 
their own positions within Mexican politics. The solidarity campaign developed 
by labour also proved to be valuable encouragement for widening the social and 
political spectrum o f Mexican solidarity towards Spain. Mexican public opinion 
was divided over Spain as it was over a number o f other issues such as 
governmental policies, workers’ strikes, and so on. Thus, in order to gain broad 
support for its cause, Mexican labour developed an ambitious permanent
• 77propaganda campaign. In the centre o f such a campaign was the exhibition of 
posters and photographs, which was complemented by the publishing o f similar 
material in Futuro. It included a photographic supplement showing the war effort 
o f the Republicans, the destruction caused by the Nationalists and the appalling 
conditions o f the population, although still sustaining optimism towards a 
victorious end to the war for the Republic.23 December 1937 was a particularly 
active time in showing Mexican support of the Spanish Republican cause. The 
CTM  resolved to call the second week of December ‘The Week o f Spain’, and
19 D ispatch G allop to Eden, A ugust 11, 1937, P o litica l situation  in M exico, F O 371/20639 A 6194.
20 Idem.
21 Idem ; the remark w as m ade by W .D . A llen .
22 It must be understood that the word “propaganda” in Spanish m eans to m ake w idely  known, to 
spread; closer to the original Latin m eaning o f pro p a g a re , to propagate, than to the English  
concept o f  political advertisem ent or proselytism .
23 F uturo , Tercera Epoca, no. 18, A ugust 1937, p.15.
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focused on organizing demonstrations, meetings, lectures, fund-rising events, and 
publishing even more than previously on the situation in Spain and explaining 
why the Spanish war was important for Mexico. On 19 December, at the regular 
venue, the Green Room at the Fine Arts Palace, the presence o f American artists, 
such as Gale Sondergaard, and her husband, film director Herbert Biberman, 
highlighted the festival. The other guest of honour was Spanish Ambassador 
Gordon Ordas, and a special guest, the representative o f the National Federation 
o f Workers o f the Film Industry, Francisco M acen.24 Under the headline 
“Hollywood stars and Spanish children”, Gale Sondergaard’s speech was 
reproduced, which pointed out that “normally, I would rather be shot than make a 
speech, but tonight, on the contrary, I would have to be shot to prevent me from 
speaking” She then referred to the warm hospitality and friendship shown to her 
that made her feel one o f them and prompted her to address the audience. She 
explained the various activities developed by the Hollywood Committee o f Artists 
in favour of Spanish children and the collection o f clothes and toys made amongst 
the children o f actors -Robert Montgomery, Edward Robinson, Virginia Bruce, 
Gloria Swanson, Melvyn Douglas, Edward Arnold, and others.25
1938 certainly was a year o f achievements for the progressive forces in Mexico. 
Particularly important was the contribution o f the labour movement. In its January 
issue, Futuro featured the international events organised by the CTM  in favour of 
the Spanish children suffering in Republican Spain. The editorial, attempting an 
objective analysis “regardless o f political sympathies [...] for one side or the 
other”, warned o f the inevitability o f a war in Europe based on the developments
Of\ * • •of the war in Spain. By March, however, the decision o f the Mexican 
government to expropriate the oil industry occupied all the attention and energy 
o f Mexican labour. Shortly afterwards, the decision to transform the ruling party, 
as a means to show the empowerment o f a new political elite and the 
strengthening o f revolutionary principles, passed almost unnoticed. In spite of 
Lombardo’s involvement in the actual transformation o f the PNR (National
24 F uturo , Tercera E poca, no. 23, January 1938, pp. 10-11.
25 F uturo , no. 23 , January 1938, p. 15. Som e other North A m erican artists supporting the solidarity 
cam paign in the U S  that sent their w arm est greetings to the event in  M exico  C ity included Boris 
Karloff, Robert Y oung, B ing Crosby, Frank Tuttle, Henry Fonda, B ette D avis, M elvyn  D ouglas, 
L ionel Stander and D onald O gden Stewart. Futuro  no. 23, January 1938, pp. 10-11.
26 F uturo  no. 23, January 1938, p.5.
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Revolutionary Party) into the PRM  (Party o f the Mexican Revolution) not even 
Futuro commented on the issue. (See next section)
In the summer o f 1938, yet another workers’ newspaper appeared as the official 
organ o f the CTM. It had an encouraging start with an ambitious plan o f two daily 
editions, including a summary section in English. On the morning o f 1 June, El 
Popular emerged “with the focus on the future”, as its editorial read. During the 
rest o f the Spanish conflict, El Popular devoted most o f its international section to 
the Spanish war, with a rather over-optimistic pro-Republican view.27 El Popular, 
as Futuro had been doing for the past two years, included regular contributions 
from leading Spanish personalities, some o f whom lived by then as exiles, such as 
poet, historian and painter Jose Moreno Villa.28
Given the increasingly critical international situation, and after succeeding in 
unifying and consolidating the Mexican labour movement, Lombardo worked for 
the unification o f the Latin American labour movement. In 1938, the Latin 
American Confederation o f Workers (CTAL) was created. One o f Lombardo’s 
major and permanent concerns was the unity o f the working-class, as well as the 
continuous strengthening o f Fascist powers and the spread o f their influence all 
over the world, particularly in Latin America. The formation o f a Continental 
labour union would encourage the unity of the labour unions in each country as 
the first step in Continental unity.30 The Latin American Workers Congress was 
held in Mexico City between 5-8 September 1938, including representatives of 
more than a dozen Latin American countries as delegates and honorary 
delegates including, significantly; from France’s CGT, Leon Jouhaux, from
27 E l P opu lar, O rgano de  la C onfederacion d e  Trabajadores de  M exico, A fio 1, T om o I, 1 June 
1938, M orning Edition.
28 M oreno V illa  arrived in M exico in 1937, after touring the U S  in a series o f  pro-Republican  
events. A  com pilation o f  his works before the exile is in  Carolina Galan Caballero, Jose  M oreno  
Villa escr ibe  articu los (1906-1937), D iputacion Provincial de M alaga, 1999.
29 The Continental workers congress gathered only a few  days before the Anti-W ar Congress, also  
organised b y  the C T M  and in w hich Lazaro Cardenas participated, alongside many o f  the 
delegates to the labour gathering; see Chapter IV.
30 James W . W ilk ie y  Edna M onzon de W ilkie, M exico visto  en e l S iglo XX, E n trevistas de  
H istoria  O ral, Instituto M exicano de Investigaciones E conom icas, M exico, 1969, p.359.
31 The main national labour organisations attending the congress were A rgentina’s CGT, B o liv ia ’s 
C ST, C h ile’s CT, C olom bia’s CT, Ecuador’s CNO, and Paraguay’s CNT. Local or regional 
w orkers’ organisations included railways, sugarcane and banana plantations, maritime, and others, 
from  Cuba, Peru, N icaragua, Costa R ica, and V enezuela. For political reasons, Brazilian labour 
organisations w ere lega lly  banned from  attending.
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Spain’s CNT\ Felix Marti Ibanez and from the UGT, Ramon Gonzalez Pena. John 
Lewis attended in representation of America’s Congress o f Industrial 
Organisations (CIO), at the time rival of the AFL, whose leader, William Green, 
labelled the congress as “little less than a Communist gathering”. Other special 
Spanish guests included Margarita Nelken, Luis Cobos and Daniel Anguiano.32
Amongst the various early resolutions of the Latin American Worker’s Congress, 
there was one on Spain. The call to promote broad support for the Spanish 
working-class and the Spanish people in general throughout the Continent was an 
essential part of the new organisation’s aim. It echoed what the CTM  and the 
Mexican labour movement had been doing for the last two years. The Spanish 
war was indeed assumed to be an extreme case of class struggle, and for the time 
being, the latter’s expression was anti-Fascism, hence victory over the Nazi- 
Fascist supported Spanish rebels was essential and not only for Spanish workers. 
After three days o f deliberations, the delegates decided to establish the 
Continental Alliance in a historic gathering at the Fine Arts Palace o f Mexico 
City, resolving among other issues specifically related to their class unity aims, to 
show their solidarity towards Spanish Republicans fighting against a common 
enemy, i.e. Fascism.33 Addressing the congress, Gonzalez Pena reminded the 
delegates o f the urge to remain truly united so as to face powerful enemies. Surely 
a lament derived from the troubles with which Spanish Republicans were then 
dangerously confronted.34
Having a defined position towards the war in Spain, the Mexican government 
pursued policies tending to explain the nature o f the situation and the reasons for 
governmental decisions. Consequently, many o f the initiatives and actions 
developed by private groups found, in many cases, either the government or 
labour as the best allies through which to materialise their aims. (See next 
section).
32E l P opu lar, 9 Septem ber 1938, p.5.
33 R esolution no. 5, On Spain, CTAL, 1938-1948, R esoluciones de  sus A sam bleas, M exico, 1948, 
p.21; C ole, G .D .H ., A h istory o f  so c ia lis t thought, V ol. 5, Socialism  and Fascism , 1931-1939, 
M acm illan, London, 1960.
34 D ispatch no. 332 , Gordon to A lvarez del V ayo, 14 Septem ber 1938, C ongreso  O brero  Latino- 
A m ericano; E l P opu lar, 5 Septem ber 1938, p.5.
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Both the Mexican government and labour, were decidedly backing the Republican - 
cause in Spain. The latter even used the argument o f defending the Spanish 
workers, represented by the Spanish Republican Popular Front government, to 
criticise its local enemies. These actions, whatever their motivations and political 
aims beyond mere solidarity, encouraged the interest o f wider sectors in Mexican 
society which became eager to contribute in a struggle they genuinely came to 
feel as their own.
b) Political Parties and Ad Hoc Organisations.
The military coup to overthrow a democratic government, because o f its 
progressive policies, was an issue still fresh in the minds o f many Mexicans by 
mid 1936, after Calles had been expelled from the country. Therefore, the military 
rebellion in Spain provoked an almost immediate reaction from both defenders 
and critics of the Spanish Republic, both seeing the Mexican government as its 
equal. However nonchalant most people in Mexico remained regarding an event 
occurring far away, the development o f the conflict into a major international 
military crisis grabbed the attention o f Mexicans gradually but firmly. During the 
first few months of the Spanish war, when the long-term nature o f the war became 
evident, Mexican conservatives showed their sympathies for the rebels mainly in 
the media, being better equipped to pursue such action, whilst the progressive 
forces, relied on the activism of their militants. The political situation in Spain, 
however, was not at all a new issue, particularly so for Mexican workers affiliated 
to the CTM , whose magazine had regularly followed the evolution o f the Spanish
1C
revolutionary movement. The activity o f those Mexican progressive forces 
would become particularly intense within months and was expressed through a 
number o f new organizations and events. Complementary to the assistance 
offered by the Mexican government, there were numerous other initiatives from 
either individuals or groups. The number o f supporters of Republican Spain grew 
by the day amongst the Mexican people. Members of the Chambers o f Deputies,
35 Futuro, the m agazine devoted to w orking-class and international political issues becam e the 
unofficial m agazine o f  the C TM  w hen the latter was founded in February 1936. It continued to 
regularly feature Spanish new s, after having devoted a w hole issue to the Asturias rising o f  1934  
{Futuro, T om o II, no. 8, February 1935) and to the electoral results o f  February 1936 {Futuro, 
Tercera Epoca, no. 2 , M ay 1936).
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writers, intellectuals, and a myriad o f organizations and institutions such as the 
Local Congress of the State o f Queretaro, the Society o f Friends o f the Soviet 
Union in Tampico, or International Red Aid, Mexican Section, are a sample o f the 
widespread involvement o f Mexican people supporting the Republican cause. 
Traditionally more militant, some of the trade unions included the Teachers’ 
National Confederation and the powerful Syndicate o f Mexican Electricians 
(iSME), o f the American-owned Mexican Light and Power Company. There were 
all kinds o f Masonic groups as well. Amongst the leading personalities in Mexico 
who unhesitatingly showed their support for the legitimate regime in Spain, was 
former Mexican ambassador to Spain, Genaro Estrada.
There was a genuine concern amongst Mexican society towards the well-being of 
Spanish orphan children; undoubtedly a major issue. There were also legitimate 
private interests o f individuals, such as in the case o f Mr. And Mrs. Antonio 
Zatarain, who volunteered to adopt two orphaned children, even before they had 
arrived m Mexico. Such initiatives were usually dealt with via the various 
consulates throughout the Mexican territory, in co-ordination with several 
different organisations set up by Mexican citizens to provide help or relieve the 
Spanish people from the horrors o f war. Some of those were the Spanish People’s 
Aid Committee (Comite de Ayuda al Pueblo Espanol), mostly dedicated to 
collecting food and clothes, and the Spanish People’s Children’s Committee 
(Comite de Ayuda a los Ninos del Pueblo Espanol), devoted exclusively to child 
welfare, both based in Mexico City.
The work developed by the organised groups to contribute to the Republican 
effort mainly took the form of humanitarian aid, aiming at collecting food and 
medicine, clothes and toys for children. Invariably, those groups worked in close 
contact with the Spanish embassy and the various consulates. Mexicans
36 D ispatch no. 122, Gordon to Barcia, 4  A ugust 1936, despatch 122, FU E, GO 2.
37 D ispatch no. 164, Pena (Spanish V ice-C onsul in M exico) 26  February 1937, A G A , FM AE, 
10237, Leg. 4.
38 Even though they had similar denom inations, they w ere indeed tw o different organisations, with 
their ow n o ffices and personnel, w hich also g ives an idea o f  the extent to w hich  the M exican  
people w ere com m itted to the Spanish cause. The Spanish P eop le’s A id  C om m ittee w as located in  
Bucareli 12, dept. 412 , and the Spanish P eop le’s Children’s A id  Com m ittee w as located in  
C olom bia 9 P.O. 1708. B esides, the difference in the actions they w ere involved  in w as clear, as 
show n below .
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overwhelmingly constituted these groups. However, there were, besides the 
groups organised by the local population, a few groups set up by members o f the 
Spanish community. In February 1937, news of the formation o f the Spanish 
People’s Children Aid Committee was in the papers. Based in Mexico City, the 
Committee’s aim was simple: fund-raising to help alleviate the difficulties o f 
Spanish orphans. In so doing, the various consular offices urged the Spanish 
community to contribute. As usual, as it had become for the last five years, the 
Consulate in Durango issued a public notice asking for co-operation.39 Ironically, 
two months after the atrocities committed by the German Condon Legion 
bombing defenceless Basque villages with no military or strategic importance, the 
Spanish residents were requested by the state official for public works for their 
contribution to several local city projects, including the Basque Jai Alai. No 
mention was made o f the bombing o f Guernica, Durango and other small Basque 
villages reduced to rubble. This showed the different perspectives, concerns, and 
thus, attitudes towards the events in Spain.40 The evidence of the crime pointing 
to the allies o f Franco was obscured by a tremendous Right-wing propaganda 
campaign aimed at blaming the Republicans.41
The main activity o f both Spanish and Mexican groups supporting the Republican 
war effort on the far side o f the Atlantic was the sending of all types o f donations, 
from money to food, destined usually for relatives and friends who were unable or 
unwilling to leave Spain. The Mexican port o f Tampico had always maintained 
important commercial activity as an alternative to Veracruz as the main port of 
entrance to Mexico on the Atlantic. In this city, because o f those early trade 
activities, the Spanish community found a niche for their natural inclinations for 
business linked to their home country. There, a Sub-Committee o f Aid for the 
Spanish People’s Children was established. In the summer o f 1937, the latter 
participated in the national campaign Dia del kilo (Day of the kilo) in which it 
was expected people would contribute a kilo of any food product they wished.
The campaign was aimed at Spanish storekeepers, who reluctantly contributed the
39 A G A , FM AE, 10237, Leg. 4 , C orrespondencia General, 1935-1937, C ircu lar no .2.
40 A G A , FM A E , 10237, Leg. 4 , Circular 3 issued b y  the Spanish V ice-C onsul in  Durango, 23 June 
1937.
41 R eporte  o fic ia l de  la s a troc idades com etidas p o r  e l g o b ie m o  rojo  de  Valencia , Burgos, 1937.
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minimum expected.42
There was a rash o f associations, groups, committees, and all sort o f organizations 
all over the country, proof of the strong sympathies of the Mexican people.43 The 
sight o f any such committees provoked the natural impulse to contribute, 
providing the passerby sympathized with the cause o f the Spanish Republic.
Some o f these groups, although genuine, couldn’t avoid arousing suspicion. One 
o f those particular groups was created in April 1937, with the specific aim o f 
providing support for the orphans and widows of those who had died on the front 
line. Comite Pro Huerfanos y  Viudas de los Trabajadores que Luchan en la 
Espana Proletaria (Committee in favour o f the orphans and widows o f the 
workers fighting in proletarian Spain).44 Although limited, there was some 
organised aid provided by the few Spanish residents in Mexico who 
unequivocally supported the legitimate government o f Spain. In the port of 
Tampico, for example, the official Spanish Chamber o f Commerce participated in 
the event commemorating the Sixth Anniversary o f the establishment o f the 
Spanish Republic, together with the Spanish Centre and the Spanish Popular 
Front groups 45 There were a number o f private initiatives, proposals or simple 
manifestations o f solidarity with Spanish Republicans from all over the country, 
including remote places in the Mexican Republic, such as Chiapas.46
One o f the best-known events, and most revealing o f the Mexican attitude 
towards the Spanish Republic, was the welcoming o f hundreds o f children. 
Commonly believed to be a personal initiative o f President Cardenas himself, he 
made clear it was not, although, obviously he firmly supported it. As Cardenas 
wrote in his diary, it came “as a private initiative from a group o f Mexican 
volunteer ladies”, who approached the government seeking support in trying to 
contribute to alleviate the burden of Spanish families in the w ar.47 After months
42 A G A , FM EA , 10234, Leg. 53, Request to the Spanish General Consulate from  the Sub­
com m ittee  presided b y  A bigail Cantu, Tampico, 18 A ugust 1937.
43 Sadly, there were also som e w ho w ould attempt to cash in on the cause o f  Spain for personal 
profit.
44 A G A , FM AE, 10234, Leg. 53, Letter -illegible signature- to the Spanish Consulate in  Tam pico  
8 April 1937.
45 A G A , FM A E , 10234, Leg. 53, Spanish Consulate in Tam pico, 13 April 1937.
46 A G A , FM A E , 10240, Leg. 4, C orrespondencia 1935-1937 , 1 A ugust 1936. S ee Chapter IV.
47 Lazaro Cardenas, O bras, I  A puntes 1913-1940, U N A M , M exico, 1 9 7 2 ,3 6 9 .
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o f consideration and consultation with the Spanish government, and preparations 
on both sides o f the Atlantic, a group o f nearly 500 Spanish children were 
embarked for Mexico.48 Initially opposed to the idea o f sending Spanish children 
to Mexico, the Spanish Republican government finally agreed to send an 
expedition o f children, most o f whom had lost their parents. Children whose 
parents were alive were sent on request o f the latter to protect their children from 
the horrors o f the war. Some o f the adults in charge o f the expedition, particularly 
women teachers, doctors and nurses, also brought their own children in the
49group.
Thus on 13 June 1937, the Spanish children arrived in Veracruz in the midst of 
popular rejoicing. This was a very touching occasion, symbolising the Mexican 
State taking under its patronage the raising o f Spanish orphans until the war was 
over and they could be repatriated to their homeland.50 Relatives or friends and 
acquaintances o f their parents claimed some children. Most o f them were 
accommodated in a special boarding school in the capital city o f Michoacan, 
Cardenas’s home state. They would end up being referred to as the “Ninos de 
Morelia” as it was in that city where they were placed in the “Mexico-Espana” 
School. A nation-wide effort was developed promoting the idea o f receiving a 
number o f war orphans who would be temporarily taken into the care o f the 
Mexican State.51 Initially assumed as a temporary arrangement, whilst the war 
lasted, the children remained in Mexico for longer than expected. However, 
shortly after the war finished, Spanish residents issued an official petition to
c* j
President Cardenas to send the children back to Spain.
A year after the arrival of the Spanish orphans, the German magazine Volkskrant, 
edited in The Hague, published an ominous article against the Mexican 
government with the title “Saving the Basque children”, suggesting that those
48 A G A , FM A E , 10237, Leg. 4 , C orrespondencia  G eneral, letter o f  the A id C om m ittee for the 
Spanish P eop le’s Children, 2 February 1937.
49 A G A , FM A E , 10237, Leg. 4 , C orrespondencia  G eneral, letter o f  the A id  C om m ittee for the 
Spanish P eop le’s Children, 28  June 1937.
50 A G A , FM A E , 9870 , Leg. 864, M edical records o f  the children sent to M exico , A pril-M ay 1937.
51 A M A E , M inisterio de Estado, Leg. R -978, Exp. 19, M ejico/E xpedicion  de  n in o s y  m aestros.
52 The request was made b y  pro-Franco Spanish residents organised in the C asa d e  G alicia , the 
C asino E spanol, the Club Espana, the C entro A sturiano, and the B eneficencia Espafiola', A G N , 
Lazaro Cardenas, Exp.550/84.
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children were being subjected to outrageous living conditions. To counteract the 
insidious remarks and unveil the real intentions o f the article, in another piece of 
work for the powerful propaganda campaign, Jose Loredo Aparicio, Spanish 
Charge de Affaires in absence o f Ambassador Gordon, joined forces with 
Mexican officials such as Ramon Beteta, a committed revolutionary, and Under 
Secretary o f Foreign Affairs. Another criticism involved those adults in charge 
o f the expedition, as if  they had volunteered with the sole purpose o f fleeing from 
Spain. Had this been the case, they can hardly been blamed for wanting to escape 
from a country at war. However, although it is true that some of those in charge of 
the Spanish children did not go back to Spain, this was due to the continuation of 
their duty towards them while in Mexico or, in the worse case, to the “pecuniary 
abandonment” in which they found themselves.
Those in the first category included the teachers Isadora Martin Gomez, Joaquina 
Lopez, Eduardo Haro, Jose Martinez Aguilar, who was in charge o f the group, 
and Danton Canut Martorell with his wife, Amparo Molla. In the second case, the 
nurses Clotilde Bemat and Antonia Seba Villanueva, who were already 
working.54 Finally, amongst those who went back to Spain was Julieta Cabeza, 
who presented a detailed account o f the children’s journey, their arrival and 
accommodation at a conference in Valencia on 26 November 1937. She also 
explained the political situation o f Mexico and the efforts made by both the 
Mexican people and its government to support the Republican struggle in Spain. 
She did not fail to mention the criticism they faced within Mexico, and how the 
bitterest criticism, which cited the thousands o f Mexican children in need who 
were not receiving anything while so much was given to the Spanish children, 
was confronted.55 The supporters o f the Republican cause simply referred to the 
fact that the Spanish people were at the forefront o f the anti-Fascist struggle, 
which was a fight for the future o f all peoples.
53 D ispatch no. 283 , Loredo A paricio to A lvarez del V ayo, 29  July 1 9 3 8 ,, A M A E , M in. Edo. Leg. 
R -2571 Exp. 16.
54 A M A E , M inisterio de Estado, Leg. R -978, M ejico. E x p ed itio n  d e  n in o s y  m aestros , Exp.19, 
several letters.
55 M exico y  los N inos E span oles , Conferencia d e  Ju lieta  C abeza , E diciones A m igos de M exico, 
V alencia, 1937, pp.5-9.
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Meanwhile, visiting Spain shortly after leaving his post as Mexican representative 
at the League o f Nations in Geneva, Narciso Bassols became Futuro’s 
correspondent in Barcelona. He did not visit in an official capacity as a 
representative o f the Mexican government, but Spanish Republicans made the 
most o f his reputation and well-known politics. The Spanish Minister o f 
Propaganda, Carlos Espla, organised a radio broadcast for Bassols to address the 
general public in Barcelona. Bassols took the opportunity to encourage the morale 
o f the combatants and non-combatants by explaining Mexico’s attitude towards 
Spain.56 He praised the Spanish Republic and its progressive government; then he 
established a parallel between the Mexican and the Spanish governments, and 
their respective challenges, which in his opinion were perfectly analogous. Thus 
the continuation o f ancient problems such as latifundismo, miserable wages, 
ignorance and fanaticism, and political oppression from traditional conservative 
forces, forced the need for political, educational, economic and agrarian 
reforms.57
Furthermore, he argued that these problems were not restricted to those two 
countries, but to all countries struggling for their independence, namely all Latin 
American countries. Finally, Bassols identified those sectors opposed to such 
reforms, the local reactionaries, with international Fascism, thus concluding the 
necessity o f the anti-Fascist alliance, in which the Spanish Republic had engaged 
outstandingly. Guatemala and Uruguay did not support the Republican effort as 
they were under military dictatorships; it was only natural that Mexico, having a 
revolutionary government, supported the Spanish Republic in its fight against 
Fascism. Mexican aid to Spain was not a sentimental matter, but a political
C O
necessity. A few months later, in another radio broadcast from Barcelona, Felix 
Marti Ibanez addressed the Mexican people on the Day o f Mexican 
Independence. He recounted the history of Mexico and praised the common 
progressive elements of both Mexico and Spain. Particularly critical of the 
Western countries who abandoned the democratic regime of the Spanish 
Republic, he compared Mexico’s attitude as the honest response o f the new
56 F uturo , Tercera epoca, no. 14, April 1937, p.28.
57 Idem, p.29.
58 Idem, pp.30-32.
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World, only comparable to that o f the Soviet Union.59 He greeted Mexican 
freedom and the new bom Hispanidad (Hispanism) not derived from blood, but 
from the ideals o f freedom in Spain and Latin America.
The Spanish war was also a war o f words, and there are no better fighters in such 
a war than poets and writers. Overcoming the enormous propaganda campaign 
developed by the rebels and their allies in many countries was not an easy task.
To contribute to such an effort, several whole issues and supplements o f Futuro 
were dedicated to the Spanish Republican struggle. In August 1937, the entire 
issue was devoted to Spain, including articles in the form o f letters by Jose 
Bergamin,Carta abierta a Victoria Ocampo “Hasta la muerte”, Alvaro de 
Albomoz “Del General Prim al Cabecilla Franco” where he condemned 
Franco’s betrayal and contrasted his poor image with that o f Prim; and poems by 
Pablo Neruda and Camaposada on the war.60 This was not the first or the last of 
such actions, nor were those writers the only ones, although they were regular 
contributors, particularly Nemda. Other writers and poets included Leon Felipe, 
Rafael Alberti, Maria Teresa Leon, Octavio Paz, Gabriel Garcia Maroto, and 
Mauricio Magdaleno. The close relationship between Spanish Republican and 
Mexican intellectuals also became more intense and even more productive during 
the years o f the Spanish war, as shown later.
It was around this time that Ramon P. de Negri, Mexican Ambassador to Spain, 
was removed from his diplomatic post amid criticism, mainly from conservative 
circles. He went back to Mexico, but far from retiring into private life, he became 
actively involved in the support o f the Spanish Republic. In November 1937, the 
Sociedad de Amigos de Espana (Friends o f Spain Society) was formed, and he 
became its president. The Vice-President was Alejandro Carrillo, o f the CTM.
The purpose o f the new organization, as defined by their public statements, was to 
provide accurate information about events in Spain, and defend its legitimate 
government from all the calumnies and unjustified accusations. The society 
would also endeavour to acquire all possible material aid for the loyal Spaniards
59 M ensaje  a  M exico, D iscurso  pron unciado  p o r  e l Dr. Felix M a rti Ibanez, en la  em isora  R adio  
A sociacion  d e  C ataluna, e l 16  d e  S ep tiem bre de  1937, con m otivo  d e l an iversario  d e  la  
Independencia  M exicana, Ediciones “L os A m igos de M exico”, Barcelona, 1937.
60 F uturo, Tercera Epoca, no. 18, A ugust 1937, p. 15.
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defending their country.61 The Spanish Popular Front Group based in Tampico 
developed an important activity close to the Spanish Embassy and the General 
Consulate, publicizing the real nature o f the so-called “Nationalist cause” and
f%ypromoting support for the Republican government.
The Mexican Chamber o f Deputies held a Solemn Session to honour the Spanish 
Republic on 11 March 1938. As usual, the occasion meant the renewal o f 
solidarity with the Republican cause, and strong criticism o f local allies o f the 
Spanish rebels. Taking advantage o f the favourable moment, the reorganisation 
o f the National Revolutionary Party was debated in terms o f necessary 
adjustments to reinforce the main political tool supporting the regime. Thus, in 
March 1938, Lombardo proposed the transformation o f the party into a more 
ample coalition, to include workers, peasants, the Army, and the so-called 
‘Popular Sector’, which amalgamated those groups not included in the other 
sectors. That decision signified the strengthening o f the revolutionary government 
and its programme.64 Narciso Bassols’ decision to go back to Spain was taken in 
order to stay close to the events o f the Spanish war, transmit his impressions to 
the Mexican people, and contribute to the “formation o f a clear class conscience 
in the Mexican proletariat.”65 Taking advantage o f Bassols’ assignment in 
Barcelona, a conference on the oil expropriation in Mexico was organised and 
held at the Ateneo Barcelones for the Ibero-American Union.66
In the meantime, the disorganised way in which, still in early 1938, numerous 
recipients o f the many donations collected without the authorities being notified 
motivated the Minister of Communications, Bernardo Giner de los Rios, to 
complain and ask for public acknowledgment of the donations. He hoped to 
channel all donations through the Finance Ministry, for the government to remain
61 A G A , FM A E, 10234, Leg. 53, Letter Ram on P.de N egri to M ariano de la Sota B idou (Spanish  
C onsulate in T am pico) 24  N ovem ber 1937.
62 A G A , FM AE, 10234, Leg. 53, Letter Quirino S. M oreno (Spanish Popular Front in Tam pico) to  
the Spanish Consulate in  Tam pico, 27 O ctober 1937.
63 A M A E , Leg. R -979 , E m bajada  espan ola  en M ejico, E xp .l, N otas d iversas.
64 V icente Fuentes D iaz, Los P artidos P o litico s en M exico, Porrua, M exico, 1996, pp. 104-106.
65 Futuro, no. 23, January 1938, p.5.
66 L a Vanguardia  2 6  April 1938, A M A E , M in. Edo. Leg. R -2571 Exp. 16.
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in charge and so avoid criticism affecting its prestige.67 On the same lines, in later 
months, following a Spanish suggestion, an agreement was reached between the 
Mexican and French Post Offices in order to deal with all exchanges between 
Mexico and Republican Spain.68
As previously mentioned, one of the best-known, most enduring and successful 
episodes o f Mexican aid to Republican Spain was the decisive action taken by 
some Mexican intellectuals towards their Spanish counterparts. During the 
summer of 1938, a group o f Mexican intellectuals headed by Alfonso Reyes -  
brother o f the Conservative Rodolfo and uncle to two Falangists- and Daniel 
Cosio Villegas, Mexican Minister in Lisbon, invited leading Spanish specialists to 
go to Mexico, where they could continue their work whilst Spain remained at 
war.69 Although the idea was first suggested by Cosio at the end o f 1936, a long 
process o f consultations, a mixture o f scepticism and ideological rivalries between 
the Mexican representative -Cosio, a Conservative- and the Spaniard -Wenceslao 
Roces, a Communist- prevented the project from being agreed before August 
1938. Naively hoping that the war would soon be over with the triumph of the 
Republican cause, the temporary arrangement took the form o f an academic 
forum in Mexico City with the support o f Mexican academia and official
• 7 0funding. Therefore, the Casa de Espana was set up for Jose Gaos, Claudio 
Sanchez Albomoz, Enrique Diez Canedo and other Spanish professors to develop 
their academic work. Under the direction o f Alfonso Reyes -then Mexican 
Ambassador to Argentina- and Daniel Cosio Villegas -M exican Minister in 
Portugal- the Casa opened its doors in M archl939, and was in fact an academic 
outpost o f the Spanish Republic. Financially supported by the Mexican 
Government, Casa de Espana embraced many more Spanish academics than the 
original thirty enlisted. Given the imminent collapse o f the Spanish Republic, the
67 A G A , FM A E , 10237, Leg. 4, Despatch 868 , 28 Septem ber 1937; M exico y  la  R epublica  
E spanola , A n to log la  d e  D ocum entos, 1931-1977 , Centro R epublicano Espanol de M exico, 
M exico , 1978, pp.32-34.
68 A G A , FM A E, 10059, Letter A lfonso  G om ez M orentin (D irector General, M exican Postal 
Services) to G ordon Ordas, 13 M ay 1938.
69 E l P opu lar, 20  A ugust 1938, front page.
70 A M A E , M inisterio de Estado, Leg. R -996, C asa d e  E spana, Exp.61, D ispatch no. 313, 20  
A ugust 1938 and D ispatch no. 429 , 12 N ovem ber 1938.
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Casa absorbed even more Spanish exiles, and was soon to be transformed into the
71Colegio de Mexico.
In September 1938, two more congresses met in Mexico, one in Mexico City, and 
the other one in Veracruz. Once the Latin American workers congress concluded 
with the creation o f the CTAL, the delegates, having also been invited to 
participate, took part in the Anti-War Congress, also organised by the CTM. In 
fact, President Cardenas had suggested the idea o f such a congress while 
addressing the CTM  assembly in February. Now, addressing the anti-war 
congress, Cardenas expressed his confidence in the ideals o f organised labour for 
freedom as the promoters o f peace in their respective countries. Such forces
77should oppose war and lniperialism, concluded Cardenas. Attending as a guest 
o f honour was the Spanish Republican Ambassador, Gordon Ordas, who attracted 
most sympathies alongside the other Spanish Republican delegates. The second 
gathering was extraordinary. It was the First Congress of Children, organised in 
the region o f Los Tuxtlas, state o f Veracruz. The young Mexican participants sent 
an encouraging message to the Spanish children, “a thousand times our brothers”,
7^
together with some photographs showing brave and enthusiastic faces.
Trying to make the most o f the presence of Spanish Republican figures in 
Mexico, the Mexican Communist Party organised a demonstration with the 
presence o f the French Communist Party representative, Jacques Gresa, the 
Colombian Communist Party, and the Vice-President o f the Chilean Popular 
Front, Carlos Contreras Labarca. The main speaker at the meeting was Margarita 
Nelken, who reiterated the need for the anti-Fascist alliance, and urged the 
Western democracies to rectify their attitude as they were making an enormous 
mistake.74 Perhaps by then, when President Negrin’s proposal for the withdrawal 
o f international volunteers was about to be fulfilled, fewer had the strength
71 The story o f  both the C asa de  E spana  and the C olegio  de  M exico  have been thoroughly  
explained in Clara E. Lida, La C asa d e  E spana en M exico, El C olegio  de M exico , M exico, 1988, 
and in Clara E. Lida and Jose A ntonio M atesanz, E l C oleg io  d e  M exico: una hazana cultural, 
1 9 40 -1962 , El C olegio  de M exico, M exico , 1990.
72 E l P opu lar, 11 Septem ber 1938, front page.
73 A M A E , M inisterio de Estado, Leg. 979 , E xp .l, E m bajada espanola  en M ejico , Letter 
Candelario Zapo to Gordon, 10 Septem ber 1938.
74 E l P opu lar, 17 Septem ber 1938, p.3.
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required to pursue Negrin’s strategy of resistance. But it was the only remaining 
resource o f the weakened Spanish Republic. For a short while, there still seemed 
to be hope, a realistic optimism, and the various supplies o f  the humanitarian aid 
being sent to Republican Spain kept arriving. The National Committee o f Aid to 
Spain (Comite Nacional deAyuda a Espana) was established by decree in 
Barcelona, to centralise and coordinate the allocation of humanitarian aid received
nc
from abroad. Mexican groups supporting the Republican cause in Spam 
remained active and in high spirits. Two years after the war in Spain had begun, 
former Mexican Minister to Spain, Enrique Gonzalez Martinez, expressed the 
extent to which the Spanish drama affected Mexican society. Gonzalez Martinez, 
whose efforts to upgrade the diplomatic representations between Mexico and 
Spain in the late 1920s and early 1930s had failed and whose pro-Hispanic views 
did not blind him to an honest evaluation of the political situation in Spain, 
vividly made an anguished premonition:
I believe, I want to believe, in the triumph o f the Republic. [...] But if  the 
Spanish Republic has to perish under the inequity o f force, let there be 
engraved on its ruins: Here lies Spain. For the corpse will not be Spain,
7but a bloody rag in the hands of international filibustensm.
Mexican society was certainly divided, and even though the debate around the 
war in Spain further polarised the positions, there was a clear imbalance in favour 
o f the Republican cause, in spite of the power and resources o f the pro-rebel 
sectors. The streets, so to speak, had been taken by the Republican supporters and 
would remain in their hands for their own sake. This, broadly speaking, meant 
that overall Mexico sided with the Spanish Republic. This was demonstrated by 
the wide variety o f political, ideological, cultural, diplomatic and local 
contributions and activities.
75 A G A , FM A E , 9872 , Leg. 884, C ircu lar 1775, M inistry o f  State, Barcelona, 24  October 1938.
76 Futuro, Tercera Epoca, no. 29, July 1938, E l Crim en de  E spana, pp.23-25.
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2. Mexican Volunteers in the Spanish Civil War.
Within days o f the military uprising, hundreds o f Mexicans and Spaniards 
volunteered to go to Spain and defend the legitimate Republican Government.
The Spanish Government refused their offer because it did not consider it 
necessary.77 The number o f Spanish residents volunteering decreased rapidly and 
considerably. A few months later, the Spanish Consul General, Emilio Zapico, 
transmitted to the vice-consulates the order o f the Ministry o f State with the 
decree of the Defence Ministry to mobilise the 1930 intake as first reserve for the 
army, but the previous enthusiasm to defend the Republican government had gone 
from Spanish residents.78
When the Spanish military rebellion developed into an international conflict, the 
people’s struggle against Fascism and in defence o f a democracy abandoned by 
its peers was in the hearts and minds o f many Mexicans. Whatever the standpoint 
assumed, it was evident that the armed conflict in Spain attracted both 
international involvement and attention. A decade that began with enormous 
enthusiasm and collective illusions after the economic crisis undergone by the 
leading capitalist power encouraged the revolutionary and progressive element in 
Western societies towards radicalism in search o f improved working and living 
conditions worldwide. However, relevant for its nature and character was the 
organisation o f the International Brigades, formed by volunteers from more than 
56 countries, including only naturally, many Latin Americans, who identified 
both culturally and politically with Republican Spain. Amongst the latter, the 
group o f Mexicans were not the majority, but the figure reached over 300 
volunteers.79
77 FUE, G.O. 21 , C opias de  despachos 1936, dispatches Gordon to Barcia, no. 1 2 2 ,4  August; no. 
146, 21 September, and no. 147, 21 Septem ber 1936.
78 A G A , FM A E , 10237, Leg. 4 , D espatch 8 9 9 ,1 6  October 1937.
79 A G M A , Guerra C ivil, Brigadas Intem acionales, 1098- Organization, inform ation, operaciones. 
The total number o f  volunteers was around 40  000 , although no more than 18 000 w ere in Spain at 
one tim e. Broadly speaking, there w ere som e 10 000  French, 5 000  Germans and Austrians, 4 000  
Polish , 3 500  Italians, 2 800 Am ericans, 2 000 British, 1 200  Y ugoslavs, 1 000  Canadian, 1 000  
Hungarian, 1 0 0 0  Scandinavians, and som e other 8 500 from different nationalities, including  
Latin A m erican, Asian, Soviet, and other Europeans. For a general v iew  o f  the International 
Brigades see V incent Brom e, The In ternational B rigades: Spain 1939-1939, London, Heinemann, 
1965.
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The relevance o f the participation o f Mexican volunteers in the Spanish Civil War 
is that it shows the level o f commitment to the Spanish Republic o f different 
groups within Mexican society. Considering the unquestionable pro-Republican 
stance o f the Mexican Government, official encouragement o f volunteers could be 
assumed as logical. However, in an apparent contradiction, not only there was no 
official support for organising Mexican volunteers, there was a clear decision to 
prevent them from going. At least, that was the case o f young cadets o f the 
Military Academy, who deserted to go to Spain, as we shall see later on.
Nevertheless, the Mexican Government did authorise some military men to work
80for the Spanish Republican Army, under contract. This ambivalence o f Mexican 
officials shows how, on the one hand, there was a small but influential sector, 
particularly in the military hierarchy, concerned about the consequences of further 
involvement in the Spanish conflict. Whereas, on the other, the predominant 
tendency within governmental officials, including the army, promoted under 
cover support, if  not an actual encouragement, o f volunteers. There was no doubt 
what side the Mexican military supported in Spain; it was just a matter o f degrees 
o f commitment and calculated risks. After all, there would certainly be groups 
willing to arrange the sending of volunteers to Spain, as was the case in many 
other countries.
When the armies o f Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy backed the rebel 
forces, the Spanish Republicans received the support o f Mexico and the Soviet 
Union, and massive solidarity from all over the world, expressed in the number o f 
volunteers from more than fifty countries. Most o f them were French, Germans, 
and Italians who saw the need to fight Fascism, and significantly, many came
o  1
from the Umted States, and many more from other European countries.
Amongst the thousands o f volunteers, most o f whom joined the International
80 A H D M -III-764-1 (2a parte). Letter sent, on request, from the Spanish M inister o f  D efence, 
Indalecio Prieto, to the M exican M inister o f  Foreign Affairs, Eduardo Hay, on 27  March 1938.
81 For the analysis and account o f  the Am erican volunteers, see  Peter Carroll, The O dyssey o f  the 
A braham  Lincoln B rigade, A m ericans in the Spanish C ivil War, Stanford U niversity Press, 
California, 1994; and John Gerassi, The P rem ature A nti-F ascists, N orth  A m erican volunteers in 
the Spanish C iv il War, 1936-39, An O ral H istory, Praeger, N ew  York, 1986. For the French 
volunteers, see R em i Skoutelsky, L 'Espoir gu ida it leurs pas, L es vo lon ta ires fran ga is  dans les  
B rigades in tem ation a les, 1936-1939, Grasset, Paris, 1998. The m ost recent work dealing with  
British volunteers is Richard B axell, British Volunteers in the Spanish C iv il War: the British  
B atta lion  in the In ternational B rigades, 1936-1939, London: R outledge, 2004 .
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Brigades, a few hundred were Mexicans. However, like most Latin American 
volunteers, the majority made their contribution to restore legitimate government 
and fight the Fascist-supported rebels as part o f the Republican Militias. The main 
reason behind their involvement in the Spanish conflict was their belief in the 
pursuit o f the anti-Fascist struggle. The very decision to become active in the 
Spanish conflict was bound to create controversy. The debate stirred up in the 
Mexican newspapers showed the profound division in public opinion.82
But there were other reasons to become involved in the Spanish conflict, as in the 
case o f Mary Bingham de Urquidi. The Anglo-Mexican spouse o f a Mexican 
diplomat accredited in Madrid, was probably the first Mexican volunteer in the 
Spanish Civil War. Personal circumstances, not politics, made her stay behind
O 'i
after a trip with her family to Jean de Luz from Madrid on 16 July 1936. She did 
not choose to stay in Madrid after the military uprising the following day, but she 
had no option. She was forced to remain in Madrid to await the reestablishment o f 
safe train services out o f the Spanish capital. In the meantime, her first encounter 
with the initial fighting outside Madrid, the numbers o f casualties, and the 
transformation of the streets into a war zone, changed her mind. Mary Bingham 
was a qualified nurse from the American Nursing School Mount Sinai in New 
York. She belonged to the Mexican Union o f Nurses, and this enabled her to 
contribute to the relief o f the casualties, which was an evident need during the 
first days o f the conflict. She initially offered her services voluntarily to the Red 
Cross, but was rejected, as she explained, because the people in charge were not 
interested in her services, “for they had enough personnel for the short period that 
the war would last.” Then she went to Red Aid (Socorro Rojo International), 
where, after a detailed scrutiny, she was warmly received.
Her appearance and manners reflected her class origins and education, and the 
people in charge were suspicious o f anyone who could be acting as a spy. 
However, her Mexican nurses-syndicate ID membership card was an “open
82 The conservative newspapers E xcelsior  and E l U niversal, w ith their daily afternoon extras, took  
side w ith the rebels, w hilst E l N acional and E l P o p u la r  assum ed the d efence o f  the Republicans. 
The difference in numbers w as significant for the right-w ing groups, including the Spanish  
colony, provided additional funds in the shape o f  com m ercial adverts to their favourite papers.
83 Interview  o f  the author w ith V ictor L. Urquidi, M exico  City, 11 April 2002 .
84 M ary B ingham  de Urquidi, M isericord ia  en M adrid , C osta-A m ic, M exico , 1975, p.33.
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sesame’". In the world o f Spanish workers, the reference given by a Mexican 
workers union was deeply appreciated. Mary Bingham then worked intensively 
for the next six months. Due to the lack o f trained nurses, she was put in charge of 
organising the improvised medical facilities, under very restrictive conditions.
Her work was truly appreciated by her colleagues and new friends, and they were
O f
disappointed when she decided to leave only a few weeks later. Mary Bingham 
was trapped in Madrid during the conflict and seized the opportunity to volunteer 
and contribute in a humanitarian gesture, in the same way she would have done 
should the war have found her on the rebel side. She was not originally 
sympathetic to the Left-wing Republicans, but her experiences during the war 
marked her vision and points o f view in a more favourable way towards the 
Republican government. She did not feel she belonged there, and she left, after 
offering what she had to give to the cause o f the Spanish Republic, and her 
recollections o f those days in Madrid give an excellent illustration of the 
complexities o f the inner doubts and vacillations o f many Mexicans, and yet the 
resolution o f many to act.
Amongst those who had absolutely no doubts regarding their going to Spain was 
Tina Modotti, the Italian photographer who lived in Mexico for several years until 
she was expelled in 1930, wrongly accused of an attempt on the life o f the
o / r
Mexican president, Ortiz Rubio at his inauguration on 5 February. While in 
Mexico, Modotti befriended Communist artists David Alfaro Siqueiros, Diego 
Rivera and Frida Khalo and, through them, was involved with the Mexican 
Communist Party. At the time of the Spanish military uprising Modotti was living 
in the Soviet Union. During the war she changed her name to Maria and worked 
at the International Red Aid (Socorro Rojo International) throughout the war. At 
first she was based in Madrid, and worked in the organisation of the Workers’ 
Hospital of the Fifth Regiment. Then she was involved in the organisation of the 
Second Congress o f Intellectuals in Defence o f Culture, held in July 1937 in
• 0 7Valencia, where she was reunited with some o f her Mexican friends. Her partner 
was a well-known Communist, Vittorio Vidali, who had also lived in Mexico and
85 Idem , pp.80-117.
86 V ittorio V idali, R itra tto  d i donna, Tina M odotti, V angelista, M ilano, 1982, pp.12-14.
87 Idem, p .31 ,4 1 -4 2 .
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left when she was expelled from that country. As a member o f the Comintern and
under the name o f Carlos Contreras, Vidali was engaged in organising the
International Brigades. He also led the Fifth Regiment during the defence of
Madrid, but his Comintern duty has provoked suggestions that he was involved in
clandestine Communist actions against Trotsky’s followers. The division, or
rather the antagonism between those two opposing factions in the Republican
camp was in the origins o f serious problems that, particularly after the armed
confrontation in Barcelona in May 1937, provoked the fall o f the Republican
government headed by Largo Caballero. Formerly a small party, the Spanish
Communist Party’s strength and influence grew during the years o f the war. This
further complicated the fragile situation of governmental control, particularly
regarding the international perception o f Communist influence in the Spanish
Republic. The Western powers had defined their policy towards the Spanish
conflict, based in the assumption that the Communist threat was a fact. In the
words o f Bassols, this was the biggest infamy in modem history, with declared
* • 68Fascists and pseudo-democrats acting in accordance against Spam.
Nevertheless, after the enormous success of the Magallanes, having arrived in 
Republican Spain safely with food, military equipment and other goods from 
Mexico, the hopes for an actual repetition o f the same action were again 
attempted. Considering that a number o f Mexicans had been living in the US 
before going to Spain, some of them for that very reason were incorporated into 
the Lincoln Battalion.
Likewise, some American volunteers left from Mexico under a Mexican name,
such as Frank Tinker, an American pilot who fought in Spain as Francisco Gomez
80  • • Trejo. In fact, as in the case o f the rifles known as Mexikansky, or the magic
code o f Mary Bingham, some Americans used the code “I want to go to Mexico”
as the secret signal to join the International Brigades under the Lincoln Battalion.
Such was the case o f Herman Rosenstein, aka Gabby.90
88 F uturo , Tercera Epoca, no. 15, M ay 1937, p.20.
89 Frank Tinker, Som e s till live: experien ces o f  a figh tin g -p lan e  p ilo t  in the Spanish w ar, Lovat 
D ickson, London, 1938, p.283.
90 John Gerassi, The P rem ature an tifascists in the Spanish C iv il War, 1936-39, An O ra l H istory , 
Praeger, N ew  York, 1986, p.43.
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Unfortunately for the volunteers and for the Republican cause, some attempts to 
reach Spain were savagely crushed. In January 1937, the Mar Cantabrico arrived 
in Veracruz loaded with war material from New York. In spite o f the discretion 
needed and, perhaps, due to the success o f the previous shipment, the lack o f 
secrecy in this case contributed greatly to the disastrous outcome o f the journey. 
The news o f a fresh shipment to Republican Spain was everything except 
stealthy. Fervent supporters could not help but welcome the ship and wish it all 
sorts o f  good fortune in its expedition to provide effective aid to Republican 
Spain. Ambassador Gordon had worked tirelessly to put together the cargo, and 
the Mar Cantabrico was ready to depart with more American and Mexican 
volunteers. Although the details were not publicly known, the press reported the 
very existence o f the ship and its aim. Francoist forces, undoubtedly informed of 
the voyage prepared to strike. The Mar Cantabrico sailed in mid-February and 
followed a cautious course. Approaching the Spanish coast early in March, the 
Captain ordered the change o f flags, trying to disguise it as the Adda o f  
Newcastle. The M ar Cantabrico avoided the rebel trail only temporarily, as the 
rebels were convinced o f the veracity o f the secret reports they had. The Canarias 
and the Almirante Cervera intercepted the Mar Cantabrico, its shipment was 
robbed, and the volunteers shot in El Ferrol. Amongst the dozens o f volunteers 
from different countries, were five Mexicans.91 The life o f Socorro Barberan, the 
only Mexican woman, was spared, she was sent to Portugal and later arrived in 
Mexico to tell her story. The reaction in Mexico to these events intensified once 
more the division o f public opinion, where most newspapers referred to the tragic 
events as a natural result o f adventurism, whilst the government and Spanish 
Republican supporters were outraged at the atrocity.92
At the time when the journey of the Mar Cantabrico was being planned, Nestor 
Sanchez left Mexico City with Jose Jaramillo and went to Veracruz. On 3 January 
1937, they boarded the Siboney for New York, via Havana. The Railroad
91 Jose A ntonio M atesanz, Las ra ices  d e l exilio , p. 174.
92 A M A E , M inisterio de Estado, Leg. R -979, E m bajada d e  E spana en M ejico , E xp .l.
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Q 'y
Worker’s Union paid for their tickets. According to Sanchez’ own account, 
they arrived in New York some time in February. In his memoirs he describes 
how he and Jaramillo arrived in New York having no idea about what to do or 
where to go. Three days after their arrival they came across an organisation o f 
Mexican workers (Mutualista Obrera Mexicana), where they were given some 
money and directions to the Brooklyn based Sociedad de Ayuda a la Republica 
Espanola. The Sociedad paid for their tickets on the Berengaria, which was to 
depart for Cherbourg and London. He reports that some o f his acquaintances on 
board seemed to him to be spies.94 A secretive and reserved attitude prevailed in 
Sanchez and Jaramillo about the purposes o f their trip, hence the distance they 
kept from those people on the Berengaria, a young Dominican man, Rafael 
Echavarria, an American youth, two women from Czechoslovakia, and some 
Italians. Furthermore, Sanchez thought the two women were spies. He could not 
possibly imagine that they would be his comrades in arms in Spain.
On arrival in Cherbourg, they avoided travelling with the group to Paris, escaped 
the group’s detection and boarded the express train. A week passed before they 
made contact with people they could trust in helping them to go to Spain. 
Meanwhile, the two were wandering around Paris, one less keen than the other on 
finally joining the war effort of the Spanish people against fascism. Sanchez 
became acquainted with Jose Reus, a Spaniard from Catalonia, who then 
established contact with Arnold Reed, ‘Jack’, an American antifascist later to be 
integrated in the XV International Brigade -the  Lincoln Battalion- and shot dead 
at the Ebro. It was ‘Jack’ who helped him to survive in Paris, who sent him and 
his friend Jose Jaramillo to Marseille, and put them in contact with the 
International Brigade in Spain.95 Once in Albacete (the International Brigades’ 
base) Jaramillo was assigned to the Lincoln Brigade whereas Sanchez and another 
Mexican, Silvestre Ortiz Toledo, entered the Dombrowski Brigade, as part of the 
Rakosi Battalion,96 Nestor Sanchez was in action on different fronts including 
Caspe, near the Ebro and Teruel; and Sierra Quemada, near Peraleda in
93 N estor Sanchez Hernandez, Un m exicano en la  guerra  c iv il espanola  y  o tros recuerdos, 
Carteles, Oaxaca, 1997, pp.95-99.
94 N estor Sanchez, Un M exicano en la G uerra C iv il E spanola , pp. 111-112.
95 Idem , pp. 121-123.
96 Idem , p. 144.
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Extremadura. Sanchez sustained three wounds in different actions, and spent 
some time in hospital. On one o f these occasions, a Czech doctor, one o f the
07travelling companions he had regarded as a spy, attended him.
In the account o f his actions, Sanchez recalls that in February 1938, after having 
being injured in Peraleda, he went to a small village, Zalamea de la Serena, near 
Badajoz, where given his dark skin and the bonnet he had taken form a dead 
Moor, he was assumed to be a Moor himself. The women o f the village furiously 
attacked him, and only stopped when an Italian volunteer from the Garibaldi 
Brigade interceded for him, and Sanchez was allowed to explain he was 
Mexican.98 He last saw military action in Sierra de Pandols, where his decimated 
battalion retreated in mid-September 1938."
Other Mexicans in the International Brigades included Tito Ruiz Marin in the 
Thaelmann Brigade, and Bautista, a former Mexican revolutionary combatant 
who went to Spain because he admired President Azana.100 Not only were 
Mexican volunteers not organised in a single unit, but also there was no 
communication between them whatsoever. In fact, most o f them claim not to have 
established contact during the war with any other Mexican national, and only 
during the withdrawal o f the International Brigades process did they became 
acquainted with some. A number of the volunteers were also incorporated into the 
ranks o f the Spanish Republican Army, and thus covered the tracks o f their 
origins as they were inscribed only by their names and rank.101
Meanwhile, those who attended the Valencia Congress o f Intellectuals in support 
o f the Republic were also engaged in a meaningful solidarity campaign. The 
Mexican delegation consisted o f Mexican intellectuals members o f the LEAR 
(Liga de Escritores y  Artistas Revolucionarios-Leagae o f Revolutionary Artists 
and Writers), and others with no affiliation. Octavio Paz, Jose Mancisidor, Juan
97 Idem , pp. 113-114
98 Idem , pp. 161-162.
99 Sanchez was unable to specify  the exact day, due to the confusion prevailing and lack o f  m eans 
o f  com m unication, N estor Sanchez, Un m exicano en la  G uerra c iv il espanola , pp .214-218.
100 Idem , p. 154-155.
101 Riberto V ega, C adetes M exicanos en la G uerra d e  E spana, Compania General de Ediciones, 
M exico, 1947, pp.53-55.
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de la Cabada, and Elena Garro were amongst the LEAR members. Some o f them 
only participated in the above mentioned congress and made their way back to 
Mexico, or at least out of Spain. Others, however, decided to remain in Spain and 
contribute to the Republican war effort, although not taking up arms, but mainly 
visiting the fronts and heartening the combatant’s morale. One o f these cases was 
Juan de la Cabada, although there is no record of the work he developed, he is 
known to have remained in Spain for some time. Another participant o f the 
Valencia Congress was the Mexican composer, then director o f the Mexican 
National Symphony Orchestra, Silvestre Revueltas. Working together with 
Spanish poet Pla y Beltran, they composed a hymn in honour o f the Mexican 
combatants in Spain, and dedicated it to Col. Juan Bautista Gomez, given his
1 O'?prestige and dedication to the Republican cause.
Blanca Lydia Trejo, travelled to Spain with a diplomatic accreditation as Third 
Class Consul assigned in Barcelona. With her previous experience as a writer o f 
women workers’ causes, she was sent to report on the progress o f the Republican 
war effort with regard to the participation o f women. She soon encountered 
rejection from other Mexican diplomats, who had firmly sided with the 
Republican government and severely, although privately, criticised the 
insubordinate anarchists and radicals that were, in their opinion, eroding the 
Republican war effort.103 She arrived at the time o f the Valencia Congress o f 
Writers, and whilst there antagonised other Latin Americans, this time 
Communist supporters. She found a natural refuge with the FAI (Anarchist 
Iberian Federation) and wrote some critical articles about the Communists, which, 
she was convinced, provoked the Ambassador’s request for her removal, on 
grounds o f inefficiency.104
An unusual case was provided by the military cadet Roberto Vega. His account 
sheds light on how young Mexican soldiers made their way to Spain. He reveals
102 Cartciones d e  lucha, 1936-39 , Songs o f  B a ttle , DAH IZ production, 2001 , track 4 , Part o f  the 
lyrics say:
“W e abandon the lands o f  green maize;
From the Anahuac V alley  w e have com e here;
T o gain w ith our b lood  an unparalleled life .”
103 Blanca Lydia Trejo, Lo que v i en E spana , pp.23-27.
104 Idem , pp.48-50.
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some o f the means used to travel to Spain. He and eight more cadets from the 
Military Academy (Heroico Colegio Militar)105 decided to seek some action in 
Spain in the summer o f 1937. Perhaps in the minds o f the young cadets was the 
recently published news o f Mexican volunteers shot by Francoists in El Ferrol, 
Franco’s hometown. Whatever the reason, they decided to keep the necessary 
secrecy to avoid insurmountable obstacles. They got the money and tickets to go 
by train to Veracruz and from there to Havana, from an unknown group of 
sympathisers o f the Spanish Republic, possibly linked with the Spanish Embassy. 
One o f the cadets, regrettably, could not remain discreet enough, leaking the news 
to other classmates leading to a search for the deserters. Five o f them were 
captured on board the train to Veracruz. The other four were taken off the ship, 
minutes away from departing.106 The press publicized the incident extensively. 
Typically, Excelsior and El Universal criticised the youngsters’ decision and 
implicated ambassador Gordon Ordas. El Nacional praised the boy’s noble 
gesture.
The issue divided opinion among both high-ranking military officers, and the 
Cardenas cabinet regarding the war in Spain. When the young cadets first 
pondered the possibility o f going to Spain, the main motivation was to gain some 
combat experience, to see the real world o f war, and they saw no better 
opportunity than fighting against a terrible foe. They wrongly assumed that the 
Mexican Government, being so friendly to the Spanish Government, would not 
prevent them from going. If they decided to proceed with caution it was to avoid 
public attention that could jeopardise their objective. This was, at first sight, a 
logical opinion. However, they could not foresee that some high-ranking officials 
at the Mexican Ministry o f Defence would be sympathetic to the cause o f the 
rebels. Those members o f the Mexican military sympathetic to the Spanish rebels 
had no intention whatsoever o f speaking up for them, but they would definitely 
thwart any attempt to extend the already uncomfortable Mexican stand in favour 
o f the Republican side. Hence, a lesson should be given to those who were
105 It its custom ary in M exico  to add the word Heroic to a city or institution that has proved so  in  
defending the causes o f  sovereignty and liberty for the country. In the case o f  the M ilitary 
A cadem y, it ow es it to the defence m ade by its young m em bers against the A m erican invasion in  
1847. The port o f  Veracruz, for instance, holds a triple H before its name.
106 V ega G onzalez, C adetes  m exicanos, pp. 16-23.
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pushing for greater radicalisation, even if  they were doing so unconsciously.
After interrogations before the Under-Secretary in Charge o f the Ministry o f 
Defence himself, Manuel Avila Camacho, and once they involuntarily gave away 
the name o f Captain Ricardo Balderas Carrillo, who had encouraged them in their 
intentions, a decision was made: they were to be dishonourably expelled from the
1 r y i
Military Academy. Captain Balderas, who had also planned to go to Spain, 
given his rank, was brought to military justice, and faced disciplinary action. 
Mexican military authorities were determined not to allow any breach of 
discipline.108 Confronted with a vociferous press campaign accusing him of 
orchestrating the desertion o f the Mexican cadets, Ambassador Gordon Ordas 
reacted by firmly denying any involvement in such an action. As expected, all the 
Right leaning newspapers, like Excelsior, El Universal, and La Prensa, made a 
strong case o f the issue, and the more radical, like El Hombre Libre, even asked 
for the expulsion o f the Spanish Ambassador. The strong defence made by 
Gordon and the pledge to the Mexican Government reassuring it o f  the 
honourable actions o f the Spanish Embassy, defused the storm.109
The young cadets saw their illusions and professional careers in ruins, but their 
determination to go to Spain nevertheless grew. This time, after recovering from 
the shocking events, and once they were no longer in the news, they approached 
the Railroad Union, as Sanchez and Jaramillo had done before, to get hold of the 
necessary funds. Soon after, they attended a meeting at which Marcelino 
Domingo, former Republican Minister o f Education, was speaking on the 
development o f the war. Had they needed to be convinced any further in their 
intentions, Domingo’s speech would have done it.110 Having learnt their lesson, 
they set up a new plan. Some time in the autumn, with the economic support of 
the Railroad Union, four went to Spain, Roberto Vega Gonzalez,111 Roberto
107 T he cadets w ould face the worst possib le option, “expulsados con  cajas destem pladas”, 
“expelled  w ith discordant instruments”. V ega G onzalez, C adetes m exicanos, pp .24-25.
108 A M A E , M inisterio de Estado, Inform e de  cam pafia d e  p ren sa , Jose A rgiielles to  M inister o f  
State, 10 A ugust 1937, Leg. R -996 , Exp. 105.
109 Idem .
1,0 A H N -SG C , S.M . Carp. 1.108, S u bsecretaria  d e l M in isterio  de  D efensa N a tion a l,E jerc ito  de  
Tierra, Exp.22, Fol. 32.
111 N estor Sanchez, Un M exicano en la  G uerra E spanola y  O tros R ecuerdos, Carteles, M exico, 
1997, p.249.
166
Chapter V Mexico Supports the Second Spanish Republic.
Mercado Tinoco, Jose Conti Varse, Humberto Villela Velez, but it is uncertain 
whether the others did. Out o f the group of Mexican cadets, it is known that Conti
119died in combat in Extremadura, and Tito Ruiz Marin m Brunete. Roberto Vega 
saw action near Alfambra, on the way to Teruel. His unit was under heavy 
bombing from the German “Condor Legion”. After the action ended, and his
11 Tgroup was decimated, those who survived were captured. His long 
confinement seemed about to end in the worst possible way. He was condemned 
to death, but due to international pressure and in particular, the diplomatic efforts 
o f American and Cuban diplomats, he was saved; although he spent over three 
years in prison, he returned to Mexico in 1941. He wrote about his experiences 
including an account o f the situation in Francoist prisons.114
Other accounts include the one written by David Alfaro Siqueiros, the foremost 
figure o f the whole group. His memoirs, however, describe in a rather elusive way 
his role in the war, and give almost no additional information relevant to the 
participation o f Mexicans in the war.115 Siqueiros mentioned his experience as 
part o f the 46th Motorised Brigade, vaguely referring to Extremadura and the 82nd 
Brigade in Teruel. He was in charge of both brigades at some point.116 Siqueiros 
has been criticised and even his participation in the Spanish Civil War put in 
doubt. Nonetheless, there is enough evidence o f  his being there and his taking 
part in armed action. The fact that he was a well-known Mexican painter, 
boastful, and a Communist, fostered fantasies about him. However embellished or 
vague his description of his time in Spain, the fact remains that he went there to 
contribute to the war effort o f the Spanish Republicans against Fascism. After all, 
Spain was not Siqueiros’ first military experience -he had seen action during the
117years o f the Mexican Revolution. In November 1937, while in charge o f the
tki46 Motorised Brigade in Extremadura, General Leobardo Ruiz, Mexican liaison 
with the Spanish government, summoned him to Barcelona to attend a meeting
1,2 Idem, p.253.
113 Roberto V ega G onzalez, C adetes M exicanos en la G uerra  de  E spana, Com pania General de 
E diciones, M exico , 1948, pp.122-125.
1,4 Idem , pp. 124-197.
115 D avid  A lfaro Siqueiros, M e llam aban  E l C oronelazo, Grijalbo, M exico, 1975, p p .317-354.
116 A H N -SG C , S.M . C arp.2671, E scuela P opu lar de  G uerra, Exp. 15.
1,7 Vida y  O bra  d e  D a v id  A lfaro Siqueiros, Juicios C riticos, FCE, M exico, 1975, prologue by  
A ngelica  A renal de Siqueiros, p. 12.
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with the Spanish Minister o f War, Indalecio Prieto. Siqueiros was commissioned 
to acquire artillery mechanisms and optical military devices in the US, on behalf 
o f Spain, but as usual, nominally for Mexico. He fulfilled the mission swiftly, but 
could not help noticing the defeatist attitude of the Spanish Minister o f W ar.118
Although there was no Mexican Battalion, or ‘Villa’ or ‘Cardenas’, as some had 
intended, there are recurrent mentions o f such a contingent, although without 
substance. They were more wishful thinking; how could there not be a Mexican 
Brigade in the Spanish war.119 Some of the volunteers were part o f the 
International Brigades, like Sanchez and Jaramillo, members o f the Dombrowsky 
and Lincoln battalions respectively. Others were members o f the Thaelmann 
Battalion, like Tito Ruiz. Some even combined military and political work, such 
as Lt. Col. Anibal Gabucio, who held some command with the artillery within the 
International Brigades during the defence of Madrid. Similarly, although more 
dedicated to political work, Gaston Lafarga participated in the anti-Fascist 
struggle. They all knew that the really dangerous enemy was not the Spanish rebel
190army, but German and Italian intervention. The overwhelming majority o f 
Mexican volunteers participated by joining the rank and file o f the Republican 
Popular Army, as did most Latin Americans.
Volunteers joined for a number o f reasons, whether political conviction, idealism 
or adventurism. This latter, o f course, was the case of a rather limited number of 
Mexican volunteers. These few cases were given greater relevance than deserved 
by Thomas Powell, the author o f the first book devoted to the role o f Mexico in 
the Spanish Civil War.121 The case Powell uses to illustrate the shallow motives 
for Mexicans to find a way out o f Mexico is the one of Luis Monter, an aviator 
who participated in the war for a few months, but died in Madrid in 1938 
“apparently by causes non-related to the war”, as the Spanish Charge in Mexico 
reported. In his despatch, Loredo Aparicio explained that Monter died while in
118 D avid A lfaro Siqueiros, M e llam aban  E l C oronelazo, pp.340-341.
1,9 President Cardenas h im self had to decline such an honour, declaring that it w ould be more 
suitable for a by-gone heroic figure. Cardenas, Apuntes, Tom o I, U N A M , M exico , 1972.
120 Futuro, Tercera Epoca, no. 15, M ay 1937, La G uerra en E spana , by Andres Iduarte, pp.32-35.
121 P ow ell, Thom as, M exico and  the Spanish C ivil War, Albuquerque, 1978, p. 106. A dditionally, 
P ow ell takes for a fact the questionable criticism  made by Blanca Lydia Trejo in her book Lo que  
v i en E spana.
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the company o f the son o f the former Mexican Ambassador to Spain, de Negri.
De Negri’s stepson had been the cause o f some embarrassment for the
ambassador while in charge o f the Mexican Representation in Madrid. Loredo
also reported that two women had visited the Spanish Embassy in Mexico both
claiming to be Monter’s widow, and stating -strangely enough- that they had
1 00news about the Mexican pilot having got married in Spain as well.
If  the case o f Monter was not one in which to take pride, there were numerous 
others worthy of honours o f the highest esteem and remembrance. They were 
undoubtedly the overwhelming majority o f the volunteers, not only Mexican. The 
Spanish Government treated the Mexican soldiers under contract as any regular 
member o f the Republican Army. One o f these cases was that o f Mexican aviator, 
Eduardo Verduzco, whose father received 100 000 francs as indemnity for his
1 91having died “in war action at the service o f the Republic.” Other Mexican 
volunteers include Juan B. Gomez, who was part o f the Spanish Popular Army in 
Extremadura, Andres Garcia Salgado, and Felix Guerrero Mejia, also a member 
o f the Spanish Popular Army, recruited by the Spanish Republican government. 
Manuel Gomez Garcia was a Mexican aviator. Eugene McCoy went out o f a 
desire for adventure, but while in Spain he became deeply convinced of the 
justice o f the Republican cause.124 Other Mexicans in Spain during the war were 
Pedro Gallo, Raul Anguiano, Juan de la Cabada, Elena Garro, who wrote a book 
in 1937, Chavez Morado, Pellicer, and others.125
Negrin’s Government sent the International Brigades out o f Spain as a result o f a 
unilateral decision. It was an attempt to finish with foreign intervention, 
demonstrating the will o f the government to keep the conflict Spanish whilst 
making evident the nature o f foreign intervention on the part o f the rebels. On 6
122 Loredo A paricio to M inster o f  State, 31 October 1938, despatch 420 , A M A E , M in. Edo. Leg. 
R -2571 Exp. 16
123 Dispatch no. 418 , Loredo A paricio to A lvarez del V ayo, 31 October 1938, A M A E , M inisterio  
de Estado, L eg. R -979 , E m bajada espanola  en M ejico , E xp .l.
124 R evista  d e  R evistas, no. 3992, A ugust 1986, pp.32 and 33.
125 Interview o f  the author w ith Raul A nguiano, M exico  City, 19 October 1999.
126 In the farew ell parade o f  the International Brigades in Barcelona in  October 1938, N estor 
Sanchez carried the M exican flag that w as clearly seen  opening the march, representing the 
presence o f  M exicans and Latin Am erican fighting in Spain, N estor Sanchez, Un M exicano en la  
G uerra C ivil E spanola , p.252.
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January 1939, a tribute to honour Mexican combatants was attended by the 
Spanish Republican Minister o f State, Julio Alvarez del Vayo, and Juan 
Comorera, o f the Catalan Generalitat. At that event, the Mexican Ambassador 
Col. Adalberto Tejeda, also recognised the contribution o f Mexican volunteers
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and expressed his hope for the triumph of Republican Spain. Present m the 
event was Luis Octavio Madero, Consul of Mexico in Barcelona, who had 
coordinated the allocation o f various Mexican volunteers. Usually, it was the 
Mexican Military Attache, Colonel Reynaldo A. Hijar, and General Leobardo C. 
Ruiz, Charge de Affairs, who worked as liaisons between the Mexican and the 
Spanish Republican governments. On 23 February 1939, Mexican newspapers 
were reporting the arrival o f a large group of the Mexican volunteers, survivors o f 
the war. Particularly eager breaking the news, El Popular devoted its headlines to 
greeting those who had come back to the Motherland after having fought in 
Spain, pointing out the spontaneous demonstrations o f support and admiration 
from the people in the streets.128 It also printed a partial list o f the volunteers.129 
In subsequent issues, it would publish interviews and articles written by some o f 
the former combatants. El Popular reported that the Mexican volunteers who 
fought in Spain returned to the Motherland, amongst the spontaneous show of
1 30admiration o f the people. They listed 34 volunteers returning together.
3. Preliminary Conclusions
The Mexican labour movement decisively supported the Republican cause in 
Spain not just out of sympathy for a progressive regime which it identified with 
the one personified by President Cardenas, but above all because the threats posed 
by local admirers o f the Spanish rebels were real. In doing so, in spreading the 
word o f the struggle o f the Spanish workers and their government, Mexican 
labour paralleled its own struggle, and the defence of the Mexican government, a 
government with which they identified the fulfilment o f their demands. In fact, 
the Spanish conflict was a mirror in which the Mexican labour movement could
127 A M A E , M inisterio de Estado, M ejico , Leg. R 2571, Exp. 16, press article in La Vanguardia, 7 
January 1939.
128 E l P opu lar, 23 February 1939, front page and p.5
129 See full list in the Appendix.
130 E l P opu lar, 23 February, 1939.
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perceive an image o f its future should they lose their grip and influence on
governmental policies. The warning was clearly issued during the closing session
of the constituent assembly o f the CTM.131 Such endeavours give clear evidence
that large and varied sectors o f Mexican society were supporting the Republican
cause in Spain. In the case o f the CTM, the imprint made left no doubt about their
perception: in Spain a class struggle was being fought with international
dimensions. Furthermore, Lombardo’s personal influence and capability in
organising independent trades unions, matched Lazaro Cardenas’ own political
aim o f re-organising the Mexican labour movement as a means to consolidate the
political basis for his social policies. On 10 September 1937, Ambassador Gordon
decorated Lombardo with the Encomienda de Isabel la Catolica, for his services
in favour o f the Spanish Republic.132 Evidently, the decoration for Lombardo was
in recognition o f the work developed by the Mexican labour movement, which
influenced and guided much o f the general interest towards Spain. During the
years o f the Spanish Civil War, the beleaguered Spanish Republic and its workers
would appreciate the solidarity o f the Latin American labour movement promoted 
1 ^by Lombardo.
The transformation o f the National Revolutionary Party (PNR) into the (.PRM) 
Party o f the Mexican Revolution in 1938, on the wave o f  the oil expropriation and 
the steady support of Republican Spain was a significant step in strengthening the 
position o f the revolutionary elite. The new feature o f the party, apart from the 
evident return to the most sensitive issues arising from the Mexican Revolution of 
1910, was the integration o f the army as the fourth sector, along with labour, 
peasantry, and the blurred popular sector. It was a kind o f Frente Amplio in the 
fashion o f the Popular Fronts o f the 1930s, but obviously, not including other 
organisations such as the Communist Party or openly Anarchist groups. The 
transformation of the ruling party was more a definitive takeover by the radical 
faction in the governing elite that had an impact on the deepening o f the reformist 
policies pursued by Lazaro Cardenas and heavily supported by Lombardo’s
131 H istoria  D ocum en ta l, p.99.
132 F uturo, Tercera Epoca, no. 20 , October 1937, p. 12.
133 C.T.A.L., R esoluciones d e s u s  A sam bleas, 1938-1948, M exico , 1948, pp.21; V icente Lombardo 
T oledano, W hat does the C.T.A.L. m ean?, M exico, 1944; Robert M illon,, Vicente Lom bardo  
Toledano, M exican M arxist, p. 129; M oises Poblete T roncoso, and B en G. Burnett, The r ise  o f  the 
Latin A m erican  L abor M ovem ent, B o o k m a n , N ew  York, 1960, pp .134-139.
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organised Labour.
The Mexican Government’s commitment towards the Spanish Republican 
Government left no doubt regarding its sympathies, yet, the evidence seems to 
suggest that further engagement was avoided by discouraging the sending o f 
Mexican volunteers to Spain. The internal political situation, although 
considerably more stable than in previous years, was by no means far from threats 
o f turmoil. The main reason explaining this, on the domestic front, was the 
cautious attitude observed by those involved in organising the recruitment o f 
volunteers. On the other hand, the official attitude discouraging any attempt 
linking the government with such activities. There was already a good deal o f 
commitment shown by the Cardenas administration vis a vis the Republican cause 
in Spain, so as to be willing to go further in a policy that could weaken its 
position. Moreover, regarding the external factor, had the Mexican government 
openly encouraged recruitment of volunteers to fight in Spain, it would have 
moved Mexico towards an even more radical position than the one already 
perceived in the international arena. The Mexican stand was a rather lonely one in 
the Americas. (See Chapter IV).
In light o f the above, it is easy to explain the extreme caution assumed, not only 
regarding the promotion o f volunteering for Spain, but in leaving evidence 
behind. The participation o f Latin Americans in the International Brigades, 
mainly as part of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, was campaigned for amongst the 
Hispanic residents in the US . One of the calls to participate came from the 
Spanish Militia and the American Brigade and was addressed to Spaniards, 
Hispanic Americans, and citizens of other countries sympathising with the 
legitimate government o f the Spanish Republic.134 Mexican volunteers were 
organised and recruited with some covert encouragement from Mexican military 
officials. Unlike most o f the volunteers who joined the International Brigades, the 
Mexican volunteers made individual arrangements to fund their trip to Spain. 
There were several ways of funding the sending of volunteers, from public 
collections to private donations, mainly from some Mexican trades unions. This
134 A G A , FM A E , 10234, Leg. 53, D ispatch Luis Careaga (Spanish C onsul, N ew  York) to Gordon 
Ordas, 10 M ay 1937.
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was the case o f the Mexican cadets, and members o f the Mexican Army. The 
Mexican CP financed members o f the Communist Party, workers o f different 
origins, and some intellectuals.
The participation o f Mexican nationals in the Spanish Civil War has hitherto been 
an issue almost non-existent within the literature o f the period. Regardless o f the 
different explanations for this, whether lack o f interest or lack o f data, the fact 
remains that no proper research has been undertaken on the issue. It is generally 
assumed that there were Mexicans involved in the war, and that they were in their 
hundreds, but there was previously no single study devoted to the issue. The 
works that include some information about those Mexicans vary and sometimes 
contradict each other. The fact that there is no organised archival material 
available that specifically deals with the topic, unlike in the cases o f the British, 
French, or American volunteers, is a major set back for the elaboration o f the full 
story. Therefore, this is an attempt to contribute to that end. The military sector 
and the working class were the main sources from which the Mexican volunteers 
came out to fight in Spain. There were others, particularly within the intellectual 
and artistic forums; nonetheless, the latter would contribute to the Republican 
cause in ways other than military action.
The fact that it is impossible to establish the actual number o f Mexican volunteers 
has given rise to very different figures. Nonetheless, the suggestion made by El 
Popular claiming that there were over 700 Mexican volunteers seems 
exaggerated. On the other hand, the figure adopted by academic works such as 
Lois Smith’s that estimate only 150 volunteers also seems inaccurate.136 Andreu 
Castells estimate, in his Las Brigadas Internacionales de la Guerra de Espana, 
that suggests a total of 464 Mexican volunteers, based on a broad report that takes 
as 500 the total number o f Latin Americans, is not reliable.137 Other academic 
works devoted to the participation o f Mexicans and Latin Americans in the 
Spanish civil war, such as Powell’s Mexico and the Spanish Civil War, and Gino 
Baumann’s Los Latinoamericanosy coincide in a more realistic estimate o f around
135 F uturo , 23 February 1939, front page.
136 L ois Smith, M exico an d  Spanish R epublican Exiles, Univerity o f California Press, Berkeley & Los 
Angeles, 1955, p. 196.
137 Andreu C astells, L as B rigadas In ternacionales de  la G uerra de  E spana, p.382.
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300 Mexican volunteers J 381 have to put the estimate o f Mexican volunteers in 
around 350.
Broadly speaking, Mexico sided with Republican Spain, but although numerically 
less, there were many Mexicans supporting the rebels. Most o f the supporters 
acted anonymously, as allies o f the Spanish conservatives residents in Mexico. 
Some others were actively involved even as combatants in Spain, as we shall see 
in the next chapter.
138 Gino Baumann, L os L atinoam ericanos en la G uerra C ivil espanola , Lima, Peru, 1979.
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Mexicans Supporting the Rebels in the Spanish Civil War.
Ojala que la aurora no de gritos que caigan en mi espalda  
Ojala que tu nombre se le olvide a esa voz  
Ojala las paredes no retengan tus ruidos de camino cansado  
Ojala que el deseo se  vaya tras de ti 
A tu viejo gobiem o de difuntos y  flores 
I w ish  the daw n m ay give no shouts th at m ight fa ll on m y b ack  
I w ish your nam e m ay be forgotten  by that vo ice  
I w ish  the w alls m ay not hold you r noises o f  the tired  path  
1 w ish the desire m ay go right a fter you  
T o your old governm ent o f  flow ers and dead
Silv io  Rodriguez
Although the overwhelming majority o f the Mexican people had clearly stated their 
sympathy for the Republican cause in the Spanish conflict, there was nevertheless a 
section of Mexican society that unequivocally supported the rebel side. Conservative 
sectors in Mexico had been naturally inspired by traditional Spanish conservative values. 
These values included the defence of religion -as long as it was orthodox Catholicism - 
the preservation of family values along the same lines, and the natural right to possession 
of private property, and were assumed to be the essence of all true Hispanic concerns. 
After the loss of Spain’s last remaining colonial outposts in the late Nineteenth Century, 
Hispanismo became the main ideological tool for maintaining links and regaining some 
influence in those regions of the former Spanish Empire.1
1 For a comprehensive and detailed analysis o f  this issue, see Frederick B. Pike, H ispanismo, 1898-1936, 
Spanish Conservatives and Liberals and  their relations with Spanish A m erica, U niversity o f  Notre Dame 
Press, Indiana, 1971. Within the M exican debate in the 1920s and 1930s, the anthropologist Manuel Gamio
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During the years of the Cristiada war, its main Right-wing challenge, the Mexican 
revolutionary government, albeit not professing any specific religious belief, encouraged 
the formation of the so-called Catholic Apostolic Mexican Church as a counterbalance to 
the Catholic Apostolic Roman Church. Given the interference of the Vatican in Mexican 
internal affairs and its influence upon a considerable section of .Mexican Catholics, the 
Mexican Government used this as a means to persuade the clergy not to continue with its 
confrontational position. As a result of the Mexican Revolution, the Conservative forces 
in Mexico had been displaced from the centre of political activity but they remained 
watching developments closely.2 After the revolutionary upheaval of the previous 
decades, Mexican Conservatives seemed less concerned about their political grouping 
than their economic survival. Nonetheless, they would still find a way to make their 
voices heard and their political presence to be taken into account.
However, during this period of Mexican politics, most of the confrontation between 
political factions and groups took place within the PNR, as local caciques pledged 
obedience to the party while remaining in control of their regions. They became the 
epitome of the cynical phrase “Revolution has done me justice”. Locally they continued 
to exploit the peasants. Politically, those new local Caciques were natural allies of the 
Conservative groups. The alliance between former hacendados and modem Conservative 
civil servants or politicians was at the base of small radical Right-wing groups, such as 
the Fascist-type Accion Revolucionaria Mexicana, known as the Dorados, organised in 
1933, and in which some middle-class professionals participated.
led the rather isolated school o f  Indigenism o , which gave more weight to the indigenous part o f  the 
M exican nationality. The more w idely spread flow  o f  Latinoam ericanism o  or Hispanoam ericanism o, 
which considered both origins, the Indigenous and the Hispanic, in equal terms, included Jose 
V asconcelos, Antonio Caso, A lfonso Taracena, and Pedro Henriquez Urena amongst others. Francisco 
Bulnes, Carlos Pereyra, and others defended the banner o f  the H ispanistas. A ll o f  them, with the significant 
addition o f  A lfonso R eyes and Octavio Paz, would play a part in the subsequent developm ent o f  the 
definition o f  the M exican stand vis a vis  Spain and Spanish issues.
2 FAPECyFT, APEC, Exp.28, Leg. 1/3, Inv. 1353, D eclaraciones de P lutarco E lias Calles, Gav. 21.
3 Gustavo Casasola, H istoria  G rafica de  la Revolucion M exicana, Vol. Ill, M exico, Trillas, 1962, pp.2126- 
2127.
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Having no organised political party as such, the Mexican Right of the early 1930s 
patronised such groups as the Union de Padres de Familia and the Confederacion de la 
Clase Media among others.4 They maintained a strong influence on the Mexican press, 
from where they could openly launch virulent attacks on public figures. The two 
publications Excelsior and El Universal became the regular places for the instigation o f 
such attacks. These newspapers had the highest circulation levels of all the Mexican 
press and pretended on face value to be open to all political and ideological orientations. 
However, it was evident that, in spite of the occasional appearance of dissident opinions, 
their general contributors and editorials were at the very least Conservative if not 
reactionary. The extreme Right also had its own newspapers, such as Omega and El 
Hombre Libre, and the magazine Todo, which, together with the papers already 
mentioned, constituted part of the varied publications under the influence of the Right- 
wing.5 Additionally, the growing presence of Spain in Mexico was also reflected in the 
grouping of Spaniards following the trends in Spanish politics. Thus early in January 
1934 the creation of a Spanish Fascist Group in Northern Mexico was reported, 
following the recent formation o f Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera’s Falange in Spain.6 
Finally, disenchanted with the radicalism of the Cardenas’s government, particularly 
after the expulsion of Calles from Mexico in 1935, some sectors of the revolutionary 
family had virtually allied themselves with the so far unorganised Conservatives.
The affinities between the Conservative sectors in both countries, Mexico and Spain, 
traditionally strong, were further reinforced during these years. A case that illustrates the 
relationship between the Mexican Conservatives and those of Spain during this period is 
that of the Reyes family. This family had originally been living in exile in Spain, but 
after a while they decided to settle and became actively involved in Spain’s political and 
social life. Rodolfo Reyes was the son of General Bernardo Reyes, the former War 
Minister of Porfirio Diaz, whose family went into exile during the first years of the
4 AH D M , no. 7, P lutarco E lias Calles, E l aspecto po litico  de la sucesion presidencia l, SRE, M exico, 1933.
5 After the Spanish Civil War, in 1942, Francisco Carmona N enclares wrote an article in which he 
developed the idea o f  the H ispanidad  as a Fascist-type elaboration to suit M exican Conservatism in times 
o f  Fascist aggression; see Francisco Carmona Nenclares, H ispanism o e h ispanidad , in Cuademos 
Americanos, no. 3, M exico, m ayo-junio 1942, pp.52-55.
6 Futuro, no. 5, February 1934, p.6.
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Mexican Revolution. General Reyes remained in Mexico and was shot shortly after they
n
left, allegedly wearing a coat that the Spanish King Alfonso XIII had given to him. 
Rodolfo went to live in Madrid with his wife, sons, and younger brother Alfonso in 1914. 
The two brothers would eventually develop opposing views on the Spanish conflict. (See 
Chapter V)
Rodolfo Reyes permanently installed himself in the Conservative circles of Madrid from 
1925, and became active in debating Spanish issues within the Ateneo de Madrid, of
o
which he became President of the Hispano American Section in 1932. Reyes supported 
the Spanish Republic and reluctantly praised both Socialists and Left- Republicans as 
they were actively pushing forward political changes whilst Conservative Republicans 
were being left behind.9 He also acknowledged that the disgrace of the Spanish Republic 
was not the fault o f the Republican regime itself, but rather that the crime was the way in 
which the Republic had been defrauded. Furthermore, he was convinced that the Right- 
wing alliance of Lerroux-Gil Robles from 1933 to 1935 “could have done everything but 
did nothing” to save the Republic.10 In the end, like most Conservatives, Reyes favoured 
a military uprising on the grounds of the prevailing situation of chaos that had developed 
following the electoral triumph of the Popular Front in February 1936. Rodolfo Reyes’ 
family was also involved in local politics. The youngest son, Fernando, who was bom in 
San Sebastian in 1915, a Spaniard by birth and choice, became an active participant in 
the Falange, and was one of its first members to be imprisoned in 1934. Roberto, the 
third son out of five, followed in the steps of Fernando and was also a member of the 
Falange. Roberto, a barrister, was also active in the defence of Falangists between 
November 1935 and July 1936, and became more involved in the Falange leadership.
The eldest son, Bernardo, was more interested in international affairs, joined the Mexican 
diplomatic corps, and was assigned a position in Paris.11 (See Chapter VII)
7 Rodolfo R eyes, D e mi vida, III, La Bi-Revolucion Espanola, JUS, M exico, 1948, p.28.
8 Rodolfo R eyes, C uatro D iscursos , Madrid, 1933, p. 26.
9 Rodolfo R eyes, D e mi vida, p.73.
10 Idem, pp.80-90.
M AHDM , III-105-8, M exicanos en Espafia, D iversos inform es de  nuestra em bajada en M adrid, 1932.
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Coinciding with the Spanish “Bienio Negro” government, the preparations for a new 
group of Mexican students to go to Spain seemed to reflect these circumstances in the 
selection.12 By January 1935, the three scholarships had been assigned to Mexican 
students from the National University, one of whom was to decline for personal 
circumstances. This led to the proposal that Juan Sanchez Navarro, “a distinguished 
student of the Faculty of Philosophy and Fine Arts”, be incorporated, together with a 
Law student, Bernardo Ponce, and Clemente Villasenor, who pursued studies in 
Histology.13 Sanchez Navarro and Ponce had both participated in the students’ strike at 
the National University in 1933 during which the progressive forces led by Lombardo 
Toledano, then director of the Escuela Nacional Preparatoria, were expelled, making the 
university a Right-wing stronghold, under the leadership of the new rector, law teacher 
and barrister, Manuel Gomez Morin.14
Juan Sanchez Navarro y Peon and his friend Bernardo Ponce, both of whose families 
were typically Conservative, thus went to study in Madrid supported by the Spanish 
Republican Government. They travelled together in Europe and were supposed to attend 
the International Congress of Students to be held in Prague in August 1935, as 
representatives o f the Right-wing Mexican Confederation of Students.15 They had been 
provided with accreditations as journalists, Sanchez Navarro from Excelsior and Ponce 
from El Universal. They arrived in Hamburg on board the Orinoco enthusiastic about 
their visit to Germany; then decided against going to Prague, apparently for economic 
reasons, and went to Paris instead, via Berlin.16 In every city they visited, some Mexican 
diplomatic official accompanied them; in Paris, for instance, it was Renato Leduc who 
showed the visitors the high lights of the French capital. They finally arrived in Madrid
12 Previously, during the Left-Republican Bienio, som e o f  the M exican students in Spain included Silvio  
Zavala, historian, and Mauricio M agdaleno and Juan Bustillo Oro, novelists; all o f  whom professed 
sympathy for the Spanish Republic. Zavala had a Spanish scholarship whilst the other two were funded by 
the M exican government. AGA, FMRE, Leg. 16o. Excmo. Sr. D. Julio A lvarez d e l Vayo. E m bajador de  
Espafia. E xpediente person a l (IlI-s-II).
13 Dispatch no 117, Pujadas to Minister o f  State, 15 May 1935, AGA, FMRE, E m bajada de Espafia en 
M ejico, Leg. 652, Politica-II-c- C ongresos- B ecas- Prensa, 1935.
14 Bemardo Ponce, Cuando los com unistas llegaron a lp o d er , quoted in Ma. Teresa Gom ez Mont, M anuel 
Gomez M orin: La lucha p o r  la libertad  de  catedra, UNAM , M exico, 1996, p .533.
15 Interview o f  the author with Juan Sanchez Navarro, M exico City, 3 July 1997.
16 A licia Ortiz Rivera, Juan Sanchez N avarro , B iografia de un testigo d e l M exico de l siglo XX, Grijalbo, 
M exico, 1997, pp. 118-119.
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and, in the absence of Ambassador, Manuel Perez Trevino, it was Arturo Allsop Vila, 
Secretary o f the Mexican Embassy, who provided the much needed funds. Then, they 
looked for accommodation in Herman Cortes street, for the latter was, symptomatically, a
17reminder o f their homeland.
During their journey, Sanchez Navarro and Ponce stayed in touch with their mentor, 
Gomez Morin, and shortly after their arrival in Madrid, they informed him that they had 
already made friends with one of the leaders of Accion Popular, Ramon Madariaga (sic) 
were invited to write in El Debate. Soon they had both established contacts with more 
Right-wing organisations. Sanchez Navarro had a cousin who was an active member o f 
the CEDA (Spanish Confederation of the Autonomous Right). With his cousin acting as 
mediator, he acquainted himself with more Spanish and Mexican Conservatives living in 
Madrid, such as Carlos Pereyra, a convinced Hispanista, who devoted his work as a 
writer to spreading the news of the grandeur of Hispanic culture throughout Latin 
America.18 Together, Pereyra and Sanchez Navarro, visited the different sites where, 
after the February 1936 elections and the triumph of the Popular Front Coalition, radical 
Leftists burned churches and provoked violence in Madrid.19 After a year studying in 
Madrid, Sanchez Navarro travelled to Santander in June 1936 to enrol in some summer 
courses at the Colegio Cantabrico of the Catholic University, only a few weeks before 
the military uprising. Meanwhile Bernardo Ponce left for Portugal on vacation.20
Shortly before the military uprising in Spain, the progressive measures of the Cardenas 
administration were generating sporadic reactions from Right-wing groups, such as 
Accion Revolucionaria Mexicanista, to which firm responses were made in turn, always 
keeping the balance in favour of the Mexican Government.21 The Mexican Conservative
17 Interview o f  the author with Juan Sanchez Navarro, M exico City, 3 July 1997.
18 Consejo S uperior de Investigaciones Cientificas, M em oria de las Secretaria General, 1942 , CSIC, 
Madrid, 1943, pp .61-62.
19 Interview o f  the author with Juan Sanchez Navarro, M exico City, 3 July 1997.
20 Bemardo Ponce, R apsodia espanola. Una cronica d e l sig loX X , Porrua, M exico, 1979, pp.23-25.
21 Luis I. Rodriguez, one time private assistant to President Cardenas, then heading the P R M  gave a speech  
criticising A R M  which he labelled as E l Fascismo C riollo  (local Fascism); see Luis I. Rodriguez, Veinte 
D iscursos, M exico, 1936, pp.181-185.
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sector justified the need for military action in Spain and pondered about a similar trend 
for Mexico.
The outbreak of the war found Rodolfo Reyes and his family in Madrid, and soon they 
were actively involved in the conflict, either protecting some of their Conservative
99
friends and acquaintances, or taking up arms against the Republican Government. His 
son, Fernando, joined the uprising from day one, and miraculously survived the fighting 
at the Madrid Cuartel de la Montana. He took refuge in the Mexican Embassy, and then
9 0
fled to France, only to return later and join the rebels as a volunteer. Another son, 
Roberto, who had also been active before the military uprising, sought refuge in the 
Mexican Embassy, and followed in his brother’s footsteps to join the rebel army as a 
member of the Falange.24 Meanwhile, the Falange Espanola de Mejico (sic), headed by 
the Spaniards Jose Vega and Baldomero Alvarez, expressed its satisfaction for the
9  c
accurate description of the war in Spain offered by Excelsior.
Probably the most significant case of Mexican supporters of the Spanish rebels is that of 
Juan Sanchez Navarro, who received the news of the military uprising in Santander while 
attending a lecture.26 As mentioned earlier, he had befriended students who were 
members of the Falange, and became anxious about his safety. Not having his passport 
with him, and mistaken for a Spaniard, he was unable to demonstrate otherwise.
Although he requested a passport at the Mexican Consulate in Santander, he had to enrol 
in the Republican army until his passport arrived. However, his going to the front line 
came about as a result of his decision to cover up a friend of his, who was a medical 
doctor assigned to Polientes. This assignment in his hometown would certainly be fatal
22 M exican newspapers broadly referred to the participation o f  the R eyes brothers as “sons o f  M exican  
exiles during the [M exican] R evolution”, Excelsior, 3 August 1936.
23 Fernando Reyes also volunteered in 1941 to join the Blue D ivision  to fight against the Soviet Union; 
Rodolfo Reyes, D e m i vida, p .500.
24 Rodolfo Reyes, D e m i vida, p. 500.
25 E xcelsior, 27 July 1936, p.2.
26 Joaquin Sorobell, Un mexicano en la guerra de Espafia, M exico, M im eo, 1938. Sanchez Navarro 
returned to M exico in late 1937, and published his experiences in Spain in a series o f  articles that appeared 
in N ovedades  in 1938; he wrote under the pseudonym o f  Joaquin Sorobell for no particular reason; 
Interview o f  the author with Juan Sanchez Navarro, M exico City, 3 July 1997; A licia Ortiz, Juan Sanchez 
N avarro, B iografia de  un testigo d e l M exico d e l sig lo  XX, Grijalbo, M exico, 1997, p. 122.
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for the doctor as he was a well-known Right-winger. Therefore, Sanchez Navarro agreed 
to substitute him for a few days. On the way to Polientes, Sanchez Navarro realised the 
danger of his foolish action, not having the least idea about medicine or even first aid. He 
spent three days with a militia group, desperately trying to get out of this dangerous 
situation. So far, nobody had suspected anything but he knew that as soon as there was 
some actual fighting and wounded soldiers he would be discovered and certainly shot. He 
managed to convince the Commander of the group to allow him to return to Santander, 
arguing the need for proper medical provisions, which he could acquire; the Commander
27reluctantly allowed him to go.
Once in Santander, he sought refuge at the Mexican Consulate, and waited there for the 
arrival of his passport. With the help of the Mexican Consul in Santander, Najera, he 
soon managed to get his passport from Mexico. When the petition reached Mexico, 
Foreign Minister Hay ordered the sending of a diplomatic passport, in consideration of 
his friendly relationship with the Sanchez Navarro family. This provided Sanchez 
Navarro with a golden opportunity to support the Spanish rebels’ war effort, given his 
identification with their cause. He did not hesitate at the request of some o f his Falangist 
friends to undertake some under-cover work. Knowing the highly valued consideration 
the Republicans held for Mexico and Mexicans, Sanchez Navarro took advantage of his 
doubly fortunate position both as a Mexican citizen and the holder of a Mexican 
diplomatic passport.29
During the following months he worked with the network of spies within the Fifth 
Column in Santander, carrying secret documents between different parts o f the province. 
Although he claimed never to have known of the content o f the packages he delivered, he 
acknowledged the effectiveness of the work of the Falangist spies in providing accurate 
information that evidently benefited the aerial bombing of the port. Although concerned 
about the effect of the bombing on Santander and the civilian casualties; and the
27 Joaquin Sorobel, Un mexicano en la guerra de  Espafia, M exico, M im eo, 1938, 65.
28 Interview o f  the author with Juan Sanchez Navarro, M exico City, 3 July 1997.
29 A licia Ortiz Rivera, Juan Sanchez Navarro, Biografia de un testigo d e l M exico d e l sig lo  XX, Grijalbo, 
M exico, 1997, pp .l 15-151.
30 Joaquin Sorobell, Un mexicano en la guerra de Espafia, p .83-87.
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bloodshed and violence on both sides, to which he made reference, he naturally criticised 
with greater intensity that of the “reds”. Sanchez Navarro was finally discovered and 
denounced, and he would have certainly been shot, had it not been for the Mexican 
Consul in Santander, Najera, who, according to Sanchez Navarro, also favoured the 
Spanish rebels and helped him to get out of Spain on board an English vessel bound for 
the port of San Sebastian, which was in the hands of the rebels, and then on to Saint Jean 
de Luz, France.31
Although there was no specific reference to it, it was very likely that Bernardo Ponce, 
given his personal contacts with both Mexican and Spanish Conservatives and his 
ideological affinities, while in Lisbon undertook to liaise between Falangists and the 
Mexican Government. Mexican Ambassador in Portugal, Daniel Cosio Villegas, 
transmitted to Mexico City the proposal made by “important members of the Falange” 
who, acting separately from the military group, asked for his mediation in seeking a 
negotiated outcome for the Spanish conflict.32 Evidently, the Mexican Government could 
not support such a proposal, strictly considering its foreign policy, as Foreign Minister 
Hay explained to Cosio, given the previous attempt in that direction made by the 
Uruguayan Foreign Minister, which was firmly rejected by Mexico.33
Meanwhile, in Madrid, the delicate situation surrounding the Mexican Embassy was 
nearing a solution. The existence of a number of asylum seekers and Spanish refugees in 
the Mexican representations in Madrid and Valencia was dealt with by the Mexican 
Government in the only way they could do, by honouring the right of sanctuary.34 Even 
though giving refuge to enemies of the Republican regime could be interpreted as a 
hostile action towards it, the Spanish Republican Government accepted this contradictory 
attitude of its most fervent supporter. After all, this situation not only affected Mexico; 
other diplomatic representations, particularly from Latin America, had also accepted 
refugees. The fact that a significant proportion of those refugees in diplomatic
31 Interview o f  the author with Juan Sanchez Navarro, M exico City 3 July 1997; Joaquin Sorobell, Un 
mexicano en la guerra de  Espafia, pp.93-94.
32 Telegram C osio to Hay, 1 February 1937, AHDM , Rebelion en Espafia, I1I-764-1 (II) 1936-1937.
33 Telegram Hay to C osio, 4 February 1937, AHDM , Rebelion en Espafia, III-764-1 (II) 1936-1937.
34 Mary Bingham de Urquidi, M isericordia en M adrid, Costa-Amic, M exico, 1975, p.15.
183
Chapter VI Mexicans Supporting the Rebels in the Spanish Civil War.
representations in Madrid effectively contributed to the Fifth Column effort was 
criticised by local authorities. Out of the over 800 refugees in the Mexican Embassy in 
Madrid, more than 60 were Mexicans who, either supported the rebels, such as the Reyes 
family, or, as supporters of the Republican regime, simply felt more secure within the 
premises of the embassy, such as in the case o f the writer Pedro de Alba.35 Many 
refugees, however, although pretending not to be interested in anything but their safety, 
did not hide their sympathies for the rebels and contributed to some extent to their war 
effort, at the very least in the propaganda campaign, as part of the machinery of the Fifth 
Column. A more ambiguous case was that of Mary Bingham de Urquidi, wife o f the 
Third Secretary of the Mexican Embassy Juan Francisco Urquidi, who volunteered as a 
nurse for the International Red Aid whilst providing refuge to open supporters of the 
rebellion, such as Jose Ma. Iraola Aguirre, and his wife, Ma. Josefa Sanchez 
Tordecillas.36 Bingham developed selfless work in organising medical relief and directly 
assisting of wounded in Madrid for the Republicans (see Chapter V) and yet, given her 
personal connections, she also aided many supporters of the rebels.37
It was not difficult for the Republican authorities to be suspicious o f the extent to which 
some Mexicans, who could get safe-conducts to move freely around Madrid, were 
involved with those well-known Spanish supporters of the rebels who had taken refuge at 
the Mexican Embassy, such as Alberto Martin Artajo, or the former Spanish Ambassador 
to Mexico, the corrupt and reactionary Emiliano Iglesias. By September, there was 
severe open criticism in Mexico of the Ambassador, Perez Trevino about this situation, 
and some discreet comments in Republican Spain.39 Then, in December 1936, given the 
number of refugees in diplomatic representations in Madrid (over 5000), Luis 
Araquistain, Spanish Republican Ambassador to France, wrote about the abuse of the 
right of sanctuary for humanitarian reasons, which was clearly what had happened in 
Spain.40 He was not criticising the Mexican Embassy, yet Cardenas decided to remove
35 AH DM , III-l905-7, M exicanos en Espafia, 1936.
36 Mary Bingham de Urquidi, M isericordia en M adrid, p.21.
37 Idem, pp.285-354.
38 AHDM , III-764-1 ( la .  Parte) Rebelion en Espafia, 1936.
39 E xcelsior 12 September 1936, p.5.
40 A H D M , A rchivo de  la Em bajada de M exico en Francia, Caja no. 217, press cutting.
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his Ambassador in Spain. Perez Trevino was recalled to Mexico City and Ramon Perez 
de Negri was appointed Mexican Ambassador to Republican Spain. Sanchez Navarro 
was also lucky to have departed by the time of the arrival of this radical Mexican 
diplomat whose criticism of the attitude of the previous ambassador and his team was 
outspoken.41 However, none of the real or invented threats were actually fulfilled, and the 
Spanish refugees at the Mexican Embassy were safely evacuated from Spain in March 
1937. (See Chapter IV)
Nonetheless, when Rodolfo Reyes was constantly harassed by local authorities for his 
well-known relations with Falangists, particularly after the refugees at the Mexican 
Embassy had been evacuated, he made a clear declaration that he wanted to “accuse our 
[Mexican] diplomatic representation [in Madrid] from July 1937 to March 1939” for 
allowing the “red” government to force a Mexican citizen to relinquish his possessions. 
According to Reyes, Perez Trevino was a magnificent diplomat, who had looked after the 
interests of Mexican and Spanish nationals alike with dignity.42 He then launched a bitter 
attack against the ambassadors, Perez de Negri and Adalberto Tejeda, who had run the 
Mexican Embassy during the period he criticised. This criticism, however, clearly shows 
a highly biased and ideologically charged aspect of the actions taken by Mexicans who 
supported the rebel side in Spain. It was also reflected in that of the contradictory stance 
adopted by some Mexican diplomats during the war in Madrid.
The war in Spain, as the British Minister in Mexico had rightly pointed out, was “bound 
to have serious repercussions in Mexico.”43 The creation of the Union Nacional 
Sinarquista (M V iS )44 in May1937, for instance, was the result o f a growing opposition to
41 A H D M , III-764-2 (2a. Parte) Rebelion en Espafia, 1936-1937.
42 R odolfo R eyes, D e m i v ida , p.494.
43 Dispatch Murray to Eden, 30 September 1936, South and C entral Am erica, Confidential, F 0371 /19792  
A 8119, 1936.
44 Given the nature o f  the UNS, and the lack o f  critical studies, it remains an elusive subject. Although its 
importance is w idely recognised, it is generally disregarded as a serious threat for the M exican regime. 
Anne-M arie Leinert, for example, showed its Fascist-like ideology and practices, yet she rejected its 
Fascist character on account o f  the UNS not having attempted power seizure forcefully. However, the case  
o f  A ntonio Santacruz, as the leader o f  La Base, the secretive clique defining UNS actions, reveals the 
extent o f  the influence o f  private businessmen in local politics attempting to subvert the political stability. 
See Anne-M arie Leinert, H istoire du M ouvem ent Sinarquiste: 1934-1944. Contribution a  VH istoire du
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the progressive regime of Cardenas, and had strong influence from European 
Conservatism. Set up as a secret society, with ultra-Nationalist orientation, the UNS 
followed in the steps of the Cristeros of the late 1920s. In fact, some of the Sinarquista 
leaders were active participants in the Cristero revolt, such as Salvador Abascal. Not 
entirely surprising was the fact that the UNS had been organised by the German Nazi 
Helmut Schreiter as the Centro Anti-Comunista in Guanajuato in 1936.45 Although 
publicly rejecting any foreign influence, the creation o f UNS along similar lines to the 
Spanish Falange and Italian Fascio di Combatimento was only natural, given their shared 
hatred of Marxism and Democracy. Presenting themselves as a genuine Nationalist 
movement, Mexican Sinarquistas followed in the footsteps of the Falangists, as the latter 
had done after their Italian and German counterparts.46 Inspired in the traditional Spanish 
Conservative heritage, the formation o f UNS 'm 1937, not only coincided with the recent 
unification of Spanish Right-wing organisations in the Spanish territory under rebel 
control, but more significantly, was a by-product of the work of the Spanish Falange in 
Mexico. The forced unification imposed upon the Falange Espanola de las JONS, and 
the Comunion Tradicionalista (Monarchist), which obeyed Francisco Franco’s decision 
to concentrate power and eliminate opposition, however loyal, saw the active 
participation of Roberto Reyes, by now a top Falangist, alongside the leader of the 
Falange, Manuel Hedilla.47
The extent to which Mexicans were involved in the Spanish conflict was broad, yet most 
of the time it passed unnoticed. But even when it was clearly shown, the stand of some 
Mexicans could be deceptive. This situation moved Andres Ituarte to write a long 
account of his experiences in Madrid in 1937. This article, which he titled Un dia 13 en 
Madrid, was a detailed narrative of everyday life in Madrid during the war. It told o f the
M exique Contem porain, PhD thesis, University o f  Sorbonne, Paris, 1975; and Brigida von M etz, et al, 
Fascism o y  anti-Fascism o, pp.72-75.
45 Albert L. M ichaels, Fascism an d Sinarquism, P opular Nationalism s A gainst the M exican R evolution, in 
A Journal o f  Church and State, num. VIII, 1966, pp.234-250.
46 Sheelagh Ellwood, Spanish fascism  in the Franco era: F alange E spanola de  las JONS, 1936-76, 
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1987, pp.1987, pp. 14-18.
47 Joan Ma. Thomas, Lo que fu e  la Falange, La F a la n g ey  los Falangistas de Jose Antonio, H edilla y  la  
Unificacion, Franco y  e l f in  de la Falange E spanola de las JONS, Plaza y Janes, Barcelona, 1999, pp. 187- 
189.
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terrible events the local people had to endure, and the almost “sinfully optimistic belief* 
that eventually France would open its borders to let aid come through. Finally, he was 
concerned about the Spanish generosity towards Mexicans, a “touching and frightening 
thing”, given the betrayal and abuse that some fellow Mexicans had committed under 
cover of the Mexican flag.48
Meanwhile, an illustration of the way in which official diplomatic business was 
conducted in the rebel-controlled zone was given by the response to the Mexican request 
for the transfer of funds. The honorary Mexican Vice-Consul in Seville, had been unable 
to send the revenue from tax collection (derived from the 5% of the tariff deposit and 
other duties paid to the consulate) to the Tax Office Delegation at the General Consulate 
in Paris since the rebellion of July 1936. The Vice-Consul enquired about the best way to 
send over 20 thousand pesetas, the total revenue from tax collection for the previous 
year 49 After consultation with the so-called Ministry o f Foreign Affairs in Burgos, and 
the Ministry of the Interior in Salamanca, permission to send this money was denied.
This decision was made on the grounds of the Mexican Government’s non-conciliatory 
attitude towards the rebels, who did not see any reason to be considerate to the 
representatives of a hostile regime, which, in addition, was continuing to provide 
material aid to the legal government. Furthermore, “there is no doubt”, they argued, “that 
countries that have shown sympathy towards our movement -even if they have not yet 
recognised our government- and practice a neutrality that often favours our cause, cannot 
be treated in the same way as those countries that are openly hostile, to whom no 
privileges or courtesy whatsoever must be given.”50
The oblivious attitude of the officials involved in this issue is most revealing, for they 
considered irrelevant the possible benefit to their cause of a positive answer, given the 
fact that in Mexico, they thought that there were “few supporters of our cause.”51 As a
48 Futuro, no. 23, January 1938, pp.26-30.
49 Dispatch no. 26, Instrucciones p a ra  desconocer a los representantes d eM ejico  com o tales, Clausura 
consulados mejicanos, Seville , 2 July 1937, AM AE, Min. Edo. Leg. R -4802 E xp.l 1.
50 Dispatch no. 1457, Comision de Hacienda, Junta Tecnica del Estado to Secretaria de Relaciones 
Exteriores, Salamanca, 23 July 1937, AM AE, M inisterio de Estado, Leg. R-4802 E xp .l 1.
51 Idem.
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result o f this incident, the Francoist regime took up an official non-cooperation position 
towards Mexico. On 5 August 1937, the official response to the Mexican request, stated 
that not only would the Mexican Government not be able to keep its own funds (tax 
collection-tariff duties) but that all the consular representations should be shut down 
immediately. The Mexican representatives were not to be granted any right, immunity, 
privilege or consideration, and were given a minimum period to remove any kind of sign, 
emblem, or banner or they would be liable to proscription and expulsion.
Throughout the entire Spanish Civil War, the Conservative Mexican press directed 
severe criticism against the government’s official position and its various policies in 
supporting the Republican cause in Spain. Their favourite target was Lombardo 
Toledano and what they perceived as the Communist influence he had on Cardenas and 
his government. He was also a preferred target since he was the visible instigator of the 
regime’s progressive policies and thus, it was easier to attack Lombardo as an indirect 
way of attacking Cardenas.54 Every effort made by its allies in raising support for the 
Republican cause in Spain would be criticised and thwarted if  possible. Events such as 
collecting funds, food, clothes or simply organising conferences or exhibitions were 
subjected to attacks by fanatics acting in support of their Spanish counterparts. The 
involvement of foreigners in such actions was not at all alien to the character of the 
Spanish conflict, as in the case of the conspiracy denounced by Lombardo against an 
Italian Consul. Supporting his claim with reference to the New York Times ’ 
correspondent, Frank L. Kluckholm, Lombardo held the Italian Consul in Veracruz, 
Gustavo Della Luna, responsible for providing vital information to the Spanish rebels 
regarding the Mar Cantabrico. The Spanish rebels captured the Republican ship, loaded
52 Dispatch no. 2215, 4 August 1937, Instrucciones p a ra  desconocer a los representantes de M exico como 
ta les , Clausura consulados m exicanos, AM AE, Ministerio de Estado, Leg. R -4802 E xp .l 1.
53 Both newspapers sided with the Spanish rebels, echoing the criticism o f  Conservative circles in both 
countries. H ow ever, E xcelsior's  afternoon edition, Ultimas N oticias, regularly published vociferous anti- 
Republican editorials, whilst E l U niversal, attempting an image o f  impartiality, opened its pages to pro- 
Republican articles by supporters such as Lombardo.
54 Although the government had its own newspaper, E l N acional, and labour organisations had theirs, 
including publications such as Futuro, E l M achete, and from 1938 onwards, E l P opular. They all had 
limited distribution and lacked the resources o f  the major newspapers. (See Chapters IV and V)
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with war material, clothes and food for the Spanish people in the Republican zone, early 
in March 1937.55
A more symbolic attack on the Republican cause took place in June 1937, when the 
Spanish Republican Government organised an exhibition of posters on the life and 
struggle of the Spanish people. Using a Mexican student supporter of the rebels as an 
instrument, the Confederation of the Middle Classes (Confederation de la Clase Media - 
CCM) instigated the destruction of several of the posters. The student was arrested and 
incarcerated, pending sentence. The CCM then turned to the unofficial representatives o f 
the rebels in Mexico, who were supervised by Francisco de Cardenas from Washington, 
for assistance to find some means of helping their young supporter. Oblivious to the 
situation prevailing in Spain, or perhaps believing their own propaganda about the law- 
abiding God-fearing rebels, they inquired after the possibility of offering the student a 
scholarship in one of the Spanish universities. De Cardenas referred the request to 
Burgos in writing, but it was declined. Burgos regretted not being able to fulfil the 
request, “considering the way scholarships are granted and particularly the fact that the 
Spanish universities are now closed.” 56 At he end, the young man was abandoned to his 
fate.
The link between Mexican Conservatives and Nazi Germans, Fascist Italians and 
Falangist Spaniards was stronger as the war in Spain continued, as we shall see. The 
Spanish Civil War effectively brought together Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. In fact, 
the Axis powers alliance was formed and consolidated during the Spanish war, which 
was effectively a war of intervention. Italy joined the Anti-Comintern Pact exactly a year 
after it was signed by Germany and Japan, on 25 November 1937. However, not being a 
priority in Hitler’s immediate scheme of political and military domination, German 
influence in Mexico and Latin America had a low profile. Concerned with maintaining 
their interests, Mexican Conservatives found in their support o f the Spanish rebels a
55 E l N ation a l, 9 April 1937.
56 AM AE, M inisterio de Estado, R elaciones Culturales, 1937, Leg. R -2463, Exp.93, Letter Juan F. de 
Cardenas to General Secretary for Foreign Relations, 7 July 1937. Reply from the Junta Tecnica del 
Estado, Comision de Educacion y Ensenanza, 11 August 1937.
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means also to defend their own position. Although it was only natural that the members 
of the same social class make alliances, the traditional values, antecedents and links 
between members of Spanish and Mexican upper-class sectors galvanized their actions.
Right-wing opposition to Lazaro Cardenas became the unifying element o f pro-Fascist 
Mexican groups, closely associated and encouraged by the Falange Exterior and Nazi 
German agents. The main organisations were the above-mentioned Confederation of the 
Middle Class and the Comite Pro-Raza, although these organisations were closer to the 
Spanish Falange than to German Fascism. The Falange Espanola en el Exterior was at 
the base of the extreme Right-wing organisations in Mexico, having National 
Syndicalism as a variation of the predominant Right-wing Nationalist tendencies. As 
explained earlier, the common ground for the reactionary groups, not only in Mexico but 
also throughout Latin America, was Hispanismo. Although the majority of the extreme 
Right-wing groups held strong Christian values and thus identified themselves with the 
views of traditional Spanish Conservatives, the more radicalised elements were also 
ultra-Nationalist, which ultimately meant they were anti-Spanish. However, their actual 
numbers and influence were limited to some municipalities in the states of Guanajuato, 
Jalisco and San Luis Potosi.57 However, the influence of Hispanismo was evident, with 
the aims equal but means differing: Conservative traditional values based on 
Catholicism, Hispanism in the case of Mexico; and a glorious imperial past to be 
resuscitated for Spain.
According to Lombardo, further notice should be taken of the ‘secret activities which 
certain elements connected with Fascism were carrying out through apparently 
commercial operations with the intervention of the German Legation’. The Stevedores’ 
Union, affiliated to the CTM, stated that the Legation was receiving large quantities of 
Fascist propaganda printed in Spanish, and added that German film companies were
57 Examples o f  such extreme Right-wing groups were the so-called Liga N acional M exicana, and the 
Reintegracion E conom ica M exicana. The latter, developed an anti-Spanish campaign between 1933 and 
1934. One o f  the pamphlets signed by one Amador E. V elez, read: “For REM , i f  it is Jewish, it is bad; i f  it 
is Gachupin, it is worse; i f  it is Agachupinado  Mexican, far worse; to wipe them out is the best.” (Para 
Reintegracion E conom ica M exicana, si es Judio es malo; si es Gachupin, es peor; si es m exicano  
agachupinado, es muchisim o peor; acabar con ellos es lo major.” AGA, FMRE, Leg. 627, Politica-II-a- 
General, Cam pana anti-espanola, 1934-1935-1936.
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giving private exhibitions of films justifying German and Italian intervention in Spain
co
and that propaganda was being carried out by the German School here.” Lombardo’s 
allegations of Fascist activities in Mexico had the Procurator General mobilised with a 
police raid on the headquarters of the Middle Class Union (which also according to the 
British Legation was in receipt of German subsidies) and the Union o f Revolutionary 
Veterans. Although documents were seized and several individuals arrested, proceedings 
were abandoned apparently based on the direct orders of President Cardenas; the two 
organisations were allowed to resume their activities.59
As part of the anti-Republican campaign, Todo, the Conservative magazine written in the 
trite style of a Mexican patriotic journal and edited by Jose Pages Llergo, published 
editorials criticising the senseless recruitment of Mexican youths just to end up being 
slaughtered like cannon fodder in Spain as volunteers for the Republican Government. 
They blamed Roberto Vega Gonzalez and other cadets from the Military Academy for 
practising deceit to permit them to join up.60 On the other hand, the attempts to 
encourage both Mexican and Spanish youths to go to fight in Spain for Franco proved 
more difficult than imagined. It was considered acceptable for second generation of 
Spaniards to support the military rebellion in Spain, but to actually joining the rebels was 
an entirely different thing. Spanish enganchadores (recruiters), such as Apolonio 
Hernandez, a Spaniard linked with the FET, approached Mexican middle class 
youngsters craving for adventure. Some of those willing to accept the offer of becoming 
military men in the Spanish rebel army, plus paid expenses, were Rogelio Aguilar, 
Gregorio Guzman, and Jacobo Aguirre.61 Uncovered by journalist Gilberto Rod, the pro- 
rebel “volunteers” were apparently discouraged from accepting the offer. Although 
there is enough evidence to demonstrate the role of Mexican Conservatives and Spanish
58 Gallop to Eden, 5 August 1937, “Reported beginnings o f  a Fascist m ovem ent in M exico” F 0 3 7 1/20639 
A 5928, 1937.
59 Gallop to Eden, 11 August 1937, “Political situation in M exico”, FO 371/20639 A 6194, 1937.
60 AM AE, M inisterio de Estado, Seccion de America, 1938 Leg. R- 979, Exp.l Ref. V-M ej, Embajada 
espanola en M ejico, press cutting o f  Todo issues o f  24 Octobre 1937, and 11 N ovem ber 1937.
61 E l P opular, 3 September 1938, p.7.
62 Idem; em phasising the nature o f  the betrayal against the Spanish Republic, E l P opular  referred to 
F alange Espanola Tradicionalista  as F alange Traicionalista Espanola.
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residents in organising the sending of Mexican combatants for Franco, no case of actual 
fighters has been documented.
The series of pro-Spanish rebel actions in Mexico, however limited in numbers and scale, 
had an impact on both Mexican public opinion and the aid effectively provided to the 
Spanish rebels. On 4 November 1937, the Republican Charge de Affairs in Mexico, Jose 
Loredo Aparicio, sent a long and detailed despatch to Valencia about the activities of 
Spanish Fascists in Mexico. He reported that, acting upon the advice o f loyal Mexican 
and Spanish friends, he had presented the Mexican Government with a memorandum 
detailing the activities of such groups and how this affected the effective work of the 
Republican representation and posed a threat to Mexico. He also submitted a copy of the 
document to the Commission drawn up at the Mexican Congress with the express aim o f  
dismantling Fascist activities in Mexico. Jose Loredo Aparicio, the Spanish Charge de 
Affairs in Gordon’s absence, envisioned an alarming situation, given the intense and 
effective work of the Falangist movement in Mexico, which had initiated a series of 
campaigns against prominent Spanish Republican supporters all over the country. The 
loyal consuls in Veracruz and Torreon, for instance, had been subjected to defamatory 
campaigns with the aim of discrediting them. Similar events had occurred in other cities 
and included both Mexican and Spanish citizens loyal to Republican Spain. Some of the 
newspapers they used, Loredo writes, are El Diario Espanol, and Vida Espanola. It was 
clear that the organiser of the Falange Exterior had plenty of economic support and 
probably some official support as well. The most notable public figures supporting the 
Falange were Augusto Ibanez Serrano, head of Union Nacionalista Espanola, who kept 
the archive that Jose Ma. Pujadas, former First Secretary, had taken from the Spanish 
Embassy before being expelled by Gordon Ordas in July 1936; Braulio Suarez, manager 
of Diario Espanol; Mario Fernandez, Managing Director of the same newspaper; Ramon 
Guerra and his brothers, and Jaime Adechederra, all of them wealthy traders; and Jose 
Castedo, director of Vida Espanola, among others.
63 AM AE, M inisterio de Estado, Leg. R-996, Em bajada Espanola, M ejico  1937-38, Exp.20, A ctividades 
espanolas fa sc is ta s  en M exico, Dispatch o f  11 November 1937.
192
Chapter VI Mexicans Supporting the Rebels in the Spanish Civil War.
Trying to prevent the spreading of rebel influence amongst loyal sympathisers, and 
having news of such attempts, the Spanish General Consulate in Mexico received, and 
passed on, communication to the Spanish Consulate in Tampico and Veracruz regarding 
the Spanish Foreign Ministry’s orders that no ship belonging to the Sota Company be 
allowed to leave any Mexican port, and even proceeding to detain any such a ship and its
64crew.
Particularly relevant to the encouragement o f anti-Republican groups was German 
influence. According to some of the few studies devoted to the issue, Nazi policy towards 
Latin America can be divided into two phases. The first one, from the coming to power 
of Nazism in Germany in 1933 to 1938, and the second one from 1939 until the end of 
Latin American neutrality during World War II in 1942.65 During the first period, Nazi 
aims in the region included the manipulation of Latin American public opinion regarding 
the “injustice of Versailles”, thus gaining implicit support and influencing governmental 
policies in the region. Other aims were the improvement of the economic position of 
German nationals to increase German exports, a shift in the structure of German imports 
towards essential raw materials in order to enhance German arms production and to use 
German communities living abroad to serve the Reich by uniting them and keeping them 
in close contact with their Fatherland.66 For the local oligarchy, the German example 
successfully repressing of progressive forces, with the additional charm of anti-
f i  7imperialist demagoguery, was very much welcomed.
According to American journalist Allan Chase, Falange Exterior was nothing but a 
German puppet manipulated by Wilhelm von Faupel, appointed head of the Ibero-
64 Circular Em ilio Zapico to Spanish Consulates in M exico, 1 August 1937, AGA, FMAE, 10234, Leg. 53.
65 Brigida von Mentz, Ricardo Perez Montfort and Verna Radkau, F ascsim o y  Anti-Fascism o en Am erica  
Latina y  M exico, SEP-Casa Chata, M exico, 1984, pp.5-16.
66 Allan Chase, Falange, The Axis Secret Arm y in the A m ericas, Putnam’s Sons, N ew  York, 1942, pp.3-21; 
Brigida von M entz, Ricardo Perez Montfort and Verna Radkau, F ascsim o y  Anti-Fascism o, pp.29-38.
67 In this respect, Friedrich Katz assesses the presence o f  Nazi Germans as a real threat, although 
dism issing the real strength o f  it. Lourdes Quintanilla, although apparently criticising Lombardo’s anti- 
Fascist position as Stalinist, acknow ledges his contribution, through the CTAL, in preventing the wider 
spread o f  pro-Fascist groups. Frederik Katz, The secret w ar in M exico: Europe, the United States an d  the 
M exican R evolution, University o f  Chicago Press, Chicago, 1981, pp.283-315; Lourdes Quintanilla, 
L om bardism o y  sindicatos en Am erica Latina, Fontamara, M exico, 1982, p p .l25-149.
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American Institute in 1934, and then diplomatic representative in Franco’s Spain. The 
Nazi-Fascist supporters of the Spanish military rebels were eager to recognise Franco’s 
government, and thus rushed to do so on 18 November 1936, when they assumed 
Franco’s forces had taken Madrid. After the recognition of Franco’s government by 
Germany and Italy, the sending of diplomatic representatives made the influence of 
foreign supporters stronger. Thus, General von Faupel, German representative in Burgos 
became a key figure in dealing with politics within the rebel-controlled zone in Spain.
His duty was to guide the rebel triumph and politically prepare the future regime in the 
shape of the Fuhrer’s needs.69 Although abundantly filled with numerous details, Chase’s 
account of the German influence in Latin America seems to exaggerate the extent and 
numbers to which pro-Fascist followers were actively involved in upsetting local 
governments in the Americas. However, his work is relevant for it contains an accurate 
description of the activities by which both Spanish Falange and German agents were 
encouraging and influencing local reactionary groups, such as the UNS in Mexico. In a 
similar case, Hermann Rauschning, pro-Nazi former President of the Senate in Danzig in 
1933, and a disaffected Nazi by 1938, described Hitler’s real intentions in his book in 
1939, making important revelations regarding the Nazi ambitions in Latin America, and 
disclosing the significant role given to Mexico in the eventual German war effort against 
the US. Rauschning’s book was criticized as mere propaganda, given the pro-Hitler 
predominant feelings of the time in the US. However, in spite of the invented 
descriptions of Hitler’s first hand references, the exposure of Nazi plans for worldwide
70domination, was accurate.
68 Allan Chase, Falange, The Axis Secret Army in the Am ericas, Putnam’s Sons, N ew  York, 1943, p.3.
69 Memorandum by the Foreign Minister, von Neurath, 18 Novem ber 1936, D ocum ents on German 
Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D (1937-1945) Vol. Ill, Germany and the Spanish C ivil War, 1936- 
1939, p. 134.
70 Hermann Rauschning, H itler speakes: a series o fp o litica l conversations with A d o lf  H itler on his rea l 
aim s, Thomton Butterworth, London, 1939. Although his work was later discredited as a forgery, and that 
no actual conversations took place in the quantity claimed by Rauschning, the description he made was in 
accordance with the events happening at the time. In fact, the recommended text for an unbiased first hand 
account o f  Hitler’s political view s, Otto W agener’s M em oirs o f  a Confidant, edited by Henry Turner, and 
Rauschning’s are strikingly similar. I f  anything, the perspectives differ from a critical one, Rauschning’s, 
to a supportive one, W agener’s; see H itler-M em oirs o f  a Confidant, edited by Henry Ashby Turner Jr., 
Yale U niversity Press, N ew  Haven and London, 1985, pp.xv-xix.
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The “living space” (Lebensraum) demanded in Hitler’s project for a stronger Germany 
was a concept tolerated by Western European leaders, as long as its territorial ambitions 
primarily threatened Eastern Europe. However, in the Nazi German strategy, Latin 
America played a significant role in the medium and long-term aims. Commercial 
interest in the region became political interest at a time of increasing international 
tension. Germany needed Latin America to remain neutral by the late 1930s.71 German 
economic interests in Latin America decreased after World War I, but were again 
encouraged during the Nazi period, regaining the pre-World War I level (16.3% Latin 
American imports, second only to the United States) the fear of a greater German 
political influence in the region was patent in American circles by 1938. Perhaps taking 
the idea of avoiding a European war to the extreme, although not considering the 
sacrifice of the Spanish Republic, the Western countries found themselves closer to the 
Nazi-Fascist countries, by then clearly identified as the Axis Powers. Ernst Wilhelm 
Bohle, head of the Auslandsorganisation and State Secretary of the German Foreign 
Office, developed the idea of maintaining contact with German citizens living abroad as 
a means to infiltrate public opinion in their host countries. Mexico was not the exception; 
in fact, Mexico was considered a priviledged launching base for its geographical 
local tion.72
However, some German people in Mexico, far from being Nazi followers or silent 
supporters of the Nazi regime, were active anti-Fascists. Bohle, actively engaged in 
keeping up appearances of German good will, at least for Western Conservatives, met 
with Winston Churchill on 2 October 1937 in London. After that meeting, Chuchill, who 
had been critical of the German AO , became quiet on the issue.74 German influence in 
South America seemed broader and easier to expand. On 1 July 1938, German diplomats 
of the region gathered in Montevideo, Uruguay, in an attempt to unify German policy 
towards the region on all political, economic and cultural fronts. No defined aims and
71 Hermann Rauschning, H itler speaks, pp.72-74.
72 AHDM , III-431-2, A lem anes radicados en M exico, 1940.
73 Letter o f  the anti-Fascist Liga pro-Cultura alem ana en M exico, 1 March 1938, AM AE, Minsiterio de 
Estado, Leg. R-979, E m bajada espanola en M ejico, E xp .l. Headed by A lfons Goldschmidt, the league 
grouped together Communists and Social-Democrat German exiles.
74 W ar-crime trials: N urem berg, Pamphlet, Germany, 1945, p. 19.
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means were reached. The antagonism between Bohle and Ribbentrop, German Foreign 
Minister, was at the base of the disagreement. Bohle’s Auslandsorganitsation pursued 
undercover partisan work versus Ribbentrop’s Foreign Office frontal action.75 German 
activism in the region, particularly after the Conference on Latin America held in 
Germany on 12 June 1939, followed Hitler’s intervention in the Reischtag in April 1939,
7 f \when he referred to Latin America and the US.
The support of Spanish rebels by Mexican Conservatives was logically part of their 
wider support of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. But the natural ally that provided 
proper guidance was the Spanish Falange. The combination of all these likely supporters 
encouraged the formation of extreme Right-wing organisations willing to oppose 
President Cardenas and his followers. Given the personal connections between pro-rebel 
and Conservative Mexicans with well-established Mexican civil servants, and the links 
between Mexican and American businessmen with Spanish rebels in the US, it is easy to 
conclude some form of financial support. On 7 May 1938, Gordon Ordas sent yet another 
detailed report on Fascist activities in Mexico. The Spanish Ambassador referred to the 
particularly alarming situation that had arisen from the rumours of a possible military 
insurrection led by General Satumino Cedillo, given the links he had with extreme Right- 
wing organisations including Fascists.77 In fact, similarly to the foreign support received 
by the Sinarquistas in 1937, General Cedillo, the local cacique in the Northern state of 
San Luis Potosi, was effectively supported from abroad. His case, however, brought 
together two apparently reluctant partners, as the cedillistas were funded by German and 
British private money. Nevertheless, their bigger support came from the Spanish Falange, 
which encouraged their Mexican members and associates firmly to collaborate with the 
rebels. The possibility of a Franco-style uprising grew stronger. Under increased tension, 
given the enforcement of the revolutionary programme, shown by the deepening of the 
land distribution process, and particularly by the oil expropriation, General Satumino 
Cedillo, former Minister of Agriculture in Cardenas’ cabinet, the typical cacique in local
75 A further Conference was held in N ovem ber 1940 in Buenos Aires, Argentina, but no agreement was 
reached.
76 Brigida von Mentz, et al, Fascism o y  anti-Fascism o, pp. 17-18.
77 AM AE, Ministerio de Estado, Leg. R -2571, Exp. 16, A ctividades F ascistas en M exico.
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politics in San Luis Potosi, his hometown, decided to rebel against the government. His 
criticism against the Cardenas administration was similar to that of General Calles, 
regarding the radicalism of the government. The rebellion of May 1938 led by General 
Cedillo was a direct response to the oil expropriation, as the latter was perceived as the 
ultimate proof of Cardenas’ Communism. Opposition groups, clearly identified with both 
Falangists and Nazi-oriented groups, used Cedillo’s disaffection with the government. 
This meant the strengthening of the pro-Fascist movement in Mexico.
In spite of lacking official diplomatic relations, there were some unofficial links between 
the rebel government and some members of Cardenas’s cabinet. In July 1938, Loredo 
reported on the work developed by Augusto Serrano Ibanez as unofficial representative 
of Franco’s government in Mexico. According to Loredo, Serrano Ibanez had offices at 
the Portuguese Legation in Mexico City, and was developing his work in favour of the 
Spanish rebels from there. Loredo reported this situation to the Mexican Foreign 
Minister, Eduardo Hay. Nevertheless, Loredo quoted some confidential reports informing 
on the personal relationship between Serrano Ibanez and Hay, which provides some sort 
of aid to Serrano’s work.
With military defeat imminent, the Republican Government was finally abandoned by 
Britain and France’s governments, which recognised Franco’s government on 26 
February 1939. This led to the resignation of President Azana. The Republican camp was 
further divided and betrayed from within. The coup led by Colonel Segismundo Casado 
in Madrid on 4 March, crushed PM Negrin’s strategy o f resistance. The Republican 
defeat saw the beginning of the Spanish Republican exile in Mexico coinciding with 
Lazaro Cardenas’ last year in office. This situation, given the political tension developed 
from the previous year’s conflicts effectively marked the pace for the most important 
political decision of the revolutionary governing elite. The pressure of stronger, better 
organised, and more determined oppositionists played a significant role in the definition 
of the official candidate to the presidency. Falangists in Mexico, both Mexican and
78 Dispatch no. 277, Loredo to Alvarez del Vayo, 22 July 1938, AM AE, M inisterio de Estado, Leg. R-979, 
E m bajada de Espafia en M ejico, Exp. 1.
197
Chapter VI Mexicans Supporting the Rebels in the Spanish Civil War.
70Spanish, openly celebrated the end of the war in Spain. The celebration was considered 
a provocation, and the violent reaction of pro-Republican Mexican workers was the 
justification the Mexican Government needed to expel three boastful Spanish 
Falangists,80 Alejandro Villanueva Plata, Eulogio Celorio and Genaro Riestra, on account 
of “promoting violence”. As a result, Falange Espanola ceased formally its activities as 
such in Mexico, although its members found new organisations to devote their anti- 
Communist sentiment to. However, Cardenas was not to go beyond strictly necessary 
preventive measures, and still tolerated new Falangist groups to be formed, as long as 
they demonstrated no violent behaviour.81
The pressure of pro-Franco groups for the recognition of his government by the Mexican 
Government grew stronger. Particularly after the US Government did so. A reluctant and 
regretful Roosevelt gave the “all clear” for recognition of the Franco regime on 1 April 
1939, but not without acknowledging to Bowers that he, the American Ambassador to 
Spain during the Civil War, had been right all along while criticising American neutrality 
and European Non-intervention. In spite of the American recognition of Franco’s 
government and the increased local pressure to follow the same path, Cardenas decided 
to continue his resolute support for the Republican, convinced that it was the right thing 
to do.
Reporting from New York, Juan Francisco de Cardenas, who had been engaged in 
promoting the recognition of the Francoist government in the US and the Americas, 
referred to the attitude o f the Mexican Government regarding the issue shortly after the 
US recognised Franco’s government. “Our friends” he wrote, “who are in touch with the 
Interior Ministry, said the issue of recognition has been discussed, and that he 
(presumably Serrano Ibanez) has been recognised as the representative of the Spanish 
Government. Although reluctant about making the first move to obtain recognition from 
the Mexican Government, de Cardenas expressed his opinion that the Spanish
79 E l Popular, 31 March 1939, front page.
80 AGN, Lazaro Cardenas-546.2/48.
81 A G N , Lazaro Cardenas-546.2/149.
82 Claude G. Bowers, M y M ission to Spain, Watching the R ehearsal f o r  W orld War II, Victor Gollancz, 
London, 1954, p.418.
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Government would accept such a move from the Mexican Government. According to the 
report, the Spanish representative claimed to have been able to talk to the Mexican 
Foreign Minister, Eduardo Hay, and the Interior Minister, Garcia Tellez, who had shown 
a “magnificent courtesy” towards the Spanish residents and himself personally.
Reporting from his office in New York, the now Spanish Ambassador to the US, Juan 
Francisco de Cardenas, wrote to Burgos on 5 April regarding the hand over of the 
buildings owned by the Spanish Government in the US. According to de Cardenas, the 
premises were handed into the custody of both the Colombian and the Mexican 
governments. However, he refused to accept anything from the Mexican Embassy in the 
US, so he demanded the hand over from the Colombian Ambassador alone, and the 
necessary arrangements were made to suit his wishes. It was very unlikely, nevertheless, 
that the Mexican Ambassador would have agreed to deal with the newly appointed 
Ambassador of the so-called Spanish State government.84
In September 1939, the Spanish Ambassador in Lisbon, Nicolas Franco, sent a detailed 
dispatch to Burgos stating the reasons why it would not be advisable to send unofficial 
Spanish representatives to Mexico for the time being. His report was based on the one 
sent to him by the Portuguese Foreign Ministry. The Portuguese Charge de Affairs in 
Mexico had reported to his Foreign Office that “public opinion in Mexico [was] not 
sympathetic towards the Spanish Government in spite of the strong efforts made by 
Conservative parties to that aim.” Furthermore, he recommended that it would be better 
to wait for a few more months, as Mexican public opinion, not being prone to extremism, 
would change. Moreover, he warned that sending representatives before that happened 
would cause irritation and be dangerous. He recalled the case of the two Falangists who 
visited Mexico earlier in the year, one of whom introduced himself as a personal 
representative of Franco, as only provoking disastrous consequences, such as the assault 
on the Casino Espanol, and his expulsion from the country by the Mexican Government.
83 Dispatch no. 274 , de Cardenas to M inister o f  Foreign Affairs in Burgos, 6 April 1939, AMAE, 
M inisterio de Estado, Reconocim iento d e l G obiem o N ational, Leg. R-1050, Exp. 19.
84 Dispatch no. 273, de Cardenas to Minister o f  Foreign Affairs in Burgos, 5 April 1939, AMAE, 
M inisterio de Estado, Reconocim iento d e l G obiem o N ational, Leg. R -1050, Exp. 19.
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Symptomatically, the Portuguese Charge de Affairs in Mexico complained about the 
CTM, which, according to him, undertook far more active policing than the official 
police, and the espionage service organized by Lombardo, who “professes a deep hatred 
of all non-Communist Spaniards” through his El Popular. On top of this, there was the 
hatred o f all the Spanish exiles against the friends of the Spanish Government.85 Finally, 
the Portuguese report pointed out the Spanish issues pending solution, such as the 
liquidation of thq Manuel Amus, the handing over of Spanish buildings, both cases 
attainable before the recognition. The Mexican debt on the ships built in Spain had to be 
dealt with, said the report, only after recognition, ignoring that the issue had already been 
completely settled.86
Although Mexican Spanish diplomatic relations were severed as a result o f the Francoist 
triumph in Spain, Spanish Conservative influence in Mexico was not absent. After the 
failure o f the Falange-supported UNS to launch a rebellion against the Mexican 
Government, Spanish Falangists pursued a more ambitious project. Perhaps its most 
enduring by-product was the creation of the National Action Party, as the alternate civil
R7outcome to a revolutionary uprising against the government. According to Manuel 
Gomez Morin, the founder of the PAN, he, and “a group of friends”, began to consider 
the necessity o f creating a political party after the frustrated electoral results of the 
presidential election of 1928, when he actively supported Jose Vasconcelos candidacy. 
But after the disillusioned losing candidate left the country, nothing was done. Gomez 
Morin only resumed the issue of the new party in 1938. By then, he said, there was an 
intolerable political situation in Mexico.88
85 Dispatch no. 343, N icolas Franco to Minister o f  Foreign Affairs in Burgos, 6 September 1939, AM AE, 
M inisterio de Estado, R -1019, E m bajada de Espana en L isboa , Exp. 19.
86 Dispatch no. 42, Gordon to Alvarez del Vayo, 18 March 1939, AGA, FM AE, Leg. 617, Com ercio, P ago  
Barcos, 1933-1938.
87 For a thorough analysis o f  the P A N  and Conservative movem ents in M exico in the second half o f  the 
Twentieth Century see Soledad Loaeza, E l Partido  Accion N acional, la larga marcha, 1939-1994, FCE, 
M exico, 1999.
88 James W ilkie and Edna M onzon de W ilkie, M exico Visto en e l Siglo XX, E ntrevistas de  H istoria O ral, 
U N A M , 1969, Chapter M anuel Gom ez M orin, p. 176.
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Gomez Morin accepted that perhaps in the origins of the UNS there was some influence 
of the Falange, but fails to mention the influence of the Falange or any other Spanish 
party in inspiring his own Action Nacional party.89 It was evident that the creation of the 
PAN  under Spanish influence and spiritual guidance was the party’s most well defined 
attribute. Amongst the celebrated eighteen original organisers of the party, there were 
Juan Sanchez Navarro and Bernardo Ponce.90 As soon as they were formally organised, 
they supported Almazan’s presidential candidacy, very much in the same terms as 
Gomez Morin had supported Vasconcelos’ candidacy ten years earlier, for the sake of 
opposition and with no electoral or political programme defined. The radical Right-wing 
groups UNS- Cristeros constituted the rank and file of the new party. Mostly bankers and 
barristers, as noted before, constituted the leadership.91 Perhaps it is not entirely accurate 
to say that Gomez Morin was nothing but a Falange puppet, as it is to say that the 
Falange was nothing but a German tool, as suggested by Chase. Nevertheless, the evident 
links between them, such as the sharing of ideological and political aims, undoubtedly 
place them as close allies. Although the Mexican Right-wing groups had begun a process 
of unification, they were not yet strong enough so as to effectively oppose the acceptance 
of a substantial Republican immigration to the country. However, the arrival of 
thousands of Spanish Republicans in Mexico encouraged the consolidation of such 
groups, making it more difficult for the revolutionary government to promote the 
continuation of its progressive policies. Nevertheless, even the anti-Republican and the 
anti-exile critics were to be divided over these issues. Thus, Conservative Hispanistas, 
such as Salvador Novo, Alfonso Junco, and Jose Vasconcelos, would assume a pro- 
Spanish Republican exile stand, if  only through a purely racist justification. Some of the 
anti-Republican Spanish residents, also ironically, welcomed the arrival of Spanish 
exiles, but they were rather keen to bolster Spanishness in Mexico than anything else.
With Franco's victory considerably assisted by Nazi-Fascist aid, Spain emerged into the 
framework of a Fascist state. "But the 'New Spain' was in fact the old Spain -a backward,
89 W ilkie & W ilkie, M exico Visto en e l Siglo XX, p. 179.
90La N ation , no. 2208, 24 September 2003.
91 David J. Mabry, M exico's A ction  N acional, A Catholic A lternative to R evolution, Syracuse University 
Press, 1973, pp. 16.
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agricultural country, with masses of illiterate peasants, little industry, and a small, 
insignificant middle class, a semi-feudal land, ruled by grandees, bishops, and
Q'y
generals." The Nazi-Fascist triumph in Spain catapulted a massive exodus o f Spanish 
people.
The presence of Spanish Falangists in Mexico, discreet at first, but more open by the end 
of the war, proved not only their interest but their confidence in their Mexican 
counterparts. The end of the war in Spain, made enthusiastic supporters of the Spanish 
rebels believe it would only be a matter of time before the Mexican Government 
conceded to a fait accompli and granted recognition to the Franco regime. Perhaps not 
even the most optimist supporter of the Spanish Republic would have expected 
otherwise. The logical response of the Mexican Government would have been to 
normalise its diplomatic relations with Spain. However, president Lazaro Cardenas’ 
decision not to recognise an armed conquest of power, strictly in accordance with the 
principles of the Estrada Doctrine, paved the way for a long-lasting tradition in Mexican 
foreign policy, regardless of the perseverance of Mexican Conservatives and their 
Spanish allies in pressuring the Mexican Government. The issue of recognition would 
remain a long-lasting aspiration for the allies of the Franco regime, never to be achieved. 
If local politics presented a grim forecast for Mexican progressive forces, the defeat of 
the Second Spanish Republic and the consequent strengthening of the Axis Powers 
became a defining factor for what was to be done next.
92 Dante A. Puzzo, Spain and the G reat Powers, 1936-1941, Columbia University Press, N ew  York, 1962, 
p.237.
Chapter VII
The Beginning of the Spanish Diaspora into Mexico
A  donde van las palabras que no se quedaron 
A  donde van las miradas que un dia partieron  
A caso flotan etem as com o prisioneras de un ventarron  
O se acurrucan entre las rendijas buscando calor 
A caso  ruedan sobre los cristales cual gotas de lluvia que quieren pasar
A caso  nunca vuelven  a ser algo  
A caso  se van y  adonde van, a donde van. 
W h ere  do th e  w o rd s th a t did n o t s ta y  go  
W h ere do th e  look s th at se t ou t on e d a y  go  
P erh ap s th ey  etern a lly  floa t as p rison ers o f  a terr ib le  w in d  
O r they  crouch  b etw een  th e crack s loo k in g  for  w arm th  
P erh ap s th ey  roll dow n w in d ow s like ra in d rop s w a n tin g  to  go th rou gh
P erhaps th ey  are  n ot an yth in g  ever  again  
P erh ap s th ey  are leav in g , and w h ere are  th ey  go in g , to  w h ere  d o  th ey  go
S ilv io  R odriguez
1. The End of the Spanish Civil War and the Final Humanitarian Gesture.
During the early 1930s, the establishment of totalitarian and repressive regimes, 
in different parts o f the world, produced the need to find a safe haven for political 
refugees from the opposition in those countries. In Latin America, the rule o f 
Getulio Vargas in Brazil, under Fascist-like repressive, corporatist, and anti- 
Communist lines, was also expelling oppositionists, some o f whom made their 
way to Mexico. In Europe, Nazi Germany’s anti-Communist and ant-Jewish 
regime forced German-speaking refugees into Mexico.1 Some refugees from 
Fascist Italy also arrived, such as the Socialist leader Francesco Froli, but the case 
that captured world attention came from the opposite extreme o f the political 
spectrum. The transformation o f Soviet Russia under a more centralised
1 N eed less to say that after W orld War II the number o f  European refugees other than Spaniards 
grew considerably, and included m any political writers such as Paul Merker, Bruno Frei, Anna 
Seghers and Paul W estheim , to m ention but a few . M ost o f  these refugees arrived in M exico  by  
sheer chance.
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dictatorship, and not the originally intended proletarian dictatorship, caused the 
exile o f the Russian revolutionary Leon Trotsky. Looking for undisputed power in 
the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin saw in Trotsky his most dangerous rival. After 
years o f exile, Trotsky was running out o f options when President Cardenas 
granted him political asylum in December 1936. Given that Mexico and the 
Soviet Union were the only countries supporting the Spanish Republic in its fight 
against a Nazi-Fascist-supported military rebellion, this unlikely tacit alliance 
would seem to contradict the granting o f asylum to Stalin’s archenemy. However, 
Mexico’s action attended more to the nature and principles o f international law 
safeguarding the rights o f sanctuary. Nonetheless, shortly after Trotsky’s arrival 
in January 1937, Cardenas considered it necessary to publicly declare that there 
was “no change” in the Mexican decision to support the Republican effort. 
However, the issue had some impact as, according to the famous Mexican 
muralist Alfaro Siqueiros, the Mexican representative at the League o f Nations, 
Narciso Bassols resigned as a result o f that political decision.4 The granting o f 
asylum to Trotsky did not mean a departure from the Mexican policy towards 
Spain. On the contrary, the permanent support in the war effort of Republican 
Spain would, eventually, produce an enduring exodus o f Spanish Republicans to 
Mexico.
a) Organising the Exile.
Mexican supporters o f the Spanish Republic, although hopeful o f a Republican 
triumph, had envisaged the consequences o f their defeat. Long before 
contemplating this possible outcome to the war, their concern and their actions 
were directed to temporary relief. The Civil War in Spain was bound to drive
2 Lazaro Cardenas wrote in his diary that D iego  Rivera w ent to see h im  to  La Laguna, in the 
Northern state o f  Coahuila, in D ecem ber 1936, to request Trotsky’s asylum , to w hich he 
im m ediately agreed, considering the feeble position o f  the R ussian revolutionary, and the M exican  
tradition o f  sanctuary “regardless o f  ideological affinities”; Lazaro Cardenas, O bras, I- A puntes, 
1913-1940 , U N A M , M exico, 1972, p .362.
3 [Lazaro Cardenas] P alabras y  D ocum entos P ublicos d e  L azaro  C ardenas,m ensajes, discuros, 
declaraciones, en trevistas y  o tros docum entos, 1928-1940 , v o l 1, S ig lo  X X I, M exico, p.236.
4 In Siqueiros unchallenged version, N arciso B assols, w ho w as working to improve M exican- 
Soviet relations, approached the Soviet A m bassador at the League o f  N ations, M axim  L itvinov, to 
that end. On reading the new s o f  the M exican offer to Trotsky, the S ov iet Ambassador asked  
B assols: “Is this the Governm ent that entrusted you to re-establish diplom atic relations w ith the 
Soviet U nion?”; D avid Alfaro Siqueiros, M e llam aban E l C oron elazo , M exico , Grijalbo, 1977, 
p p.341-342.
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people out o f the country at some stage. For practical reasons, the first 
destinations were other European countries, and given the political and military 
involvement o f some o f them in the Spanish conflict, particularly to France and 
the UK; then, considering the traditional links between Spain and Latin America, 
to various countries, amongst which Mexico was the most well known 
destination. As part o f their open backing o f Republican Spain, both the Mexican 
Government and broad sectors o f the population promoted the arrival o f Spanish 
refugees throughout the war. The first private initiative to collectively receive 
hundreds o f Spaniards in Mexico took place in the summer o f 1937. The proposal 
received the warm backing of the Mexican Government and a great deal o f 
publicity, and was under close scrutiny, as the group o f children who came to be 
known as the Children o f Morelia aroused the interest o f wide sectors o f Mexican 
public opinion.5 Wrongly assumed to be a Cardenas initiative, he clearly 
acknowledged that had he been the author o f such a project, he would have been 
proud o f it.
However, the idea came from a group o f Mexican women who volunteered to 
provide some relief to Spanish war orphans. The Children o f Morelia went 
through all sorts o f experiences, positive and negative.6 It was intended as a 
temporary arrangement that would last until the end of the war. Indeed, efforts 
were made by the Spanish community to send the children back to Spain once the 
war was over. Failing to obtain either the authorisation o f the Spanish Republican 
Government, or o f the parents, guardians or the people responsible for the 
children, nothing was done to that end.7 Similarly, after a long process 
coordinating the parties involved, poignantly a group o f Spanish intellectuals 
were invited by their Mexican counterparts to spend some time in Mexico for as
Q
long as the Civil War lasted in Spain. Thus, in the autumn o f 1938, a group o f 
newly arrived Spanish lecturers and scientists mixed with some others already
5 A G A , FM AE, 10237, Leg. 4 .- C orrespondencia  general, (1935-1937).
6 M any works have been devoted to the study o f  the Children o f  M orelia, am ongst w hich D olores 
P la’s L os N inos d e  M orelia . Un estudio  so b re  los prim eros refugiados espan oles en M exico, 
INAH , M exico , 1985, is perhaps the m ost exhaustive.
7 A G N , Lazaro Cardenas, E xp.550/84.
8 Both o f  these issues are dealt w ith in Chapter V .
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living in Mexico as refugees, and were incorporated into the Casa de Espana, a 
Mexican Government funded project.9
Although the first official request made by the Spanish Ambassador Felix Gordon 
Ordas to the Mexican Government, as early as October 1936, was rejected, this 
was due to the fact that the Spaniards involved in the petition, the Vidaurrazaga 
family, were already living in Cuba.10 A year later, in October 1937, Spanish 
Prime Minister, Juan Negrin sent Juan Simeon Vidarte on a special mission to see 
President Cardenas and ask his opinion regarding the reception o f Spanish 
refugees, “should the need arise”. Although dismissing the idea of Republican 
defeat, the Mexican President’s response was warmly positive.11 Gradually, more 
Spanish citizens arrived in Mexico in small numbers throughout the length o f the 
Civil War. They were not the only refugees received in Mexico. Given the 
increasing repression for political or racial motives in the totalitarian countries 
and the countries under their influence, a number o f Europeans arrived in Mexico 
between 1936 and 1938.12 Mexican Laws did not accept the permanent 
immigration o f workers; hence, the necessary modifications had to be made in 
order to pave the way for the announced offer o f the Mexican President to the 
Spanish Republicans.
In the midst o f the Republican defeat, in February 1939, the massive exodus 
towards the Pyrenees began. The French Government only allowed unarmed 
Spanish Republicans to cross the border. There, they were put in concentration 
camps: Agde, Argeles, Barcares, Bram, Collioure, Gurs, Rivesaltes, Saint- 
Cyprien, Septfonds, Le Vervet. The Mexican representative at the League of 
Nations, Isidro Fabela, wrote to Cardenas in February 1939 from France, after 
having visited some o f the concentration camps, such as Arles (One, Two, and 
Three) Boulou, Amelie-les-Bains and others. He reported that in Argeles, for 
instance, there were one hundred thousand Spanish refugees, and that over forty
9 A M A E , M inisterio de Estado, Leg. R -996, E xp.61, dispatches dated on 20  A ugust and 12 
N ovem ber 1938 regarding the formation o f  the “C asa de  E spana en M exico
10 F elix  G ordon Ordas, M i p o litic o  fu era  d e  E spana, Tom o I, M exico, 1965, p .775.
11 Juan Sim eon Vidarte, Todos fu im os culpables, Testim onio de  un socia lista  espanol, FCE, 
M exico, 1973, pp .776-796.
12 M axim o Garcia Tovar, D e  la  tradicion de asilo  a l  reconocim iento  d e l E sta tu to  d e  R efugiado, 
M A  thesis, U N A M , M exico , 2000 , p.27.
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thousand Spanish children had been distributed throughout France. Fabela had 
visited the Amelie camp on 13 February, and he witnessed how the terrible winds 
shattered the precarious shelters o f the Spanish refugees. He also reported that 
food and water were often scarce and unhealthy. But, if  possible, things were 
even worse in Argeles, where, according to the Mexican envoy, “sanitary services 
[were] less than satisfactory.” In fact, the hygiene conditions were appalling i f  
existing at all. Thus Argeles and Arles were the places chosen by the Mexican 
diplomats to provide some relief.13
Isidro Fabela was deeply convinced by Cardenas’ decision to offer asylum to a 
number o f Republican Spaniards, not only for humanitarian reasons but also as 
the logical conclusion to the Mexican stance towards Republican Spain. To begin 
with, Fabela told Azana, on behalf o f Cardenas, that he would be most welcome 
in Mexico, if  the time came and should he wish to go there. But the still President 
o f the Spanish Republic did not seem interested in going too far away from 
Spain.14 Similar offers were made to Prieto, Negrin, Alvarez del Vayo and 
virtually all the Republican leaders. O f course, the Mexican offer included “as 
many Spanish Republicans as possible”, although this was not an easy task to 
achieve. Nevertheless, considering the strong opposition campaign against the 
arrival o f masses o f Spanish refugees, no efforts were spared to make public 
opinion aware o f the circumstances o f the Spanish Republicans and their families.
As a reminder o f the urge to aid Spanish refugees in concentration camps in 
France, Andres Iduarte made a vibrant and dramatic description of the dreadful 
conditions under which French authorities had put the Spanish Republican exiles, 
many o f whom were also international combatants.15 While in France, Fabela was 
told by Jose Quero Morales, Spanish Under-Secretary of State, that the President 
o f the Cortes, Martinez Barrio, headed the Spanish committee dealing with the 
emmigration of Spanish Republicans to the Americas. Therefore, Fabela
13 Isidro Fabela, C artas a lp re s id e n te  C ardenas , M exico, 1947, p p .l 19-124.
14 Fabela, C artas a l p res id en te , p p .l 15-116.
15 E l P opu lar, 6  March 1939.
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suggested to Cardenas, that the Spaniards should make the initial selection, 
leaving the final decision in the hands o f the Mexican diplomats.16
Meanwhile, on the home front, Lombardo Toledano sent a telegram to President 
Cardenas, on behalf o f the CTM, enthusiastically endorsing Cardenas’s decision 
to continue support the Spanish Republic. Lombardo also reported on the C T M s 
decision to collect funds, and to allocate them in France, in order to contribute to
1 7the Spanish Republican’s relief. Even after the fall o f Barcelona, Mexican 
solidarity was maintained to send humanitarian aid for the Spanish Republic. 
Mexican Labour echoed the Spanish Republican Government “to resist is to win” 
strategy. Concerned about the relevance o f supporting the Republican cause at 
this late stage, the CTM  issued yet another call on 17 February 1939 to its 
members, urging them to send all the aid possible in order to contribute to the 
resistance o f the Spanish Republicans, as they assumed the anti-Fascist struggle 
as theirs.18
Then the C TM s Consejo Nacional Extraordinario, which met between 21 and 23 
February, dedicated the last day o f the meeting to a session honouring the Spanish 
Republic, “which fights for Liberty and against Fascism”, thus setting an example 
for the new generations and the peoples o f the world. Attending the meeting as 
special guests, were the Spanish Ambassador, Gordon Ordas, and Indalecio 
Prieto, former Spanish Minister. Lombardo addressed the audience with his usual 
strong rhetorical resources, playing down the Mexican contribution to the 
Republican war effort, perhaps also from a more realistic non-triumphal 
perspective. “Being so far away from Europe, that is geographically, we haven’t 
been able effectively to do something in favour o f Spain”, he said, “except for the 
spontaneous contribution o f blood and courage o f a fistful o f fellow countrymen.” 
“Nevertheless”, Lombardo continued, “we have done all we could to explain
16 Fabela, C artas a l p res iden te , pp .124-128.
17 E l P opular, 9 February 1939; [V icente Lombardo T oledano], O bra H istorico -C ron o log ica , 
T om o III, V ol. 9, 1939, CEFPSVLT, 1997, p .53.
18 E l P opu lar, 18 February 1939; [Lombardo Toledano] O bra H istorico -C ron o log ica , Tom o III, 
V ol. 9 , p.75.
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throughout Mexico and Latin America [...] the importance o f the Spanish 
struggle”, and its benefits for the world.19
Characteristically, Lombardo declared that the Spanish cause was not only the 
cause o f humankind, but that the Spanish struggle marked the beginning o f a new 
era in world history. But bigger efforts must be made to gather stronger forces 
against Fascism and prevent the return to past times. “Either Fascism takes over 
the entire world or Democracy is restored in those countries where it has been 
temporarily lost.” That was why the case o f Spain was not yet a lost cause, in 
spite o f the foreign troops occupying its territory. Taking further the regional 
revolutionary fervour, Lombardo said: “In Latin America, we want to become 
fighters o f the cause o f Freedom and Democracy.” Finally, Lombardo praised the 
special guests, particularly Prieto, who he referred to as “one of the best o f ours in 
Mexico and the world.” (“ C/«o de los mejores de los nuestros, en Mexico y  en el 
mundo”). He then thanked the Mexican volunteers who went to Spain: “our deep 
gratitude, as you have honoured the national (Mexican) proletariat.” 20 He then 
also thanked Ambassador Gordon Ordas. Lombardo’s confidence could not be 
shattered by what he saw as a temporary defeat in the Spanish workers struggle 
for liberty.
However, Negrin’s tactical resistance was not achievable. Although accurate, his 
approach o f resisting until there was an international war, failed to draw the 
attention o f the democracies, which still refused to acknowledge that the 
confrontation they had so wanted to avoid had already begun in Spain. Britain and 
France granted recognition to Franco’s Government on 27 February 1939. As a 
result, President Manuel Azana resigned his post, and the divisions within the 
Republican camp deepened further. According to the Constitution o f the Spanish 
Republic, in these circumstances the president o f the Cortes should assume the 
presidency o f the Republic. Thus Diego Martinez Barrio became the new Spanish 
Republican President. Negrin remained Prime Minister and devoted all his efforts
19 [Lombardo T oledano] O bra  H istorico -C ron o log ica , Tom o III, V o l. 9 , 1939, pp .135-137.
20 E l P opu lar, 24  February 1939.
209
Chapter VII The Beginning o f the Spanish Diaspora into Mexico
^ 1
to resistance. Ironically, only the Communists backed him. It seemed as if the 
Western Democracies had created a self -fulfilling prophecy.
Azana’s resignation also led Ambassador Gordon to resign both his 
ambassadorial posts, in Mexico22 on 28 February and Cuba on 31 March.23 
Nonetheless, he remained committed to supporting the efforts developed under 
more critical circumstances by the Spanish Charge de Affaires, Jose Loredo 
Aparicio, in the Spanish Embassy in Mexico, dealing with any unfinished 
business and awaiting further instructions from the Republican Government in 
exile.24 Gordon Ordas criticised Azana’s decision to resign, which had left him no 
option but to follow this path. However legalistic this may have appeared to 
Gordon, his decision was as unjustified as Azana’s, and had a negative impact for 
the Republican effort, regardless his continuing support o f Loredo’s new 
responsibility. There was no need for him to resign, particularly at such a difficult 
time for the Republican Government. These resignations were part o f the growing 
division and fracturing process o f the Republicans, at a time when there Was ah 
urgent need for unity to face whatever was to come next. Gordon himself 
recognised that this also led to a wavering in the Mexican support o f the Spanish 
Republicans, as his request to hand over the Spanish Embassy to the Mexican 
Foreign Ministry, was met with scepticism, and finally denied.25
Meanwhile, after receiving fresh supplies o f war material from Germany, the 
military rebels’ offensive produced several defeats o f the Republican Army 
throughout March 1939. On 4 March, there had been a desperate attempt to reach 
a negotiated surrender with Franco in the form of a coup at the hands o f Colonel 
Segismundo Casado in Madrid against Negrin’s Government.26 By this time the 
rebel army was stronger than ever and had just launched an unstoppable march on 
Catalonia and the other remaining Republican territories. Moderate Socialists and
21 Paul Preston, A C oncise H isto ry  o f  the Spanish C ivil War, Fontana Press, London, 1996, 
p p .212-215 .
22 Gordon Ordas, M i p o litico  fu era  de  E spana, Tom o 1, pp .780-781.
23 F elix  Gordon Ordas, M i p o litico  fu e ra  de  E spana, Tom o II, M exico, 1967, p .256.
24 Gordon Ordas, M i p o litico  fu era  de  E spana, Tom o II, p .255.
25 Idem , p .259. Previously, M exican diplom ats had been authorised to look after Spanish interests 
in  different countries. In Panama, for instance, in July 1937, and in Peru, in January 1938; FUE, 
G .0 .2 1 .
26 Preston, A C oncise H istory  o f  the Spanish C iv il War, pp .213-214.
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Republican military men regretfully joined Casado’s Junta o f National Defence, 
and suppressed the Communists in the vain hope that this would persuade the
77rebels to make a pact. However, with strong German military backing and the 
Italian army at his disposal to obtain fresh troops, Franco was ill-disposed to 
accept anything except unconditional surrender. The firm decision of the French 
Government not to allow Soviet military material to reach the Spanish
7QRepublicans, finally led to the collapse of the Republican war effort. The 
military defeat also showed the urge to remain united so as to pursue a political 
endeavour in the international arena as the only option left for Spanish 
Republicans, whilst attending to the immediate needs o f a decimated army and 
massive civil exodus. However, the consequent antagonism amongst the 
Republican leadership precipitated the fracture o f the Republican command, 
hence its further weakening.
With their ultimate demise in sight, masses o f Spanish Republicans fled to 
Alicante in larger numbers, hoping vainly to escape from the terrible repression 
unleashed by the rebels. An official policy o f annihilation and revenge against the
1
Republicans was established under Franco. Negrin’s efforts to resist failed, 
mainly as a result o f the renewed supplies o f war material from Germany and 
Italy, particularly the former. Franco’s war o f annihilation and the fierce 
repression unleashed afterwards made the risks o f exile seem minimal.32
The victorious rebel leader announced the triumph o f his force on 1 April, and 
jubilant pro-Franco groups in Mexico were confident that soon the new Spanish
27 D ocum ents on G erm an F oreign P olicy, 1918-1945, From  the A rch ives o f  the Germ an F oreign  
M inistry , London, H is M ajesty’s Stationary O ffice, 1951, p .802.
28 A M A E , L eg. R -832, E x p .l, Servicio  d e  Inform acion y  P o lid a  M ilitar , various reports, betw een  
January and M arch 1939.
29 Gerald H ow son , A rm s f o r  Spain, The un told  s to ry  o f  the Spanish C ivil War, Murray, London, 
1998, pp .242-243; and Ricardo M iralles, Juan N egrin, La R epu blica  en gu erra , Tem as de hoy, 
2003 . p p .300-304 .
30 In m id -1939, M anuel Azana wrote to A n gel O ssorio, former C ivil Governor o f  Catalonia, and 
A m bassador in A rgentina, then exiled  in B uenos Aires, a long letter describing the dramatic days 
o f  the end o f  the war, D iario s C om pletos, Critica, Barcelona, 2000 , pp. 1258-1276.
31 The L ey d e  R esponsabilidades P o litico s  was established b y  Franco’s Governm ent on 9  February 
1939, and w as intended to punish all those w ho did not actively  support the Falangist M ovim ien to  
since October 1934. F undam entos d e l N uevo E stado , E diciones de la Vicesecretaria de E ducation  
Popular, M adrid, 1953, pp .324-374
32 Eladia de los R ios was mem ber o f  the JSU . Interview o f  the author with M s. de los R ios in 
M exico  C ity, 13 A ugust 1999.
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Government would be recognised by the Mexican Government. However, as the 
celebrations o f the military rebel triumph in Spain by Falangist supporters in 
Mexico went on, they caused only greater antagonism and encouraged violence. 
Particularly provocative was the meeting o f the Falange with Italian, German and 
Portuguese diplomatic representatives in Mexico, and last but not least, a 
representative o f the Interior Ministry, Ricardo Rubio, a minor civil servant, 
whose presence in a pro-Franco celebration, although merely as an observer, was, 
nevertheless, severely criticised. Regarding this event o f Falange Espanola in 
Mexico, the Executive Committee o f the CTM  issued a public declaration 
pointing out its amazement about the meeting o f diplomatic representatives of 
Fascist countries with the Spanish Falange at the Casino Espanol, refusing to 
believe the version that a representative o f the Interior Ministry was present.34 
The Spanish Falange, being an armed foreign militia, argued the CTM , thus has 
no right to exist on Mexican territory. Furthermore, the Spanish Falange is 
incompatible with Mexican autonomy, they concluded.35
The issue o f the Spanish refugees grew considerably, not only for the tension 
created by the Conservative opposition to their asylum in Mexico, but because o f 
reports o f the appalling conditions which the refugees faced in France. The CTM, 
then, pondered how to best contribute to President Cardenas’s policy of assisting 
the Spanish Republicans in French concentration camps. For the CTM  -that is for 
Lombardo- the option o f granting asylum to Spanish Republicans was an urgent 
necessity. Accordingly, they decided first, to support the offer o f the Mexican 
Government to give refuge to those Spaniards whose lives were endangered if 
faced with a forced return to Spain. Secondly, the CTM  defended the notion that 
in offering asylum to Spanish citizens, the political affiliation or even professional
33 E xcelsior , 3 April 1939. On 4  April, the Interior M inistry issued a com m unique criticising the 
Falange, and pointing out its relationship w ith groups in  opposition to the M exican  Government, 
w hich could be considered as a foreign interference.
34 E l P opu lar , 4  A pril 1939; [V icente Lombardo Toledano] O bra H istorico -C ron o log ica , Tomo 
III, V ol. 9 , 1939, CEFPSVLT, M exico, 1997, pp.175-176.
35 The celebration w as considered a provocation, and the violent reaction o f  pro-Republican  
M exican workers w as the justification the M exican Governm ent needed to expel the Spanish 
Falangists, Alejandro V illanueva Plata, E ulogio C elorio and Genaro Riestra, on account o f  
“prom oting v io len ce”. A s a result, F alange E spanola  ceased its activities as such in M exico, 
although its mem bers found a new  organisation to devote their anti-Com m unist sentiment to. See 
Chapter VI. The Interior M inistry justified the presence o f  the governmental envoy, “exclusively” 
on grounds o f  h is duties to keep the Governm ent informed.
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capacity should not be considered. It was, therefore, not an issue o f migration but 
a matter o f a humanitarian nature, and hence not a problem o f migrants or settlers. 
For the keenest supporters o f the Spanish cause, it was a question o f saving the 
lives o f those who could not find refuge anywhere else but in Mexico. 
Furthermore, the CTM  considered that, regardless o f the financial support 
provided by international organisations to the Spanish refugees, it was “an honour 
and a duty”, to contribute to the aid o f those who the CTM  itself praised as “la 
f lo r y  nata” (cream of the crop) o f the Spanish people.
According to the information o f the Francoist Military Police Intelligence Service 
(SIPM), Spanish refugees in French concentration camps would be organised, 
giving priority to “those Marxists to be taken to Argentina and Chile”. The rest, 
according to their sources, would be going to Mexico, although the latter country, 
they said, had refused entry to Anarcho-syndicalist type elements. In the cases o f 
Santiago Garces, Central Chief o f the Servicio de Inteligencia Militar (SIM), 
Republican Military Intelligence Service, and the chief o f the SIM*s Catalan 
section, Jose Alonso Mayoll (former Director General de Seguridad), they 
concluded, would be going to Mexico.37 Francoist informers were not entirely 
accurate in their reports. Neither Argentina nor Chile were that keen on receiving 
more that the few thousands of refugees already in those countries. Secondly, 
Mexican authorities had not established a quota nor a professional or ideological 
requisite for the claimants to be admitted as exiles.
The imminent arrival of Spanish Republicans, regardless of their political 
affiliations, gave the opportunity for Conservative and reactionary groups to 
criticise the Mexican Government, protesting about the threat posed by thousand 
o f refugees who were supposedly taking on the scarce jobs very much needed by 
local workers. The CTM  noted the irony of pro-Franco supporters now apparently 
defending Mexican workers. However, it also recalled the public declaration o f all 
organisations affiliated to the CTM  in support of the Mexican Government’s 
decision to grant asylum to the defenders of Spain’s democracy and liberty, and
36 E l P opu lar, 14 April 1939; [Lombardo Toledano] O bra H istorico -C ron olog ica , Tom o III, V ol. 
9, 1939, p. 196.
37 A M A E , M inisterio de Estado, Leg. R -832, Inform acion resem ada , 1938-39 , E x p .l , Servicio de  
Inform acion y  P o lic ia  M ilitar  7 April 1939.
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decided to counter-attack the insidious campaign against the Spanish refugees. 
Similarly, and more than merely fulfilling his duty, the Interior Minister, Ignacio 
Garcia Tellez, sent a personal letter to President Cardenas informing him o f his 
decision to reinforce the public defence o f the Government’s attitude regarding 
the Spanish refugees. He did so, given the intense campaign of the Conservative 
media, which had increased after the arrival o f the first two massive expeditions 
(see next section), and to show his conviction of the justice of the Mexican 
Government’s support o f the Spanish Republicans.38 Apart from the efforts in 
favour o f the Spanish Republicans, the Mexican Government still had to 
guarantee the safe return o f a number o f Mexican citizens still in Spain. Having 
no official relations with the triumphant Government o f Francisco Franco,
Mexico requested the intervention of its Southern neighbour, Guatemala, to 
protect them.39
The huge flight o f Republicans amounted to half a million Spaniards. They left 
their country hungry, disarmed and dispossessed. Although their new temporary 
home spared them the horrors o f reprisals, it was no paradise. After being 
subjected to a humiliating arrival in French territory, they were interned in 
concentration camps. If the French Government of the Popular Front had done 
close to nothing to help its Spanish counterpart, the new Conservative French 
Government was to cause much harm to thousands o f refugees.40 Not only did 
they have to give up their arms, as the French Government would not allow armed 
militia in its territory, but they allowed Gestapo agents to seek out important 
Republican figures and hand them back to Franco’s Spain, where they were shot. 
Up to 12 000 others were sent to German concentration camps, amongst them, 
former Spanish Republican Premier, Francisco Largo Caballero. The atrocities 
experienced by the Republicans during the war, were now matched by the 
atrocities under a French pro-Francoist repressive regime, and Nazi Germany. 
Most of the Republican leaders also went into exile, and the Franco regime made
38 A G N , Lazaro Cardenas, E xp .546 .6 /212-13 . Letter o f  1 July 1939.
39 A H D M , III-426-7, M exicanos en E spana.
40 In 1939, at 17, Eladia de los R ios spent eleven  m onths in a French concentration camp, and 
recalls how  the Spanish Governm ent, through the SERE , paid 10 Francs per refugee, for 
accom m odation and food poorly provided by French wardens. Interview o f  13 A ugust 1999.
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attempts to capture well-known Republican figures during their French exile. The 
French Government willingly collaborated in such efforts.
The clear commitment to organise a massive rescue o f the Republicans in France 
was not an easy task. The terrible conditions in which the exiles were living were 
reported by different sources.41 Throughout the course o f the Spanish Civil War, a 
series o f groups were established with the express humanitarian purpose o f 
relieving the horrors of the war. These groups were set up in different countries 
and included the American Aid Relief, Swedish Aid for Spain and the British 
Spanish Aid Relief and other relief efforts. Now, this colourful combination o f 
groups united with the common aim of providing some assistance to those 
deprived o f a normal life and a place to live. The organisation o f the massive exile 
and the provision o f shelter and some relief aid was an international effort by 
private organisations. In this humanitarian gesture, the Mexican Government’s 
decision to accept thousands of refugees was the natural conclusion to its 
outstanding performance during the war. The Spanish Republicans started a long 
journey.
Mexican diplomats had been instructed to provide as much help as possible to 
alleviate the suffering o f the Spanish refugees, but above all, the Mexican 
Government had publicly offered to receive as many refugees as possible into the 
country. Mexican Minister in Marseilles, Gilberto Bosques, Narciso Bassols in 
Paris, and later Francisco Aguilar in Vichy, were all instructed to coordinate the 
evacuation effort.42 The process would be long and difficult but worthwhile. In 
order to organise transport o f the refugees, many other issues needed to be dealt 
with, such as food, clothes and medical assistance. Funds were essential. Mexico 
neither had sufficient available ships nor enough money to pay for them together 
with the maintenance o f the passengers. Besides, to calm critics, the Mexican 
Government had announced that no public funds would be spent in bringing 
Spanish refugees to Mexico. Hence, the only way to solve things was by
41 Eulalio Ferrer wrote his ow n experiences in a concentration camp in h is E ntre alcim bradas, 
Grijalbo, M exico , 1988.
42 M auricio Fresco, one o f  the M exican civil servants appointed in France, participated in the 
organisation o f  the Spanish Republican re lie f and exile. Other M exican diplom ats included, 
Bernardo R eyes, and M ajor Eladio R uiz Camarillo. Fresco wrote his experiences in his La  
em igra tion  R epublicana espanola: una victoria  de  M exico, O asis, M ex ico , 1950.
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collaboration with governments or groups interested in participating in such an 
enterprise. There was no shortage o f possible collaborators. To this end, British 
and American Quakers made an enormous effort toward raising the necessary 
funds through collections. In fact, referring to the first massive expedition of 
Spanish Republicans, it was claimed “the biggest achievement of the British aid 
organisations was the sending o f its own refugee ship to Mexico.”43
The divisions between Republican leaders grew deeper during the first months o f 
the Republican exile. The enmity between Prieto and Negrin, in particular, was a 
significant contributing factor to the divisions that would finally annihilate the 
Republican effort to facilitate the rescue o f the refugees, and later, to re-organise a 
strong Republican Government in exile. The origins o f this conflict can be traced 
to the time when Negrin decided to remove Prieto in the reshuffle o f his cabinet in 
1938. After being accused o f defeatism by Negrin, Prieto was removed from the 
Cabinet. Prieto never forgot the incident nor did he forgive Negrin. As Prime 
Minister, Negrin could not afford to have a defeatist as Minister of War, as he 
perceived Prieto to be. According to Prieto, the Communists plotted against 
him 44 The confrontation was never resolved and the division produced would 
affect the Spanish Republican exile. (See next section)
Meanwhile, the disputes between the two factions had a negative impact on the 
refugee relief. Negrin’s Government established the Servicio para la Evacuacion 
de Republicanos Espanoles (SERE -  Spanish Republicans Evacuation Service) at 
the end o f March 1939, which would work in close connection with Mexican 
diplomats. The funding destined to such an urgent task was set up with the 
contents o f the Caja de Reparaciones, which included the confiscations made by 
the Government.45 A few months later, as a result o f a fortuitous event, Negrin’s 
main challenger managed to set up a parallel service called the Junta de Auxilio a 
Refugiados Espanoles (JARE -  Spanish Refugees Relief Council), with the bigger 
part o f such funds. (See next section).
43 Jim Fyrth, The S ignal w as Spain, The Spanish A id  M ovem ent in Britain, 1936-1939 , Lawrence 
and W ishart, London, 1986, p.299.
44 Indalecio Prieto, C onvulsiones d e  E spana : pequ en os deta lles d e  gran des sucesos, T om o II, 
M exico, 1968, pp.9-85.
45 Vidarte, Todos fu im os cu lpables, pp .888-890.
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An indication o f the degree o f tension if  not outright hostility between the two 
groups was revealed by a plea for help. Whilst exiled in La Prasle, Collognes - 
sous- Saleve, Azana’s former personal assistant, Santos Martinez Saura, who was 
also a member of the Left-Republican Party (Izquierda Republicana), wrote to 
Prieto, who was in charge o f the JARE , requesting his inclusion on the list o f 
refugees to be allowed on board any ship to the Americas.46 Although Martinez 
Saura had been devoted to organising the refugees’ transportation, he had not 
taken advantage o f his position to guarantee passage for himself. Apart from 
anything else, his contribution to the evacuation was made within the official 
organisation, the SERE, the rival o f Prieto’s JARE, which lacked sufficient funds. 
Unable and unwilling to hide his bitterness, Prieto refused to help Martinez on the 
grounds that there were no places available.47 This discrimination for political 
reasons against supporters o f Negrin’s Government was the same that prevented 
any member o f the Spanish Communist Party from benefiting from the JARE. 
Prieto’s JARE , although contributing to the protection o f Republicans and 
organising the exile to the Americas, had a rather more political than 
humanitarian nature.
Besides the official representation o f the Spanish Republican Government and the 
Mexican Government, and those o f the Spanish Aid Committees, Spanish 
political parties also contributed to this effort. The Spanish Communist Party, for 
instance, used its relationship with its Mexican counterpart and the various labour 
organisations with which it had close contacts to reinforce the evacuation. They 
were not only concerned about the future o f its members, but were effectively 
concerned about the fate o f the members of the International Brigades, who 
clearly faced a more difficult situation.48 Even the Mexican Government, which 
was adamant about taking as many refugees as possible, avoided the embarkation 
o f the former International Brigades combatants as a group.49 In fact, a petition 
signed by over a hundred former International Brigaders requesting to be allowed
46 Letter M artinez to Prieto, 25 September 1939, AIR, Personal Papers o f  Santos Martinez Saura.
47 Letter Prieto to M artinez, 12 October 1939, AIR, Personal Papers o f  Santos Martinez Saura.
48 APCE, S obre  la  cuestion d e  los refugiados espanoles y  de  los com batien te  d e  las B rigadas  
In tern a tion a les , “2” 4937  (5 ej.) E P ./l6 /V I. 1939.
49 A M A E , M inisterio de Estado, Leg. R -1785, Exp.3, P olitico  d e  M exico  con re la tio n  a  E spana, 
N ota V erbal (verbal note), 30  D ecem ber 1938.
217
Chapter VII The Beginning o f the Spanish Diaspora into Mexico
to go to Mexico, was turned down by Narciso Bassols in July 1939.50 
Nevertheless, Cardenas regarded it to be the duty of Mexico to offer hospitality to 
the Spanish refugees, and to any person subjected to persecution for political 
reasons, such as the case o f Trotsky had proved in 1937, and many other non- 
Spanish refugees would prove from 1939 onwards.
The Mexican President proudly reported to the Congress that “the doors o f 
Mexico were opened to the Republican elements”.51 Even though there were 
reports speculating upon the end o f  the Mexican offer o f asylum on the grounds 
o f the start o f hostilities in France, the fact remains that reinforced efforts were 
made to help the Spamsh Republicans m their exile m France. In fact, by 1940, 
Mexican diplomats had rented two properties near Le Menet, in Marseille, and 
established residences for the Spanish refugees waiting en route to Mexico.53 
Thus, the Chateau de Reynard was used to provide shelter to men, whilst the 
Chateau de Montgrand provided relief for women and children.54 Furthermore, 
the appointment of Luis I. Rodriguez as Minister in Vichy, in July 1940, was a 
significant development in the effort regarding the evacuation o f Spanish 
Republicans from France. Rodriguez had the specific task o f strengthening the 
protection of Spanish Republicans in France and the organisation o f new 
expeditions o f refugees to Mexico, a particularly delicate undertaking, given the 
military developments and the increasing attempts by Francoist Spain to capture 
leading Republican figures, such as Azana and Negrin. Rodriguez not only 
developed a strong campaign in favour o f the Spanish refugees, but also managed 
to establish an agreement with the French Government in that respect. In an 
intense encounter with Petain, on 8 July 1940, Rodriguez convinced the French 
leader to accept the Mexican offer to take the Spanish refugees, and resolve what
50 A H D M , A rchivo de la Embajada de M exico en Espana, Caja no. 243; A H D M , M exico y  
E spana: so lid a r id a d y  asilo  po litico , 1936-1942, SRE, M exico, 1990, pp .277-278 .
51 A H D M ., no, 9 , pp.36 and 37, Fifth State o f  the U nion Speech, 1 Septem ber 1939.
52 A M A E , M inisterio de Estado, Leg. R -1787, Exp.21 A ctitud  d e l g o b ie m o  m exicano. The report, 
addressed to the Rt. Hon. President o f  the Basque Government, in Paris, on  23 Septem ber 1939, 
details a m eeting o f  B assols w ith N egrin and M endez A spe, where the M exican  M inister 
supposedly confirm ed the decision  o f  the M exican Government to fin ish the em igration o f  
Spanish R epublicans to M exico.
53 A lthough there is no concrete evidence, the funds to let those properties were apparently 
provided by the JARE, as referred to in E spana R epublicana  11 Octobre 1941, cit in  Caudet, 
H ipo tesis so b re  e l exilio republicano, p .267 , fn. 50.
54 M auricio Fresco, La em igracion  R epublicana espanola: una victoria  d e  M exico, O asis, M exico , 
1950, pp .38-42.
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was also a difficult situation for the French Government. They agreed to set up a 
French-Mexican commission that established the requirements o f the Mexican 
proposal, and the final agreement was signed on 23 August 1940.55 Mexican 
diplomats processed over 100 000 applications during the following six months.56 
Evidently, not all those authorised to embark towards Mexico succeeded. The 
European war also thwarted this effort. In fact, there were some cases where, after 
the registration o f passengers and been authorised by the local French authorities, 
all men between 18 and 48 were prevented from boarding. This was part o f the 
collaboration between Vichy France, Nazi Germany and Franco’ Spain.57
During his commission, Luis I. Rodriguez had an extraordinary experience at a 
very emotional event, at the time when Manuel Azana, former President o f the 
Spanish Republic, lived in exile in Montauban. Azana had been followed by 
Francoist secret police who intended to kidnap him to take him back to Spain. 
Franco wanted an exemplary punishment for the man who represented all that he 
hated. Azana was living in a small flat, and his health was frail. Reluctantly, he 
accepted the offer made by the Mexican Minister to move to the Midi Hotel, 
under the Mexican flag. An audacious attempt was made to take Azana, under 
cover, out o f France and into Mexico in October 1940. The plot was discovered 
and the endeavour frustrated. Shortly afterwards, on 4 November, Azana died.
The local authorities would not authorise the use o f the Spanish Republican flag 
at his funeral, thus Rodriguez decided that Azana was to be buried covered by the 
Mexican flag.58 Minister Rodriguez and the rest of the Mexican diplomats 
accredited in France were still to face enormous challenges to confront regarding 
asylum.
55 Armando Pareyon A zpeitia, former aid o f  President Cardenas, wrote h is experiences regarding 
the Spanish ex iles in C ardenas ante e l mundo, La Prensa, M exico , 1973, pp. 127-134; [Luis I. 
Rodriguez], M ision  d e  Luis I. R odriguez en F rancia, C olegio  de M exico , SRE, C O N A C Y T , 
M exico, 1999, pp .102-144.
56 [Luis I. Rodriguez], M ision  de  Luis / . R odriguez en F rancia, pp .xiii-xv .
57 M inister in M arseilles, B osques, to Foreign M inister, Hay, 31 M arch 1941. D ocum ent 
reproduced in M auricio Fresco, La em igracion R epublicana espanola: una v ic toria  d e  M exico, 
O asis, M exico , 1950, pp.44-45.
58 [Luis I. Rodriguez] M ision d e  Luis I. R odriguez en F rancia , pp.202; Interview o f  the author 
with Luis Danton Rodriguez, 22 D ecem ber 1999.
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Finally, as a preparation for receiving an undefined number o f refugees, new 
legislation regarding the admission o f immigrants had been approved. The 
detailed description of possible immigrants and political refugees seemed 
restrictive o f the latter, and although it was not made to fit the case o f the Spanish 
refugees, its enforcement regarding them had to be flexible, and indeed, it was.59
As shown, the effort o f Mexican diplomats to provide some relief to as many 
Spanish Republicans as possible also considered individual cases o f former 
volunteers o f the International Brigades. There was no discrimination and no 
official preferences other than, perhaps, personal.60 Organising the exile was a 
collective work, and, critical o f the decreasing activity o f the Communist parties 
in favour o f the Spanish Republicans, the Comintern pointed out the danger of 
such a pattern, and urged its members to provide the Spanish exiles with the 
necessary support in their French and Algerian concentration camps. This aid to 
Spanish Republicans and International Brigades was “the most important political 
and practical problem to face”, therefore, all the sections o f the Comintern, but 
particularly the Spanish and French Communist parties, should concentrate on the 
solidarity campaign to provide relief to those groups.61 The Mexican Communist 
Party played a minor role in this endeavour. The Swedish Aid Committee to the 
Spanish People coordinated the Spanish Communist Party’s work aiding the 
refugees in France and the Americas. They kept on doing this until after the
ATSecond World War had officially begun.
b) The A rrival of Spanish Republican exiles in Mexico.
As noted earlier, the flood o f Spanish exiles into Mexico began shortly after the 
outbreak of the Civil War. Although in small numbers, these first few exiles
59 D iario  O ficia l de  la F ederacion , 1 N ovem ber 1938. Tablas d iferencia les a  que se  su jetard  la 
adm ission  d e  inm igrantes durante e l ano de  1939. A lso  cit in M exico  y  la R epublica  E spanola, 
pp.52-54.
60 A s part o f  the group o f  M exican c iv il servants in charge o f  the final selection  o f  Spanish  
refugees, M auricio Fresco acknow ledged that, although he had “preference for B asques and 
Catalans, and for intellectuals”, this did not prevent him  from fu lfilling  his job  honourably.
61 APCE, S obre  la cuestion d e  los refugiados espanoles y  d e  los com batien tes de  la s B rigadas 
In tem acion a les, “2 ” 4937  (5 ej.) E P ./l6 /V I. 1939.
62 APCE, Inform e 89 3 9  “tob .D iaz ” 3 ek3/22.X .39, hand-written note signed b y  Knut Olsen, 5 
N ovem ber 1939.
63 APCE, Inform e so b re  e l trabajo  d e l P C E  en M exico, signed “Marta” on 3 D ecem ber 1941.
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represented the origins o f the forthcoming massive exile, the first o f its nature in 
modem history. This also implied the need to make Mexican public opinion more 
sensitive to the significance o f the arrival o f thousands o f Spaniards to live in 
Mexico for an unspecified period o f time.
Meanwhile, the Negrin-Prieto rift reached unexpected heights following a stroke 
o f luck on the part o f Prieto, when a yacht filled with money, jewels, and art 
works, quietly arrived from Spain and found no claimants for the treasure in 
Mexico. It was part o f the contents o f the Bank o f Spain’s vault, about which 
many varied and fantastical accounts have been written, referring to the treasure 
as the so-called “Moscow gold”. Fearing the fall o f the city into the hands o f the 
rebels, the Bank o f Spain transferred its reserves out o f Madrid, and the treasure 
was then divided into five parts. The actual amounts o f each part were difficult to 
establish, but they ranged from between 180 to 260 million dollars. 257 million 
dollars were deposited in the Bank o f France.64 Rebel forces on the Catalan 
border captured another part. An unspecified amount was sent to Moscow, the 
fate o f which has become the subject o f much debate and speculation.65 A further 
250 million dollars were sent to the US. The last part arrived in Mexico on board 
the yacht Vita, and it was the fate o f this that was to become one o f the main 
issues that deepened the divisions between the Spanish Republicans in exile.
The Vita arrived in Veracruz in March 1939. Although Negrin had delegated Jose 
Puche to take charge o f the cargo while he was in London, Puche was not 
informed about the details o f the arrival and was absent when the Vita was 
already in Mexican waters. The yacht first made harbour at Tampico, but the 
captain decided to set sail again immediately for Veracruz since he was anxious to 
hand over his precious consignment. Meanwhile, President Cardenas was 
informed o f the urgency of the issue, and the fact that nobody seemed to know o f 
Puche’s whereabouts. He then decided to call Prieto, who readily and gladly took
64 Ricardo M iralles, Juan N egrin, La R epublica  en g u erra , Tem as de H oy, Madrid, 2003 , pp.353. 
Later, shortly before h is death, N egrin made efforts to get the m oney back to  Spain, Idem .
65 The S oviet Governm ent set up an account in Switzerland w ith those funds, against w hich  the 
selling o f  arms and war material to the R epublican Governm ent w as made. The intricate story is 
discussed  at length in A ngel V inas, E l oro  d e  M oscu, A lfa y  om ega d e  un m ito fran qu ista , 
Barcelona, 1979. Som e relevant com m ents are in M iralles, Juan N egrin , pp. 161-179, and 
H ow son, A rm s f o r  Spain , pp .121-123.
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charge o f the Vita and its shipment.66 The actual details o f the cargo were never 
fully disclosed by Prieto and the treasure became a symbol o f the ever-lasting 
Republican quarrel. Prieto constantly refused to hand over the shipment to 
Negrin, in spite o f repeated requests by the then President o f the Spanish 
Government. Prieto even refused to meet with Negrin for an interview, when 
Negrin later went to Mexico, although he had written to Prieto beforehand to set 
up a meeting. Prieto repeatedly turned down Negrin’s requests to meet. Prieto had 
used his influence within the Cortes, and supported his action with a resolution 
that granted him the legal support and the confidence o f the Cortes to control the 
funds he had confiscated.67 Originally destined by Negrin for the relief o f Spanish 
Republicans to be assigned through the SERE, on whose Comite Tecnico (CTARE 
-Technical Committee for the Aid o f Spanish Republicans) was Jose Puche, the 
Vita's cargo was used by Prieto to fund the JARE. Prieto thus acquired a 
powerful tool that he could wield to influence the future direction taken by the 
Republican exile.68 The confrontation continued for the duration of the exile, 
making it more difficult to organise not only a strong anti-Franco coalition, but 
more significantly, it contributed to the failure to establish a government in exile 
in London, which, eventually, could have aimed at a possible allied intervention 
in Spain during the Second World War. The Mexican Government stayed out o f 
the conflict, at least until 1942, when President Avila Camacho, using the 
extraordinary powers in time o f war, created a governmental commission to 
administer the Spanish Republican funds.69
The arrival o f Spanish Republicans in Mexico steadily increased after the 
Republican Government was finally overthrown. Numerous large and small ships 
with a few Spanish Republican refugees continuously arrived at Mexican ports. 
But Spanish refugees also made their way via the US, which meant that they 
would arrive in Mexico by train. The first ship to carry a group of Spanish
66 Ricardo M iralles g ives a different version, where, on 17 M arch, Prieto received a cablegram  
from  Enrique Puente, on  board the Vita, telling him  to go to Veracruz. M iralles, Juan N egrin, 
p.333 .
67 Indalecio Prieto, and Juan Negrin, C orrespondencia , Fundacion Indalecio Prieto, M exico, 1991.
68 Am aro del R osal D iaz, E l oro d e l B anco de  Espana y  la h istoria  d e l Vita, Grijalbo, M exico, 
1977, pp. 122-146.
69 D iario  O jic ia l d e  la  F ederacion, 1 D ecem ber 1942. “D ecreto  que crea  una C om isidn  
en cargada  d e l control, custodia  y  adm inistracion  d e  los bienes d e  la D elgacion  en M exico d e  la  
Junta d e  A uxilios a  lo s  R epublicanos E spanoles”.
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Republicans in 1939 to Mexico was the Flandre, which, according to the 
information published by Excelsior, arrived on 20 April with between 77 and 169 
passengers. The imprecision o f the figures would be a regular feature, which 
would reflect the variations in accounting for the final number o f Spanish 
refugees in Mexico. Some medium-size ships, such as the Siboney, and the 
Flandre undertook at least two journeys carrying Spanish exiles. Similarly many 
other small vessels returned with more refugees throughout the year, such as the 
Iseri, the Orizaba, the Orinoco, the Leerdam, the Monterrey, the Iberia, and
7ftothers. In fact, in its second tnp, the Flandre took 327 Spanish refugees on 30 
May, making the presence o f Spanish Republicans almost a regular issue, and the 
names o f well-known Republican figures began to appear in Mexico.
Although the Sinaia was not the first ship with Spanish Republican exiles to set 
sail for Mexico, the story o f its voyage has become a classic reference for the 
thousands o f Spanish Republican refugees. Nor was it the biggest contingent o f 
Spaniards bound for Mexico, but their daily experience was recorded in a one or 
two page newsletter detailing the activities organised by Fernando Gamboa and 
his wife Susana, who were representing the Mexican Government. As such, the 
couple were at least largely responsible for, if  not in charge o f the ship. The 
journey o f the Sinaia was the successful accomplishment of the British National 
Joint Committee for Spanish Relief, which had managed to gather the various 
contributions necessary to achieve that end.71 The Mexican Government did not 
have to pay anything but just needed to accommodate some 1 600 Spaniards. 
They were neither the first nor the biggest contingent to arrive in Mexico, yet 
those on board became a testing ground for future expeditions.
Nan Green, a former British volunteer in Spain, accompanied the expedition, 
given her experience, commitment to the cause of Republican Spain and the fact 
that she could be the interpreter for the British delegation. Her description of the 
voyage of the Sinaia vividly complements the picture o f everyday life for the
70 AH PCE, Sig. Caja 97 /2 .1 , Inform es (sobre  refugiados espanoles).
71 Jim Fyrth, The S ign a l Was Spain, The Spanish A id  M ovem en t in B ritain, 1936-39, Lawrence 
and Wishart, London, 1986, pp.299 and 300.
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ship’s passengers, described in the daily diary that was kept on board. To begin 
with, most o f the passengers did not know where they were going, and, in fact, 
did not really seem to care. It was good enough to have left the confines o f the 
concentration camp and to now be faced with a different and hopefully better fate. 
Not knowing exactly what to expect, the passengers grew anxious when they first 
approached Veracruz. But the emotion and excitement o f a recent encounter with 
the Hispanic people o f Puerto Rico was still fresh in their memory. Nan Green 
tells o f the magnificent reception organised by the Puerto Rican supporters o f 
Republican Spain. Although the American authorities had refused permission for 
the passengers to set foot on land, a crowd gathered on shore next to the ship and 
managed to transfer part o f the feast they had prepared on board using ropes to 
manoeuvre roast chickens, loaves of bread, baskets o f fruit, cakes and biscuits 
aboard the vessel. Such was the scene that it was difficult to distinguish whether
7Tthose on the ship or those on land were more moved. The Sinaia finally arrived 
in Veracruz on 13 June 1939, and the nervous and tired passengers, not knowing 
what to expect, were even more surprised to witness the massive demonstration 
greeting them. Negrin was there to receive the contingent and went on board to 
greet them personally before the grand celebration prepared began. High ranking 
Mexican figures attended the event, from the State Governor, Fernando Casas 
Aleman, the Interior Minister, Garcia Tellez, and representing President 
Cardenas, Alejandro Gomez Maganda, former Mexican Consul in Barcelona, and 
the representatives o f Labour, Alejandro Carrillo, and Lombardo Toledano. They 
were the familiar faces amongst the 20 000 demonstrators o f solidarity towards 
the Spanish refugees.
On welcoming the Spanish refugees in what came to be known as the first 
massive arrival o f Spanish Republicans in Mexico, Lombardo told the crowd that, 
if  not for the very existence o f the traitor Francisco Franco, “our first words 
would be to give thanks for the bliss o f receiving these Spanish workers in 
Mexico, labourers, artists, intellectuals, journalists, men and women who 
constitute the cream of the crop o f the Spanish people.” According to Lombardo,
72 Sinaia, D iario  de  la P rim era  E xpedicion de  R epublicanos E spanoles a M exico, U A M -U N A M , 
M exico, 1989.
73 N an Green, A C hronicle o f  sm a ll beer, The M em oirs o f  Nan Green, ©  Martin Greeen, Penzance, 
1979, pp .81-82.
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their very presence in Mexico would suffice to encourage the Mexican people to 
achieve their complete economic and political independence. Therefore, the 
Mexican people and the Mexican proletariat warmly received them, according to 
Lombardo, as they knew they constituted “a treasure for the cause o f Spain, the 
cause o f Mexico, and the cause o f all free people o f the world.” Then, Lombardo, 
in an unusual remark, promised that no Spanish Republican would be a stranger 
in Mexico, reminding the crowd “you, Spaniards, are the backbone o f our race.”
Then, directing his words towards Mexican workers, he urged them to 
demonstrate that the Spanish refugees would add to material production and that 
they had brought cultural and ideological contributions. For Lombardo, the arrival 
o f Spanish Republicans was a double blessing for they constituted the anti-Fascist 
fighting experience to be held both in Mexico and abroad. Finally, he made 
scornful remarks about the Spanish residents in Veracruz, and said that they were 
gachupines, not Spaniards.74 “They are enemies of Spain, traitors to Spain. They 
are alien to Mexico, more so, than even those Spanish arriving today, for the latter
nc
fight at our side for freedom and democracy.”
Other speakers included Ignacio Garcia Tellez, Mexican Minister o f Interior, 
responsible o f coordinating the arrival o f the Spanish refugees. Garcia Tellez told 
the newly arrived that they were received as the defenders o f democracy and 
liberty, and recalled the arrival o f the first Spaniards four hundred years earlier in 
entirely different circumstances. Finally, recalling the presence of numerous 
intellectuals, he pointed out the work they should develop to contribute to the
n(\development o f Mexican culture. In the parade that followed the speeches, the 
streets o f the Port of Veracruz filled with the thousands o f Mexicans greeting 
Spanish Republicans. It was at this stage that Lombardo waved the Spanish 
Republican flag amidst popular rejoicing, certainly an unprecedented action in
• * 77modem Mexican history.
74 G achupin  is the derogatory word used  to refer to a Spaniard in M exico . N ot politically  correct. 
See Chapter I.
75 E l P opular, 14 June 1939. A lso  in [V icente Lombardo Toledano] O bra  H istorico-C ronologica , 
T om o III, V ol. 9, 1939, CEFPSVLT, M exico , 1997, pp .285-286.
76 E l N acional, 14 June 1939. A lso  in M exico y  la R epublica E spafio la , p .58.
77 Lombardo recalled doing so in a public lecture in 1958, w hich was attended by Robert P M illon . 
See Robert P .M illon, M exican M arxist: Vicente L om bardo Toledano, .p. 129.
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Although no similarly massive receptions were made for the following 
expeditions, there were still big demonstrations of solidarity welcoming the newly 
arrived. After the Sinaia, the Ipanema arrived in Mexico on 7 July, bringing
70
another almost 1 000 Spanish refugees. Then, the Mexique, the biggest o f all 
collective journeys, with over 2 000 Spanish passengers, arrived on 27 July. Then, 
given the increasingly delicate situation in Europe, as anticipated by the 
Republican leaders, many other expected expeditions were frustrated. 
Nevertheless, according to an official report on 7 February 1940, the total number 
o f Spanish Republican refugees who arrived in Mexico during 1939 was 8 150. 
According to the Swiss Sanitarian Central, however, by September, the total o f 
Spanish refugees who had gone to the Americas was 24 450, including 7 700 to
70Mexico. As mentioned, the number of Spanish Republicans was difficult to 
trace, as the entrance to Mexico by train from the US was less controlled. Their 
arrival by ship, in contrast, was better controlled, as in the case o f the 1 105
OA
Spanish refugees who disembarked from the Niassa and the Serpa Pinto.
Given the intensity of the anti-Republican refugee campaign, the C TM  s National 
Council decided to counter its fallacious arguments. Exposing the Mexican 
reactionaries’ propaganda, the CTM  had not only to denounce them but also to 
take specific actions. Anti-Republican propaganda aimed to scare Mexican people 
by suggesting that the arrival of Republican refugees would affect Mexican 
workers’ interests; that they would take their jobs, that they would be privileged 
workers, that they would become the C T M s strike force; that the Mexican 
Government would have to use enormous amounts o f public money to bring them
01
to Mexico, and so on. Defining the nature o f the struggle pursued by Spanish 
Republicans as anti-Fascist, and considering the imminent danger to the Spanish 
refugees, the C T M s Consejo Nacional justified the protection o f Spanish
78 A n  account o f  the journey o f  the Ipanem a, as w ell as a description o f  the final m onths o f  the war 
in  Catalonia and the first months o f  French captivity are narrated by S ilv ia  M istral in her Exodo, 
D iario  de  una refugiada espanola , M inerva, M exico, 1940.
79 AHPCE, 8293 “ 1” 2 eje.C P .7.9.40, Sobre  la  E m igracion .
80 M em oria  d e  la  S ecretaria  d e  G obem acion , September 1942- A ugust 1943, presen tada  a l H. 
C ongreso d e  la  Union p o r  e l Secretario  d e l ramo, Lie. M iguel A lem an, D irection  General de 
Inform ation, M exico , 1943, p .65.
81 CTM  Circular no. 12, 15 A ugust 1939; E l P opular, 16 August 1939;
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Republicans as the only possible logical action to be followed by both the 
Mexican Government and Labour. Furthermore, it was not only to be consequent 
with the efforts developed during the Spanish war, but above all, an unavoidable 
humanitarian gesture. Apart from the regular strong response in the press, this 
time the X Consejo Nacional o f the CTM  decided to grant membership to all 
Spanish workers, as this would enable them to find jobs more easily, and to 
consider both Mexican and Spanish cases under equal conditions. Finally, the 
C T M s decided to call the attention o f its members to not fall victim to the 
Conservative propaganda, which intended to divide the Labour movement 
through the Spanish Republican issue.82
Some Spanish residents used their organisations to offer help to the recently 
arrived Republican exiles. Particularly relevant was the case o f the Catalan Choral 
Society (L 'Orfeo Catala de Mexic). Although still a humble organisation, at least 
in terms o f funding, the Catalan Orfeo provided some relief by offering food, 
shelter, and most o f all a sense of belonging to those Catalan exiles who had no 
relations or acquaintances in Mexico. Eventually, the division between 
Republican exiles would also reach the Catalan Orfeo, likewise resulting in its
* •  R4 *division, and the formation of a new organisation, La Casal Catala. Not entirely 
surprisingly, some well-known Mexican Conservatives welcomed the arrival of 
the Spanish refugees, such as Alfonso Junco and Salvador Novo. However, their 
acknowledgement o f the benefit o f such a daring decision by the Mexican 
Government was motivated more on racial grounds. Notwithstanding their 
acceptance, they o f course criticised that part o f the Spanish immigration they
o c
considered negative, such as the “reds” and Communists.
Likewise, although on slightly similar lines, the Basque community and its 
organisation welcomed their fellow countrymen. However, that was not the case 
o f most o f the Spanish centres, such as the Casino Espanol, the Centro Asturiano,
82 [V icente Lombardo Toledano] O bra H istorico-C ronologica , Tom o III, V ol. 10, 1939, 
CEFPSVLT, M exico, 1997, pp .147-151.
83 Lluis A ym am i i Baudina, C ronica, in La Nostra R evista, no. 25, January 1948.
84 M iquel Marti i S o le r , L ‘ O rfeo C atala  d e  M exic (1906-1986) , Curial E diciones Catalanes, 
Barcelona, 1989.
85 A lfonso  Junco, M exico y l o s  refugiados, L as C ortes d e  p a ja y  e l co rte  d e  ca ja , pp.21-22; also 
A lfonso  Junco, E spana en c a m e  viva, M exico, B otas, 1946.
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and others. After the vivid and emotional welcome, most o f the Spanish refugees 
needed to find an occupation and try to normalise their every-day lives. Some 
others, hoping soon to return to Spain, did not want to engage in deep or long 
term commitments, or “echar raices” (put down roots). Driven by the basic 
demands for survival, those with families in particular were more concerned 
about everyday life and problems than Spanish politics or any eventual return.
Amongst the large number o f Spanish exiles, Adolfo Sanchez Vazquez, for 
instance, arrived in Mexico in 1939, aged 24, on board the Sinaia. He was a 
student o f Philosophy at the Universidad Central o f Madrid, with strong literary 
inclinations.86 Sanchez Vazquez, a member o f the Socialist Unified Youth (JSU), 
and former member o f the Communist Youth, initiated his political and 
ideological formation in Malaga, after finishing his BA and Teacher Training at 
the Escuela Normal in 1935. He moved to Madrid in that year, and registered at 
the Faculty o f Philosophy and Letters o f the Universidad Central, where he 
studied for a year, under the influence o f Jose Ortega y Gasset, Garcia Morente,
87Zubirin, and Jose Gaos.
Similarly, Aurora Amaiz, who arrived in Mexico in 1940, was a member of the 
JSU  during the war, and also member o f the FUE (University Student Federation 
-Federacion Universitaria Escolar) at the University o f Madrid (Universidad 
Central de Madrid). Her arrival in Mexico meant the possibility o f remaining 
active in her militant position fighting against Franco. Amaiz arrived shortly 
before the murder o f Trotsky in Mexico City and was living in the house shared 
by Pedro Checa, Secretary o f the Spanish Communist Party, Vicente Uribe, and
oo
others After Trotsky’s murder at the hands o f pro-Stalin Communists, the 
Mexican police put the homes o f well-known Communists under surveillance in 
their search for possible accomplices o f the captured assassin, Ramon Mercader. 
In doing so, they made no distinction between factions within the Communist 
movement, and monitored these activists for no particular reason other than the
86 A d olfo  Sanchez V azquez, D e l exilio en M exico, R ecuerdos y  reflexiones, Grijalbo, 1997, p. 191.
87 Interview by Palom a U lacia  and James Valender with A dolfo  Sanchez V azquez in Septem ber 
1985, as part o f  a bigger project regarding the Spanish ex iles in M exico; cit in A d olfo  Sanchez 
V azquez, D el exilio  en M exico, R ecuerdos y  reflexiones, Grijalbo, M exico , 1997, pp. 185-228.
88 Aurora A m aiz, R etra to  hablado  de  Luisa Julian, M em orias d e  una gu erra , Compania Literaria, 
M adrid, 1996, p .243.
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fact that they were Communists. It was decided that Amaiz should then move 
houses, but the possibility o f staying with Margarita Nelken, with whom she was 
acquainted, was ruled out, as Nelken*s house was also under police vigilance. 
Instead, she was sent to live with Constancia de la Mora for a while.89
Alongside political factors, the Spanish exiles had to overcome the identity crisis 
to which they were subjected. Paraphrasing Bernard Shaw’s notion o f two nations 
divided by the same language, the newly arrived Spaniards faced the initial shock 
o f the distinct use o f their mother tongue.90 And even though the Mexican people 
welcomed them with an almost overwhelming affection, a sense o f displacement 
in many Spanish Republicans was still present. To deal with this issues, and to 
come to terms with their presumed temporary exile, the Spanish Republicans 
responded in different ways to fulfil their sense o f belonging. Some, assuming 
their exile was o f a temporary nature, gathered only around other exiles, never 
fully engaging in local life. Others felt as if  they were living in Spain whilst living 
in Mexico, for whom Jose Gaos developed the idea o f the “transterrados” to 
express this notion o f Spaniards such as himself.91 It is safe to say, however, that 
most o f the Spanish exiles tried to integrate into their host society entirely, 
although at their own individual pace.
The case o f Aurora Amaiz illustrates this process. As a member o f the Spanish 
Communist Party, she met Tina Modotti and Vittorio Vidali (aka Carlos 
Contreras) and became good friends with them in Mexico. But she did not cut off 
herself from the rest o f the community of Spanish exiles. Furthermore, she 
frequently gathered with some o f the Mexicans who were involved in making the 
Spanish exile in Mexico possible, such as Narciso Bassols, Susana and Federico 
Gamboa, Elena Garro, and her husband, Octavio Paz. Finally, she decided to
89 Interview  o f  the author with Aurora A m aiz, M exico City, 15 D ecem ber 1999.
90 Sanchez V azquez referred the amazem ent with w hich those on board the Sinaia  read the 
w elcom in g placards o f  the Sindicato  d e  Tortilleras, as the term was used in Spain to refer 
colloquially  to lesbians; Sanchez V azquez, D el exilio en M exico, R ecuerdos y  reflexiones, 
Grijalbo, M exico, 1997, p .27.
91 Sanchez V azquez criticised the concept, as it only considered the Spanish elem ent o f  M exico, 
and not the indigenous part that com pletes its com plex reality; Sanchez V azquez, D e l exilio  en 
M exico , pp. 101-118.
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enrol in the National University, and remained there after graduating, thus 
completing her full integration into Mexican society.
For some other refugees, the new location o f their residence was o f no particular 
relevance, as they were equally committed to continuing their political work as 
before. This was particularly so for political activists such as Vittono Vidali and 
Clive Smith, both former International Brigaders, who worked with Lombardo at 
the CTAL, the Latin American Labour organisation devoted to the anti-Fascist 
struggle in the Americas.93
Salvador Tellez, loyal Spanish Republican diplomat, who had been assigned to 
Santiago de Chile before the military rebellion was only a temporary exile in 
Mexico, with his wife Luz Urech. During the war, they had returned to Spain, 
where he actively joined the Popular Army as a volunteer. Soon he was relieved 
from his military duty, as the shortage o f diplomatic personnel required his work 
at the Ministry o f State.94 Once the war was over, they left Spain on the Flandre 
and went to Mexico, although what they really wanted was to go back to Chile. 
After a short stay in Mexico, but particularly after witnessing the enthusiasm of 
the Mexican people in receiving the Spanish Republicans, they did not want to 
leave. However, the new diplomatic post o f Salvador Tellez demanded their 
departure to Santiago, where they remained until 1973. Then another brutal 
military coup against a democratically elected Left-wing government obliged the 
family to go into exile once more. This time, the exile was not in Mexico City, but 
in London.95 Similar cases were not uncommon in younger generations o f liberal 
and progressive sectors o f Spanish origins, Republicans or not.96
92 A H N -SG C , A rch ivo  d e  H istoria  O ral: E l E xilio espafio l en M exico , V ittorio V idali, interviewed  
b y  C oncepcion R uiz-Funes, Trieste, 1979, Libro: 113, Sign. PH O /10/36.
93 A H N -SG C , A rchivo d e  H istoria  O ral: E l E xilio espah o l en M exico , Smith C live, interview ed  
b y  M arisol A lonso , M exico , 1979, Libro: 107, Sign. PH O /10/26.
94 Interview o f  the author with Luz U rech de T ellez, London, 7 July 1998.
95 Idem .
96 Historian Lucia Sala de Touron, daughter o f  Spanish immigrants, also left her native Uruguay 
and w ent into ex ile  in M exico  in the m id 1970s. She referred to her ow n experience as ex ile  at the 
launching o f  the book by R ogelio  M artinez, C ronicas d e l exilio espah o l en U ruguay, Brecha, 
M ontevideo, 2002 , at the Club Espanol, on 20 M ay 2003 .
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Nevertheless, in most cases, the Spanish Republicans who arrived in Mexico 
stayed there. Eulalio Ferrer Rodriguez, for instance, left Spain defeated and 
empty-handed, arriving in Mexico in 1940, after being in a concentration camp in
07France. Ferrer was one o f thousands o f young Spaniards who had their lives 
ahead of them. Given their poor living conditions in the French camps, their 
option was simple. Many o f them became successful entrepreneurs, as Ferrer did. 
However, not only young people decided to go to the other side of the Atlantic. 
Asked why did he decided to go into exile at 89, Ignacio Bolivar Urrutia, the 
eminent Spanish biologist, former president o f the Junta para la Ampliacion de 
Estudios e Investigaciones Cientificas, and director o f the Natural History 
Museum and the Madrid Botanic Garden, responded on board the ship that took 
him to Mexico, “to die with dignity.”98 An identical attitude characterised the 80- 
year-old writer Antonio Zozaya."
Victor L. Urquidi Bingham, a Mexican student in London whose family was in 
Spain at the outbreak o f the civil War (See Chapter V), left Britain in the 
Somaria, which was part o f a convoy of 6 ships and 31 freighters in the custody 
o f British warships, in August 1940. On board he made the acquaintance o f 
Severo Ochoa, future Spanish Nobel Prize winner, and Sixto Obrador, famous 
brain surgeon (neurocirujano). They all made their way to Veracruz, via New 
York, arriving on 2 September. Urquidi Bingham recalled the general ambience in 
Mexican upper-class circles as very pro-German (germanofilo). “My own 
experience, however, put me on the side o f the democratic alliance.” Fortunately, 
he acknowledged, the Mexican Government had long defined its position since 
the beginning o f the Spanish Civil War.”100
If  for most Spanish Republicans their Mexican exile was fortuitous, there were 
still many who could not think o f a better place to go; such was the case of
97 Eulalio Ferrer, E ntre a lam bradas, Grijalbo, M exico, 1988, p. 148.
98 Maria Luisa Capella (coord.) E l E xilio espafio l y  la  U N  AM , C oloqu io  organ izado  p o r  la 
C oordinacion  d e  H um anidades y  e l C entro  de  E studios so b re  la  U niversidad, U N A M , M exico, 
1987, p .40.
99 Sinaia, D iario  d e  la  P rim era  E xpedicion  de  R epublicanos espafio les a  M exico, N o . 9, 3 June
1939.
100 V ictor L. Urquidi Bingham , intervention at the launch o f  the book M ision de  Luis I. R odriguez  
en Francia, ju lio -d ic iem b re  d e  1940, C olM ex-SR E-C onacyt, M exico , 2000 , at the C olegio  de 
M exico  on 10 February 2000 .
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Anselmo Carretero Jimenez. Mexico was not an unfamiliar place for Carretero at 
the time o f his exile, as he had been in Mexico working as an engineer in 1936. In 
fact, he was in Mexico at the time o f the military rebellion in Spain, and became 
an active participant in the solidarity campaign with the Spanish Republic 
developed by Mexican Labour. (See Chapter V) Therefore, when the time came 
to decide where to go from France, Carretero gladly accepted the almost solitary 
option. During his sixty years o f exile, Carretero devoted his energies to academic 
work, first as an engineer, as he said, to be able to study; then as a historian, 
dedicating more than forty years to the study of the Spanish nationalities. His 
books were, and still are, very much appreciated in Mexico by both Mexicans and 
Spaniards.101
The origins o f another long-lasting success story touching both countries can be 
found in Candido Souza, Francisco Souza, Julio Souza, Faustino del Castillo and 
Pablo del Castillo, who arrived in Mexico in 1939. Two o f them were 
professional photographers, and encouraged the other three to join their group. 
The best that they could do was to start working and make some money. They 
called themselves the “Mayo Brothers” (Hermanos Mayo). Since their formation, 
the group produced an enormous amount o f material and their archives are filled 
with hundreds o f thousands o f photographs of Mexican political and cultural life 
since the late 1930s. Many o f their photographs now form part o f both Spanish 
and Mexican national general archives.102
As part o f the Spanish Republican exile, as previously mentioned, some former 
International Brigades combatants arrived in Mexico. Although the initial 
Mexican offer generously included all Republican combatants and non- 
combatants, Spanish or otherwise, it was decided not to allow the International
101 Carretero expressed the concept o f  “nation o f  nations” to define Spain since the early 1970s. 
N o w  this concept is w id ely  accepted inside and outside Spain. H ow ever, h is works are scarcely  
know n in  Spain due to unfortunate tim ing. B esides, Spanish regional politics, particularly in the 
B asque country, w ould not a llow  that concept to prosper, g iven  the com m on origins o f  both  
C astillian and Basque peoples, as proven b y  Carretero; see A nselm o Carretero y  Jim enez, Los 
p u e b lo s  d e  E spana, In troduccion  a l estudio  d e  la  nacion espan ola , ENEP-Acatlan, U N A M , 
M exico , 1980. Interview o f  the author w ith A nselm o Carretero, 7 October 1999. Sadly, D on  
A n selm o died in 2002 , age 93.
102 A s part o f  a M exican Spanish jo in  project, the A rchivo F otografico  d e  lo s  H erm anos M ayo  was 
set up b y  both the M exican  National A rchive (A G N ) and the Spanish M inistry o f  C ulture’s State 
A rchives O ffice in June 1991.
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Brigades, as a group, to be sheltered in Mexico. This seemed to respond both to 
the pressure o f Mexican Conservatives, and also to that o f the American 
Government, which, although grateful for Mexico’s help with the problem of 
exiles, was not keen on having perhaps thousands o f radical ex-combatants South 
o f the Rio Grande. However, as many o f these former combatants were American, 
they gradually went back home. These “premature” anti-Fascists, as they would 
be labelled shortly afterwards, were not very welcome in the US. Eventually, 
some o f them returned to Mexico, such as in the cases o f James Norman 
Schmidt,103 and Emile Jacobs, who, after a short stay in their homeland, could not 
bear the hostile treatment any longer. Schmidt settled in a small village in the 
state o f Guanajuato for many years. Jacobs married a Mexican and settled in 
Mexico City for good.104
Other former anti-Fascist combatants made their way straight to the Mexican 
refuge, such as Emile Rosenstein, a Polish medical doctor who joined the 
Dombrowsky Batallion o f the International Brigades. After the Republican defeat, 
he joined the French resistance and fought for two more years before eventually 
going into exile in Mexico.105 Unwilling to disclose the details o f his ordeal 
before arriving, however, Rosenstein recalls the active intervention of Gilberto 
Bosques and Ernesto Madero, both Mexican diplomats, in organising and making 
possible his journey to Mexico. He arrived in 1942, leaving his French wife, 
Paulette, behind. He then asked Margarita Nelken to mediate through her 
Mexican connections so as to make it possible for his wife to go to Mexico too, 
which finally happened the following year.
The urgent need o f all the exiles to earn their living motivated them to take on 
jobs, establish industries, or become workers in already established ones, 
immediately after their arrival. Similarly to the organisation and transport o f 
refugees, the immediate needs o f the newly arrived were satisfied by a collective 
effort. In Veracruz, the initial accommodation was offered by the Spanish
103 John Gerassi, The P rem ature A ntifascists, N orth  A m erican Volunteers in the Spanish C ivil War 
1 9 36 -1939  An O ra l H istory , Praeger, N ew  York, 1986, p .168-169 .
104 Interview o f  the author w ith Barbara Jacobs and T ito M onterroso, M exico City, D ecem ber 
1999.
105 Interview o f  the author w ith Em ile R osenstein , M exico City, October 1999.
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Republican authorities, which arranged the Manuel Arnus for temporary housing, 
providing food, clothes and some pocket money for the refugees, always 
supported by the solidarity of local Labour, and the generosity o f the local 
population.106 In Mexico City, not having to receive massive groups, the 
organisation rested in the shoulders o f the local Committees, coordinated by the 
personnel o f the former Spanish Republican Embassy, to which, as mentioned 
earlier, also contributed some o f the organisations of the Spanish residents.
Soon they would be on their way to live in different parts of the Mexican 
Republic, particularly in Michoacan, Puebla, and Hidalgo states, not necessarily 
following a predetermined plan, but on the basis of a broader scheme for
107developing industries or strengthening economic or educational spheres.
Their presence in Mexico had an enduring impact upon Mexican culture and 
society. They were a living reminder of the prelude to even more terrible things to 
come. Although most Spanish Republican refugees arrived in Mexico between 
1939 and 1942, the flood continued throughout the 1940s and early 1950s, 
making their presence a familiar element in the new era o f Mexican Spanish 
relations.
c) The Impact
Although the political situation in Mexico was increasingly difficult for the 
President, he was deeply convinced of the rightness of his decision in favour o f 
the Republicans. Lazaro Cardenas had engaged in a profound reform of the 
country and was determined to pursue his progressive policies to the limit of his 
abilities, as he retained a sincere conviction o f the revolutionary cause in which 
he had been but a soldier. His commitment to restore the rights o f the indigenous 
peoples, as well as the necessary land reform and provision of elementary 
education to all were part of the Six-Year-Plan approved by the National 
Congress o f the Revolutionary Party to which he was obliged to abide. In doing
106 Gordon Ordas, M i politico, fu era  de  E spafia, T om o I, pp.
107 M em oria  d e  la  S ecretaria  de  G obernacion , September 1939- A ugust 1940, P resen tada  al H. 
C ongreso  d e  la  Union p o r  e l S ecretario  d e l ram o, Lie. Ignacio G arcia  Tellez, D A P P , M exico,
1940.
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so, he met unexpected challenges both in local politics and foreign affairs. His 
response proved the humble uneducated soldier to be a statesman, something 
recognised even by his most fervent enemies. His firm stand before the foreign oil 
companies and their respective governments was perhaps the biggest challenge o f 
all. Nonetheless, Mexican Conservative public opinion accepted the arrival o f 
thousands o f Spanish Republicans reputed to be dangerous Communists who 
posed a threat to the Mexican way o f life.108
The impact o f thousands o f Spanish Republican exiles was considerable in 
various spheres o f Mexican life and society. It was not, as some exaggerated 
versions have claimed, responsible for the creation o f modem Mexico. This 
narrow vision o f the Spanish Republican influence in Mexico fails properly to 
evaluate the political, economic and cultural conditions o f Mexico at the time o f 
their arrival. The Spanish intellectuals did not act isolated from Mexican society, 
nor did they engage in creative work on their own. As we have seen, the 
establishment o f the Casa de Espana, then transformed into the El Colegio de 
Mexico, was closely dependent on the effort o f Mexican intellectuals, such as 
Daniel Cosio Villegas and Alfonso Reyes. But these two leading personalities 
were not working alone. Clemente Villasenor, Andres Iduarte, Jesus Silva 
Herzog, Isidro Fabela, Narciso Bassols, Lombardo Toledano and Manuel Gomez 
Morin, to mention only the most relevant or influential, were also active.
Although the Spanish Republican exiles were soon incorporated into the ongoing 
cultural and artistic activities in Mexico, they also remained concerned about the 
future o f their country. During the first few years of the Spanish exile, perhaps the 
magazine Espana Peregrina was the most representative o f the collective works 
o f Spanish intellectuals. 109They would soon evolve into promoters o f such
108 In Septem ber 1939, Cardenas made a reference to the “long process” o f  expropriation that 
began w ith the 18 M arch 1938 decree, w hose debt ($ 200 ,556 ,732 . 66) were a severe constraint 
for the M exican Governm ent. N onetheless, he was deeply convinced o f  the justice o f  the 
expropriation as he w as o f  the granting o f  asylum  to the Spanish Republicans.
109 One o f  the first and m ost com prehensive general works pursued by Spaniards in M exico and 
Spain and dealing w ith the Spanish R epublican exile in  M exico was the collective E l exilio  
espafio l d e  1939, 6  tom os, Taurus, Madrid, published betw een 1976 and 1978. Other works 
relevant to the subject include Jose Luis Abelian, D e la guerra  c iv il a l exilio  republicano  (1936- 
1977), M ezquita, M adrid, 1982. V ictor Alba, L os espan oles fu era  d e s u  casa, esquem a historico  
d e  E spana, 1868-1965 , Las A m ericas Publishing Company, N ew  York, 1968.
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activities. Particularly intense was the publishing of books, magazines, and 
bulletins o f the Spanish Republicans, which principally aimed at keeping the exile 
united and maintaining hopes for an early return to Spain. Unfortunately, the 
existing division was also reflected in such publications.
The influence o f the Spanish Republican exile on Mexican life is evident in many 
respects, but particularly in the cultural sphere. They made an important 
contribution to literature, cinema, and the arts in general. However, it is far from 
having set an entirely new trend in Mexican culture or politics. They have greatly 
contributed to make them more robust, more mature, as part o f the collective 
effort that such endeavour needed. The process o f integration and the cultural 
contribution made by the Spanish Republicans to Mexican life can also be 
illustrated by the foundation o f Spanish publishing companies. - Siglo XXI, 
Joaquin Mortiz, and other successful businesses.
The writers, artists, scholars and politicians at the forefront o f the Spanish 
Republicans have mostly been identified as the Spanish exile in Mexico.
However, behind all o f them there is the “silent hard-working” majority 
constituted by workers and professionals.
Politically, the Spanish Republican exiles are also an example o f what used to be 
Spanish politics, as it included Right-wing and Left-wing Republicans, Socialists, 
Communists, Anarchists, and Galician, Basque and Catalan nationalists. Some o f 
the organisations and newspapers or magazines the Spanish Republicans set up in 
Mexico include the Ateneo Espanol de Mexico, Centro Republicano Espanol, and 
their respective newsletters, Boletin del Ateneo Espanol de Mexico and Boletin 
del Centro Republicano Espanol de Mexico.
The numerous teachers and scientists developed an intense activity almost 
immediately after their arrival. Ignacio Bolivar, alongside his son Candido 
Bolivar Pieltain, already an eminent scientist on his own right, Isaac Costero and 
Francisco Giral, founded the magazine Ciencia (Science), Revista hispano-
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americana de ciencias pur as y  aplicadas, in March 1940. Shortly afterwards, 
Ignacio Bolivar was awarded an honorary doctorate from the National University 
(UNAM).no The variety o f professions and the quality o f their professional 
capacities lead to public recognition. In the artistic sphere, young actors such as 
Augusto Benedico, Ofelia Guilmain, Magda Donato, Aurora Molina, Sonia Furio, 
and many others who were soon working together with old Spanish actor 
residents, were acclaimed by the Mexican audiences.111 In the film industry, 
evidently, the presence o f Luis Bunuel contributed to the ongoing work o f 
Fernando de Fuentes and the maturing o f other young Mexican directors such as 
Alejandro Galindo and Rene Cardona.
Years after the beginning o f his exile, and perhaps the most recognised 
philosopher o f the Spanish Republican exile, Adolfo Sanchez Vazquez, defined 
the main characteristics o f the Spanish Republican exile, first, as political, given 
its military defeat at the hands o f local and international Fascism. Secondly, as 
numerically massive, unlike most exiles, as it was not only formed by a political 
or intellectual elite, but by thousands o f ordinary Spaniards. Finally, as a 
reflection o f the composition o f Republican Spain; firstly, in its territorial 
composition, as Spanish exiles came from all regions; then socially, as all social 
classes and sectors are represented (Liberal bourgeois, Middle-classes, workers, 
peasants, and intellectuals) and finally, professionally, as virtually every
119profession can be found amongst the Spanish Republicans.
An illustrative example of the long-reach of the Spanish Republican influence in 
social circles o f both Mexicans and Spanish residents is the case o f Faustino 
Lastra, a Mexican of Spanish Conservative family. He studied in Spain, but left at 
the beginning of the Spanish Civil War. In 1940 he went to study at the Faculty of
110 One o f  the m ost recent works devoted to the contribution o f  Spanish R epublicans to the 
developm ent o f  M exican science is Gerardo Sanchez D iaz and Porfirio Garcia de Leon, (eds.) 
(2001) L os c ien tijicos d e l exilio espan o l en M exico, U niversidad M ichoacana de San N ico las de 
H idalgo, Instituto de Investigaciones H istoricas, Sociedad M exicana de Historia de la C iencia y  de 
la T ecnologia & Sociedad Espanola de Historia de las C iencias y  de las T ecnicas, M orelia  
(M exico), 2001 .
111 R evista  d e  R evistas, no. 3995, 22 A ugust 1986.
112 Unpublished conference given by A dolfo  Sanchez V azquez in the opening sessions o f  the 
V alencia and Barcelona C ongresses on  the Spanish exiles in 1999, 6 0  A fios despues. C opy o f  the 
paper titled D e l D estierro  a l Transtierro, k indly provided by Professor Sanchez V azquez to the 
author.
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San Bernardo, but the Spanish Consul in Lisbon took his passport away and sent 
him to Burgos. He alleged his Mexican citizenship, but Francoist authorities 
replied that both his parents were Spaniards, thus he was too. He was sent to do 
military service. Lastra recalled that, since there was no Mexican official 
representation, “they did as they pleased.” i^hacian lo que les daba la gana”).u 3 
After a short while, he managed to escape the barracks and made his way to 
Portugal via Badajoz. He found a French and a Belgian former International 
Brigades fighters hidden near the border. They succeeded in crossing to Portugal 
by bribing the control guards. The guards were ready to let them through as long 
as they had some money. Lastra had $3 000 US, and “that was enough for 
everybody.” (“habia para todos”). Back in Mexico, he became acquainted with 
Spanish Communist exiles, and his transformation from a jetsetter into a 
Communist supporter began. He financially supported many o f the Spanish 
Republicans in exile in Mexico, as well as the Spanish Communist Party. He then 
went to study Economics in Paris, extending his circle o f Republican 
acquaintances and his support for their cause.114
It must be said that although the overwhelming majority o f Spanish Republican 
exiles in Mexico honoured their host, not all o f them followed a pattern o f 
acceptable behaviour during their long exile. A former aide o f Lazaro Cardenas, 
Luis Prieto, referred to the case o f Maximo Munoz, a Spanish exile who came to 
own mines in the municipality o f Altamirano, in the state o f Guerrero. Munoz had 
recreated the old cacique-style in organising his business and exploited the 
workers mercilessly. Cardenas himself requested presidential intervention in the 
late 1950s to resolve the inhuman working conditions maintained by Munoz 
towards his labourers.115 Although grave, Munoz’s case was by no means 
representative o f the attitude o f the Spanish exiles in Mexico. As Luis Prieto put 
it, it was just the black sheep o f the family. (“ I/h negrito en el arroz”). No doubt 
there were some other Spanish Republicans who betrayed not only their fellow 
countrymen, but also the people whose generosity they had enjoyed. By abusing
113 E l P a is  Sem anal, no, interview  o f  Sol A lam eda with Faustino Lastra, p .28 .
114 A H N -SG C , A rchivo de Historia Oral: El E xilio  espanol en M exico , Faustino Lastra y M endez  
D eya, interview ed by Elena Aub and Enriqueta Tunon, Madrid, 1980, Libro: 59, Sign. 
P H O /10/ESP.26.
115 Interview o f  the author w ith Luis Prieto, M exico City, 17 N ovem ber 1999.
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the generous offer o f living in peace and liberty,-those few Spanish exiles only 
made the gratitude o f the overwhelming majority o f the Spanish Republican 
exiles in Mexico evident. They have become a reference point for the defence o f 
democratic principles, culture, and humanism.
Prelim inary Conclusions
There has been much debate over the total numbers o f Spanish Republican exiles 
in Mexico. The first figures produced, frequently over-estimating the number o f 
refugees, have been replaced by more accurate estimates o f later years, which 
have arrived at smaller figures. Although the final total o f Spanish Republicans 
going to Mexico during this era has been put at somewhere in the region o f 50 
000116 exiles, the actual number is probably well under 30 000 .117 However, even 
though the number o f Spanish Republicans exiles in Mexico was not as 
considerable as traditionally thought, there is no doubt regarding the considerable 
positive impact their presence had in Mexican culture and society.118
The organising o f the main expeditions of Spanish Republicans and their arrival 
in Mexico took place in the summer o f 1939. Although it has been suggested that 
there was a change o f attitude by the Mexican Government regarding the Spanish 
refugees exiled in France, arguably in response to the official outbreak o f 
hostilities in Europe at the beginning o f September 1939, this seems lacking in 
credibility. It is true, however, that some high-ranking Mexican-officials, even 
some close allies o f Lazaro Cardenas had reservations regarding the convenience 
o f receiving thousands o f Spanish Republican refugees. However, this might have
116 Clara E. Lida (ed .), M exico y  E spana D urante e l Franquism o, R upturas F orm ales, R elaciones  
O ficiosas, 1939-1950 , El C olegio  de M exico , M exico, 2001; the new  count, based on  offic ia l 
statistics, leaves the figure at a surprisingly low  17 800 Spanish R epublican ex iles in  M exico .
117 A H PCE, Santiago A lvarez G om ez, Sig. 1/3.1.1 , P onencia so b re  los espanoles en Francia, 
1939-1942 . In this work presented in 1991, A lvarez analysed the data presented by different 
authors such as M ichel Fabreguet and Amaro del R osal, plus the offic ia l reports from  
organisations such as the SERE  and the JARE. He then concluded that the total figure o f  Spanish 
R epublican ex iles to the A m ericas “did not go beyond 30 000” including C hile, Argentina, 
V enezuela, Panama, B oliv ia , Cuba, the U S, and M exico. Sim ilarly, the estim ate o f  Spanish  
R epublican ex iles in the A m ericas given  by the S w iss Central H ealth ( C en tra l San itaria) in 
Septem ber 1940 was o f  over 24  000, divided in seven  Latin A m erican countries, including  
M exico , for w hich the figure g iven  was 7 000 refugees; APCE, S obre  la  E m igracion , 8293 “I” 2 
eje. CP 7 .9 .1940 .
118 A n  excellent work about the Spanish Republicans in general is in Francisco Caudet, H ipo tesis  
so b re  e l exilio  repu blicano d e  1939, Fundacion Universiatria Espanola, Madrid, 1997.
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been more likely in the case o f Ignacio Garcia Tellez, the Interior Minister, whose 
religious formation, cornerstone o f his Conservatism, was similar to that of some 
o f the Right-wing Republicans, than in that o f the Minister in France, Narciso 
Bassols, as alleged. In any case, Garcia Tellez acted firmly in favour o f the 
Spanish Republicans, albeit more concerned about the numbers than any other 
serious objection towards their arrival. If the number o f sailings from France o f 
Spanish refugees was limited, and thus the number o f exiles not as high as 
originally expected, this had more to do with the circumstances imposed upon the 
organisers, given the state o f war in Europe, than a change o f  policy by the 
Mexican Government.
It is also true that, although political circumstances had changed in Mexico, 
Lazaro Cardenas’s administration’s decision to pursue a specific policy towards 
Spain was more robust than ever. Nonetheless, the increasing tension between the 
government and the Conservatives must be borne in mind. As Lombardo 
explained to the local leaders o f the CTM, “Mexico’s problem [was] not an 
electoral one; the problem is to know whether Almazan triumphs and all the work 
done by Cardenas is dismantled, or if  his example will continue for another six 
years.” 119 Most revolutionary sectors, and a fervent supporter such as Lombardo 
Toledano, wholeheartedly shared Cardenas’s vision, and promoted Avila 
Camacho’s candidacy. Cardenas’ decision to support Manuel Avila Camacho’s 
presidential ambitions must, therefore, be read in the context o f the growing 
strength o f the Right. Likewise, Lombardo’s enthusiastic support as the head of 
the Labour movement can also be explained in these terms. In hindsight, 
Cardenas’s decision had a negative impact for his own political legacy. 
Nevertheless, his progressive policies had long lasting repercussions in economic 
and social terms; in the economic sphere, the nationalisation o f the railways and 
the oil industry, which enabled the transformation o f the country’s economy from 
predominantly agricultural to increasingly industrial; in the social sphere, the
1,9 V icente Lombardo Toledano, La nueva guerra  e u ro p e a y  e lp ro le ta r ia d o  mexicano, M exico, 
1939, p.65.
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support o f the Spanish Republican cause, and the granting o f  asylum to thousands 
o f Spanish exiles, who became an essential part o f modem Mexico.
The era inaugurated in Spain in 1931, with the optimistic vision o f establishing a 
democratic regime aiming at modernising the country through land reform and the 
separation o f State and Church as a means o f building social justice, ended up in a 
leap backwards imposed by Franco and his Nazi-Fascist allies, strongly helped by 
the inaction o f the Western democracies. Under those circumstances, the modest 
aid provided by Mexico to the Spanish Republic became paramount, both in 
symbolic and practical terms. Juan Negrin used a Mexican passport to leave 
France after the German occupation. Manuel Azana was buried covered by the 
Mexican flag. Francisco Largo Caballero, in captivity in a German concentration 
camp in Oranienburg, avoided deportation to Franco’s Spain through the 
intervention o f Mexican diplomats. The massive reception o f the Spanish 
Republicans in Veracruz and the tumultuous hero’s welcome given to both 
Indalecio Prieto and Jose Miaja in Mexico City showed the strong feeling towards 
everything that the Spanish Republic represented. After a long exile, they both 
died in Mexico City, Miaja in 1958, and Prieto in 1962. The list o f Spanish 
Republicans who died in their Mexican exile is long, and includes, Roberto 
Castrovido, Antonio Zozaya, Ignacio Bolivar, Joaquin Diez Canedo, Mariano 
Ruiz-Funes, Felix Gordon Ordas, Luis Cemuda, Magda Donato, Leon Felipe, 
Margarita Nelken, Jose Giral, Max Aub, Manuel Altolaguirre, Anselmo 
Carretero, and many, many more. Likewise, the number of significant events 
linking Spanish Republicans and Mexicans throughout the years is endless. 
Although the case o f Faustino Lastra was exceptional, it showed further the level 
o f influence the Spanish Republicans had in wide circles o f Mexican society, 
including the prior Spanish residents, traditionally Conservative and anti- 
Republican.
120 A H D M , no. 2, Gilberto Bosques, H istoria  ora l d e  la  D ip lom acia  m exicana, SRE, M exico  
1988.
121 Juan N egrin left France under the name and passport o f  M exican diplom at A lfon so  Castro 
V alle , [Rodriguez], M ision d e  Luis I. R odriguez, D ocum ent 429 , C orre  p e lig ro  la  v ida  de  N egrin , 
pp.365-366.
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Mexico has been able proudly to recall the selfless attitude from which it 
developed an important element o f modem culture. Within Spain itself, it seems 
that this is still a sensitive issue with which Spanish people still have to come to 
terms. The Spanish exiles found in Mexico the kind o f political circumstances 
they wished they could have had in Spain to pursue their intellectual and 
academic interests. Indeed, it has even been suggested that the Spanish 
Republican intellectuals were better treated than their Mexican counterparts, but
1 99no hard evidence has been produced to sustain this view.
The exiles were soon immersed in the same fate as the Mexican people and the 
heavy burden o f being in exile was at times worsened by some manifestations o f 
anti-Spanish attitudes. O f course, there were very successful cases o f Spanish 
exile, but that was more the result o f individual efforts than o f a governmental 
attitude towards them. Aurora Amaiz, for instance, eventually became a lecturer 
at the National University {UNAM) and in later years Emeritus Professor. She 
wrote her memoirs in 1997, in which she described her involvement in the
1 9 9Socialist Youth, and the JSU  during the war years in Madrid. Similarly, Adolfo 
Sanchez Vazquez considerably contributed to the development o f philosophical 
studies in the National University and also became Emeritus Professor. His works 
are regularly referred to in academic circles throughout the country and he is also 
renowned internationally. In 1989, the Spanish Government decorated him with 
the Gran Cruz de Alfonso X E l Sabio.124
Eulalio Ferrer developed his career as a publicist, and is commonly referred as the 
father o f advertising in Mexico. However, he never forgot the hardship o f exile 
and remained as committed to the Republican cause, namely Democracy, as ever. 
Eventually, after a lifetime dedicated to promoting culture and the strengthening 
o f Mexican Spanish relations, his recognition as a cultural benefactor saw him
122 Sebastiaan Faber, E xile an d  cultural hegem ony, Spanish in tellectuals in M exico, 1939-1945 , 
Vanderbilt U niversity Press, N ashville, 2002 , pp .21-23.
123 Aurora A m aiz, R etra to  hablado  de  Luisa Julian, p p .3 1-104.
124 Sanchez V azquez, D e l exilio  en M exico, pp .39-42.
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decorated by the Spanish Government with the Gran Cruz de Isabel la 
Catolica}25
In general, for the Spanish Republicans exiled in Mexico, the new life they gained 
offered them a less painful way to live through defeat. Most Spanish Republicans 
were in the end completely immersed in Mexican society, their children active in 
politics and even in governmental positions. However, after patiently and 
painfully waiting for the fall o f Franco, many of the Spanish exiles felt treated as 
‘Spaniards in Mexico and Mexicans in Spain’. They had lost the identity o f their 
early years, but had a life to work for, and represented a new phase in the 
Mexican Spanish relationship. Eulalio Ferrer summed up thus this circumstance: 
“I was bom in Spain, but I was re-bom in Mexico.”
125 La Jornada , 15 July 2003 . Ferrer has also been devoted to the cause o f  the Spanish Republican  
exiles organised in the A teneo E spanol d e  M exico, o f  w hich he served as president in 1979-1980.
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Y  cuando desperto, 
el dinosaurio seguia ahf. 
A nd w hen  he w ok e up, 
the d inosaur w as still there.
T ito Monterroso.
Mexican-Spanish relations have traditionally been complex and inconsistent. As a result 
o f the revolutionary movement which began in 1910 in Mexico, an anti-Spanish 
sentiment emerged once more, almost as strongly as during the years of the War of 
Independence a century earlier. During the defining years of the Mexican Revolution, the 
consolidation of a new foreign policy was an essential element both in terms of the 
principles upon which it was based, and the objectives to be pursued beyond Mexico’s 
frontiers. At the core of those principles and policies were the concepts of Non­
intervention and Self-determination. The internal political developments in Mexico, 
which had originated with the Revolution of 1910, are particularly relevant to the 
understanding of Mexico's official stance towards Spain in the Twentieth Century, as 
well as the contrasting positions adopted by influential groups within Mexico itself, such 
as the emergent progressive Labour movement and the Conservative media. The 
following decades witnessed cosmetic changes and a superficial normalisation of 
diplomatic relations whilst the everyday issues faced by both Spaniards in Mexico and 
Mexicans in Spain were often complicated and dealt with neglectfully.
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Throughout the decade of the 1930s, there were unexpected developments in 
international politics, which had an extraordinary impact on Mexican-Spanish relations. 
At the beginning of the 1930s, the world was immersed in a great economic slump 
following the financial crash in the leading capitalist countries, and the forecasts were 
still gloomy. The political and economic situation in Europe, worsened by the economic 
depression initiated in the US, rapidly spread towards the rest of the industrialised world. 
Italian politics were particularly revealing of the way Right-wing organisations were 
prepared to go when in government, and the German Weimar Republic was struggling to 
preserve not only its political stability, but also its very existence.1 As it turned out, 
resisting the pressure of the strong Socialist party, and its various potential allies, while at 
the same time learning to deal with the rise of the far-Right Nazi party, was too heavy a 
burden to bear for a democratic regime subjected to economic strife and dealing with 
damaged national pride. Still unknown to the greater public, both because of its own 
secretiveness and due to its treatment as a pariah state, the Soviet experiment was the 
other ingredient in international politics of the period, arousing both fascination and 
suspicion.
The tense calm that defined the history of Mexican-Spanish relations, for almost a 
century, came to an end. All started poignantly in Spain in 1931, where the optimism and 
joy with which the people brought down the corrupt and senile Monarchist regime, 
fuelled confidence that it would be possible to build a true democracy. Other peoples 
shared the optimistic view o f the Spanish people at the beginning of the 1930s, 
significantly the Mexican and the Latin-American peoples. In fact, contrary to traditional 
interpretations of the period, there were good enough reasons for the common people to 
be confident and hopeful for the future. How could it have been otherwise, when 
economic depression had tested to the extreme a traditional way of doing things? True, 
the Weimar experiment in Germany had ended in failure, but its very failure was teaching 
important lessons. There must be other ways surely, as the Soviets were attempting in
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their own recently backward country, a country which the world was now watching 
closely. The Soviet experiment seemed to be and it was indeed at the time the only 
alternative method of solving society’s problems. Evidently, many people watched such 
an experiment with horror, but it is certain that many others were watching from a 
distance with joy. Whatever the case, both felt passionately about how that experiment 
would conclude and how it could affect their lives.
The establishment of the Second Spanish Republic in 193 Ion the one hand, and the 
political stability achieved in Mexico in the early 1930s on the other hand, paved the way 
for a real change in their bilateral relationship, well beyond the status of their diplomatic 
representations. Diplomatic relations between the Spanish Republic and revolutionary 
Mexico entered a golden age expressed in ever-closer cultural exchanges, economic 
agreements, and amicable solutions of bilateral controversies. Although frustrated in the 
end, there were also preferential trade agreement negotiations that demonstrated a 
willingness to further strengthen the relationship. Simultaneously, internal politics in both 
countries were following similar patterns and, up to a point, had some influence on each 
other’s countries, although ultimately the Spanish Republican and the Mexican 
revolutionary programmes would develop differently. Between 1931 and 1933, during 
the so-called Maximato period in Mexican politics, Mexican-Spanish relations saw the 
beginning of the new era, where bilateral disagreements were dealt with in an amicable 
and constructive way. This period also witnessed the improvement o f bilateral relations 
other than diplomatic, as the Spanish Republic became a familiar image of a similar 
political project which included political parties and Labour organisations with similar 
aims. Mexican political strongman, Plutarco Elias Calles, and Spanish Republican 
Ambassador, Julio Alvarez del Vayo, were representative of this period.
However, the resistance offered by Mexican producers and Spanish traders resident in 
Mexico, however, thwarted the pursuing of reciprocally beneficial agreements. Although 
some economic and cultural agreements were reached, the change of regime in Spain
1 Eric Hobsbawm, A ge o f  Extremes, The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991 , Abacus, London, 1994,
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during the 1933-1935 Right-wing Government period, and the corresponding changes in 
diplomatic personnel (the long interim Charge, Jose Ma. Pujadas, and Ambassador, 
Emiliano Iglesias) prevented their enforcement and any further development. The 
continuity of the battered, though still strong relationship, was then in the hands of 
Mexican Ambassador in Madrid, Genaro Estrada, and later, up to a point, Manuel Perez 
Trevino. Although regretting the change of government in Spain, and the consequent 
change of attitude towards Mexico, Ambassador Estrada concluded that, “even with the 
political animosity of the ruling group, and far away from the general consideration of the 
people”, Spain remained “the one country in Europe where Mexico cannot and will 
[would] not be ignored”.2
During the five years culminating in 1936, Mexican-Spanish relations experienced an 
increase in commercial exchange under more favourable terms thanks to close contact 
between officials. Furthermore, ever-friendlier relations were also evident in the cultural 
sphere, including regular interaction between political parties and Labour organisations. 
However, the various projects for the development of the economic bilateral relationship 
and to strengthen Mexican-Spanish friendship did not come to a practical conclusion. 
Throughout its entire history, the Spanish Republic faced political unrest. While trying to 
pursue radical economic and political reforms, the Republicans were, at the same time 
restraining the revolutionary impetus of the Left-wing organisations, and resisting the 
Right-wing pressure demanding changes to maintain the status quo. The election of the 
Popular Front regime in 1936 again opened the possibility of the fulfilment of new 
common projects and agreements between Mexico and Spain. This developing strong 
connection was thwarted with the military rebellion that led to Civil War in Spain in July 
1936. Nevertheless, it also contributed to strengthen Spanish-Mexican relations, for the 
Spanish war, although it divided Mexican society, put to the test the nature of the 
relationship and the political aims of both regimes. The prospect for taking Mexican- 
Spanish relations to higher levels was thus frustrated.
p.137.
2 AHDM , 34-5-15 (2a. parte), E m bajada de  M exico en Espana (1932-1934), no. 2 9 ,4a. epoca, La 
diplom acia en Accion, G enaro E strada, SRE, M exico, 1987, pp.235-242.
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The open aid received by the Spanish military rebels from Germany and Italy, once their 
attempt to seize power failed, proved crucial to the development of the rightist war effort, 
and more significantly, to its outcome. The Western democracies contributed with their 
proposed Non-intervention, as the rebels had to acknowledge: “That, overall, the British 
stand is favourable to us can be observed in the open, and admirable aid that Portugal is 
providing to us, given the Portuguese intense economic liaisons with British economic 
interests in such a way, that has to be admitted that Oliveira Salazar enjoys absolute 
British approval to help us in the way he does.” The eagerness of both Germany and 
Italy to grant recognition to Franco’s Government set up in Burgos in October 1936, not 
only further showed the political affiliations of the Spanish military rebels, but the hill 
commitment of the Nazi-Fascist powers in the struggle in Spain.
As a result of either partisan propaganda or deliberate misinformation, the Communist 
threat made an impact. A plethora of reasonable suspicions, pure speculations, factual 
evidence or absurd inventions about Soviet involvement in revolutionary movements all 
over the world was permanently voiced throughout the entire existence of the Soviet 
Union. The fear of Communism became a cliche in Twentieth Century international 
politics. However, it was more the threat that Communism presented to private economic 
interests, rather than to democracy, which more than once forced the major Western 
powers to act rather awkwardly in foreign affairs, when trying to justify their motives. 
Spain in the 1930s was by no means the exception. Since it was difficult to prove the 
existence of any real Communist threat, it was necessary to create a fa$ade so as to be 
able to appear concerned about democracy and respectful regarding the domestic affairs 
o f others. During the Spanish Civil War, the most Successful route for such a policy took 
the form of prejudiced Neutrality and partial Non-intervention. Although the Republican 
Government was eager to obtain the support of the Western democracies, it also tried to 
find some real support from wherever possible. It is clear that the European Non­
intervention and American Neutrality pursued an undeclared objective of protecting
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Western economic interests in the Peninsula whilst promoting a political project closer to 
their values. Democracy was not a concern for these nations in the case of the Spanish 
Republic,4 as it has not been in any case where such a democratic regime drifts towards 
the Left.
Before a big player decided to enter the game on its side, the Spanish Republic only had 
the firm response of Mexico. The previous years of comradeship between the Mexican 
and Spanish Governments had not been in vain. In times of need there was plenty of 
evidence of solidarity not only from the Mexican Government, but also from the Mexican 
people towards the Spanish people. The Mexican aid to Spain during the Civil War had 
multiple fronts; it was developed systematically as diplomatic efforts within the League 
of Nations or in direct actions, such as the selling o f arms, food, and military equipment, 
and the sending of donations o f food, medicines, and clothes, as well as in the volunteers 
who went to support the legitimate Republican Government. In the end, as expressed by 
one of the Mexican writers participating in the Congress in Valencia in 1937, Octavio 
Paz, Spain was considered “nothing else but the transatlantic part of Mexico.”
However, to use the Mexican stand as an exemplar of a rightful and selfless attitude with 
which to criticise the Soviet position,5 would endorse the fallacious Communist threat.
On the other hand, to reduce the Mexican attitude towards the Spanish Civil War to no 
more than a personal crusade by President Cardenas, and the action of a small group of 
adventurers who went to fight in Spain, as Thomas Powell does, concluding that the 
Mexican support for Spanish Republicans was nothing but myth, entirely lacks 
substance.6 President Cardenas was determined to support a friendly regime with which 
he and his predecessors had established strong links, and with whom they shared an
3 AM AE, Ministerio de Estado, Leg. R -614, Informe a la Junta de  D efensa N a c io n a ly  a  la  Secretaria de  
R elaciones E xteriores, Exp.5, Informe sobre  la situacion in tem acional, Burgos, 10 August 1936.
4 A s Claude Bowers acknowledges in his book, an overall remarkably useful material, honestly written, his 
“allegiance as to democracy, that is to say, in this particular case, with the Spanish Republic.” Claude 
Bowers, M y mission to Spain , p.4
5 Gerald Howson, Arm s f o r  Spain, p. 103.
6 Thomas G. Powell, M exico and the Spanish C ivil War, Albuquerque, University o f  N ew  M exico Press, 
\ 9 S \ ,  passim .
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ideology and similar political projects. He did so to the limits of his capabilities, perhaps 
even stretching those limits. According to Frank Tannenbaum, American historian and 
journalist, Cardenas remarked later: “It was my good fortune to have President Roosevelt 
and Ambassador Daniels representing the American people during my incumbency of the
n
Mexican Presidency.”
The progressive policies implemented by the Cardenas administration had not been 
originated because of the “Good-Neighbour” policy of American President Roosevelt. 
Nonetheless, as Cardenas acknowledged, such a policy made it easier to pursue the Six- 
Year-Plan o f the Mexican Government. Moreover, it was not only Roosevelt’s Good- 
neighbour policy that allowed Mexico to pursue an independent foreign policy, as 
Frederick Pike suggested.8 It is a fact that Josephus Daniels was the perfect envoy to 
pursue the Good-neighbour readiness to solve diplomatic conflicts in an amicable way. 
And yet, it was not even the excellent work carried out by Roosevelt’s Ambassador to 
Mexico, which on its own encouraged Mexico to follow a rather lonely path in 1930s 
international politics. Although these circumstances made it easier, the main reason must 
be found in the internal situation of Mexico. As explained earlier, during the years o f the 
Cardenas administration there was a strengthening of the revolutionary ideology within 
the governing elite, which led to an increase in the depth of the revolutionary policies. 
Furthermore, coinciding with the latter, the bolstering of a progressive labour movement 
backing the governmental programme proved instrumental in the achievement of its 
progressive aims.
The Mexican stance before the Spanish Civil War was entirely consistent with its 
previous relations during the years of Republican reform in Spain. In fact, the clear 
ideological affinity between the two Republican projects was the common ground, but 
there was more than that. It was above all a matter of principles; those principles accepted 
and signed up to within the League of Nations, which, in theory, all the member states
7 Frank Tannenbaum, Mexico, the S truggle f o r  P eace and  B read, Alfred A. Knopf, N ew  York, 1960, p .278.
8 Frederick Pike, F D R 's go o d  neighbour po licy . Sixty yea rs  o fg en era lly  gen tle chaos, University o f  Texas 
Press, Austin, 1995.
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were obliged to honour and pursue. The notion of self-determination and the freedom to 
establish democracy and legality in their own countries appeared to be accepted by the 
signatories of the constituent Covenant of the League, although the Spanish Civil War 
revealed a fundamental disagreement about the terms on which democratic countries 
might deal with their own political and economic programmes.
The official Mexican response to the Spanish conflict was matched by broad popular 
support for helping the Spanish Republicans. Yet, the widespread solidarity actions are 
usually relegated or forgotten. Moreover, recognition of Mexican volunteers who went to 
fight in Spain on the Republican side is almost non-existent. This, and the issue of 
refugees in the Mexican Embassy in Madrid (discussed in Chapter III) were part of a 
darker side of Mexican foreign policy towards Spain in times of trouble. In the case of 
the former, it was clear that the Mexican Government did not want openly to encourage 
the volunteering of Mexican nationals. Furthermore, some high-ranking Mexican 
officials, not entirely convinced o f the wisdom of Cardenas’ policy, if not opposed to it, 
frankly discouraged some volunteers (discussed in Chapter V). The Mexican 
Government, they assumed, had enough on its plate without having to explain the 
presence of Mexicans in Spain beyond official representation. Yet, over 300 Mexican 
volunteers participated in the Spanish war, and numerous official representatives 
contributed in different degrees to the Republican war effort as part of the official 
standing of the Mexican Government towards Republican Spain.
Supporters of the two sides in Spain had their respective counterparts in Mexico. 
However, hard-core Conservatives in Mexico had considerable power in the media, as 
did Spanish residents in the business community. Both thus wielded influence on 
Mexican public opinion in general. Nevertheless, for once, they were overpowered by the 
resolute efforts of pro-Republican groups to win the hearts and minds of most Mexicans. 
Although the sympathies of Mexican society toward the Spanish fighters were divided, 
there was a clear preference toward the loyalists. The faction of Mexican society that 
clearly demonstrated its support for the rebel side, Mexican Conservatives, who allied
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themselves with the Spanish colony, did as much as they could in support of the cause of 
the so-called Nationalists, including the recruitment of “volunteers” and fund raising for 
the defenders of traditional Conservative Spanish values. In this respect, the general 
Conservative attitude was illustrated by the activism of the Falange Espanola en el 
Exterior (in Mexico), and the intense anti-Republican sentiment expressed by certain 
Mexican newspapers and sectors of the public. Further commitment to the rebel cause 
was given by Juan Sanchez Navarro, a member of a prominent Conservative family 
studying in Spain at the outbreak of hostilities. Regarding his involvement in the Spanish 
war, Sanchez Navarro himself acknowledged, however, that the fact that he used his 
diplomatic passport to act against and betray a government that had granted him leave to 
study in their country might be viewed badly (“Quiza se juzgue m a F )9 (Discussed in 
Chapter VI).
At the time o f the military rebellion in Spain, Mexican Conservatives became aware of 
the possibility of overthrowing a democratically elected government, particularly one 
suspected of anti-democratic practices and Communist influences, as they labelled the 
Cardenas Government. They immediately supported the Spanish rebels. Hence, those 
supporting the Spanish military rebellion in 1936 were primarily from Conservative 
sectors that had always been quick to criticise the Cardenas administration for its 
progressive policies. By allying themselves with what they saw as the “good” side in 
Spain, they were taking a clear stand against the Mexican Government as well. They were 
the same Mexican Conservatives who had taken offence at the insistence o f the 
government in strictly adhering to the separation of matters of Church and State in 
accordance with the Mexican Constitution. Furthermore, they opposed the government’s 
anti-fanatical education programme (Desfanatizacion), as they considered this to be a 
clear demonstration of the Mexican government’s anti-Catholicism. They had always 
opposed the freedom of religion, as stipulated in the Constitution, and its enforcement by 
the various revolutionary governments since the years of Alvaro Obregon’s Government. 
Many of them even went so far as to support, either openly or clandestinely, the fanatical
9 Interview with the author in M exico City, 3 July 1997.
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Cristeros during Calles’ administration. Most Mexican Catholics however, like their 
counterparts in Spain, were not militant, but broadly upheld traditional Conservative 
values, such as the defence o f the family unit and the right to private property. These 
groups incorporated among their ranks Mexican middle-class professionals and 
businessmen, with economic interests closely linked to those o f their rich Spanish 
counterparts.10
The links between the Spanish Falange and Mexican Conservative organisations was 
clear, and the influential presence of the former in Mexico was evident. Furthermore, the 
formation of the secretive Union Nacional Sinarquista in Mexico in 1937, coincided With 
the process of unification of Right-wing parties in Spain. The fact that Franco mastered 
this unification through subterfuge, repression and effectively taming formerly strong 
parties, such as the Falange itself, draws an even closer similarity between with the 
formation of the UNS along similar lines in Mexico. The difference in strength and final 
outcome in these two cases was given by the broad political circumstances in both 
countries.
According to Sanchez Navarro, Mexico’s pro-Republican stand was entirely due to 
Cardenas (“Una cosa personalisima de Cardenas”)11 However, the accuracy of such a 
statement is seriously questionable, given the broad popular support shown by the 
numerous private initiatives favouring the Republican effort throughout the war. 
Furthermore, different pro-Republican actions throughout the war and the tumultuous 
receptions for Republican figures and massive expeditions of Spanish Republican exiles 
in Veracruz from 1939 onwards prove otherwise. But perhaps Sanchez Navarro’s 
perception was based on the fact that not even all of Cardenas* cabinet members shared 
the strong view of the President. The contradictory attitudes, and in fact the divided 
loyalty, of some Mexican civil servants regarding the Spanish Civil War was the product 
of their personal beliefs, as in the case of Eduardo Hay, and Manuel Perez Trevino. If an 
official decision had been made about fully engaging with the Spanish Republic, that did
10 A G N -182, Alvaro Obregon-Plutarco Elias Calles, V ol. 178-181, Serie 429, R eclam aciones.
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not actually mean that all the people involved were entirely convinced of the wisdom of 
i t  On the other hand, however, although most Mexican civil servants shared the views of 
the President, in the case of those who favoured the Spanish rebels there was yet another 
option. Unlike Hay and Perez Trevino, others followed institutional policy regardless of 
their personal or ideological affinities with the rebels, such as Isidro Fabela and Ignacio 
Garcia Tellez did. They might have been, like Fabela, fervently anti-Communist, and yet 
thoroughly convinced about the rightness o f the Mexican position in the international 
dispute which he brilliantly exposed and defended in the League of Nations, following 
Cardenas* policy. (Discussed in Chapter III).
Mexican and Soviet attitudes in supporting the Spanish Republic derived from entirely 
different circumstances. The relevant issues to take into account are principles v 
realpolitik in an on-going conflict in the international arena. The end of the war on 
Spanish soil meant the end of the rehearsal for a general war and the spreading of 
confrontation. In Spain, the non-existent threat of Communism overshadowed the 
Western Powers’ commitment to democracy. Perhaps the Mexican Government followed 
principles in an age o f pragmatism. Its stance, had the other countries behaved in the way 
they were expected to, would probably not have emerged as so isolated and so just. The 
Mexican position in the League of Nations was already rather isolated in 1935, when 
demanding an active enforcement o f sanctions against Italy for having invaded Abyssinia, 
and even more so in 1936, when the League proved outdated and too weak to defend the 
Spanish democracy. The outstanding exception of Mexico made its foreign policy 
uncomfortable for the Western democracies and pinpointed the limitations of the League 
of Nations as a guarantor of international legality. The justification for not helping the 
Spanish Republic was no doubt the fear of Communism and sympathy for a Conservative 
regime, even a Fascist one, as conveniently favourable for both the economic and the 
political interests of the West. Nonetheless, the threat of a Communist take-over never 
existed. The former American Ambassador to Republican Spain, Claude Bowers, frankly 
admitted that there was not one Communist in the Spanish Republican Government at the
11 Interview o f  the author with Juan Sanchez Navarro, M exico City, 3 July 1997.
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time of the insurrection, not even a Socialist o f the mild Besteiro type. “There was not 
one who could be described as an extremist; not one who was not a republican and a 
democrat in the French and the American sense.”12
Likewise, English journalist Vernon Bartlett, permanently criticised Prime Minister 
Neville Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement, and went as far as to accuse the British 
Government “for cowardice amounting to treachery.”13 Similarly, although from an 
entirely different perspective, Winston Churchill was also critical o f such policy. None of 
these criticisms made an impact upon a decision established firmly. The Republican 
Government was left alone to face the military rebellion, deprived of arms it had 
previously arranged to receive. Then it was abandoned, hence betrayed, when German 
and Italian invading armies went to support the rebels, leaving the Spanish Republic 
defenceless. In the words o f American journalist Vincent Sheean, “the word 
‘appeasement’ served as the wing for the ostrich.”14
There were many voices raised from prominent Western politicians and diplomats, not 
necessarily defending Republican Spain’s rights but certainly criticising the policy of 
appeasement, such as Churchill himself. It seemed that there was yet to be room for 
another kind of pragmatism. As American Ambassador in Belgium, former Ambassador 
in the Soviet Union, Joseph Davies, wrote to President Roosevelt early in 1939 reporting 
that, “[i]n the event of [...] international conflict between the totalitarian and the 
democratic states, the Soviet Government is, in my opinion, a much more powerful factor 
than the reactionaries of Europe concede, and might be of the greatest value.”15 Yet there 
is little doubt that much of the British establishment loathed Communism more than 
Fascism, reflecting a wider Western European aim of favouring the latter in order to get 
rid o f the former.
12 Claude Bowers, M y mission to Spain, p. 194
13 N ew s Chronicle, 13 October 1937. In 1938, Bartlett stood for Parliament as an anti-appeasement 
independent candidate and won in an area considered a safe Tory seat.
14 V incent Sheean, N ot p ea ce  but a sw ord , Doubleday, Doran and Co., N ew  York, 1939, p.39.
15 D avies to Roosevelt, 18 January 1939, F/?t/S, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, W ashington, 1952,pp .600- 
601.
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British and French recognition of Franco’s Government took place in February 1939 as 
the natural outcome o f a common policy that hoped to maintain Spanish traditional 
economic dependence upon the former states. In the same way, the United States gave 
full recognition to the victors’ Government during the first days of April 1939. On 1 
April, a proclamation signed by President Roosevelt lifting the arms embargo went into 
effect. A reluctant and regretful Roosevelt gave the “all clear” for recognition of the 
Franco regime, but not without acknowledging to Bowers that he, the American 
Ambassador to Spain during the Civil War, had been right all along while criticising 
American Neutrality and European Non-intervention.16 Mexican foreign policy towards 
Republican Spain seemed completely out of tune with the trend established by the 
Western Powers. However, the Mexican stance should have been the predominant 
tendency had the legal and moral principles of the League of Nations been enforced.
Once the Spanish Civil War, that is, the rehearsal for the Second World War as defined 
by Bowers, was officially over, armed conflict between the great powers was no longer 
avoidable. The opportunity to prevent widespread confrontation, the much-feared 
nightmare of the Western Democracies, had been missed. The sacrifice of the young 
Spanish democracy was not enough to appease the gods of war, anymore indeed than had 
been those of Abyssinia, Austria, or Czechoslovakia. In the broader picture, the Hitler- 
Stalin Non-aggression Pact was the “last straw” on the road to war. Reluctant to reach an 
agreement with the Soviet Union, the Western Powers finally closed the door on a 
different solution other than widespread confrontation. "The second Great War of the 
twentieth century began in July, 1936", wrote Liddell Hart in 1939. Referring to Italo- 
German aid in transporting Franco's troops from Spanish Morocco to the Iberian
• 17Peninsula, he concluded that those "were the first operations of the present war".
16 Claude G.Bowers, M ision en Espana, En e l um bral de la II  Guerra M undial, Grijalbo, M exico, 1955, 
pp .430-431.
17 Liddell Hart, quoted in Patricia van der Esch, Prelude to War. The Intem ationalRepercussions o f  the 
Spanish C ivil War (19361939), The Hague, 1951, p.24.
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Following the military defeat o f the Second Spanish Republic, and facing the certainty of 
a merciless repression if remaining in Spain, many Spanish Republicans opted for 
temporary refuge and the uncertainty of exile. Nearly half a million civilians fled to 
France as refugees together with the defeated army. Tired of the insufferable living 
conditions in French captivity, many decided to return to Spain, although most Spanish 
refugees remained in France, suffered horrendous privations. Some joined the French 
resistance movement. Around 12 000 Spanish exiles were sent to German concentration 
camps by the Nazi-collaborationist French Government between 1939 and 1942. German
1 O
companies used others as slave labour. The lucky refugees were on board ships to the 
Americas, manly to Mexico. The Spanish Republican exiles who went to Mexico had the 
opportunity to lead more or less normal lives, and their influence in Mexico flourished 
from the beginning.
Many of the exiles had a profession in Spain that they were fortunate enough to continue 
in Mexico, namely as intellectual workers. Perhaps the most renowned industry 
developed by Spanish Republicans exiled in Mexico was the setting up of publishing 
companies.19 Spanish Republican influence on Mexico’s cultural and social life was 
significant. Several Spanish publishing companies were established (Siglo XXI, Joaquin 
Mortiz, Oasis). Teachers, researchers, and artists, all made contributions in their specific 
areas of knowledge. The new citizens had repaid Mexican society, and gradually, the 
already established Spanish colony incorporated them. The thousands of Spanish exiles 
enriched Mexico through entrepreneurial activity and outstanding artistic and cultural 
contributions. These included filmmaker Luis Bunuel, and poet Leon Felipe amongst 
many others. Once more, the identification of the Spanish Republican cause with that of 
the Mexican revolutionary tradition was emphasised. Nonetheless, the overwhelming 
majority of the Spanish exiles living in Mexico were a silent group of labourers in all
18 About 2 000  survivors returned to Spain. In the endless list o f  humiliations, they were denied any aid. 
Furthermore, when the German Federal Republic acknowledged the Nazi crimes and began a process o f  
compensation between 1956 and 1965, this could not be requested by Spanish Republicans, as Franco’s 
government did not recognised them as victims. La Jornada, 8 May 2000.
19 Regarding the Spanish Republican exile in M exico, there have been a lot o f  works published by the 
exiles them selves, but according to Luis Danton Rodriguez, there is still the need for a comprehensive work 
on the issue from the Mexican perspective.
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fields in both urban and rural Mexico. Their lives, already affected by the nature of exile, 
and a long one at that, were following the same path as the Mexican people, to the point 
of completely integrating into Mexican culture and conscience.
To this end the Mexican volunteers that fought on the Republican side also contributed 
by deciding to write memoirs of their Spanish experiences. Even though they were 
formally organised, shortly after their return to Mexico, into the Sociedad Javier Mina 
(named after the Spaniard who volunteered to fight for Mexican Independence) the 
endless enmity and division between the former combatants meant that the society 
existed on paper only. However, Roberto Vega Gonzalez was one of the few who decided 
to write about the Spanish Civil War from the Mexican perspective. His is a vibrant 
account of the horrors of war, and particularly of the physical and psychological torture of 
being a prisoner in Francoist dungeons. Although Nestor Sanchez’s memoirs still seem 
tainted by bitterness at being abandoned by the Mexican Government which, moreover, 
had denied his re-incorporation into the military and refused to recognise his Spanish 
military rank, it is, however, an intense account of his participation in the war. In May 
1940, Siqueiros recruited him in a murder attempt on Trotsky in Mexico City. According 
to Sanchez, the plan was never to kill him but to scare him off, and Sanchez readily 
accepted the invitation given what he called the betrayal by Trotsky’s followers during 
the war in Spain. Both Siqueiros and Sanchez went to prison for their attempt on 
Trotsky’s life and were there when the actual murder was carried out in August 1940 by 
Ramon Mercader, the son of a Spanish militia woman who visited Mexico during the 
Spanish war. Gradually, Nestor Sanchez developed his career as a journalist.21 Perhaps 
adding to Sanchez’s bitterness was the fact that Vega was given a hero’s welcome in 
Mexico in 1941, and became the second most notorious Mexican volunteer after 
Siqueiros. Furthermore, contrary to Sanchez’s experience, Vega saw the recognition of 
his Spanish military rank. He then enlisted in the American Army during World War II.
20 EL N ational, 25 October, 1939.
21 Nestor Sanchez, Un M exicano en la Guerra C ivil Espanola, p .3 11.
22 Revista de  R evistas, no. 3991 , July 1986, p.22.
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The Cardenas years can be defined as the peak of the State-led development strategy 
relying on public-sector investment, still heavily skewed toward agriculture, to integrate 
the national economy. The government’s expropriation of all foreign oil operations and 
nationalization of the oil and petrochemicals industry in 1938, won President Cardenas 
widespread praise within Mexico. The country enjoyed strong economic growth and low 
external debt. Thus initiating Mexico's transition from a primarily agricultural economy 
to an industrial one. The government-owned strategic industries, including energy, 
transportation, communications, and some manufacturing, were at the base of its 
economic development. Furthermore, Mexico’s foreign policy, namely towards the 
Spanish Republic, gave Mexico’s international position prominence. The basis of 
industrialization had been firmly laid down. An era of economic growth was about to 
start. However, the formation of the Right-wing National Action Party (PAN) in 1939, as 
a response to the progressive and revolutionary policies pursued by Cardenas, together 
with the strengthening of the Labour movement, changed the Mexican political spectrum. 
This internal reactionary challenge was encouraged by the events that had taken place in 
Spain. The defeat of the Spanish Republican Government and the issue of recognition of 
the de facto  Government in Spain was the start of a long process. The newly elected 
President, a loyal aid of Lazaro Cardenas, had a mind of his own and other loyalties to 
attend to. During the early 1940s, Mexico supplied the World War II Allies with war 
equipment and its own population with consumer goods. The National Finance Bank was 
reorganized to foster industrial expansion as the beginning of the so called “stabilisation 
period” prior to the lengthy and superficially successful “imports substitution period.” 
There would be no need for an independent Labour movement or indeed for too radical 
views by the new administration. The international conflict imposed new challenges to be 
faced both at home and abroad.
To commemorate the defence of the Spanish Republic, a gathering took place at the 
Holbom Hall in London on 20 July 1941. Pablo de Azcarate, former Spanish Republican 
Ambassador in Britain, presided over the event. Negrin addressed an audience of Spanish 
Republican exiles and British supporters regarding the meaning of the military rebellion
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in Spain, five years earlier. Having no doubts whatsoever, Negrin stated that the military 
uprising in Spain had been the first episode of the ongoing war. He referred to the 
acceptance o f such an idea in wider Western circles by 1941. “We said that five years 
ago, but found no response in those who could have done something not only to avoid the 
ruin of Spain, but to prevent the horrors of the present war.” The Second World War 
was the direct result of applying the policy of appeasement towards the Axis Powers, and 
the origins of such a policy can be traced to the definition of Non-intervention in the 
Spanish Civil War in 1936. The cost of the misperception, egotism, and the betrayal of 
the true principles of democracy, was to be very high. But that was the price the Western 
democracies considered worth paying to prevent the phantom of Communism setting foot 
closer to their immediate interests.
In Mexico, the new administration would show a different character from that of 
Cardenas. It marked a significant moment in Mexican politics at the end of the decade o f 
optimism. On 1 September 1941, during his State o f the Union speech, Avila Camacho 
mentioned the developing tension between Mexico and Germany and Italy. Then, 
referring to the international situation, he spoke about Latin America. No mention 
whatsoever was made about the German attack on the Soviet Union. An event o f such 
magnitude would not have failed to figure in one of Cardenas’s speeches, but these were 
already new times and new people were in charge.
On 30 December 1941, there was a meeting of the Spanish Republicans at the Fine Arts 
Palace in Mexico City. They wanted to acknowledge the Soviet support for the 
Republican cause during the war, and make a symbolic contribution to the Soviet war 
effort against Fascism by sending an ambulance to the USSR. Speeches were made to 
recall the beginning of the Spanish Civil War clearly as the beginning of the Second 
World War. Ramon Lamoneda, Secretary-General of the PSOE, exhorted the Spanish 
Republicans to unite as the only means to regain Spain from the Falangists allied with 
Germany and Italy. Unable to attend the meeting, Pablo Neruda, the Chilean poet who
23 FPI/M- Fot 50, Comm emoration d e l 19 de ju lio , acto celebrado en Londres e l dia 2 0  de  ju lio  de  1941 ,
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had organised the Spanish Republican exiles in Chile, sent a written message: “Let us be 
in the midst of the trembling night, united, more than ever; vigilant, more than ever; firm, 
more than ever; for Victory does not come but to united, firm and vigilant peoples.” 24
Finally, Antonio Velao, former Minister of the Spanish Republic, made an eloquent 
pledge “to say to the World: we have not lost our freedom, it has been taken away from 
us; to say to Russia: we have not lost our memory; to say to Mexico: we have not lost our 
heart.” Apart from the understandably emotional speeches, under the circumstances, it 
was thought appropriate that a message be sent to the presidents of Mexico, the United 
States, England, China, and the Soviet Union. In the case of the latter, a donation was 
also sent to the Soviet people by way of the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, Maxim 
Litvinov.25 Part of the message sent to the leaders of those countries read:
In the present struggle, the Spanish people believe they have the right to expect, 
from those who are fighting for the liberation of all the subjugated countries, the 
aid necessary for their restless effort to rescue their sovereignty and freedom.26
Both the hope that they would receive assistance and the wait for this help were also to 
prove in vain.
By the time the new Mexican President, Manuel Avila Camacho, had to deliver his first 
State of the Union speech, the Second World War had almost reached its full extent. 
However, no mention was made of the war beyond the “diplomatic tension” between 
Mexico on one side and Germany and Italy on the other. Symptomatic of the new 
political interest and orientation of Mexican foreign policy, no mention was made of the
Hogar Espanol, London, 1941.
24 FPI/M- Fa 2836, L os republicanos espanoles con la U.R.S.S., con las dem ocracias, p o r  la  reconquista  
de la R epublica, Comite espanol Pro-ambulancia para la U .R .S.S, M exico, 1941, pp .26-31.
25 After collecting funds from impoverished Republican exiles in M exico, the sum o f  $ 1646.09 U S dollars 
was sent as a gesture o f  solidarity with the country that helped the Republican war effort the most, now a 
victim  o f  the Nazi-Fascist-Falangist aggression.
26 FPI/M- Fa 2836, L os republicanos espanoles con la U.R.S.S., con las dem ocracias, p o r  la  reconquista de  
la R epublica, Com ite espanol Pro-ambulancia para la U .R .S.S, M exico, 1941, pp.41-42.
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German attack on the Soviet Union, even though it had occurred a few weeks earlier. It 
would still take another nine months for the Mexican Government to decide to make a 
clear move against the Axis Powers, and that would only come after the sinking of two
7R /Mexican cargo ships by the German fleet. On 28 May 1942, Avila Camacho addressed 
the Congress in an extraordinary session to report on the “state of war” prevailing 
between Mexico and the Axis Powers. World War II had dragged countries from every 
continent into confrontation.29
As part of a new approach to relations with the Spanish Republicans, Avila Camacho’s 
decision to intervene in the administration of the Spanish funds was significant. The 
CAFARE, (Comision Administradora del Fondo deAuxilio a los Refugiados Espanoles) 
created by Presidential decree of 27 November 1942, was now placed in charge o f the 
remaining Republican finances. It was set up with Spanish Republican money, presented 
by Has SERE and the JARE, although only the former gave a detailed report of its funds 
and expenses. In an effort to dispel suspicions about the motives of the Mexican 
Government’s decision to intervene in Spanish Republican issues, the CAFARE regularly 
reported on the work carried out and the distribution of funds. The main beneficiaries 
included JARE, the Casa-Hogar Espana-Mexico, Colegio Madrid, and the Financier a 
Hispano-Mexicana (Hispano-Mexican Bank).
In the midst o f the Second World War and the inter-Republican struggle, on 20 
November 1943, several Spanish Republican organisations signed a Pact for the 
restoration of the Spanish Republic. This was the first of the attempts pursued by Prieto 
to outmanoeuvre Negrin for the upper hand in securing international recognition and 
backing for the restoration of a democratic regime in Spain. The Junta Espanola de
27 AHDM , no. 9, Las relaciones internacionales de M exico, 1935-1956  (a traves de  los m ensajes 
presidencia les), SRE, M exico, 1957, pp.50-57, First State o f  the Union speech o f  President Manuel A vila  
Camacho, 1 September 1941.
28 The two ships were, the Potrero d e l Llano, a freighter, and F aja de  Oro, an oil tanker.
29 AHDM , no. 9, L as relaciones internacionales de Mexico, 1935-1956, pp.50-57, First State o f  the Union 
speech o f  President A vila Camacho, 1 September 1941.
30 FPI/M- Fbb 33, Comision de Adm inistracion d e l Fondo de  Auxilios a  los R epublicanos Espanoles, 
Informe de  su  gestion  durante e l ano 1942-1943, CAFARE, M exico, 1943.
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Liberation issued a Manifesto and designated representatives in Latin America and the 
UK. The Junta showed the deepening of the division within the Republican forces, and 
the influence of Prieto and his followers on Republican parties.31 The public 
confrontation could not be avoided and the response to the constitution of the Junta was 
criticised as sectarian by the followers of Negrin.
However, the majority of the remnants of the Cortes were by now following Prieto. 
Alvaro Pascual Leone, Secretary of the Permanent Commission o f the Spanish Cortes, 
who founded “Espana con HonrcC’ in 1943, in order to secure the recognition of the 
legality o f the Spanish Republican Government in exile, pursued the idea of a formal 
session o f the Spanish Cortes in Mexican territory two years. After patiently persevering,
r
he finally received the authorisation from Mexican President, Avila Camacho. The 
basis of the legal request made by Pascual Leone, Fernandez Clerigo, and other Spanish 
Republican lawyers was the concept o f the war in Spain as an “international coup d ’e ta f\ 
which should not be accepted by democratic nations.34 Eventually, the successful 
meeting o f the Cortes, and the formation of a new Republican Government were the 
causes of the final demise of Negrin at the forefront of the Republican cause.
In mid-1945, numerous representatives of Spanish Republicans in exile gathered in 
Mexico City to re-constitute the Spanish Republican Government in exile. Their hopes 
were placed upon a final strike by the Allies against the remaining pro-Fascist 
government in Europe. They were ready to assume full responsibility and control of the 
country, providing they received the essential military support, previously denied by the 
Western democracies. Again, both the internal divisions within the Spanish Republicans 
and the new international situation militated against the possibility of regaining Spain for
31 Juan Bautista Climent, E lp a c to  de  restaurar la Republica espanola: en trevistas a  D iego M artinez 
Barrio, ln da lec io  Prieto, A lvaro de A lbom oz y  Antonio Ma. Sbert, America, M exico, 1944.
32 M undo L ibre , December 1943.
33 La R epublica Espanola Existe, Espana con Honra, Finisterre, M exico, 1971, p. 16
34 On 15 August 1945, M exican Foreign Minister, Manuel T ello, confirmed the authorisation for the 
Spanish Cortes to be able to meet, having been granted the diplomatic immunity required for a legal 
session; La R epublica Espanola Existe, p.61.
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the legal and legitimate heirs of Spanish democracy. The international conference held 
to establish a new organisation to replace the extinct League of Nations was an excellent 
opportunity for the Spanish Republican Government in exile and its close allies to regain 
the necessary support to liberate Spain. Again, their expectations were shattered. If Non­
intervention and Neutrality had been the contribution of the Western democracies to the 
tragedy of the Spanish Republic during the Civil War, the new international order arising 
from the Second World War would be the last nail in the coffin of the best example until 
then of democracy in Spain. The only consolation was that Franco’s Spain was prevented 
from joining the United Nations Organisation.
On his return to Mexico in 1944, Gilberto Bosques, who spent a year in Nazi captivity in 
Bad Godesberg, near Bonn, wrote: "I implemented my country’s policy, a policy of help, 
of material and moral support to the heroic defenders of the Spanish Republic, to the 
relentlessly brave people who fought against Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, Petain and 
Laval"37 But Mexico had also changed. Mexican politics became more Conservative, and 
the transformation o f the Party of the Mexican Revolution into the Revolutionary 
Institutional Party was the best proof of such a change.
Lombardo was often held responsible for not having taken the revolutionary programme 
and the labour movement further; particularly, for eagerly supporting Manuel Avila 
Camacho’s candidacy instead of that o f Francisco Mujica, a proven radical revolutionary. 
Given the local situation and considering the international war, it has to be concluded 
that, sadly, he was justified in doing so, although the consequences were to be 
catastrophic. Lombardo’s expulsion from the CTM in 1948 was probably the most 
significant single event illustrating the new tendencies of the Mexican governing elite in 
the late 1940s, and the revival of a corporative Labour movement. The change of political 
orientation, regardless of the “ruling” party’s ideology is a key issue in understanding the 
so-called “perfect dictatorship” as the Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa labelled it.
35 D ocum entos p o litico s p a ra  la historia de la R epublica espanola, Col. M alaga, M exico, 1945.
36 The M exican proposal not to accept as a member o f  the new  organisation any country whose government 
had been empowered with the aid o f  Nazi-Fascist powers had only one case to deal with.
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The “Cold War” was to influence if not determine the new trend of Mexican political 
development. With no diplomatic relations, Mexico and Spain had “back door” liaison, 
with Cardenas’s pro-Republican stance as the only recollection of a golden past.
The links of the conservative Sanchez Navarro with Francoist Spain remained a regular 
issue as he joined the Cerveceria Modelo, whose owner, Pablo Diez, a Spaniard, did 
regular intensive business in Spain. In fact, Sanchez Navarro had yet another opportunity 
to serve the cause of Franco’s regime in 1950, when the informal representative of 
Franco’s Spain in Mexico, Jose Gallostra y Coello de Portugal, was murdered in Mexico 
City. Although a Spanish Anarchist committed the crime, this seemed the result of an 
obscure event, apparently, more related to personal than political motivations.
Gallostra, a former Spanish diplomat, had been the ad interim Charge de Affaires of the 
provisional Republican Government in Mexico in 1931. (Discussed in Chapter I) At the 
time of his murder, however, he was reputedly the unofficial Francoist representative in 
Mexico. Concerned about the secret code (“C/ave Secreta”) used to decode official 
messages from Madrid, the second man responsible for the unofficial representation, 
Ricardo Jimenez Amau, panicked about the legal consequences o f the discovery of such a 
document, which could lead to his expulsion from Mexico, and was unable to act. Thus 
Sanchez Navarro decided he would break in to Gallostra’s house to recover the code. He 
did, and Franco’s Government rewarded such an action with a decoration for his 
services.39
Gallostra’s violent death made the front pages of the newspapers, particularly because the 
police had discovered a report about Mexico, in his possession. The document contained 
insulting descriptions o f both Mexico and Mexicans, and pro-Franco supporters 
vehemently denied its authenticity. It seemed and was thus assumed to be an official
37 Gilberto Bosques, H istoria ora l de  la D iplom acia mexicana, SRE, M exico 1988, AHDM ,no. 2, pp.122.
38 Mauricio Fresco, La em igracion republicana espanola, una victoria de  M exico, Editores Asociados, 
M exico, 1950, p.7; A licia Ortiz Rivera, Juan Sanchez N avarro, Biografia de un Testigo d e l M exico del 
sig lo  XX, Grijalbo, 1998, pp. 141.
39 Sanchez Navarro received the Spanish Gran Cruz de  Isabel la C atolica  decoration in February 1965, in 
the presence o f  Franco, who merely referred it to as “w ell deserved”. Ortiz Rivera, Juan Sanchez Navarro, 
p.142.
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report to Franco’s Government on the current political and economic situation in Mexico. 
Given the offence which it produced, even amongst those Mexicans sympathetic to 
Franco’s regime, the Spanish Foreign Minister, Martin Artajo, issued an official 
declaration denying any links with Gallostra’s manuscript. Perhaps Artajo’s refuge at the 
Mexican Embassy in Madrid during the war inclined him not to antagonise Francoist 
sympathisers in Mexico. After all, they were still hoping to hasten a Mexican decision to 
recognise Franco’s Government.40 A period of friendlier relations occurred during the 
late 1940s and early 1950s, encouraged by a cordial new Mexican openness to private 
agreements and exchanges. Private artistic exchanges were not uncommon; films and 
bullfights featuring both Mexican and Spanish figures were regular, and triangular 
commercial exchanges, via Cuba, remained in effect. In fact, Franco’ Spain’s diplomat, 
Jose Maria de Doussinague, persistently, although vainly, approached Mexican diplomats 
to push for recognition 41 However, the official Mexican stance regarding Spain was clear 
and firm. At the time of the debate concerning the admission of new members at the 
United Nations in December 1955, Mexico voted in favour of the resolution in general, 
which included sixteen countries, but abstained in the case of Spain.42 Mexican 
Ambassador to the UN, Rafael de la Colina, hoped for the understanding of the Spanish 
people, the “dearest and closest” of all the petitioner countries, for such a position, but 
recalled the resolution of the San Francisco Conference regarding governments imposed 
with the aid of the Axis Powers 43
Although official relations between the two governments never existed, in spite of the 
permanent efforts of Francoist representatives and their Mexican supporters, there were
40 President M iguel A lem an’s pro-business administration, apart from having marked the era o f  rampant 
corruption, w as also the time o f  the closest links with Franco’s Spain, yet when asked for the re­
establishment o f  diplomatic relations, he could not but point out his limits: “Pidanm e lo que quieran, pero  
eso no” (A sk m e anything you want, but that).
41 V ictor L. Urquidi Bingham commented on his personal experience during his participation at the 
launching o f  the book by Clara L. Lida (com p.) M exico y  Espana en e l p rim er franquism o, 1939-1950. 
R upturas form ales, relaciones oficiosas, M exico, El C olegio de M exico, 2001, held on 10 April 2002.
42 N aciones Unidas. R esoluciones aprobadas por la Asamblea General durante su decim o periodo de 
sesiones, 20  de septiembre-20 de diciembre de 1955. A sam blea General. D ocum entos oficiales: decim o  
p erio d o  de sesiones. Suplem ento No. 19 (A /3116), N ew  York, p.58.
43 M exico y  la R epublica Espanola, A ntologia d e  documentos, 1931-1977, Centro Republicano Espanol, 
M exico, 1978, p.381.
266
Chapter VIII The Schizophrenia o f  Mexican Spanish Relations, 1939-1977.
still some sorts of convenient unofficial arrangements. Soon an air connection would be 
established, via Lisbon, and Arturo Allsop Vila, for instance, a Mexican diplomat 
assigned to the Mexican representation in Portugal, used to “come and go” frequently 
between Madrid and Lisbon. According to Victor L. Urquidi, “I do not know how he 
managed, but around 1965,1 was in his Madrid office, near the Puerta del Sol.”44 The 
symbolism of Mexican support for the Spanish Republic seemed to have reached the end, 
but the presence of the Republican exiles was a constant reminder of the principles they 
represented, and their cause a useful instrument to demonstrate the independence of 
Mexican foreign policy.
In his speech celebrating the XXXII Anniversary of the proclamation of the Second 
Spanish Republic, Josue de Benito Lopez, President of the Spanish Republican Centre in 
Mexico, said:
There are so many evident similarities between your struggle and ours. There are 
so many things that make us close, Mexicans and Spaniards, that it is difficult to 
distinguish between the ideals that inspired the Mexican Revolution of 1910, and 
those that would produce, two decades later, the establishment of the Second 
Spanish Republic.45
Addressing Leon Felipe in a letter, in May 1966, Lazaro Cardenas recalled the 
“prolonged and painful historical plight that obliged numerous Republicans to leave and 
stay away from their Motherland.” That situation however, Cardenas acknowledged, 
offered Mexicans the opportunity to “interact” fraternally with Spaniards in both material 
and intellectual work, making the relationship between the two peoples stronger and 
deeper.”46
44 Interview o f  the author with Victor L. Urquidi, M exico City, April 2002.
45 E l N a tion a l, April 2 , 1963, Cit in Centro Republicano Espanol de M exico, M exico y  la Republica  
E spanola, A ntologia d e  Docum entos, 1931-1977, p.446.
46 Centro Republicano Espanol de M exico, M exico y  la Republica Espanola, A ntologia de Documentos, 
1931-1977, p.81.
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When Lazaro Cardenas died, in 1970, Manuel Aznar wrote “Response* a Cardenas”. 
There he said that “the spirit of Cardenas contributed to the division of Spain, and fought 
against the reconciliation of the Spanish people for over thirty years”. Aznar could not 
help but show the depth of the frustration of the Spanish regime he represented, and the 
impact of the Mexican stand well beyond simple symbolism. “None of us had offended 
him”, bitterly concluded Aznar on Cardenas’s posture regarding Spain, unable to 
understand how the Mexican President embodied the respect for Spanish democracy by 
preserving the essence of the Republican regime. And the traditional Mexican foreign 
policy towards Spain set up by Cardenas continued. In September 1975, after the 
execution of five anti-Franco guerrillas from ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna — Basque 
Country and Liberty) and the FRAP (Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y  Patriotico -  
Revolutionary Antifascist and Patriotic Front), and in spite of broad international 
petitions for clemency, President Echeverria strongly criticised the repressive Spanish 
regime and requested the General Assembly of the United Nations, to suspend Spain 
from its rights as a UN member.47
The final breakdown of the Francoist dictatorship ultimately came with the death of the 
Caudillo in 1975. Even Franco’s death was a painful agony, literally and metaphorically, 
both for Franco and the Spanish people 48 An ever-decreasing number of Spaniards were 
grieving over the imminent loss of the Caudillo, ‘for the grace of God’. The majority, 
however, were impatient to see the man finally pass away, particularly those in exile, who 
had held a perennial hope that “this year Franco will go” since the 1940s. Spanish society 
started a slow awakening to full rights. But the sole fact of Franco’s death would not be 
enough for the Republican exiles nor for the Mexican President, Luis Echeverria, to 
resume diplomatic relations. Echeverria acknowledged that Mexico could not expect 
Spain to have “what we lack, a perfect democracy.” However, if a clear commitment 
towards democracy was to be made, Mexico would establish relations with Spain, “even
47 N aciones Unidas, Consejo de Seguridad. A d a s  o fida les. Trigesimo ano. Suplem ento ju lio  a septiem bre  
1975 , Docum ento S /1 1831, pp.73-74. A lso in M exico y  la R epublica E spanola , pp.415-416.
48 Preston, F ranco, pp.775-778.
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with a king.”49 The death of the dictator only speeded up a process initiated years earlier 
in which the level of political participation in favour of democratisation produced social 
tension and the pressure necessary to this end. In November 1975, only days before the 
death of Franco, President Echeverria attended a lunch organised by the Centro 
Republicano Espanol. At this meeting Fernando Valera, President of the Spanish 
Republican Government in exile, Jose Giral, Minister without portfolio of the Spanish 
Republican Government in exile, and other prominent Spanish Republicans did not need 
to question the Mexican President about his intentions regarding Spain. He volunteered 
his opinion and expressed no doubts whatsoever on the matter and reassured the Spanish 
Republicans that Franco’s death would not be enough for Mexico to re-establish 
diplomatic relations with Spain. However, they were all aware of the possible 
implications o f this event. Manuel Martinez Feduchi, Mexican charge d ’ affaires before 
the Spanish Republican Government in exile was also present. His presence acted as a 
reminder that, whatever the outcome, the Mexican political position was always and 
would remain entirely in support of the establishment of democracy in Spain.50 In 
December 1999, in an interview with the author, former President Echeverria 
acknowledged that he would have very much liked to have been the one president to re­
establish diplomatic relations with Spain. However, he had no doubt that in order to 
continue to uphold the Mexican policy towards Spain established by Cardenas, a 
significant change towards democracy would first have to occur in Spain.51 It took two 
more years after Franco’s death, and it was Mexican President Jose Lopez Portillo who 
finally re-established diplomatic relations, in 1977, with the newly restored democratic 
Monarchy.
49 E xcelsior, 6 October 1975.
50 Centro R epublicano E spanol de M exico, Banquete ofrecido al Presidente D. Luis Echeverria Alvarez y 
Da. Maria Esther Zuno de Echevem'ia, M exico, 9 Novem ber 1975, pp.37-44. A lso in M exico y  la  
R epublica E spanola, pp.436-439.
51 The interview took place at the house o f  the former Mexican President Luis Echeverria in M exico City, 
on 22 Novem ber 1999.
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Between 1939 and 1975, seven Mexican presidents refused to establish diplomatic 
relations with Franco’s Government. Instead, they encouraged the Spanish 
Republican exiles in Mexico to continue their struggle for democracy in Spain. 
Mexico’s foreign policy towards Spain was derived from President Cardenas’s 
decision to pursue Self-determination and Non-intervention, i.e. the principles 
contained in the Estrada Doctrine, and not just a pragmatic policy. A foreign policy 
consistently sustained for over forty years must be considered to be based on defined 
principles and not determined capriciously. That was also the case o f the Mexican 
position towards the invasion o f Abyssinia by Italy in 1935, the Japanese attack on 
China in 1937, the Austrian ‘Anschluss’, and the Czechoslovakian partition 
perpetrated by Germany in 1938, and the Russian attack on Finland in 1940. More 
recently, the same pattern in Mexican foreign policy was evident in regards to Cuba, 
Nicaragua, Chile, Grenada, Hungary and Afghanistan, to mention just a few examples 
o f  foreign military intervention.1
Mexico’s diplomatic relations with the Spanish Republic lasted for over forty-five 
years, and served to keep alive the hope not only for the re-establishment o f the 
legitimate government of the Spanish Republic, but above all, for the restoration o f a 
democratic regime in Spain. The last President o f the Second Spanish Republic, Jose 
Maldonado, and Mexican President Jose Lopez Portillo, declared cancelled 
diplomatic relations between both governments on March 18,1977. Shortly 
afterwards, Mexico established diplomatic relations with the government o f Madrid, a 
democratic, constitutional Monarchy. This ended thirty-seven years o f enmity with 
Franco's government and almost forty-six years o f diplomatic relations with the 
Spanish Republic — during most o f which the Republican Government had been in 
exile. Throughout this period, there had been a long lasting and sustained political 
stance, which embraced three generations o f Mexicans and Spaniards in a unique 
relationship. Why was Mexico so eager to support the Spanish Republican 
Government? Undoubtedly it was a matter of ideology and o f principles. The
1 A  com prehensive work o f  M exican foreign policy  in the Twentieth Century is in Secretaria de 
R elaciones Exteriores, 75 A nos de  R elaciones E xtriores, FCE, M exico, 1985.
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ideology emanating from the Mexican Revolution and principles based upon that 
ideology were pursued as the only possible way a poor, and therefore non-influential 
country could have done to show its political independence. In other words, the 
Spanish Civil War gave Mexico the opportunity to demonstrate to the world how a 
sovereign State could manage itself, even at the risk of jeopardising its most 
important foreign relations. The Mexican aid, alongside that o f the International 
Brigades and the Soviet Union, to the legitimate Spanish Republican Government, 
was not enough to make a decisive outcome in favour o f the cause o f democratic 
Spain during the war. It did show, however, the difference between acting in 
accordance with principles, those supposedly pursued by all the civilised and 
democratic countries, as opposed to a pragmatic approach used by the Western 
democracies, ready to deal with a regime, regardless o f the lack o f democracy and 
justice, and “open for business as usual.”
Felix Gordon Ordas, former Spanish Republican MP, former Ambassador in both 
Mexico and Cuba, and one time President of the Spanish Republican Government in 
exile, was honoured posthumously in his hometown, Leon, in 2003.2 The so-called 
Pact o f Silence, that necessary evil that facilitated the return o f political pluralism and 
democracy to Spain, has started giving way to the recovery of historical memory. 
Democratic Spain is stronger, and the need to come to terms with what was 
temporarily forgotten is over. The time for fully re-integrating its exiles is now. In a 
ceremony to pay homage to Lazaro Cardenas and his wife, Amalia Solorzano de 
Cardenas in Alcala de Henares, Cardenas’ grandson, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas Batel, 
spoke on behalf o f the Cardenas family to show their gratitude for the honour, and 
dared to point out that there seemed to be an “unfinished reconciliation” between 
Spaniards, particularly considering those who lived in exile. Echoing these words, 
Eduardo Vazquez, on behalf o f the Spanish Republican exiles, said that in Spain “true 
reconciliation will only arrive on the day it is clearly stated with whom the reason, 
liberty and bravery lay, and where the crime and barbarism.”4 A few months later, 
Carlos Fuentes wrote an article in the form of an imagined interview with Lazaro
2 D iario  d e  Leon, 25 July 2003 . The mural w as com m issioned by the V ela Zanetti Foundation, and 
unveiled  b y  the M ayor o f  Leon, Francisco Fernandez, in an event that becam e a celebration o f  the 
Spanish R epublican exiles.
3 La Jorn ada , 31 October 2002.
4 La Jornada , 1 N ovem ber 2002 .
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Cardenas recalling his presidency and its most relevant features. Evidently, the 
Spanish Civil War, which saw the solitary action o f his government, and the oil 
expropriation, which caused antagonism between his regime and the US and the UK, 
formed the cornerstones of Cardenas’ performance. Referring to the arrival o f 
thousands o f Spanish refugees once “Spain [had] lost the war against Franco”, 
Fuentes accurately concluded, voicing Cardenas’ views, that, regretfully, “the loss o f 
Spain was the gain o f Mexico.”5
It is, therefore, easy to perceive why Mexican-Spanish relations during the 1930s 
remain the highest point in the bilateral relationship, as this golden age o f Mexican- 
Spanish relations represented the opportunity to pursue similar political projects. 
They were thwarted as they lacked the necessary allies to achieve their goals. Seven 
decades after the Spanish Republican debacle, both Mexico and Spain had entered 
into similar processes o f regional economic integration. Spain has recovered its 
democratic path long ago, and alternatively elected Right-wing and Centre-Left 
PSOE-led governments. It has also been dragged into the most ambitious economic 
and political integration project, as part of the European Union. Mexico is more and 
more distanced from the revolutionary ideals and policies o f the 1930s. Although it 
enjoys a stronger democratic system, under the rule of the PAN, it is more 
economically and politically dependent on the US, evidently including Mexican 
foreign policy. For a short period during the early 1980s, it seemed the revival of the 
golden years o f Mexican-Spanish relations would occur, but international 
circumstances and local politics in each country were completely different from those 
o f half a century earlier and no defined move was made by either part to encourage it. 
Mexican-Spanish relations entered a new era with a formal amicable approach but 
less committed to a strong engagement.
5 E l P ais, 18 A ugust 2003 .
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Appendix 
List of Mexican volunteers in Spain.
Surnam e Forenam e Comments
Acosta, or Acosta H. 
Luz
Isaias
Acosta Felix
Acosta Jose
Aguilar Rafael
Alatorre Miguel
Alegria Antonio
Alfaro Siqueiros David Bom 1896. Painter. Communist. 46 
Brig.SRA Extremadura
Alonso Campillo Rafael
Alvarez Alegria Carlos
Amal Angelica
Angeles Lizardi Rafael
Antonio aka “El Brujo”
Artazanchez Romero Rafael
Asfuera Antonio
Barret Pan Carlos Peasant
Barrios Bemabe aka “Pancho”
Bautista,
Bauzet Brau Carlos
Bedoya Aka “El Indio”
Bernal Hector
Bingham de Urquidi Mary Nurse, Soc. Rojo, Madrid
Brana Blanco Segundo Med. Doctor, Madrid
Braqui Beri, Antonio
Bracho B. Antonio
Bruno Aguilar Rafael
Cancino Julio
Conti Varce Jose Cadet, SRA
Contreras, Carlos aka 
Vittorio Vidali
Communist
Cueto Cerda Alberto
de la Cabada Juan Writer, Valencia
de la Fuente Domingo 0 .
de Lago Gerardo Student
Appendix
de la Llave Fernando
de la Mata Guinard Rogelio Cadet
Domenzain Leroy Miguel
Escobar Hidalgo Roberto
Estela Colaz Roberto
Fernandez Julio
Filemore or Filmore J. Santiago
Flores Sanson
Franco Alejandro Killed at Ferrol
Gabucio y Sanchez 
Marquez
Anibal Bom in Tabasco, IB Artillery 
Section,Madrid
Gallo Jose Carlos Killed at Ferrol
Gamboa Berta
Gamboa Fernando Painter
Garcia Felipe
Garcia Fernando
Garcia Lezama Francisco
Garcia Heman
Garcia Arana Ruperto Killed in AJfambra, 1938
Garcia Lezama Francisco
Garcia Salgado Andres Railway worker, Political 
Commissar
Garcia Torres Felipe
Gomez Benito
Gomez Juan
Bautista
Bom in Veracruz, Coml. SRA, 86th. 
Brig., 20th. Btn. And 92 th. Brig., 
Extremadura
Gomez Cuellar Antonio Bom in Puebla
Gomez Garcia Manuel Pilot
Gomez Montezuma, or 
Moctezuma
Jose Bom 20 Nov. 1887, Guadalajara, 
Mexico, was at concentration camp 
in San Pedro de Cardena
Guerrero Mejia Felix
Guevara Aleman Francisco
Haces Romero Felipe
Helguera Sebastian
Hernandez Hector
Iduarte Andres Bom in Tabasco, Journalist
Inista Poch Miguel
Jaramillo Rojas Jose Killed at Teruel, Cuban Btn. XV 
Brigade
Julio Just Miguel
Lafarga Gaston
Laduc Roberto
Latorre Miguel
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Lasso Guerra Angel
Llamas or Llanes 
Collado
Emilio Assigned Huesca
Lumen Enrique
Lumen Nelly
McCoy Eugene
Madero Ernesto Journalist
Mancisidor Jose Writer, Valencia
Marti Buenquechea Joaquin
Martinez Miguel
Mercado Tinoco Roberto Cadet, SRA
Migoni Francisco
Modotti Tina 16 Aug. 1896, Udine, Italy. 
Photographer Communist. IB Died 5 
Jan. 1942, Mexico City
Monter Cecilio Luis
Moet Cano Alejandro
Mogoni Antonio
Muniz E.
Nunez Dolores Red Aid, Barcelona
Obregon Blanco Enrique 1900 Ver. Anarchist FAI, Secretary 
o f Local Fed. Barcelona, Anarchist 
Group. Killed 19 July 1936
Olavarria de la Fuente Domingo
O ’Neill Carlota
Ortiz Toledo Silvestre Rakosi Btn.XIII Brigad, Aragon
Othon Tarabillo Jose
Paz Octavio Writer, Valencia
Pellicer Carlos Writer, Valencia
Pereira Miguel
Perez Talavera Leonardo
Proal Nunez Hector
Pujol Antonio
Ramirez, Nicolas
Razo (or Rasso) Razo Juan
Revueltas Silvestre Composer, Valencia
Reyes Alicia
Reyes Fernando Falangist
Reyes Roberto Falangist
Rio Urtiaga, or Ubiaga Juan
Roel Carlos
Romero Ricardo Engineer
Ruiz Marin Tito Killed at Brunete, Thaelmann 
Brigade
Ruiz Eleuterio aka “El Meji”
Sanchez Hernandez Nestor Bom 1919 in Oaxaca, XIII Brigade,
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Dombrowski, Extremadura, Aragon
Sanchez Hidalgo Roberto
Sanchez Juarez Pablo
Sanchez Navarro Juan Fifth Column, Santander
Sanchez Sobrino
?
Angel Bom 19 May 1913 in Mexico City, 
was at concentration camp San 
Pedro de Cardena
Serderos Francisco Intl. Brig.
Serna Cecilio
Serrano Andonegui David aka “El Chivo”
Sirio Martin Jose Killed at Ebro, Pilot
Solorzano Ricardo Killed at Ferrol
Suarez Alonso Vicente
Talavera Leonardo
Tarazona Toran Francisco Pilot
Tinoco Mercado Humberto
Torices Santiago
Trejo Blanca
Lydia
Anarchist
Trujillo Carranza Antonio Intl. Brig.
Valencia Antonio Juan
Manuel
Valenzuela Manuel
Vargas Henriquez Leonardo
Vega Alfonso
Vega Gonzalez Roberto Cadet, Spanish Rep. Army
Videlas Macias Julio
Alberto
Vi llano va, (2 brothers)
Villela Hector
Villela Velez Humberto Cadet, Spanish Rep. Army
Zavala Ceballos Manuel Kiled at Ferrol
Zoila Gracia (pseud) Anarchist, FAI
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